

A PENGUIN SPECIAL

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I CHOOSE PEACE

BY K. ZILLIACUS

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TO 'FERGIE'

IN MEMORIAM

This book is dedicated to the memory of Alderman Ferguson Forster of Gateshead. Warm-hearted, fiery-tempered, strong-willed, a craggy, salty, colourful character, Fergie was a worker and a fighter all his days. He was a Co-operator and a Trades Unionist, one of the earliest members of the I.L.P. and a foundation member of the Labour Party, in which he was ever a rebel and a stormy petrel, and which he served loyally throughout his long life as the instrument of his burning Socialist faith. It is such as he that have made the Labour Party, brought it to power, and will in the end keep it true to that triune and indivisible cause, Socialism, peace and human brotherhood.

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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK :

To face the fact that we are losing the peace and drifting toward a third world war.

To cure fatalism about war and apathy about world affairs, and to bring democracy to bear on our foreign policy while there is time (and there is still time) to save the peace.

HOW IT SETS ABOUT THE JOB :

This book drives home the points that :

(a) Wars are not acts of God but man-made. Primarily they are due to the foreign policies of the great powers.

(b) Our foreign policy is only one factor in the situation, but it is our responsibility.

(c) It is a factor big enough to make the difference between winning and losing the peace.

(d) If we don't do the job, neither of the two ideologically muscle-bound giants can do it and we'll all go smash.

(e) We can do it because we have enough common ground with both to make three-cornered agreements possible and enough pluck, tenacity, political sagacity and experience of our own to bring off such agreements.

THIS BOOK ANSWERS SUCH QUESTIONS AS :

(a) Just what is going on?

(b) How did we get into this mess?

(c) What can we do to stop the drift to war?

(d) Why didn't the Soviet Government treat the Labour Government as friends when Labour won the election?

(e) Why should we make all the concessions and they none?

It disposes of such appeals from reason to authority as 'The Government know the facts, so they must be right', and from reason to prejudice such as 'Why blame our Government; what about the Russians (or the Americans, or both)?'

It clears up the misunderstandings and confusions of thought behind such statements, often made by the same people, as 'We can't help it, we've got to do what the Americans tell us, or starve'. 'We mustn't appease the Russians. No more Munichs.'

'If we don't arm and build up the defences of Western Europe and stick to America, the Red Army will march in and put Harry Pollitt into power, and we shall turn into a Red dictatorship and a Russian police State, run from Moscow and suffering the horrors of the OGPU and slave camps'.

THE CONTENTS OF THIS BOOK :

The first nine chapters give a clear picture of how and why the present situation has developed, the shape it has assumed to-day and whither we are going. These are the most important chapters in the book, for they give the relevant facts. Where sources are not given, they are to be found in my earlier books, particularly *Mirror of the Past* and *Mirror of the Present*. I beg the reader not to be shocked or dismayed by some of the facts related in what follows. The jungle world of international politics is cruel, stupid and treacherous almost beyond belief. It may well seem incredible to those used to the comparative decency and honesty of home affairs. The two things to ask in reading this book are (a) Is this true? (b) What should I do about it?

The next three chapters are equally explicit about what is the price of peace, who can pay it, and what paying it means. The last two chapters trace the first steps to peace and explain why Britain's position and standing in the post-war world are such that we can give the necessary lead.

MY QUALIFICATIONS FOR WRITING THIS BOOK :

(a) Two years as Intelligence Officer in the British Military Mission in Siberia, where I learned the Russian language, something of the revolution, a good deal about the country and the people, and a lot about counter-revolution and intervention.

(b) Nineteen years as a Member of the Information Section of the League of Nations Secretariat. During that time my jobs included (i) Liaison with the Second International; (ii) Liaison with the Labour Party, which meant mostly the N.E.C., Transport House and the Parliamentary Labour Party; (iii) Liaison with the Soviet Union, which meant following the Soviet press, keeping in touch with Soviet affairs, and with Soviet delegates, journalists and experts attending League meetings, and occasional visits to the U.S.S.R.; (iv) Two years seconded from the Information Section to act as private secretary to Arthur Henderson in his capacity of President to the long-drawn agony of the Disarmament Conference.

(c) Five years in the Ministry of Information during the war,

in a job that enabled me to keep in touch with what was happening in the world.

(d) Post-war travels and contacts in America and Europe with diplomats, journalists, political leaders and ordinary people in France, Germany, Italy, Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., taking full advantage of being able to speak six languages and get on in ten, and of pre-war acquaintance with the countries visited.

(e) A student of and writer on international affairs and the organisation of peace, ever since the idea of a League of Nations was launched in a public speech by Mr Asquith in 1915 until to-day. Author of a dozen books, several pamphlets, and numerous newspaper and review articles on these subjects.

THE POINT OF VIEW FROM WHICH I WRITE:

That of one who became convinced by many years of direct experience in the fight for peace of the inescapable relationship between changing the social order and organising peace.

Who after the 1918 Armistice considered that the war against German militarism, for which he had joined up and taken his oath as an officer, was finished, and rebelled and fought against the war of intervention against the Russian Revolution into which he had been pitchforked against his will as Intelligence Officer in the British Military Mission in Siberia.

Who joined the Secretariat of the League of Nations on demobilisation in 1919 and found that Secretariat officials, as practical fighters for and professional organisers of peace, were generally in conflict with the Foreign Office officials of the great powers. They knew many facts but understood none of the issues, because they were professionally power politicians and preparers of war. Their political consciousness was conditioned by the social class to which they belonged. It held nothing but blank incomprehension and maniac fear and hatred of the vast forces of social change convulsing the world.

Who was one of the handful of League officials that stood by the victims of aggression and the Covenant and fought the aggressors and their appeasers and accomplices from Japan in 1931 to Hitler at Munich in 1938.

Who joined the Labour Party on demobilisation in 1919 because it was opposing intervention in Russia and fighting for a sound peace settlement and a strong League of Nations, and is proud that he has stuck to the Labour Party in all its ups and downs for thirty years.

Who is prouder still to be a Labour Member of Parliament, and proudest of all that the people of Gateshead, on a record poll, in a straight fight, turned a 3,000 majority for the sitting National Liberal Member into a 19,000 majority for Labour and for himself as the standard bearer of Labour.

Who believes that Labour has come to fulfil the promise of Liberalism and that, in advancing toward Socialism, increasing social justice and diminishing economic inequality and insecurity, we are laying the foundations of peace, enlarging the frontiers of liberty and approaching the good society, where the State exists for the individual and not the individual for the State, where all men are equal; all men are free and all men are brothers.

It is our duty to our people and our mission in the world to carry out the vast social transformation that has become necessary if civilisation is to survive, by means that will not jeopardise the measure of freedom and democracy, of tolerance and fundamental national unity that is our heritage, and never to lose the clear perception that Socialism itself is only a means to greater freedom through more justice. The ends we pursue are not any 'ism' or ideology, but always and everywhere the making of a world where better and happier human beings can live.

Who still believes in the causes for which he has fought all his adult life, and is sure that although the conjoint cause of Socialism and world government was beaten last time by counter-revolution and war, we shall win this time.

Who remains unshaken in his reasoned conviction that the election pledges and policy statements, foreign as well as domestic, for which Labour received a mandate from the people and on the strength of which Labour rules, should serve as a guide not only for laying the foundations of a Socialist society at home but also for winning the peace abroad.

Who is convinced that the Labour Party, with all its imperfections and weaknesses, is the political instrument that can and will translate these pledges and policies into realities, and that there is no other political instrument capable of doing the job.

Who believes that the search for peace is a far rougher and more fundamental job than most people imagine. It may lead close to or even cross the borderline between democracy and revolution, national loyalty and treason. It certainly involves sweeping social change, jettisoning the balance of power, making the establishment of world government the overriding aim of our

foreign policy and transcending the cannon fodder level of citizenship.

Who believes that democracy is not a creed for sissies and stooges. Freedom to know, to think and to utter, fortifies and invigorates. Democracy is red-blooded and virile, with hair on its chest and fire in its eye. It is far from being respectable. It is something never-ending, living and growing, astoundingly strong, patient and brave if trusted and dealt with frankly, but apt to break out and rage if deceived or kept in ignorance; foolish occasionally, wise sometimes, unexpected often and finished and complete never.

Freedom to think can't help if you refuse to use your head, nor freedom of speech if you remain dumb because you don't dare to speak out. To be a Member of Parliament is a noble calling, because the Constitution prescribes that M.P.s are not delegates or agents, and it is a breach of privilege to attempt to dictate to them what they may say. The M.P.s loyalty to his Party should not and normally does not conflict with his loyalty to his constituents and his conscience. The two can generally be reconciled by compromise and common sense. The Labour Party is big and broad-minded enough to allow reasonable freedom to minorities and dissenters in its ranks. But in the last analysis, and on issues of principle, of life or death, a Member of Parliament must cleave to his election pledges and to what he believes is right. He embodies in his own person the paradox of democracy.

The paradox of democracy is that it combines the duty of minorities to be obedient to the will of the majority with the right of revolution. A good democrat must be a law-abiding citizen, and, if he wishes to play an active part in politics, a loyal Party man. But he must also be ready, when the issue is grave enough, to stand and deliver on his conscience and judgment, even though that make him a rebel and an anarchist.

The paradox of democracy is part and parcel of the glory of democracy, which is that, like prayer in Pascal's famous definition, it gives man the dignity of causality. For the public weal rests on the conscience and courage of the private individual. Power is diffused throughout the community. The people choose their rulers, who are their servants, can correct them through the pressure of public opinion while they govern, and can exercise at reasonable intervals the right to repeat their choice or change their minds.

Above all, who believes that this old country can and will

deliver mankind from bondage to fear and the evil host of fantasies and fanaticisms that accompany fear, can and will blaze the trail out of the Valley of the Shadow of Death, along which we are dolefully wandering, into a world where there is light and life and hope, commonsense and a dawning promise of human brotherhood.

The people are astir. Soon they will be awake. Then they will rouse themselves, and seek and never cease from their search, until they find how to make good their demand for peace. I hope this book will help to show them the way to their heart's desire.

K. ZILLIACUS

PS. This was written before the conflict with the National Executive that began with the refusal to endorse my candidature and ended with my expulsion from the Party. On reading the proofs I see no reason to alter what I have said of the Labour Party, except to observe that its present leaders are too frightened 'to allow reasonable freedom to minorities and dissenters in its ranks'. But that will pass, and appear in a few years as a growing pain in the Party's advance to maturity in world affairs (see Chapter X). The pamphlet *Why I Was Expelled* (Collet's 1/6d.), tells the inside story of my expulsion, discusses the issues it raises, and draws political conclusions.

CHAPTER I

Revolution; Intervention; The League of Nations

(1917-20)

PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

WE cannot understand what is going on to-day without knowing a little about what happened yesterday. We must understand what is going on to-day if we want to be alive to-morrow. What happened between the first world war and the second is the background to the events of the crowded years since 1945 and helps us to forecast the shape of things to come. We must see the background in order to get the contemporary scene into the right focus and perspective, so that we can plot our course for the future.

This book starts with a rapid review of the leading events since the first world war that opened the great crisis of capitalism, because that crisis is still with us. The first world war closed an epoch in world history. The Russian Revolution and the founding of the League of Nations opened a new era, in which we are still living. The failure of intervention in Russia and the success of intervention in Europe; the capitalist counter-revolutions and the underground struggle against them; the second world war; the clash between the interlocking Nazi, Fascist and quisling tyrannies on the one hand and the popular resistance movements on the other; liberation, victory, the second wave of social revolution and the gathering counter-revolution directed from Washington after the war; the growingly painful and anomalous position of Labour Britain in world affairs and the significant but futile choice of the American people in the 1948 Presidential election; are further instalments of the vast and intricate story, the thrilling and terrible drama unfolding before our eyes and around our lives. Most of the acts have been liberally interspersed with alarums and excursions, battle, murder and sudden death. Many of the chapters have been written in fire and blood. The record contains some of the darkest deeds in mankind's long annals of crime and folly, and a few shining and immortal pages.

The first world war brought democracy within sight of foreign

policy and released forces hostile to capitalist society. The League of Nations was the outcome and visible sign of the people going into world affairs. The Russian Revolution cracked the foundations of the old social order.

NO DEMOCRACY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS BEFORE 1914

Before the first world war foreign affairs were conducted as secretly and autocratically in the West European democracies as in the Austro-Hungarian, German or Russian empires. True as long ago as the 1890s Lord Salisbury had complained that: 'Unfortunately we no longer live in the time of Pitt. Then the aristocracy was in power, and we could pursue an active policy which made England, after the Congress of Vienna, the richest and most respected of European Powers. Now the democracy rules, and has introduced a regime of persons and parties which has made every English Government dependent, unconditionally, on the *aura popularis* ... This generation can only be taught by events.'

But, in fact, democracy had not made itself felt in international affairs. The diplomats and officials of the Foreign Office reigned supreme, and conducted a policy which did not change even after the great Liberal victory of 1906. British foreign policy, wrote Bertrand Russell, was '... really conducted by the permanent officials of the Foreign Office ... their secret power, established in the time of Grey, was almost unbounded.'^{*} Sir Edward Grey (the Liberal Foreign Minister from 1906 until the first world war) was helpless in the hands of his officials, Russell explained, because he knew no foreign language, had hardly ever been out of England and did not take the trouble to find out whether what his officials told him was true, 'Moreover, his belief in honourable dealing did not extend to the House of Commons, since he held the aristocratic opinion that ordinary mortals could not understand foreign politics.'

In the two years before the first world war there were only three debates on foreign affairs. Not only were Liberal backbenchers given answers by their own Government that were evasive, misleading and untrue, but even half the Cabinet did not know what the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and the heads of the fighting services were doing. The belief was strong that there should be national unity and continuity in foreign affairs, that foreign policy should be kept out of Party politics.

These were the outward symptoms of an almost total lack of

democracy in the conduct of foreign policy. Democracy means frankness and fair dealing, whereas secrecy and fraud were essential to the statecraft of those days. For there was no serious challenge to international anarchy and power politics, resulting in a balance of power kept up by rival alliances and a race for armaments.

BALANCE OF POWER, ARMS RACE, IMPERIALISM

International anarchy meant that States were sovereign. Every State was a law unto itself and took the law into its own hands, because it was sole judge of its own rights, claims and interests in relation to other States, and decided for itself what action it should take, including, if necessary, war, to uphold its view of its rights, defend its interests and impose its claims. That meant the amount of force a Government could muster to get what it wanted was the only thing that mattered. There was no way of distinguishing self-defence from aggression or the use of war as an instrument of national policy, because all three meant threatening force and, if necessary, using force to make the other fellow back down and make your own point of view prevail in any argument. Defence meant defending your own point of view, your self-judged rights.

Naturally every country wanted to be stronger than any possible rival so as to be able to play this game successfully. That meant a race for arms. It also meant countries lining up in rival alliances in order to maintain the so-called balance of power. Since no one was strong enough to stand alone against any possible combination of rivals, States looked around for friends who shared common interests and had the same enemies. Such alliances were apt to be unstable and to shift and vary.

In this system of power politics it was important not only to have enough armaments to impress the other fellow, but also to make him believe that you were really prepared to use them, that is that you would rather go to war than give way. Disputes were not discussed on their merits but became contests of prestige, in which one party's gain was the other's loss. To be reasonable and conciliatory was apt to be regarded as a sign of weakness and no State could afford to give way for the sake of a quiet life more than once or twice, for otherwise its prestige would be gone and it would be regarded as too weak or too peace-loving to keep its end up in the great game of power politics.

That is why, even if there had been no distracting influences

the balance of power would always mean a race for arms and would invariably end in war, as it has done throughout history. War would break out not because either side wanted to attack but merely because both believed they must risk war in self-defence rather than 'appease'. But in our private profit-making economic system, the manufacture of arms itself became a vested interest. The 'merchants of death', as the arms manufacturers became known, used to stir up panics, pay for press campaigns (often run by international rings making money from both sides) and generally do their best to bedevil the workings of diplomacy and heat the atmosphere to the point where governments would beggar themselves in feverish rearmament.

Finally, as Mr J. A. Hobson wrote in his classic work, *Imperialism*, as long ago as 1903:

It is not too much to say that the modern foreign policy of Great Britain is primarily a struggle for profitable markets of investment. To a larger extent every year Great Britain is becoming a nation living upon a tribute from abroad, and the classes who enjoy this tribute have an ever-increasing incentive to employ the public policy, the public purse, and the public force to extend the field of their private investments, and to safeguard and improve their existing investments. This is, perhaps, the most important fact in modern politics, and the obscurity in which it is wrapped constitutes the gravest danger to our State.

What is true of Great Britain is true likewise of France, Germany, the United States, and of all countries in which modern capitalism has placed large surplus savings in the hands of a plutocracy ... Thus we reach the conclusion that Imperialism is the endeavour of the great controllers of industry to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign investments to take off the goods and capital they cannot sell or use at home.

In the short run the drive for foreign markets and colonies, summed up in the general term Imperialism, and the drive toward more and more armaments were ways of keeping the capitalist economic system going. If arms manufacture had been drastically cut or colonial populations had been allowed to keep most of the wealth they produced instead of having it drained away to the countries administering them, unemployment and social distress and tensions would have arisen in the chief capitalist nations. But in the long run the race for arms and the workings of Imperialism, apart from ending in the vast breakdown and upheaval of the world war, were producing conditions that began to frighten the politicians far-sighted

enough to read the signs of the times. In 1912 Sir Edward Grey gave a solemn warning:

If this tremendous expenditure on armaments goes on it **must**, in the long run, break down civilisation. You are having this great burden of force piled up in times of peace, and if it goes on increasing by leaps and bounds as it has done in the last generation, in time it will become intolerable. There are those who think it will lead to war, precisely because it is becoming intolerable. I think it is much more likely the burden will be dissipated by internal revolution – not by nations fighting against each other, but by the revolt of masses of men against taxation ... The great nations of the world are in bondage to their armies and navies at the present moment – increasing bondage.

Mr Esmé Cecil Wingfield-Stratford in *The Victorian Aftermath* writes that:

If the war peril from Germany delayed much longer to materialise, it seemed quite on the cards that it might be forestalled by revolution. As the Edwardian passes into the Georgian age ... class rises against class ... faction against faction – it is a question whether international will not be anticipated by civil war.

When the diplomacy of power politics, after keeping the world in an uproar for fourteen years in a series of steadily aggravating crises, accompanied by the increasing strain of a race for arms and an ever growing sense of fatalism, brought about the final crisis that plunged us into disaster, Grey's last remark to the Ambassador of the Austro-Hungarian empire, when the latter paid his farewell visit, was that 'Universal war with all its horrible and revolting consequences has broken out ... It is the greatest step towards Socialism that can possibly have been made ... We shall have Labour Governments in every country after this.' That to him was the end.

THE DEMAND FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT

The revolt of public opinion was slow but in the end pretty thorough. It was shocked into thought by the suffering and sheer, stupendous imbecility of four years of world war. It was jolted wide awake by the Russian Revolution. Much of the new thought stirring in the masses was nobly voiced by President Wilson when the United States entered the war.

Grey, in his conversations during the fateful twelve days that ended world peace, had spoken out against the balance of power and in favour of some kind of standing council or conference of the great powers to put international relations on a more

civilised basis. In 1915 Prime Minister Asquith made a speech that put the idea of a league of nations on the map. Small Left Wing groups of intellectuals, including such men as E. D. Morel, Norman Angell, G. Lowes Dickinson, Bertrand Russell, H. N. Brailsford, Leonard Woolf, were active in bodies like the Union for Democratic Control of Foreign Policy, the Fabian Society and the League of Nations Society, in formulating criticism of the way in which international relations had hitherto been conducted and in putting forward alternatives.

Instead of secret diplomacy there was to be the obligation to make all treaties and international agreements public. International anarchy, power politics and the balance of power were to be ended by the nations signing a treaty pledging them to meet regularly in conference, to submit all their disputes to some form of peaceful settlement and not to take the law into their own hands by using or threatening force until this procedure had been given a reasonable time to see what it could accomplish. The principle of third party judgement in disputes was to replace the parties being judges of their own rights. States were also to be pledged not to resort to war against a party to a dispute that accepted a peaceful award, either through arbitration or in the shape of a report from the council or conference of the proposed world organisation.

This was the vital principle of the whole peace structure: compulsory delay and resort to peaceful procedure, third party judgement, the rule of law. It was to be protected by the strongest possible safeguards, in particular the pledge by all the members of the new organisation that they would regard as an aggressor any State resorting to war in disregard of its primary pledge to attempt peaceful settlement and to respect peaceful awards. A wide choice of means was left to States trying to settle their disputes: negotiation, conciliation, mediation and good offices, with the help of the Council or otherwise, and, finally, if both parties agreed, some form of arbitration or judicial settlement. If they could not settle the dispute themselves either party could bring the other before the Council, and if it accepted a report of the Council agreed to by all its members, except the parties to the dispute, it was protected against resort to war by the other party.

The private manufacture of armaments was condemned and the members of the new world organisation, known as the League of Nations, undertook to reduce and limit their armaments by international agreement. They also agreed to work

together on matters of common interest and concern such as health, transport, economic questions and social and educational matters. International trusteeship was to replace Imperialism in colonial rule. What was wanted, said Field-Marshal (then General) Smuts, in his famous Peace Conference pamphlet, *The League of Nations - A Practical Suggestion*, was a League of Nations that would be 'real, practical and effective as a system of world government.'

The League that emerged after the tussle between public, chiefly Labour, opinion that really wanted something done and the sceptical Foreign Offices and power politicians wedded to the old order, was a feeble and imperfect affair. It dropped the economic controls that had grown up during the war instead of internationalising them and adapting them to peacetime purposes. It did not put non-self-governing colonies under a system of international trusteeship but merely applied a watered-down form of this system to the colonies of the ex-enemy powers taken by some of the Allies. It was vague and non-committal about disarmament and co-operation on matters of common concern.

But such as it was it was based on the very clear recognition by statesmen and public opinion alike that piling up armaments and taking the law into one's own hands was the road to war, and that we must not drift back to the balance of power. Grey, in his book *Twenty-five Years*, summed the matter up as follows:

The moral is obvious; it is that great armaments lead inevitably to war. If there are armaments on one side, there must be armaments on the other sides ...

The increase of armaments, that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts ... The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them - it was these that made war inevitable. This, it seems to me, is the truest reading of history, and the lesson that the present should be learning from the past in the interests of future peace, the warning to be handed on to those who come after us.

INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA

By the end of the war the fear of social upheaval at the back of the minds of some of the leading statesmen had become a dread reality that terrified all Conservative and much of Liberal

opinion. Colonel House, President Wilson's right hand man, wrote in his Peace Conference diary on March 22, 1919:

Bolshevism is gaining ground everywhere. Hungary has just succumbed. We are sitting upon an open powder magazine and some day a spark may ignite it.'

Ray Stannard Baker in his account of the Peace Conference (*Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*) where he was a member of the American delegation, writes:

... At all times, at every turn of the negotiations, there rose the spectre of chaos, like a black cloud out of the East, threatening to overwhelm and swallow up the world. There was no Russia knocking at the gates of Vienna. At Vienna* apparently, the revolution was securely behind them; at Paris it was always with them.

Mr Lloyd George told the Allied Supreme Council soon after the November 1918 armistice that:

The condition of Russia is well known, and it might be possible to look on at a muddle which has there been created. But now, if Germany goes, and perhaps Spain, who would feel safe? As long as order is maintained in Germany, a breakwater exists between the countries of the Allies, and the waters of revolution beyond. But once that breakwater is swept away, I cannot speak for France, and I tremble for my own country ...

In his secret memorandum to the Big Four of March 1919, entitled 'Some Considerations for the Peace Conference Before They Finally Draft Their Terms', Mr Lloyd George gave a vivid picture of the condition of Europe, summed up in the following sentences:

The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution. There is a deep sense not only of discontent, but of anger and revolt amongst the workers against pre-war conditions. The whole existing order in its political, social and economic aspects is questioned by the masses of the population, from one end of Europe to the other.

He explained that the great danger was that Germany would go Communist and throw in her lot with the Russian Bolsheviks.

Once that happens all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik revolution and within a year we may witness the spectacle of nearly three hundred million people organised into a vast red army under German instructors and German generals equipped with German cannon and German machine guns and prepared for a renewal of the attack on Western Europe.

* The reference is to the Congress of Vienna that made peace after the Napoleonic Wars.

It was no use trying to hold down Germany by force :

A large army of occupation for an indefinite period is out of the question. Germany would not mind it. A very large number of people in that country would welcome it, as it would be the only hope of preserving the existing order of things. The objection would not come from Germany, but from our own countries. Neither the British Empire nor America would agree to occupy Germany. France by herself could not bear the burden of occupation. We should therefore be driven back on the policy of blockading the country. That would inevitably mean spartacism [German Communism] from the Urals to the Rhine, with its inevitable consequence of a huge Red Army attempting to cross the Rhine.

Mr Lloyd George drew the conclusion that on the one hand Germany must be offered a peace sufficiently moderate to prevent the country disintegrating or going Bolshevik, and on the other the Russian problem must be dealt with as soon as possible.

For two years a resolute attempt was made to crush the Russian Revolution with blood, fire and famine. A blockade was applied so rigorous as to exclude medical and Red Cross supplies, so that wounded Red Army soldiers had to be operated on without anaesthetics and bandaged with paper. Arms, money, supplies and equipment, trainers and advisers were supplied to all kinds of counter-revolutionary groups and governments, and forces from fourteen countries invaded Russia.

The Russian Revolution had been met with fear and hatred from the day it broke out. That was not surprising, because its effect on the working class of Europe and Britain was so great as to constitute a real threat to the social order. During the first period of the Revolution, between April and October, the Allies tried to keep Russia as a fighting ally while not making any concession to the revolutionary demand for a revision of Allied war aims in the light of the principle 'No annexations or reparations.'

The Cadets or Constitutional Democratic (Liberal) Party, which had been the most Left Wing of the capitalist Parties, became the Right Wing of the provisional government formed after the Revolution. Its ranks were swelled by the former adherents of monarchist and reactionary parties that were no longer tolerated after the Revolution. The programme of the Cadets was to keep the Revolution from becoming a social revolution, and to cling to the Allies and prosecute the war as their only visible means of support. They did not see how they

could survive the coming of peace and they became more and more frightened and filled with hatred at the 'Revolutionary Democracy' represented by the Soviets or Councils of workers, democrats and peasants representatives.

The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries were confused and wavering, but on the whole stood for a revision of war aims, coupled with continuing the war on the side of the Allies.

The Bolsheviks under Lenin had a clear-cut programme for giving the land to the peasants and making an immediate offer of peace to both sides, on the basis of no annexations or reparations. If the Allies accepted and the Germans rejected the offer the Bolsheviks said they would fight on the side of the Allies. If the Allies rejected and the Germans accepted they would conclude a separate peace with the Germans. If both sides accepted they would end the war.

The Bolsheviks also urged the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries to break their alliance with the Cadets, withdraw from the Provisional Government and proclaim all power to the Soviets, in which they had the great majority. Lenin said the Bolsheviks were perfectly prepared to be a constitutional and democratic opposition within the Soviet democracy, on the basis of freedom of the press and association for the 90 per cent of the total population represented in the Soviets, because he was confident that in due course the Bolsheviks would win the majority of the voters to their policy. In this way, he said, the Social Revolution could take place without bloodshed or violence. The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries were frankly afraid of parting company with the Cadets and of social revolution. They rationalised this fear as belief in the necessity to defend democracy against Communism.

Allied intervention began long before it was officially proclaimed. The Allies strengthened and encouraged the Cadets, forced the Kerensky Government into an offensive that was its undoing and tried to assassinate it by thrusting the Czarist General Kornilov upon it as commander-in-chief and then plotting with the General to overthrow our ally the Kerensky Government and establish a military dictatorship.

Instead of enthroning counter-revolution the Allies' efforts helped to produce the second, or October, revolution. Intervention was stepped up against the latter with, however, the pretext that it was part of the war against Germany and that the Allies were not taking sides between Whites or Reds or interfering in the internal affairs of the Russian people. The story

of Allied intervention in Russia is rich in lessons for the present. The important points are:

(a) The dishonesty, confusion and hypocrisy of the whole policy;

(b) The sacrifice of the interests of our national war against German militarism to the Tory class war against the Russian Revolution;

(c) The total unscrupulousness resulting from blind fanaticism of the politicians and officials conducting intervention.

Public opinion to this day is often abashed when told in a lordly way that it must not question our foreign policy even when it does not make sense because the Government alone know the facts. The Government and their Foreign Office advisers knew plenty of facts when the Russian Revolution broke out but understood none of the issues, because they were faced with something they feared and hated so much that they passionately refused to accept facts running counter to their fanatically held convictions and social religion, and believed the wildest fantasies.

FEAR, HATRED AND BLINDNESS TO FACTS

'Hate of the revolution and fear of its consequences in England were the dominant reactions of Conservatives,' observes Sir Bruce Lockhart in his *Memoirs of a British Agent*. He adds: 'I found the same fears among the Labour patriots.'

Sir Bruce Lockhart represented the British Government in Moscow at the time of the revolution and therefore writes with first-hand knowledge. 'In Moscow, with one's finger on the pulse of events,' he comments further, 'everyone except the most obstinate traditionalist could realise that here was a cataclysm which had shattered all previous conceptions of Russia. London, however, continued to regard it as a passing storm, after which the glass would return to "set fair".' And again 'the Allies greeted the revolution first with feigned enthusiasm and then with increasing alarm. They wanted ... things to be put back where they were before.'

Not only did our officials and statesmen refuse to believe that the revolution was real after it had begun. A high power official mission, headed by Lord Milner, visited Russia to investigate the situation on the spot and was given masses of information, including the fact that the Tsar had withdrawn two crack divisions from the front at a critical time and brought them to

the Capital for fear of a major upheaval. And yet, in his report written on his way home, one week before the revolution broke out, Lord Milner concluded 'I have formed the opinion that there is a great deal of exaggeration in the talk about revolution and especially about the alleged disloyalty of the army.'

The revolution began a few days later when regiment after regiment of the Petrograd garrison, including Guards units and Cossacks, mutinied and went over to the striking and demonstrating workers. A fortnight after the outbreak of the revolution and three weeks after Lord Milner's report the British Military Attaché in Petrograd, General Knox, wired home (November 21st) that, apart from anything the Russian authorities might do, the Russian troops were now insisting upon an armistice. 'It appears quite clear that whatever happens politically in Russia the bulk of the Russian Army refuses to continue the war.'*

FORCE VERSUS IDEAS

What the Governments and Foreign Offices of the West and of Germany and Austria-Hungary feared and hated were the ideas broadcast by the Russian Revolution. Mr Lloyd George remarks, when speaking of the attitude of the War Cabinet towards the infant Soviet Republic, 'There was a genuine fear that recognition would involve admitting into Allied countries a swarm of Bolshevik intriguers to foment revolution.'

The process had begun during the Kerensky period, when the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries nearly succeeded in holding an international Socialist conference at Stockholm, including enemies and neutrals as well as allies, to agree on a peace without annexations or reparations. That would have taken the job of peacemaking out of the hands of the governments and transferred it to the workers. The Bolsheviks made a deep impression by publishing the annexationist secret treaties between the Allies and by their offer of peace negotiations to both sides. After the refusal of this offer by the Allies the Bol-

* As early as July 10, 1917, commenting on the collapse of the July offensive, Knox had reported that the army did not want to fight, discipline had disappeared, and there was a general collapse of morale. 'Kornilov told me that he considered the Offensive the last chance' and that it would be impossible to continue the war through a fourth winter. General Ignatiev, commanding the First Guards Division 'considers that peace is essential for Russia for if there is not peace soon there will be a general massacre ... From the very beginning the peasants had hated the war.' This is true, comments Knox: 'The Revolution has been a revolt against the burdens of the war.' On September 7, 1917, Knox told the War Cabinet that 'the great mass of the soldiers do not want to fight.'

shevik broadcasting of the dishonesty and rapacity of the German General Staff at the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations at the end of 1917 caused monster strikes in January 1918 in both Germany and Austria-Hungary and hastened the breakdown of resistance in both countries.

The Allies' method of meeting the danger of the ideas of the revolution spreading was to try to destroy the revolution by force. The disconcerting result of their attempt to bring about the overthrow of their ally the Kerensky Government by Kornilov caused them only to redouble their efforts. In a despatch to Lockhart, Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, explained that the Government's view about the Soviet Government was that 'We desire that they should refrain from Bolshevik propaganda in the territories of the Allies. And they wish us to refuse aid or encouragement to any military or political movement in Russia of which they disapprove.' The last part of this remark referred to the Allies' support of various Russian counter-revolutionary groups in waging war on the Soviet Government.

THE LIE IN THE SOUL

One of the most baffling and curious things in this laying bare of the soul of a governing class when faced by social revolution is the complete mental dishonesty displayed by politicians and officials who were apparently quite unconscious of their own inconsistencies. Thus the War Cabinet on December 21, 1917, approved a memorandum drafted by Balfour for despatch to the French Government, which accepted it on December 23, so that it became the basis of Allied policy toward Russia. This memorandum was so barefaced in its mendacity that it would be hardly fair to accuse its authors of deliberate duplicity. It is sufficient to quote two passages side by side containing the two flatly contradictory propositions on which Allied intervention was based:

(1) 'We should represent to the Bolsheviks that we have no desire to take part in any way in the internal politics of Russia and that any idea that we favour a counter-revolution is a profound mistake. Such a policy might be attractive to the autocratic Governments of Germany and Austria, but not to the Western democracies or America' ...

(2) The memorandum then proposes that at the same time as they were trying to induce the Bolsheviks to believe these assurances the Allies should supply 'money to reorganise the Ukraine, to pay the Cossacks and the Caucasian forces, and to subsidise the Persians

... Besides finance, it is important to have agents and officers to advise and support the provincial Governments and their armies. It is essential that this should be done as quietly as possible so as to avoid the imputation – as far as we can – that we are preparing to make war on the Bolsheviks’.

So long as the war against Germany continued, intervention was solemnly justified as being necessary to prosecute the war and restore a second front. Mr Lloyd George abounds in this sense in his Memoirs. He produces half a dozen reasons why the Allies intervened and protests too much that the idea of counter revolutionary class war never entered the pure mind of any of our statesmen.

But Lockhart and other of the younger and junior representatives of the Allied Governments who stayed behind in Moscow unanimously informed their governments that it was useless and even dangerous from a military point of view to support the Whites, who had no backing in the country and were several hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of miles away from the German forces. To subsidise and arm them merely risked throwing the Bolsheviks into the arms of the Germans. Lenin’s offer to fight on the side of the Allies if they would call off intervention and help to train and arm the Red Army, because the German General Staff had violated the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and invaded Soviet Russia, was a perfectly genuine offer, they said, and strongly urged its acceptance.

This advice was rejected and the Allies went on backing the Whites against their own military interests, while solemnly pretending that they were not taking sides in Russian internal affairs, and acting in the interests of the war against Germany.

‘The British Government’, wrote Colonel House in his diary ‘considers that it is necessary for the Allies to unite in order to bring about a Russian national revival, and in order to adopt a policy of freeing Russia from foreign control by means of Allied intervention. The Allies must, of course, avoid taking sides in Russian politics.’ A constituent assembly, democracy and self-determination were also favourite phrases. The Japanese General Staff were called in to assist the Russian people to free themselves from foreign influence by submitting to a Japanese and Allied invasion of Siberia; to establish national unity by starting a civil war; to restore the Eastern front 4,000 miles away from the nearest German troops; and, of course, to defend democracy, Western Civilisation, and the Christian Religion (by, among other things, proclaiming a Jihad or Holy War against the

Bolsheviks among the Moslem tribes of Asiatic Russia and Siberia).

This humbug was kept up even after the armistice had put Germany out of the war. As late as November 29, 1918 (i.e. three weeks after the armistice), another Balfour memorandum to the War Cabinet laid down British policy in the following terms:

This country would certainly refuse to see its forces, after more than four years of strenuous fighting, dissipated over the huge expanse of Russia in order to carry out political reforms in a State which is no longer a belligerent ally.

We have constantly asserted that it is for the Russians to choose their own form of government, that we have no desire to intervene in their domestic affairs, and that if, in the course of operations directed essentially against the Central Powers, we have to act with such Russian political and military organisations as are favourable to the *Entente*, this does not imply that we deem ourselves to have any mission to establish or disestablish any particular political system among the Russian people ... But it does not follow that we can disinterest ourselves wholly from Russian affairs. Recent events have created obligations which last beyond the occasions which gave them birth. The Czechoslovaks are our allies and we must do what we can to help them. In the South-east corner of Russia in Europe, in Siberia, in Transcaucasia and Transcaspia, in the territories adjacent to the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean, new anti-Bolshevik administrations have grown up under the shelter of Allied forces. We are responsible for their existence and must endeavour to support them.

When Lockhart, who suffered from abnormal mental honesty and outspokenness, took it for granted that the policy of intervention was indeed what appeared obvious, namely a class war on the side of the counter-revolution, he was reproved in a tart despatch by Balfour speaking for the whole Cabinet, which told Mr (as he then was) Lockhart:

'It is a mistake for you to suppose that we are "disinclined to take the line of a qualified recognition of the Bolsheviks," and no less a mistake to fancy that our decision in this matter is influenced by "anxiety as to the injury that might be inflicted on the bourgeois elements in Russia by such a course." I must state clearly and emphatically in regard to this second point that we are in no way concerned with the internal affairs of Russia as such; our sole interest in them is how they affect the War.'

In his Memoirs Sir Bruce Lockhart expresses his impatience

with all this make-believe: one conversation he records with 'Reynolds, a well-to-do timber merchant, who had been very intimate with members of the Petrograd embassy staff' was, he says, typical of the point of view during 1918 not only of the Russian bourgeoisie but also of the prosperous British colony in St Petersburg and Moscow, who 'in a night had seen their comfortable existence swept away before their eyes in the maelstrom of revolution,' and who were now refugees from Russia. Reynolds 'had lost everything and was very nervous and was obsessed with only one idea: that we should make peace as soon as possible in order, in alliance with Germany, to restore order in Russia.'

There were, in fact, observes Lockhart, no Russians 'who thought of any other interests than their own or of any other front than the civil war front once the Bolshevik revolution had started. This is not anti-Russian prejudice. It is plain common sense. An Englishman or a German, situated in similar circumstances, would have had the same thoughts and the same mental reactions. If there were Russians who accepted the English formula of restoring the Eastern front and who talked of the sanctity of their oath to fight until victory was assured, they did so, consciously or sub-consciously, with their tongues in their cheeks. The one aim of every Russian bourgeois (and 99 per cent of the so-called "loyal" Russians were bourgeois) was to secure the intervention of British troops (and, failing British, German troops) to re-establish order in Russia, suppress Bolshevism and restore to the bourgeois his property.'

WISHFUL DEALING WITH FACTS

The wilful blindness to facts and mental dishonesty bred by fear and hatred among the politicians and officials whose job it was to know the facts and take realistic decisions on policy passed over into attempts to bludgeon facts into assuming the shape desired by our counter-revolutionary zealots. Lockhart complains frequently in his book of the stubborn refusal of the Foreign Office to believe what he told it, coupled with threats to cashier him if he persisted in reporting facts that were so inconvenient and unwelcome to the fanatics in high places. He laments the fact that he let himself be bullied by these threats into 'coming round' to the view that there should be intervention, instead of sticking to his guns.

An outstanding example of wishful dealing with facts was the personal super-secret telegram of General Knox, then head of

the British Military Mission intervening in Siberia, to the Secretary of State for War, Mr Churchill, at the end of June 1919, to the effect that Admiral Kolchak's failure at the front necessitated a reconsideration of the whole position. General Knox laid it down that all hope of a military success that summer had gone and that either 100,000 men should be thrown in to take Petrograd and Moscow and so 'finish' the war, or else there should be an immediate armistice and peace.

This despatch produced an agitated and remarkable reply from Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who was then attending the Peace Conference in Paris. Wilson said flatly that he could not believe the situation to be as Knox described it, and asked him to think again before giving a final view as to whether or not there was any chance of a military success. Everything, he explained, depended on General Knox's answer, because Mr Churchill and he had been able to persuade the War Cabinet to Kolchak's being recognised only by promising that he would score a decisive military success that summer. This exchange of personal messages with General Knox was not, of course, communicated to the War Cabinet. The latter was, however, given the benefit of the telegram General Knox felt obliged to send in reply, arguing that after all success that summer might be possible. Three months later Kolchak's army had been routed and chased halfway down Siberia and Kolchak himself captured and shot.

CLASS WAR AGAINST THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

VERSUS

THE NATIONAL WAR AGAINST GERMANY

This kind of obstinacy readily degenerated into more or less deliberately putting the class war against the Russian Revolution before the interests of the national war against German militarism. The refusal of Lenin's offer to fight on our side at the very time when the German army was being transferred from the East to the West in preparation for the March 1918 offensive that nearly broke through the British front, and in the teeth of the unanimous advice of the Allied representatives on the spot, has already been noted. The interesting thing is that the Allied Governments took their decision to disregard the advice of the men on the spot, not because they believed they were wrong but because they regarded waging war against the Russian Revolution as more important than getting on with the war against Germany.

The War Cabinet minutes of that time show our statesmen teetering on the ragged edge of treason, with occasional slips over the edge. On January 17 and 22, 1918, Mr Balfour in two successive statements said that (a) 'From the point of view of postponing a separate peace between Russia and Germany and stopping the Germans getting supplies out of Russia, it would appear that the Bolsheviks were more likely to effect such a policy than any other party in Russia.' (b) 'From a purely Foreign Office point of view, however, there would be great advantages in cutting off all relations with the Bolsheviks. The latter had broken their treaty with the Allies and repudiated their debts to us and were openly trying to raise revolutions in all countries ... the Bolsheviks appeared determined to spread "passionate propaganda" in this Country and also in Germany.'

Balfour added that according to his information the danger of revolution in Germany was really serious. So it was – this was the period of the monster strikes referred to above.

The Cabinet's point of view appeared to be that they would rather the war went on, however many British lives it cost, than that German resistance should collapse because of a revolution in that country – or that we should beat Germany with the help of Bolshevik Russia.

At the same time the Government and the Foreign and War Offices were certain that the Bolsheviks were nothing but paid agitators sent and kept by Imperial Germany. Lockhart comments bitterly on what he calls the 'sheer folly' of the Government in continuing to 'regard Bolshevism as a movement fostered solely for the furtherance of German ends'. He comments repeatedly on his efforts to 'combat the firmly rooted conviction' in Whitehall and the Cabinet 'that Lenin and Trotsky were German Staff officers in disguise or at least servile agents of German policy.'

As a final contradiction, the Allies at the armistice compelled the German Army to stay in the Baltic States and the Ukraine, so as to keep the Bolsheviks out until the Allies took over. This co-operation with the enemy began in one case even before the armistice was signed, that is, while we were still at war with Germany. Encouragement and help was given to German officers and units true to the old regime in suppressing German soldiers' councils and dealing with German soldiers who had 'gone Red' – until the situation got out of hand altogether and the German revolution triumphed.

The January 22, 1918 War Cabinet minutes record the observations of Sir George Buchanan, who had been our Ambassador in Petrograd, and attended the meeting of the War Cabinet discussing our policy to the Russian Revolution. Sir George 'thought it was clear that the Germans would like to see a rupture between us and the Bolsheviks'. But he said he would 'sooner see a rupture than allow Bolshevik propaganda on a large scale in this country, as such propaganda was dangerous and attractive to those who had nothing to lose'. In fact the whole Cabinet was not far from the view of our then Minister in Norway who, says Lockhart, 'in his political views was an extreme Conservative who would rather have lost the war than run the risk of social upheaval in England.'

MR CHURCHILL'S BLACK RECORD

Mr Churchill was the most flagrant example of what happens to capitalist political leaders when their class war blood is up. Intervention in Russia was in a very real sense his own private war, which he waged for two years in spite of the reluctance and doubts of Prime Minister Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Balfour. In conducting it he displayed demonic energy, blind, ruthless fanaticism, grandiose sweep and vision, and a total lack of scruple. In fact he displayed the spirit and qualities that win wars or wreck civilisations (sometimes both, or the latter in trying to achieve the former).

HE TRIES TO RESTORE TSARISM

First, there was the passionate refusal to accept the fact of the revolution. 'I cannot believe that the title deeds of national Russia will ever rest durably or recognisedly in the hands of the Bolsheviks, because their ideal is a world wide proletarian revolution ... There is, however, a Russia somewhere, and not far away if it could only be evoked, which represents and embodies all that treasury of the centuries which the nation has built up from the days of Peter the Great.' (House of Commons, November 5, 1919).

Even long after the whole lamentable business was over, after Mr Churchill had squandered one hundred million pounds of the British taxpayers' money, prolonged the world war anything up to a year, and killed, maimed and caused to suffer horribly tens of thousands of innocent human beings in Russia and elsewhere in trying to 'evoke' the defunct Tsardom by whose ghost he was haunted, he still clung to his crazy delusions.

In *World Crisis and the Aftermath* Mr Churchill stoutly defended the obstinacy of Nicholas II in refusing any reforms or concessions and sang the praises of the Tsardom.

'It can never be proved that a three-quarter Tsar or half Tsar and the rest a Parliament could, in such a period, have commanded anything at all ... Thus it is by no means certain ... that the Tsar for all his errors and shortcomings was wrong. After all, he was within an ace of safety and success.'

The last remark refers to the strangest delusion of all, namely that the revolution stole upon Russia like a thief in the night from somewhere out of a satanic limbo and struck her down in the very flush and dawn of victory.

'Surely to no nation has Fate been more malignant than to Russia. Her ship went down in sight of port. She had actually weathered the storm when all was cast away. Every sacrifice had been made; the toil was achieved. Despair and Treachery usurped command at the very moment when the task was done ... In March the Tsar was on his throne; the Russian Empire and people stood, the front was safe, and victory certain.'

Mr Lloyd George comments adequately in his *Memoirs* on this politically insane delusion:

'Mr Churchill says: "It is the shallow fashion of these times to dismiss the Tsarist regime as a purblind, corrupt, incompetent tyranny." Talking of Tsarist Russia, he said: "With victory in her grasp, she fell upon the earth, devoured alive, like Herod of old, by worms." The worms that ate into the vitals of the old regime and devoured its strength were bred out of its own corruption. It fell because every fibre of its power, influence and authority had rotted through and through. It therefore tumbled to pieces at the first shock of insurrection ...

'Mr Churchill in describing the catastrophe says: "The ship sank in sight of port." A ludicrous picture this, made attractive only because of the glittering rhetoric in which it is framed by a great colour artist.

'He continues: "She had weathered the storm." Yes, a battered hulk, with her engines neglected and out of repair, tossed about helplessly in the breakers with a feeble and foolish captain, a scratch lot of officers and a crew some on the brink of mutiny and the rest steeped in the spirit of discontent, rapidly fermenting into mutiny ... Mr Churchill's morbid detestation of the Revolution that in 1919 baffled his most ingenious military dispositions in Russia has rendered him incapable of weighing fairly the causes that led to the downfall of autocracy. The

revolution was the inevitable consequence of the failure of Tsardom and not its cause.'

FOOLING PARLIAMENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

When men operate at the level of supreme power on world issues it is idle to apply personal standards of conduct. For in pursuing at any cost and by any means ends they believe are all-important such men feel that they are the instruments of forces greater than themselves and must serve truth, justice, liberty and religion by any means that will advance the immortal cause to which they are dedicated.

In June, 1919, Mr Churchill cabled General Knox in Siberia a secret and personal message in which he frankly laid before the General the situation at home: the Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George, who was all powerful, had begun to be visited by grave doubts as to whether it was worth while going on supporting the various White generals and admirals on the fringes of Russia. Not only were they uniformly unsuccessful and seemed to have no backing in the country, but Mr Lloyd George was becoming more and more sceptical about the genuineness of their devotion to democracy. The Prime Minister, explained Mr Churchill, was a convinced democrat and held advanced views on the land question. Mr Churchill therefore suggested that General Knox should persuade Admiral Kolchak to issue a 'broad and stirring appeal' promising the land to the peasants and a constituent assembly. Mr Churchill could use this declaration in order to rekindle Mr Lloyd George's waning faith in the democracy of Tsarist field officers. This would help him in urging the Prime Minister and Cabinet to recognise Admiral Kolchak's Government. In short, after faking a military victory to get Kolchak recognised, Mr Churchill was now out to induce the Tsarist Admiral to make a noise like a democrat in order to help him pull the wool over the eyes of his own Prime Minister.'

Kolchak's 'Stavka' (i.e. general staff) in Siberia was, in fact, full of officers who were ex-landowners. During the brief incursion of the White troops from Siberia into Eastern Russia some of them had recovered their estates and promptly flogged and murdered the peasants that had taken an active part in their division. It was not surprising therefore that Admiral Kolchak refused to oblige.

The second episode was Mr Churchill telling the House of Commons and the public that he was withdrawing troops from Russia at the very time he was planning a grandiose offensive

with General Knox to join with the Archangel forces at Kotlas and then sweep on down to Petrograd and Moscow. General Knox at first pressed the case for going South-west instead of North-west so as to pass through the more populous, richer and warmer territories between Kolchak's army and General Denikin's forces in the Ukraine, but was overruled by Mr Churchill's romantic and determined strategy. The result has already been mentioned and is recorded in history.

But it may be recalled that when the Bolsheviks captured General Golovin, an emissary of Denikin's returned from London and carrying despatches to Admiral Kolchak, they found a record of Golovin's conversations with Mr Churchill, who had explained that he was sending reinforcements to Russia on the pretext of facilitating withdrawal, but that what was really being planned was a big offensive and that he was doing all he could to help the Russian Whites, but could not act too openly or on a larger scale for fear of the hostility of organised labour.

CLASS BEFORE COUNTRY

Mr Churchill's blind fanaticism carried him well over the border-line between patriotism and anti-patriotic class war. For he pursued his private war to 'evoke' Tsarism from its bloody and dishonoured grave in the teeth of Balfour's memorandum to the War Cabinet of July 16, 1918, pointing out that:

... the re-establishment of Russian autocracy would, so far as I can judge, be a misfortune for the British Empire. Autocracy and militarism naturally go together; and it is almost inconceivable that, if the Tsar could be re-established, Russia would not again become a purely military Empire. If so, she would inevitably be a danger to her neighbours; and to none of her neighbours so much as ourselves ...

In my opinion, moreover, a restored Tsardom would be more dangerous to British interests than the Tsardom which has just vanished; for it would almost certainly be dependent upon Germany.

Autocracy in Russia, concluded Sir Arthur Balfour, would lean on and be linked with autocracy in Germany, against Britain and her Empire.

It is surely one of the great ironies of history that Mr Churchill, who was Britain's architect of victory in the second world war, did his best, by intervening in Russia, to be the author of our defeat long before the war had begun. For if he had succeeded

in restoring Russian autocracy Fascism would have swept Europe after the first post-war slump, the second world war would have come sooner and would have found Russia and Germany fighting as allies and forming an overwhelmingly powerful combination.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION

As it was intervention in Russia failed but made the Soviet regime far harsher, more suspicious and intractable than it would have been if the defenders of democracy and Western civilisation had shown the slightest glimmer of belief in civilisation in their treatment of the Russian Revolution. At its outset, reports Sir Bruce Lockhart in his Memoirs, the Bolshevik regime was comparatively tolerant. 'The cruelties which followed later were the result of the intensification of the civil war. For the intensification of that bloody struggle Allied intervention with the false hopes it raised was largely responsible. I do not say that a policy of abstention from interference in the internal affairs of Russia would have altered the course of the Bolshevik revolution. I do suggest that our intervention intensified the terror and increased the bloodshed.'

Summing up the consequences of what he calls 'the ill-conceived venture' [of intervention] Lockhart says further: 'It raised hopes which could not be fulfilled. It intensified the civil war and sent thousands of Russians to meet their deaths. Indirectly, it was responsible for the Terror. Its direct effect was to provide the Bolsheviks with a cheap victory, to give them a new confidence, and to galvanise them into a strong and ruthless organism.'

The so-called Lord Emmett Committee, appointed by the Lloyd George Government on May 17th, 1920 to 'collect information on Russia', reported to Parliament on six months of Bolshevik rule, 'that liberty was restricted only after two members of the Government had been assassinated, civil war and Allied intervention had started, and the air was thick with plots and rumours of plots'. With regard to the effects of intervention, 'the abundant and almost unanimous testimony of our witnesses shows that the military intervention of the Allies in Russia assisted to give strength and cohesion to the Soviet Government, and, by so doing, achieved exactly the opposite of what it was intended to effect.'

'There is evidence to show that, up to the time of military intervention, the majority of the Russian intellectuals was well

disposed towards the Allies, and more especially to Great Britain, but that later the attitude of the Russian people towards the Allies became characterised by indifference, distrust and anti-pathy'.

Gen. William S. Graves, Commander of the U.S. troops in Siberia during intervention, wrote in his book *America's Siberian Adventure*:

There were horrible murders committed, but they were not committed by the Bolsheviks as the world believes. I am well on the side of safety when I say that the anti-Bolsheviks killed one hundred people in Eastern Siberia to every one killed by the Bolsheviks.

There is no doubt at all that the very terrorism and bloodshed which the Allies used for political atrocity campaigns to justify intervention were themselves largely the product of intervention. At no time were the Reds crueller or more oppressive than the Whites whom we were supporting – on the contrary. And throughout the Bolsheviks did stand for building a new and juster society, whereas the Russian Whites wanted only revenge and the restoration of the old order. That was precisely why the Allies felt they had to attack the revolution, invade and intervene and hound the Whites on to exterminate the Reds, all in the name of not taking sides or interfering in Russian internal affairs; helping the Russian people to unite and free themselves from foreign influences; and defending democracy and western civilisation, Christianity and freedom against Communism.

CHAPTER II

Cold War in Europe and The First Western Union

(1920-30)

A PYRRHIC VICTORY

WHEREAS intervention in Russia failed, intervention in Europe succeeded. The consequences of that Pyrrhic victory are still with us.

Counter-revolutionary intervention in Russia made the social revolution more savage and suspicious than it would have been if Western Capitalist statesmen, diplomats, brass hats and the propertied classes to which they owed allegiance had behaved toward it like civilised human beings and not like panic-stricken apes endowed with super-simian malice and powers of destruction. The failure of intervention allowed the social revolution to survive and to fashion a Soviet Union which served as a powerful obstacle to the spread of Fascism between the wars, became five times as strong as Tsarist Russia, fought as our ally in the second world war and defeated three-quarters of Hitler's Wehrmacht.

If intervention in Europe had failed, social revolution, mostly under Social Democratic leadership, would have swept the Continent after the first world war. There would have been no Hitler, no Mussolini, and no second world war. That unnecessary calamity and an infinitude of suffering and injustice between the wars, as well as the war itself, were part of the price mankind paid for the defeat of social revolution by Capitalist counter-revolution in Europe after the first world war. Defeat did not permanently secure Capitalism against social change. It merely made peaceful and bloodless transition impossible and made sure that the workers should advance towards Socialism the hard way, to the accompaniment of the maximum of hatred and violence, destruction and loss of life.

The greater part of the price remains to be paid, unless the common people learn the lesson of the first instalment and refuse to foot the bill that their rulers are running up against them.

THE COLD WAR: (a) FOOD

'The old institutions on which Imperialism and Autocracy

flourished, lie crumbled in the dust; a great wave of advanced democracy is sweeping blindly through Europe', wrote Field-Marshal (then General) Smuts in 1918 ('The League of Nations - a Practical Suggestion').

How the Allies dealt with that menace in Russia has already been described. They were no less resolute to crush the 'wave of advanced democracy' in Europe. But counter-revolutionary intervention in Europe was less clear-cut and even more humbugging, hypocritical, confused and contradictory than in Russia. There were Liberals mixed up in the business, who really believed in intervention to restore or establish Capitalist democracy, as well as Conservatives who were ferociously determined to save Capitalism at the cost, if necessary, of destroying democracy. But the main lines of allied policy were clear.

While being as zealous to proclaim their non-interference and determination not to take sides in internal affairs, and their tender solicitude for democracy, freedom, and self-determination as they were in Russia, the Western Powers used their military occupations, economic pressure, including the manipulation of food supplies, and diplomatic threats to renew the blockade or otherwise 'get tough', to overthrow left wing regimes wherever they existed, to prevent the workers changing the social order and to restore and prop up reactionary and counter-revolutionary groups, parties and governments.

In fact, they waged a half-war or cold war against the danger of social revolution in Europe, whereas their warfare was open against the Russian revolution.

The British Director of Relief in Central Europe, Sir William Goode, in his official report of 1920, wrote:

'Food was practically the only basis on which the Governments of the hastily created States could be maintained in power. Half of Europe had hovered on the brink of Bolshevism. If it had not been for the £137 million in relief credits granted to Central and Eastern Europe between 1919 and 1921, it would have been impossible to provide food and coal and the sea and land transport for them. Without food and coal and transport, Austria and probably several other countries would have gone the way of Russia ... Two and a half years after the Armistice the back of Bolshevism in Central Europe had been broken, largely by relief credits ... The expenditure of £137 million was probably one of the best international investments from a financial and political point of view ever recorded in history.'

Mr Herbert Hoover, in charge of American relief in Europe, and who was then, as ever since, a thick and thin supporter of

big business and untrammelled private enterprise, expressed concisely the aim of the relief work of which he was in charge, in a letter dated August 17, 1921, and quoted by Mr Louis Fischer in *The Soviets in World Affairs*:

The whole of American policy during the liquidation of the armistice was to contribute everything it could to prevent Europe from going Bolshevik or being overrun by their armies.

THE COLD WAR: (b) MILITARY OCCUPATION

To exploiting food as an instrument of policy was added the political use of military occupation. Mr Lloyd George's remark has already been quoted that 'a very large number of people in Germany' would welcome a big Allied army of occupation 'as it would be the only hope of preserving the existing order of things'. Allied occupation in the Rhineland, extended by the French to the Ruhr, was in fact used precisely in that way. One feature of the Ruhr occupation was the shooting down of the 'red' workers by the German counter-revolution under the noses of the complacent Allies.

THE COLD WAR: (c) BACKING COUNTER-REVOLUTION

Germany was, in fact, the storm centre of the fight to break the social revolution in Europe and the incident referred to was an episode in the third method used by the Western Powers to preserve Capitalism in Europe. It overlapped the second (military occupation) and was intimately associated with the first (manipulation of food supplies and diplomatic threats). It consisted in discreetly encouraging or at least tolerating the counter-revolutionary organisations formed in the early days of the German Republic, such as the 'Stahlhelm', 'Einwohnerwehr', the Black Reichswehr, the organisation 'Consul', 'Orgesch', and last but not least, Hitler's 'S.A.' and 'S.S.' troops.

Thus Lord D'Abernon, the British Ambassador in Berlin in the critical post-war years, explains in his diary on November 3, 1920 (quoted in *An Ambassador of Peace*) that the allies, while insisting on the destruction of the larger war material, should adopt a somewhat less energetic and categorical attitude about small arms, because 'I should fear to disarm the orderly sections of the people, leaving arms in the hands of the extreme Socialists and Spartacists ... Regarding the "Einwohnerwehr" and "Orgesch" organisations, it is difficult to decide whether these make for order or for future trouble. I consider the danger from the Left far exceeds the danger from the Right, and in the

event of a new outbreak of Communism in Germany these organisations would powerfully serve the cause of order'. He was irritated by the attitude of the French, who 'do not appear to understand that the military danger is past and that the real danger in Germany is Communist disorder'. Their demand that the British should agree to disbanding the 'Einwohnerwehr', 'Orgesch' etc. was 'almost insane, like cutting the branch of the tree on which you are sitting'.

These bodies, on which British policy in Germany was sitting, were the seed-bed of German Fascism. They were all sworn enemies of the Republic, of democracy and of the peace settlement. They all preached a war of revenge. They armed and drilled in defiance of the Versailles Treaty. But the Allies preferred them to the danger of a social revolution that would have pulled up the roots of German militarism and Fascism and established a Socialist Weimar Republic that was safe for peace.

This third method of combating the social revolution in Europe was, in its turn, the forerunner of the policy that later became notorious under the name of 'appeasement'. For these 'tolerated' armed bands soon included Hitler's brown and black shirts. They were the Praetorian Guards of German Imperialism and counter-revolution in their struggle to smash German democracy, lest the German workers use their votes and their democratic rights to obtain power. And in that enterprise, from start to finish, the propertied classes and Conservative governments of the West were the allies and friends of German counter-revolution, even when it assumed the most repulsive and hideously cruel forms, and started to re-arm and perpetrate one act of aggression after another. Similar policies were pursued with regard to Japan and Italy, for the same motive and with similar results.

The history of the years between the wars shows how the new 'advanced democracies' in one country after another in Europe were snuffed out by Capitalist counter-revolutions supported by the propertied classes – monarchist or militarist dictatorships, as in Poland and the Balkans; or clerical as in Austria (Dolfus was a forerunner of Franco and Pétain); or Right Wing Peasant and big business as in the Baltic States; semi-feudal landowners as in Hungary (where Allied interference first helped to destroy the Social Democratic Government of Count Karolyi; then manipulated food supplies, provoked armed Roumanian intervention and finally overthrew the Bela Kun Bolshevik regime and

established the White dictatorship and terror of Admiral Horthy and the great landowners, that lasted until it threw in its lot with Hitler in the second world war); classic lower middle-class Fascism as in Germany and Italy; a military variant of the same in Japan, where the lower middle-class Younger Officers' movement linked up with the two great naval and military clans, Satsuma and Choshu, and the Zaibatsu, the oligarchy of huge family business and banking concerns, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, etc., the usurers and the rack-renting landlords.

But the second stage, when Allied anti-communist intervention changed into pro-Fascist appeasement, falls to be described in the next chapter. The first stage of active intervention succeeded partly because of geographical and economic circumstances – the European States and their populations were far more vulnerable to Allied intervention than the primitive economy and peoples of the Soviet Union, inured to suffering and aided by the vast size and poor communications of their country.

WORKING-CLASS LEADERSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

But a large part of the Russian victory was due to the revolutionary leadership of the Bolsheviks. They proceeded on the view that the working class must take the lead, should not ally itself with Capitalist parties, and must seize the chance to turn the political revolution into a social revolution.

Counter-revolutionary intervention in Europe, on the other hand, succeeded, largely because the great majority of the working-class were led by Social Democratic parties who were not prepared for a revolution, were astounded and terrified when they found themselves caught up in one, and proceeded on the theory that what the situation called for was an advance to full political democracy in alliance with Liberal and Radical Capitalist parties and without disturbing the foundations of society. After that, they held, the real issue was not between Capitalism and Socialism, because thanks to the existence of democratic constitutions it was possible to achieve Socialism gradually and peacefully.

The fight therefore was now between Democracy and Totalitarian Communism. The Social Democrats must join with Capitalist Democrats to wage this fight against the Communists and Left-Wing Socialists, who wished to follow up the political revolution by measures of social revolution that would break up the estates of the great landowners and give the land to the

peasantry, put key industries, transport and finance into the hands of the people and purge the Civil service, army command, judiciary and corps of teachers of the out-and-out reactionaries and supporters of the old regime. The argument that such measures were necessary to prevent the new-born democracy being overthrown by a Capitalist counter-revolution was dismissed as fanciful and even perverse, in fact, sheer 'Bolshevism'.

There was nothing inherently unreasonable in the prevailing Social Democratic attitude at that time. As is explained in chapter XI below, it was a natural and legitimate product of the social and economic conditions of Germany and other European countries.

It was not the fault of the leaders in those troubled days that the catastrophe of war had changed the world out of all recognition. They could hardly be blamed for failing to understand the novel and terrifying realities with which they were faced. The new-born European Communist parties and their Left-Wing Socialist allies were also, to say the least of it, fanatical, visionary, arrogant and thoroughly unreasonable and difficult to deal with.

But looking back, there is no excuse for failing to perceive, at this late date, with the whole tragic story before our eyes, that on the fundamental issue of 'Democracy first - then social change', versus 'Social change first - then Democracy', in countries that had not previously known either, the orthodox Social Democrats were wrong and the Communists and Left-Wing Socialists were right. For the moment it appeared even possible that the workers and the poor peasants, who were many, might use their votes to attack the power and privileges of the rich, who were few, the propertied classes did not hesitate for a single instant to carry out a preventive counter-revolution, which in their minds was their patriotic duty and the defence of civilisation and Christianity against red ruin and the breaking up of laws.

FASCISM BEGINS

The break-through first occurred in Italy. From the first there was no concealment of Conservative approval of Fascism as a bulwark against Communism. The voice of British Toryism spoke when Mr Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Baldwin Government, told the Italian and foreign press in Rome on January 20th, 1927, that, if he had been an Italian, he would certainly have been wholeheartedly with Mussolini from start to finish in his 'triumphant struggle against the bestial appetites and passions of Leninism'. In its international aspect the Fascist

movement had rendered a service to the whole world. 'The great fear which has always beset every democratic leader or a working-class leader has been that of being undermined or overbid by someone more extreme than he. Italy has shown that there is a way of fighting the subversive forces which can rally the masses of the people, properly led, to value and wish to defend the honour and stability of civilised society. She has provided the necessary antidote to the Russian poison. Hereafter no great nation will be unprovided with an ultimate means of protection against the cancerous growth of Bolshevism'.

THE SOVIET UNION AT GENOA

Allied intervention succeeded in preserving the old order in Europe, at the price of sowing the dragon's teeth of Fascism that sprang up in armed men and bore such evil, bitter and bloody fruit. At the same time a puny and neglected League of Nations was feebly beginning to live and breathe at Geneva, and Mr Lloyd George attempted at the Genoa Conference in 1922 to bring together ex-enemies and ex-allies and even to introduce the hitherto unrecognised Soviet Government into international society. Foreign Commissar Chicherin offered at Genoa to enter the League of Nations if the Covenant were revised so as to cut out all obligations to coerce a peacebreaker, and to give the Assembly the power to elect all the members of the Council.

These proposals were intended more as propaganda than serious offers, but revealed the fears and suspicions of the Soviet Union, which was still being boycotted by the Capitalist world. The Soviet Government had hoped to come to terms with the Western Powers at Genoa and to start trade relations on the basis of granting large concessions on favourable terms to Western Capitalists for a limited number of years. They were met by demands which would have meant practically recognising the Tsarist debts and restoring Capitalism in Russia. As late as April 14, 1924, *The Times* published a letter to the Prime Minister by a number of leading British Bankers, that laid down the conditions on which credit could be granted to the Soviet Union. The fifth condition ran: 'That bankers, and traders, and industrialists of this country should be able to deal freely, without interference by Government authorities, with similar private institutions in Russia controlled by men of whom they have personal knowledge and in whose character, word, and resources, they have confidence'.

The Soviet leaders had drawn the conclusion, after a severe

struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, that as, contrary to their expectations, the Soviet regime had survived and Capitalism had reconsolidated itself in Europe, they must establish normal relations with the Capitalist world, while building Socialism at home. The Bolsheviks had hitherto proceeded on the assumption that either the Capitalist world would intervene and overthrow the Social revolution in Russia or that revolution would spread to a number of other countries. They regarded themselves as the outpost and advance guard of world revolution.

But they accepted the fact that instead they found themselves heading a national revolution in a hostile but not belligerent Capitalist world. Their appearance at the Genoa Conference was only part of a general policy to secure recognition, and conclude non-aggression treaties with their neighbours and trade treaties with as many states as possible.

Their rebuff at Genoa was promptly countered by the conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty of non-aggression, trade and friendship with the other great pariah, Germany. This caused an enormous sensation.

LOCARNO: THE FIRST WESTERN UNION

The counter-stroke of the Western Powers was the conclusion of the Locarno Treaties. They were officially presented to the world as a regional agreement intended to strengthen and give fuller effect to the purposes of the League of Nations in Western Europe. They were indeed carefully drafted to conform with the letter of the Covenant. But their political content was hard to reconcile with its spirit.

The French regarded them primarily as renewing the Anglo-French alliance. In the eyes of the Foreign Office and Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Tory Foreign Secretary, they implied a partial return to the balance of power, with Britain sitting in judgement between France and Germany and deciding which it was in her interest to back at any given moment. But the grand underlying motive and meaning of the Locarno Treaties was made quite clear by Lord D'Abernon, then our Ambassador in Berlin, in a striking passage in his book *An Ambassador of Peace*:

It was apparent to those who took a world view that Western civilisation was menaced by an external danger which, coming into being during the war, threatened a cataclysm equalled only by the fall of the Roman Empire. This danger arose from the success of the Russian Revolution. French and German opinion was so much concerned with the Ruhr and the Rhineland that it relegated the

vastly more important problem of the defence of Europe against Asiatic communism to the category of the non-urgent. And yet there is little doubt that a blind persistence in the policy of maintaining the war grouping of the Allies against Germany would eventually have led to Germany being forced into close alliance with Russia ... Were it to come into being, the danger to European civilisation would be dire in the extreme ... On broad grounds of European interest the case was strong [for the Locarno policy of bringing Germany into alliance with the West against East Europe and the Soviet Union] for all nations who regarded Western civilisation as a precious heritage. It was even stronger when judged from the special standpoint of the British Empire. Apart from the general danger resulting from the spread of Communism, the anti-English bias in Russia throughout the nineteenth century had to be borne in mind ...

Resistance to communistic propaganda, the maintenance of peace in Europe, the avoidance of another Great War, the establishment of security for respective frontiers, the preservation of society on existing lines, were capital objects of British policy. But there was more than this. England's stupendous and vital interests in Asia were menaced by a danger graver than any which existed in the time of the old Imperialistic regime in Russia. Hostility to England or jealousy of the intrusion of British civilisation into Asia were indeed of old standing. For the last seventy years of the nineteenth century, rivalry between England and Russia had been a dominant fact in history.' The Bolsheviks were far more energetic and efficient than the slothful and corrupt Tsarist regime, and disposed of the menacing weapon of 'Class revolt propaganda, appealing to the proletariat of the world.' Those were the reasons why a deadly danger to the West would arise if Germany were left 'a prey to Russian wiles and Russian influence'.

Perhaps the most significant and revealing sentence in the whole of this passage is the statement that 'resistance to communistic propaganda, the maintenance of peace in Europe, the avoidance of another great war, the establishment of security for respective frontiers, the preservation of society on existing lines, were capital objects of British policy'.

The operative words in this sentence are 'resistance to communistic propaganda' (meaning any vigorous Socialist propaganda) and 'the preservation of society on existing lines' (meaning the defence of Capitalism by any and every means). These were indeed the capital objects of British policy between the wars. Everything else was sacrificed to them. That is why there was no security for the frontiers of Germany's neighbours and the victims of Fascist aggression; why peace in Europe was violated

again and again with impunity by Hitler and Mussolini; and why the Fascist powers were allowed to re-arm, overrun and subjugate our allies one by one and combine and commit aggressions to the point where another great war could no longer be avoided, and we had to fight almost alone.

The main fear of our Capitalist statesmen when the first world war broke out, was that it might end with Socialism and Labour Governments everywhere. From the outbreak of the Russian revolution they were haunted by the terror that Socialism should spread and undermine the foundations of the old order. The overmastering obsession of our Tories and the capital object of their foreign policy from the outbreak of the Russian revolution until to-day has been and still is to preserve the old social order by any and every means, not excluding Fascism and war*. How that master motive has worked itself out after the great slump, during the second world war and from then until to-day, and how it goes on operating in our foreign policy, in spite of the Labour Government assuming office, is the subject of the next few chapters.

* *C.f.* the view referred to by Bruce Lockhart above (p. 35) of the British Minister in Oslo who would rather Britain were defeated in war than risk social upheaval in this country; Mr Churchill on Salvation by Fascism (pp. 46-7, 60, 66-7) and on the need in case of defeat for a British Hitler; the way the pro-Fascists put the interests of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler before the safety of their own country and the lives of their countrymen (Chapter III *passim*, and particularly pp. 56-9); and the view of Mr J. Gibson Jarvie, Chairman of the United Dominions Trust, of which he delivered himself to an Economic League meeting in Birmingham on March 29, 1949, that Socialism was a greater evil than war, because 'war may destroy your property and your body, but Socialism will destroy your soul ... To secure the dismissal of the Labour Government may require drastic steps for this conventional country of ours with our ingrained love of constitutional methods. But to save the country it may be necessary to take even unusual and drastic action.'

CHAPTER III

The Devil's Minuet: Fascist Aggression and Tory Appeasement

THE fear for the future of the social order and the hatred of the forces of social revolution in general and the Soviet Union in particular that had been smouldering in the hearts of Capitalist statesmen since 1917, burst into bright flame when Capitalism was shaken to its foundations by the great slump. Their fear was natural and not unreasonable.

FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO RESTORE THE OLD ORDER

For the whole of post-war reconstruction had proceeded on the assumption that the world of 1913 could and must be restored. The slump knocked the bottom out of that belief. 'It is not surprising,' wrote Sir Arthur Salter, who, as Director of the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations Secretariat was a central figure in the post-war reconstruction effort, in *World Trade and the Future* 'that in 1919 we should have failed to realise that we needed not only to rebuild on the old foundations, but to enlarge and strengthen the foundations themselves ...

'By comparison with 1919 the world of 1913 seemed to most of us a paradise from which we had for some years been excluded by the flaming sword of destruction. It seemed a sufficient goal for our efforts to regain the paradise we had lost. It was natural therefore that the first effort after the war should have been directed in nearly all countries, not to changing the foundations or the main structure of our society, but to repairing and rebuilding upon the old foundations and upon the familiar design. This basic conception underlay the policy pursued in every sphere of action ...

'After the first needs of urgent relief ... the vast reconstruction effort of the post-war world was directed to the re-establishment of the pre-war system, with the one notable addition of the League of Nations. The removal of State control and the establishment of conditions favourable to private enterprise ... the creation of

a new international organisation, which would supplement, but would not necessarily change fundamentally, national sovereignty and the traditional social and economic system: these were the objectives – and they seemed for the time the sufficient objectives – of the efforts of the first decade after the war ...

‘For a time the success seemed almost complete and likely to be permanent ...

‘Then came the sudden and devastating collapse in the economic life of the world, in its financial system, in parliamentary government, in the new structure of peaceful international relations ...

‘The tale of collapse, extending over the whole range of man’s collective constructive efforts of the first decade after the war, cannot now be re-told. But it is necessary to emphasize the central feature to be observed in every sphere of disintegration. It was the old system that had been rebuilt; and this system proved in some respects unsuitable to the new conditions, and not strong enough to control the new forces’.

MONOPOLY ; ECONOMIC NATIONALISM ; ARMS RACE ; FASCISM

The great slump further accelerated the development of tendencies in the Capitalist economic system that became important toward the end of the last century and were vastly speeded up by the first world war. Competition between many small independent units had ceased to be the normal condition of economic life, and instead vast concentrations of economic and financial power arose in a variety of forms, through holding companies, trusts, monopolies, cartels, trade associations, etc.

With increasing size and spreading organisation came swelling ambitions: big business began to capture Capitalist political parties and to get more and more mixed up with the State. This meant the drive for economic nationalism; expansion in the search for markets; converging pressures of enterprises that sought escape from the slump in vast armament programmes. These economic developments were accompanied by the development of political ideologies stressing national unity and a hierarchical, paternal and authoritarian social order.

In the United States Professor R. E. Brady, in a research report published by the Carnegie Foundation and entitled ‘Business as a System of Power’, has assembled and analysed a vast array of facts about economic developments after the first world war and the slump, leading to the conclusion that there

was a general similarity of pattern between the Fascist countries and the Western Capitalist democracies. In the former, where democracy was weak, recent and imperfect, it had been swept away altogether and the system of government and prevailing political ideology had given full expression to the tendencies of modern Capitalist organisation and combination. In the Capitalist countries where democracy still survived the difference was one of degree rather than of kind and the same tendencies were at work, although retarded, 'diluted' and diversified by the much stronger traditions of democracy and civil liberty.

'NATIONAL' GOVERNMENT AND ITS CALIBAN BROTHER

This kinship of structure and purpose was quite consciously realised by the defenders of the old social order in the Western democracies. In October, 1933, for instance, Mr Ramsay MacDonald, Sir John Simon and Mr Baldwin at a 'National Labour Party' luncheon to celebrate the virtues and blessings of the 'National' Government, pointed out that like Mussolini and Hitler, but by British methods, they were saving the country in the crisis of the great slump by unifying the nation. There was an obvious family resemblance between the propaganda of the Fascist regimes and the justification for the National Government as standing above Party politics, which were not suitable for dealing with the emergency threatening civilisation (i.e. the partial collapse of Capitalism, which it was the object of the 'National' Government, as of the Fascist regimes, to shore up and preserve). The whole argument ruled the Labour Party out of the comity of the nation, treated the existence of an opposition as not only unnecessary but unpatriotic, and regarded fundamental social change as tantamount to treason.

THE ESSENCE OF FASCISM

The essential character of the Fascist regimes was clear from the outset to anyone capable of realistic social analysis. I can say that because in *Inquest on Peace*, written in the summer of 1935 and published in September of that year, I described the then Japanese, Italian and German regimes as essentially forms of Capitalist counter-revolution. They represented the offensive-defensive of the propertied classes against the masses, who had been aroused by their sufferings in the war and the slumps to the point where they demanded drastic social change. By social demagoguery and appeals to racial and national passions, the

plutocracy had captured a ruined and desperate lower middle class and turned it against the workers.

Inquest on Peace further pointed out that these regimes needed war preparations, the cult of war and prestige successes to survive; that they were incapable of living at peace, because they could not satisfy the social demands of their peoples and so would have to turn more and more to Jew-baiting, xenophobia and aggression, according to the old formula of blood and circuses instead of bread; and that they would end by starting a second world war.

THE DILEMMA OF TORYISM

This situation presented Western Capitalist governments, in particular our Tory National Government, with a dilemma that they found insoluble and on the horns of which they wriggled and squirmed helplessly to the bitter end. They regarded the Fascist regimes as a bulwark against Communism and therefore as social allies. But, at the same time, the Fascist regimes were more and more clearly becoming a menace to the Empire and to international peace. As though this dilemma were not enough, there was also the painful necessity of keeping public opinion fooled by pretending devotion to purposes that the Tory Government despised and concealing its concern with matters that could not be publicly avowed.

The story of how the unnecessary second world war was made inevitable by Tory foreign policy was a further instalment of the spectacle of an intellectually, morally and politically bankrupt ruling class, bewildered and adrift in a rapidly changing world, clinging to power that it did not know how to use and descending to depths of cruelty, treachery and sheer imbecility in order to hang on that had to be seen to be believed.

JAPAN

When Japan, to relieve her own internal social pressures rendered acute by the slump, struck in Manchuria in September 1931, the one idea of our Tories was to do a deal with the Japanese aggressor at the expense of its victim, China, and of the Covenant. The theory was that there was plenty of room in China both for Japanese aggression and for British interests, and that nothing else mattered. No attempt was made to enlist United States (let alone Soviet) co-operation on the basis of the Covenant and the Nine Power Treaty, to curb Japanese aggression and impose a minimum of respect for international law and

the rights of China. The upshot, of course, was that Japan went on to ever greater and more flagrant aggressions and treated British interests as ruthlessly as Chinese rights and lives. The collapse of the League in face of Japan, thanks primarily to British Tory sabotage, started a new race for arms, raised the spectre of a new world war and encouraged the Nazis to launch their defiance of the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty.

GERMAN REARMAMENT

The Government knew that their policy had set in motion a new race for arms, and had started us on the road to war, for in February, 1932, the very month the Disarmament Conference met, they decided to scrap the so-called 'Ten-Year Rule', that is, to begin rearming against the danger of our being involved in a world war within the next ten years. But at the same time, as Mr Baldwin told the House of Commons on November 12, 1936, with what he himself called 'appalling frankness', they pretended the utmost devotion to disarmament and professed to desire the success of the Disarmament Conference. Why?

'Supposing', honest Mr Baldwin told the House of Commons, 'I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm, does anybody think that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain'. He backed his view by pointing out that by-elections and press campaigns had shown that there was tremendous support in the country for trying to organise peace and make a success of the Disarmament Conference.

Mr Baldwin's cynical frankness was a relief after so much hypocrisy. But it stopped a long way short of honesty. The Government's real crime, which Mr Baldwin dared not confess even in November 1936, was that they had in 1933 resisted energetic attempts at Geneva by the French, Poles and others to bring Nazi Germany's treaty-breaking rearmament before the Council of the League of Nations under Chapter V of the Versailles Treaty, which gave the Council the right to take decisions by a mere majority for coercive action to stop such rearmament.

The French and the Poles wanted action, including, if necessary, boycott, blockade and even the marching of Polish troops to Berlin to stop Hitler before he was strong enough to threaten world peace. There was no question of war, for at that time

Germany was so far disarmed as to be physically incapable of waging a war. There were still millions of Germans who hated the Nazi regime and were longing for the Allies to give it a knock so that they could rise and overthrow it.

That was the rub. The Tories preferred Nazi rearmament and the drift to war, to peace through the overthrow of the Nazi regime by the German people. Mr Lloyd George voiced the views of many Tories, and showed how far the rot had gone among the Liberals, when, in a speech at Barmouth, September 22, 1933, he 'entreated the Government to proceed cautiously' [this was a veiled reference to the French, Polish, etc. demands that Britain join them to stop Nazi rearmament] because 'if the Powers succeeded in overthrowing Nazism in Germany, what would follow? Not a Conservative, Socialist or Liberal regime, but extreme Communism. Surely that could not be their objective'.

Mr Lloyd George added that 'a Communist Germany would be infinitely more formidable than a Communist Russia' because 'the Germans would know how to run their Communism effectively'.

A year later Mr Lloyd George again pleaded for shaking Hitler's bloody hand and winking at his preparations for war: 'In a very short time, perhaps in a year or two, the Conservative elements in this country will be looking to Germany as the bulwark against Communism in Europe. She is planted right in the centre of Europe, and if her defence breaks down against the Communists - only two or three years ago a very distinguished German statesman said to me: "I am not afraid of Nazism, but of Communism" - and if Germany is seized by the Communists, Europe will follow; because the German could make a better job of it than any other country. Do not let us be in a hurry to condemn Germany. We shall be welcoming Germany as our friend'. (House of Commons, November 28, 1934).

As far as the Tory Party was concerned Mr Lloyd George was pushing at an open door. Perhaps the frankest expression of prevailing Tory views is contained in the speech by Sir Arthur Balfour, Chairman and Managing Director of Arthur Balfour & Co. Ltd., Capital Steel Works, Sheffield, reported in the *Sheffield Telegraph* of October 24, 1933:

... Something was bound to happen in Germany after the defeat and its aftermath, explained Sir Arthur. Either they were to have Communism or something else. Hitler has produced Hitlerism as we see it to-day, and of the two I think it is preferable.

Will the Germans go to war again? I don't think there is any

doubt about it, and the curious thing about it is that I am almost persuaded that some day we shall have to let the Germans arm or we shall have to arm them. With the Russians armed to the teeth and the tremendous menace in the East, Germany, unarmed in the middle is always going to be a plum waiting for the Russians to take, and which we should have to defend if the Germans could not defend themselves. One of the greatest menaces to peace in Europe to-day is the totally unarmed condition of Germany.

And so our Tories stood off the Poles and the French, and encouraged and helped Hitler to tear up the Versailles Treaty and rearm.

MUSSOLINI BREAKS LOOSE

The fact that Hitler got away with leaving the League and starting to rearm in defiance of the Versailles Treaty and the Allies, plus Japan's continuing aggression in the Far East, emboldened Mussolini deliberately to prepare for and launch a war of aggression and conquest against Abyssinia. The world slump had produced such appalling poverty and unemployment in Italy, and had so effectively called Fascism's demagogic social bluff that some such diversion was necessary to save the regime. The result in British foreign policy was some of the most tortuous shuffling, double-dealing and double-crossing that even the Tories had so far perpetrated, and the grandiose swindle of the sham sanctions to defeat the British people at the General Election, while preserving Mussolini for a dirty deal at the expense of Abyssinia. In *Inquest on Peace*, written some months before the event, I predicted that the National Government would use the Italo-Abyssinian conflict to spring a snap election, that the application of sanctions was a mere pretence designed to fool the British people into voting for the Tories, and that after the election the National Government, if returned to power, would 'seek the earliest opportunity to do a deal with Mussolini without demanding his previous withdrawal from Abyssinian territory.' That was exactly what happened. The attempt bore the name of the Hoare-Laval deal.

In the January, 1937, number of the Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Mr E. H. Carr, who was a high official of the Foreign Office at the time of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, says bluntly that British policy was due, not, as alleged, to lack of armaments, but to the National Government's desire to win over Italy as an ally against Germany. The Hoare-Laval proposals for partitioning Abyssinia were not put forward

because the Government believed that Italy would win but, on the contrary, because 'the British and French Governments, like almost everybody else, believed in December 1935 that Italy was in an embarrassing military situation; and the famous "plan" was designed to provide her with an honourable and profitable way out.'

Baron Aloisi, the Italian delegate at Geneva, was assiduous in pressing the argument with the British, French and other delegates that Mussolini had staked his prestige on the Abyssinian adventure and that defeat would mean the overthrow of the Fascist regime. 'You don't want Italy to go Red, do you?' he would conclude triumphantly. Our Tories did not. They were reduced to the strangest and most humiliating devices to fool public opinion and among other absurdities claimed that we did not dare to challenge Mussolini because the British Navy could not stand up to the Italian fleet.

THE MURDER OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC

Hitler's and Mussolini's assault on the Spanish Republic through their hireling Franco was met in the same spirit of hypocrisy, confusion, crass and obstinate ignorance of the forces moving the world, divided councils and bitter, blind class prejudice. The Spanish Government was denied its right under international law to buy arms to defend itself against rebellion and foreign aggression. The obligation in Article 10 of the Covenant to take collective action to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of Spain against external aggression was treated as a scrap of paper. Franco, the rebel, who had no standing in international law, was allowed to exercise the right of blockade, but this was denied to the Spanish Government. This policy, known as 'non-intervention', amounted to the Western democracies co-operating with Hitler and Mussolini to murder the Spanish Republic.

When some British sea captains ran Franco's illegal blockade to bring food to the Spanish people they were denounced as mercenaries by the Tories. The bombing of British ships and the killing of British seamen by Spanish Fascists and by Hitler's and Mussolini's non-intervening (and in the case of Hitler illegal) military air forces were regarded with equanimity. Mr J. L. Hammond wrote in the *Manchester Guardian* of February 24, 1938: 'The fear of Communism has produced a phenomenon new in English history. The strongest supporters of Austria in Italy in the eighteen-fifties did not put Austria's success as the

first of British interests. To-day there is a large class of Englishmen who in their dread of Communism think that the success of Franco in Spain, of Mussolini in Italy, and Hitler in Germany is so important that the fate of British power in the Mediterranean is a secondary matter.

'There is nothing wicked in this view, but its consequences must be recognised. When it leads to such insensibility as Mr Duff Cooper shows about the drowning of British sailors by Franco in the cause of Fascism, it startles all but the extreme Right in the House of Commons. But it is all the time in the minds of a great many Conservatives'.

Mr F. L. Lucas also put his finger on the spot when he wrote, likewise in the *Manchester Guardian*, on February 16, 1937, to protest against co-operation with Fascist aggression in Spain under the hypocritical guise of 'non-intervention':

As over Ethiopia our policy is palsied by one fundamental thing. More and more it stands out above every other factor. A large section of English opinion is obsessed with a *delirium tremens* which sees everywhere the red rat of Bolshevism gnawing its way into its bank cellars. Hitler may arm to the teeth, bestride our trade routes, yell for colonies; no matter, this agony about their beloved bank balances blinds these people to all else. Hitler, they think, may save them from being plundered by "the Reds"; he well may - to do it twice as effectively himself. Nothing will get done till we are cured of this ignoble paranoia.

WHY THE TORIES CANNOT GOVERN

Even yet the full depths of the Tory Party's failure, and the deadly danger to civilisation if they were to return to power, for they have learned nothing and hope the electors have forgotten everything, is not realised. That is why the following analysis, which, although published early in 1939 (in my book *Why We are Losing the Peace*), still holds good, should be taken to heart:

There is a fairly close analogy between the frame of mind of the National Government to-day and the attitude of great financiers, such as Samuel Insull or Krueger, in the last stages of the struggle preceding their collapse. These men only dimly understood the ramifications of the vast enterprises they had built up. They did not know in the least why things began to go wrong. They were caught in the slump and started to gamble and steal and forge, more and more recklessly and desperately, to stave off the impending collapse. Under cross-examination they appeared - according to their own accounts and who can say they did not believe it themselves - as

good men hardly treated by fate, whose only desire was to save their shareholders' money, who were sure they could have brought it off if only they had had more time and more shareholders' money to play with, and who differed from their business colleagues still at large only in that the latter got away with it and they had been caught.

Why has the Government's foreign policy worked so badly? Chiefly because the post-slump world is so different from the pre-war world that the pre-war policies simply will not work.

The failure of the Government's policy is part of the failure of the whole social and colonial order they are trying so desperately to prop up. Their attempts to hold back the forces of change merely mean that they are banking them up until they break out in a devastating explosion. By hanging on desperately they are not saving capitalism but merely making sure that when it falls it will bring down civilisation.

Conservatives, with a few possible exceptions, are not democrats in an 'absolute' sense. Their loyalty to democracy is strictly conditioned by democracy's fidelity to Capitalism. Although he wrote about the Spanish Republic Mr Churchill also expressed his and most Tories' views about democracy in this country when he said (in the *Evening Standard* of August 10 1936):

'It is idle to claim that a constitutional and parliamentary regime is legally or morally entitled to the obedience of all classes when it is actually being subverted and devoured from day to day by Communism'. There were no Communists in the Spanish Republican Government when Franco rebelled. Its offence was that it had, by perfectly legal means, and according to its mandate from the people, attempted some mild social and land reforms. Mr Churchill has treated most of the Labour Government's legislation and administrative acts as heralding Communism, Red ruin and the breaking up of laws.

The Fascist assault on Spain made the dilemma arising from the conflict between the needs of Imperial safety and those of social stability so acute that there was a split between the Tories stuck on one or the other horn of the dilemma. They divided into what I at the time called the Churchill-Eden-Vansittart balance-of-power appeasers and the Chamberlain-Sir Horace Wilson all-in appeasers. I defined the difference between the two schools as follows in *Why We are Losing the Peace*:

The issue on which Mr Eden disagreed with Mr Chamberlain, and had the sympathies of almost the whole Foreign Office and of a section of the Conservative Party, was the difference between the

power-politics of the Foreign Office and the class-war politics of the City. The policy of the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Robert Vansittart, had ever since the advent of Hitler in 1933 been the orthodox, pre-war policy of building up a Balance of Power against Germany, which was regarded as the chief potential enemy of the British Empire. On orthodox, pre-war lines Sir Robert set about converting the Anglo-French Entente into an alliance and buying over lesser potential enemies to our side at the expense of third parties.

'If the world had been "normal" (i.e. more like pre-war) the obvious partner in the Balance of Power game would have been Russia. But unfortunately that country had gone all wrong and dangerous since the Revolution. It could not be used, for instance, to counter-balance Japan in the Far East, because it wanted to help China's struggle for national independence, even at the risk of undermining British as well as Japanese Imperialism. In fact, it was unscrupulous enough to find the prospect an added attraction rather than a deterrent. The same deplorable attitude was observable over Abyssinia and Spain.

In each case the Soviet Union was bent on helping the victim of aggression to defeat the aggressor, regardless - or even because of - the disastrous consequences to the colonial and social *status quo*. That would not do at all from the point of view of the Foreign Office, which was trying each time to 'wangle' the situation in such a way as to prolong the war until universal exhaustion and ruin produced a deadlock in which Great Britain would be accepted by both sides as the mediator, and would exact respect for British Imperial interests as the price of mediation. It was a policy so delicate and complicated that it never quite came off, and so 'realistic' that its aims could never be publicly avowed. But, such as it was, it was the policy evolved by Sir Robert Vansittart and the Foreign Office ...

The U.S.S.R., therefore, being 'out' and Japan not only remote but intractable, the only possible partner in a Balance of Power against Germany was Italy. Hence the Stresa Conference of April 1935, which Sir Robert Vansittart attended in person, in order to see that his nominal chiefs, Mr Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon, did what the Foreign Office wanted them to do. They did. Germany's breach of the Versailles Treaty by the denunciation of Chapter V (Disarmament) was solemnly denounced by France, Great Britain and Italy jointly. This was to be the beginning of a 'Stresa Front', i.e. an Anglo-Franco-Italian alliance against Germany. The blood of Abyssinia and the scraps of paper of the Covenant were to seal this alliance, just as before the war the conquest of Morocco was the price of the Anglo-French and the partition of Persia the price of the Anglo-Russian Entente.

The results of the Abyssinian betrayal were not quite what the 'realists' had intended. Once more the power-politicians, having in the name of 'realism' thrown overboard treaty obligations, morality,

honour, mercy and justice, for the sake of success, found they had only encompassed disaster, and fell back on the plea of good intentions to excuse the ruin they had wrought. But it would be quite wrong to imagine that this in any way shook the confidence of the Foreign Office in power politics or altered their belief that this post-war talk about the Covenant was at best electoral eye-wash and at worst mischievous nonsense ...

Nothing daunted by failure, the Foreign Office began to play the same game over Spain. This time we were to let Italian Fascism butcher Spanish democracy as the price of buying Italy out of the Rome-Berlin axis.

But Spain was different from previous victims of aggression. Japanese Imperialism had been the traditional ally of British Imperialism in the Far East and China was the traditional victim of both. The conquest of Abyssinia, in the opinion of the Government's advisers as expressed in the Maffey Report, did not matter from the point of view of Imperial defence, unless we were at war with Italy, which they regarded as a remote contingency. Abyssinia was also a traditional bargaining counter in the relations of British and Italian Imperialism. But Spain always has mattered tremendously from the point of view of British Imperial defence, and air power has increased its importance.

'The Churchill-Eden-Vansittart school of thought in the governing class were just as indifferent to the rights of the Spanish Government and just as callous to the agonies of the Spanish people as the Chamberlain section. But they were concerned about British Imperial interests, i.e. the colonial and strategic interests of the propertied classes. They wanted to break up the Rome-Berlin axis, and in any case to prevent Spain joining the Axis. And so they tried first to induce Hitler to double-cross Mussolini and then Mussolini to double-cross Hitler. They also cherished the hope that they could, with the help of one-sided 'non-intervention', prolong the war indefinitely so as to be able to 'mediate' and win the gratitude of both sides. And they toyed with the notion of lending Franco money so as to buy him over and double-cross both Hitler and Mussolini.

Their policy fluctuated and wavered and was almost incredibly tortuous and complicated ...

But for exactly the same class-war reasons that our power-politicians rejected co-operation with the U.S.S.R. and attempted the impossible task of building up a European Balance of Power without the Soviet Union, they also ruled out fair dealing with the Spanish Government, and attempted to build up a Balance of Power in Spain by juggling with Franco, Mussolini and Hitler.

The freedom from moral scruple of our 'realists' was only equalled by the magnitude of their political miscalculations. Their Spanish policy was as abject a failure as their Abyssinian policy.

When it dawned tardily upon our power-politicians that Mussolini had no intention of breaking the 'Axis', and looked upon

the conquest of Spain as merely a further step toward building up a new Roman Empire on the ruins of the British Empire, they took alarm ...

Mr Chamberlain, on the other hand, had for years represented another section in the Conservative Party, which wanted to acknowledge the leadership of the Fascist Powers in the world-wide capitalist reaction and to buy Tory England into the Rome-Berlin axis at the price of Abyssinia, Spain, Czechoslovakia or even some British colonies (although for preference French, Belgian, Portuguese or Dutch colonies). This section represented the vested interests of the City and F.B.I. and the true-blue Tories better than the relatively high-brow Churchill-Eden group. It was not so good as the latter at taking long views and analysing the world situation. It did not know much about the intricacies of power politics. But it relied on class instinct. It quite simply hated and feared the Spanish 'Reds' and the U.S.S.R., was very much worried about what the British workers might do in the next slump, and looked on the Fascist regimes as a bulwark against the danger of 'Communism' (i.e. social unrest).'

MUNICH

The triumph of Mr Chamberlain and the all-in appeasers was signalised by the crowning betrayal of Munich. The attempts of the Soviet Union to conclude alliances with France and Britain and to hold a conference of the great powers Members of the League to concert measures for acting on our Covenant obligation to oppose an attack by Hitler on Czechoslovakia were twice rejected by Mr Chamberlain. He said that that would mean taking sides in the ideological conflict and dividing Europe into two camps. (The same plea had been used by Mr Eden at the League Assembly as an excuse for 'welshing' on the Covenant and letting Franco and his Axis backers rip in Spain). Thereupon Mr Chamberlain flew to Munich in order to join with Hitler, Mussolini, and the French to carve up Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union was ignored. This was not only morally infamous towards the Czechs; it amounted to spitting in the face of the Soviet Government.

When the Soviet Union had found that the capitalist world was splitting into two camps, that of the Fascists, who were aggressive and expansionist, and that of the democracies, which clung to peace and the *status quo*, there was another fundamental shift and adjustment in Soviet policy and outlook. The Soviet Union entered the League and worked within the League for strengthening the guarantees against aggression. This brought with it as a consequence the attempt to soften and democratise

the internal regime of the Soviet Union. The leaders in this campaign were Kirov, Governor of Leningrad and the North Western Area, and Maxim Gorky. Kirov's argument was that a 'western orientation' in foreign policy, leading to alliances with democratic parties and governments, carried with it the necessity for democratising the Soviet system of government and home policy generally. He stressed this argument equally with domestic considerations – the Socialist economic order was now firmly established, the collective farm system was a success, 'here were only remnants of the old economic classes left, etc. – as arguments for broadening and democratising the regime.

The murder of Kirov by a member of the 'Opposition' who had been amnestied but had not become reconciled, and the discovery of very far-reaching Nazi fifth column work in Russia, as well as the rebuffs received by the Soviet Union culminating in the humiliation of Munich, and the growing danger of war, frustrated these tendencies and led to a last-minute change of policy. The promise of the Stalin constitution remained unfulfilled. But the Soviet Government went on trying to strengthen the League against aggression by an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance based on the Covenant (this was also the policy advocated by the Labour Party at that time).

The French and British Governments went so far in 'appeasement' that when the Soviet Government offered to stand by Czechoslovakia if the latter resisted Hitler, even although she were let down by her ally France and by Great Britain, the Czechs were told by Mr Chamberlain and M. Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Secretary, that if they fought with the Soviet Union as their ally, France and Britain might not remain neutral and might supply Hitler with arms and munitions (i.e. become the arsenal of Fascism). And so the Western democracies held Czechoslovakia down on the butcher's block while Hitler carved the heart out of that little democracy at Munich.

Mr Chamberlain's reason for this supreme betrayal, like most of the melancholy history of how we lost the last peace and the last but one, has a topical ring: he explained to Messrs Daladier and Georges Bonnet on their final visit to London at the end of September 1938 that it was better that Czechoslovakia should be sacrificed than that she should fight with the Soviet Union as her ally. For in the latter case either Hitler would win and become so strong as to menace the colonial empires and vital interests of the Western powers, or else the Soviet Union would defeat Hitler and in that case half Europe

would go Communist and that also was a deadly danger to the vital interests of the Western powers.

When the Soviet Government made up its mind that British and French Tories would put class before country to the bitter end and were concerned only to do deals with Hitler, turning his aggression eastwards, it determined to make this 'West European' policy backfire. The result was the Soviet-German treaty of friendship and non-aggression concluded at the expense of Poland, the Baltic States and ultimately of the Western powers and world peace.

The Soviet Union had received severe and sustained provocation. But if the Soviet analysis of the situation had allowed for the existence of public opinion as an independent force in the Western democracies, for the potential power of Labour and for the split in the Conservative camp between the balance-of-power appeasers and the all-in appeasers, it might have arrived at a different conclusion.

It would have been better for the world if the Soviet Government had decided to accept even an imperfect alliance full of loopholes on paper with the Western powers, for then Hitler would have been faced at the outset with a war on two fronts and the internal developments in France and Britain would have been such as to produce resolutely belligerent governments from the moment we went to war. Hitler might even have been given pause until internal disaster overtook him.

Instead we were pitchforked into war with no allies except a weakened France. If the Japanese had not committed the folly of attacking the United States and Hitler the even greater folly of assaulting the Soviet Union, it is difficult to see how even the staunchness of our people could have saved us from the mortal consequences of Tory misrule.

CHAPTER IV

Through War to Intervention Again

THE second world war continued the story of the long fight that has been waged against the forces of social change by our ruling class, ever since the first world war and the Russian revolution made this the primary issue in international affairs. Mr Churchill was a great war leader. He worthily embodied and voiced national unity and determination to defeat the menace to our existence as a free community.

THE TORY DILEMMA GROWS MORE ACUTE

But he made it clear in more than one speech that what he was fighting for was the defence of things as they are, the survival of the imperial and social *status quo*. Unlike most of the nation, he did not really feel that there was any deep and irreconcilable clash of principle between us and our Fascist enemies. That feeling he reserved for our ally, the Soviet Union, and the Communist parties, fighting magnificently on our side at Stalingrad and Moscow and in the European resistance movements. He unconsciously revealed his real attitude when he wrote:

Greater divergencies have opened among men than those of the religious wars of the Reformation or of the political and social conflicts of the French Revolution, or of the power struggle just concluded with Hitler's Germany. The schism between Communism, on the one hand, and Christian ethics, on the other, is the most deadly, far-reaching and rending that the human race has known. (In the American weekly, *Collier's Magazine* of January 4, 1947).

Most of us felt and still feel, that the fight with the Fascist regimes was not a mere 'power struggle', but the contest of rival, fundamentally opposed views on the nature of civilisation, which could not live together, and one of which must perish in the conflict. That obviously is not the way Mr Churchill felt or feels about the issue. How could he? For, after all, he was saying in 1927 that Fascism was the last line of defence of Capitalist society and thanking Mussolini for his example to Western statesmen in difficulties with their own working class. In a series of articles in the *Evening Standard* in August and

September 1936, he paid a perfervid tribute to Franco, who was pitted against 'squalid' (a favourite word of Mr Churchill's) Communism and was going, inspired by Mussolini's great example, to restore the splendours and glories of Imperial Spain.

Mr Churchill is still demanding the inclusion of Franco in the United Nations and has stoutly refused to recant his views about the international merit of Mussolini's victory over 'Communism'. As late as 1938, only a year before the second world war, he wrote an article on Hitler, paying him almost as high a tribute for his services to Germany as he previously had to Mussolini and concluding:

I have always said that if Great Britain were defeated in war, I hoped we should find a Hitler to lead us back to our rightful position among the nations. (Quoted in the I.L.P. pamphlet *Common Sense versus Vansittartism*, published October 1943).

Most of us would feel that to have Fascism imposed on us after being beaten in war would be to add social defeat to national defeat. But not so Mr Churchill. Capitalist counter-revolution appears to him as the last line of defence, the supreme resource of hard-pressed Toryism and the only way to save the existing social order in the disillusionment and suffering resulting from the loss of a war.

To the bulk of the Tory party, which had clung to Chamberlain, appeasement and Fascism to the bloody end, the resulting war was somehow the wrong war. For was it not true, as Sir Thomas Moore, still Tory M.P., for Ayr Burghs, had written in dithyrambic praise of Mosley's Blackshirts and their 'pride of race, love of country, loyalty', that 'the briefest study of the movement [i.e. the British Union of Fascists] and the most casual examination of its members satisfy one that it is largely derived from the Conservative Party. This is perhaps natural, for the instincts are the same.' (In the *Daily Mail* of April 25, 1934).

The Blackshirts were so loyal and loved their country so much that most of them had to be locked up during the war under 18B. So had a Tory M.P. As for the rest, one, Sir Arnold Wilson, consciously and nobly expiated his pro-Fascist record by going out, although he was far above military age, as tail-gunner in a bomber – the most dangerous post he could find – and fell in battle. Another, Sir Henry Morris Jones, still Liberal National M.P. for Denbigh, was moved to confess that 'I

suppose I was one of the "yes-men" in the old days and we yes-men are largely responsible for this war having come about. If we had not been so "yes" it could have been avoided. A constructive act of statesmanship on the part of this country could have avoided this war' (January 28, 1942).

The great majority of the pro-Fascist yes-men in the Tory Party were patriotic and self-sacrificing in the war without ever changing their views. From 1939-1945 they and the bulk of the nation were on the same side, but not fighting the same war. For them our Soviet ally was still our enemy, and our Fascist enemies were the friends of yesterday that might have to be salvaged to-morrow.

THE WAR AS APPEASEMENT CONTINUED BY OTHER MEANS

The idea of letting Hitler rip against the Soviet Union, on the basis of a deal with him in the West, which had been the guiding motive of Tory foreign policy in the years before the war, did not die with the outbreak of war. It reappeared as the idea of 'switching the war' during the period of the 'phony' war, when all was quiet on the Western front while Hitler attacked the Soviet Union.

To those who held this view, the war was simply pro-Fascist appeasement continued by other means, just as pro-Fascist appeasement was itself only a continuation of anti-Communist intervention by other means. 'Either we do the job of butchering Communists (including anybody who means business with Socialism) ourselves, or we let our Fascist pals do it for us', summarised the general idea of such Tories.

Colonel Moore-Brabazon, then Minister of Aircraft Production, made a speech on a semi-private occasion at Manchester in which he said he hoped that our enemy Nazi Germany and our ally the Soviet Union, then fighting desperately before Stalin-grad, would destroy each other, leaving Britain mistress of the Continent. Some members of the A.E.U. present on this occasion became so indignant that they communicated the speech to the Press, with the result that Colonel Moore-Brabazon had to resign.

Before the Soviet Union was attacked, during the period when she was strengthening her defences against the danger of attack and waged war against Finland to secure the concessions she demanded for this purpose, there was an outcry in this country that was fully exploited by the 'switch the war' school of thought. The Soviet action was ruthless, because the Soviet Government had got wind of the fact that the Finnish General

Staff, most of which had fought in the German Army during the first world war, was prepared to allow Hitler's forces to march through the country and attack Leningrad from the heavily fortified Finnish frontier only a few miles to the north. Information available since the end of the war has proved that that Soviet information was accurate, whatever may be thought of the ethics of the Soviet demands on the Finnish Government for a revision of the frontier in exchange for compensations further north.

But we after all were at the time supposed to be fighting for our lives against Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, Mr F. A. Voigt, the editor of the *Nineteenth Century*, and at the time employed in our official war propaganda, publicly urged that this country and France should attack the Soviet Union, bomb the oil wells of Baku, etc., on the ground that the U.S.S.R. was militarily so weak that it would embarrass Hitler to have her as his ally. Attacking the Soviet Union would therefore be the best way to win the war against Germany.

Mr Hore-Belisha, then Minister for War, resigned because, among other reasons, he could not persuade the Government to adopt a view much like that of Mr Voigt. The 'switch the war' school was much stronger in leading Tory circles at this stage of the war than is generally realised. So it was in France.

Mr Philip Jordan, the highly competent and well-informed Liberal journalist who is now P.R.O. to the Prime Minister, observed in his book *Russian Glory*, recounting his personal experiences and inside views as a war correspondent:

They [the French and British leaders] were at war with Germany, with the most formidable fighting machine that the world had yet known. And yet they were consumed with a desire to destroy the Soviet Union and to deal with Hitler later and at leisure.

Of such criminal folly I had evidence in the early months of 1940 when I visited Syria at the invitation of General Weygand to inspect and see for myself something of the French war effort in that country.

There is no harm in saying now that the old gentleman was infinitely more concerned with the hope of an attack by the Allies on Russia than he was with the necessity of beating the Germans.

The first, and the largest, maps I saw in his headquarters were not maps of Turkey and how to go to its aid; were not maps which might more quickly have enabled the French in Syria to do damage to actual enemies' influence in that part of the world; but were maps showing how best and most easily British and French troops could move up the Armenian plateau and attack Baku.

He had sent French air planes to take aerial photographs of both Baku and Batoum, and he would show these photographs with the same sort of excited pleasure that a ruined debauchee will exhibit indecent pictures to the curious. This view of the new world struggle was by no means confined to the French.

General Weygand, it may be recalled, later helped to bring about the defeat and collapse of France by holding back the tanks that were desperately needed to close the breach made by the Germans in the Maginot Line and through which they were pouring into France, because he wanted these tanks to 'restore order' in case of a 'red rising' in the hour of defeat. The average decent citizen simply does not understand the mad intensity, the fixed maniac obsession of so many of our leading diplomats, brass hats and Capitalist politicians, when faced by the menace of social revolution.

The day after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, the United States Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, wrote to President Roosevelt that he had conferred with the Chiefs of Staff and the War Plans Division and found general agreement on the view that 'Germany will be thoroughly occupied in beating Russia for a minimum of one month and a possible maximum of three months'. The War Office and Sir Stafford Cripps, then our Ambassador in Moscow and, no doubt, advised by his Military Attaché, gave it as their considered, professional, inside view that the Red Army would not last more than from six to ten weeks.

These were the men who 'knew the facts'. This was not mere honest incompetence – it was the result of bitter, murderous and suicidal political prejudice on the part of the Government's advisers. American and British brass hats simply could not bring themselves to believe that the damned reds, who had become our allies through no fault of the War Office or the War Department, could possibly fight. They haven't forgiven them for that fact to this day. That was why the Soviet Union got no help at all for three months. In the end help was generous within the straitened limits of our physical possibilities, and there were many deeds of heroism in the course of convoying American and British arms and munitions to Archangel through the awful cold and darkness and the stormy seas of the Arctic winter.

MR CHURCHILL CONFUSES ANTI-GERMAN STRATEGY WITH ANTI-SOVIET INTERVENTION

But it is hardly surprising perhaps that the Russians, with

their bitter memories of the ceaseless hostility and perfidy of the Governments of the Western Democracies ever since they attempted to strangle the Russian revolution in its cradle, were suspicious of their Allies. They could hardly help learning of how freely Mr Churchill, as revealed in Colonel Elliot Roosevelt's record of the conversations between his father and the British Prime Minister, expressed in private his bitter enmity towards the Soviet Union. The fact that Mr Churchill passed on to the United States, then still neutral, the discovery made by a British scientist of how to split the atom, and kept the secret from our allies, the Russians, who were then arousing the admiration of the world by their epic fight before Stalingrad and Moscow, made a deep impression in the Soviet Union when it was revealed.

Long before that, the Soviet Government could not but be aware that Mr Churchill's war strategy was being shaped with an eye at least as much to opposing the Soviet Union as to defeating Germany. Colonel Elliot Roosevelt's memoirs and the supporting evidence in Harry Hopkins' private papers and General Eisenhower's book make it clear that the whole controversy about a second front from 1942 onwards, was deeply influenced by Mr Churchill's politico-strategic concept that Britain and the U.S.A. should land in the Balkans and push up into Eastern Europe, in order to keep the Russians from coming westwards.

General Eisenhower says it straight out: after making it clear that the strategy of a cross-Channel invasion, as promised by Churchill and Roosevelt to Stalin in 1942, was vainly pressed on Mr Churchill by the Americans for two years, he remarks:

'I could not escape the feeling that Mr Churchill's views were unconsciously coloured by two considerations that lay outside the scope of the immediate military problem. The first of them was his concern as a political leader for the future of the Balkans. The other was an inner compulsion to vindicate his strategic concepts of World War I, in which he had been the principal exponent of the Gallipoli campaign.' (And of the Antwerp expedition, just as, in the second world war, he overrode his military advisers and sent troops to Greece on a militarily hopeless enterprise that cost 40,000 lives and despatched several shiploads of men and supplies to Singapore just in time to be scooped in by the Japanese. Mr Churchill has always believed in scattering our forces. He is a shot-gun strategist because he is a romantic politician).

The war was needlessly prolonged; the opening of the Second

Front was delayed for at least a year and the promise to Stalin was broken, because from 1943 onwards Mr Churchill was waging war against the resistance movements and the Soviet Union almost as much as against Germany. Just like last time.

But it would be a vulgar error and a grave injustice to Mr Churchill to suppose that he was conscious of any duality of aim, still less of any duplicity in his policy in combining counter-revolutionary intervention against the Russian and European revolutions with waging war against German Imperialism or Fascism, in the first world war or the second. In his mind, the war was one war both times, and victory meant the defeat of German militarism or Fascism and the preservation of Capitalism as a combined operation in defence of a single indivisible cause.

How to defend this cause in the second world war was even more complicated than in the first, because, as Fascism was essentially capitalist counter-revolution, the defeat and overthrow of the Fascist regimes carried with it grave danger of a measure of social revolution. The Fascist and Quisling regimes were based largely on the propertied classes, whereas the backbone of the resistance movements were the workers, the poorer peasants and trade unionists, Socialists and Communists.

Those who were our national allies in the life and death struggle were still regarded by the Tories as their class enemies. And so our friends of the war were destined in their eyes to be our enemies of the coming peace, even if that meant beginning to get ready to fight still another world war long before the second world war had ended.

This situation, resulting from the fundamental clash of interests between the Soviet Union and the resistance movements on the one hand and the ruling classes of Britain and the U.S.A. on the other, was fairly clear as early as 1943, even to those who had few or no inside sources of information and could use only past knowledge and reflect on the news publicly available to guide them. In proof of this assertion I herewith quote most of a report I wrote in August and September 1943 for a Fabian Study Group. I bid the reader take careful note of the date - September 1943 - for so much of what this report forecast has unfortunately come true that it sounds more like a description of the present situation than an analysis of the shape of things to come written in the middle of the war.

THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME

The report began with an analysis, showing that the fight

against social revolution had been the main issue in world affairs ever since 1917, that concluded with the following two paragraphs :

At every step of the way, in Italy, in Germany, and later in the defeat and overthrow of the Popular Front in France, domestic reaction [between the wars] not only enjoyed the passive or active assistance of western Toryism, but found the way to power opened through the split between Socialists and Communists, which in its turn aggravated dissensions within the Socialist camp, strengthening the right wing and weakening the left.

The present world war is largely the price humanity is paying for the success of the propertied classes in preserving the old order. There are no signs that this motive has in any way weakened in the classes concerned, nor that they are any less resolved to conduct the war and shape the peace settlement as a continuation of their fight to defend the old order by whatever means seem most convenient.

After this introduction the report went on, as quoted herewith, headings and all :

THE DANGER OF LOSING THE NEXT PEACE

On the contrary, although to-day there is national unity for defeating the Axis in this country and in the U.S.A., and such unity is literally a vital necessity, the signs multiply that unity will cease with the end of hostilities and that the propertied classes in this country, following the lead of their American big brothers, will make a most determined effort again to save the old order of society.

This time the Soviet Union is our ally instead of our enemy and an ally that bids fair to do the greater part of the job of winning the war in Europe, and hence to enjoy a lion's share of influence in making the Continental peace settlement.

To-day the whole of Europe, with the exception of Sweden and Switzerland, is under Nazi, Fascist and satellite Quisling regimes. (Franco Spain belongs half way between the two latter categories). These regimes have so thoroughly taken possession of transport, banking and key industries, and are collaborating to such an extent with the leaders of the propertied classes in the countries concerned, that their overthrow and the restoration of democracy will lead, not to a return to the pre-war freedom of private enterprise but to a semi-collectivist society in which the working class will acquire a new social status and the chance to exercise decisive political power.

Just as the propertied classes were the stronghold of appeasement and collaboration, and big business and the great landowners are the economic taproots of Fascism, so the underground resistance movements, although they have become nation-wide, originated in and are dominated by the working class. Such reconstruction programmes as have come to the knowledge of the outside world show clearly that the resistance movements are almost without exception

left in character. The French, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, Belgian, Dutch, Polish, Italian and Greek underground fighters regard public ownership of banking, transport and key industries, and national control of the whole economic system as the essential foundation for political democracy, and as the only way of dealing with the elements of society that have proved fundamentally hostile to the rights of the common people, and have literally sold out to Fascism.

In face of this situation the Allies have, it is true, made general declarations of principle, which are well up to the standard of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, or of the Memorandum adopted by the British and French Cabinets at the end of 1917, defining their policy towards Russia.

The memorandum then quoted the Cabinet document of December 1917 mentioned in Chapter I, proposing that the Allies were 'as quietly as possible' to subsidise and prepare various counter-revolutionary forces to make war on the Bolsheviks, while representing to the latter that 'we have no desire to take part in any way in the internal politics of Russia, and that any idea that we favour a counter-revolution is a profound mistake'. The 1943 memorandum continued:

Admiral Darlan was supported in North Africa by arguments of military expediency that closely resembled those used in the last war for supporting Admiral Kolchak in Siberia. The De Gaulle-Giraud regime resulting from his disappearance has got rid of most of the traitors and out-and-out Fascists. But it is so predominantly conservative in character that it may easily clash with the claims of the democratic and largely socialist underground resistance movement in France, and develop into a military dictatorship of semi-Fascist character ...

A similar latent conflict with the British and American Governments lurks in the antagonism between the Yugoslav and Greek *émigré* Governments and dynasties on the one hand and on the other the Partisans in Yugoslavia and Greece who are doing most of the fighting and enjoy Soviet support (although in this case it looks as though the Foreign Office and, after stiff resistance, the War Office, are now backing both sides).

In a broadcast from Quebec on August 31, 1943, Mr Churchill declared that he desired to see the Kings of Yugoslavia and Greece restored to their thrones. The King of Yugoslavia is the tool of a clique of extreme reactionaries, Pan-Serb officers and officials who dominate the *émigré* Yugoslav Government. Some of them have an evil past of collaboration with the Fascist, pro-Nazi dictatorship of Stoyadinovich. An attempt to re-introduce this Government and dynasty into Yugoslavia will mean civil war with the federalist, democratic, partly Socialist and Communist, partisan movement.

As to the effect in Greece of Mr Churchill's open partisanship on behalf of the Greek King, who has a black record of hostility to democracy and of pro-Fascism, the following cautious hints in a despatch sent by *The Times* Smyrna correspondent, September 12, 1943, and published on September 15, are significant: 'It would be futile to conceal the fact that the King is blamed for having tolerated and supported the Metaxas regime, which abolished the parliamentary system and established a dictatorship on Nazi and Fascist lines. The Greeks have neither forgotten nor forgiven that regime ...

'The British public should take particular note of the insidious propaganda that has been carried on for some time, to the effect that the British Government are seeking to impose the King on the Greek people, with the innuendo that the peace terms will be more or less favourable to Greece according to whether the King returns to Greece or not. It is difficult to imagine anything more harmful to British influence or prestige in Greece or to the King himself.'

'*The Times* correspondent adds that the most important organisation conducting underground resistance in Greece 'is the National Liberation Front (E.A.M.), which includes adherents of the Radical Republican, Socialist and Communist parties.'

The American and British Governments are not responsible for the fact that the Polish Government in London is drawn from the 'motorised emigration' from Poland,* and so is dominated by landowners, big businessmen and generals, nor that it considers itself not competent to revise the semi-Fascist Constitution imposed on Poland by Pilsudski. But the net result is potentia! dissension between the Anglo-American policy towards Poland, and that of the Soviet Union, which has broken off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government, does not recognise its frontier claims, and is encouraging a Free Polish Committee and a Polish force.

Although the underground movement in Poland, which is largely Socialist and Radical Peasant in its leadership, recognises the Polish *émigré* Government as the leader of national resistance, there are serious possibilities of a clash between the latter's claim to take charge of liberated Poland, and the underground movement's programme for overthrowing the German occupation regime at a favourable moment and then forming a People's Government with a democratic and semi-Socialist policy of reconstruction, including the handing over of the landowners' estates to the peasants without compensation, nationalisation of transport, key industries and banking, and control of the rest; a great development of the co-operative movement; local self-government; democratic national government; and a merciless fight against Polish reaction and those

* This was an allusion to the fact that the Poles who escaped and got to London were mostly those who had the position or influence to get a car by hook or by crook in order to flee when Poland collapsed. The result was that the London *émigrés* were a cross section of the Polish bourgeoisie and official classes rather than of the nation. Genuine working class or peasant representatives were exceedingly rare.

remnants of the old ruling classes desirous of recovering the privileges they have lost.

The Belgian underground resistance movement is strongly Socialist and working class in character. But parallel with it there is a 'National' movement which may take the form of an officers' conspiracy in alliance with big business collaborationists and the right wing of the Belgian exiled Government, with a programme of using the King as figurehead for an authoritarian regime.

Anglo-American appeasement of Franco; the State Department's and Mr Stimson's [U.S. Secretary of State for War] relations with Otto of Habsburg; Mr Myron Taylor's [U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican] and Archbishop Spellman's negotiations with the Vatican and the strong probability that their object is to enlist the services of that venerable institution as an employment exchange for potential Darlans; Mr Kingsbury Smith's well-informed and disquieting articles in the *American Mercury* on the intentions of the State Department in Europe, and on the 'keep things as they are' policy for which American military administrators (humorously known as *Gauleiters*) are being trained – all this and much else, point to a determined effort by at least certain powerful quarters in the Foreign and War Offices, with vigorous support from Anglo-American Conservative and Catholic circles, to clamp some kind of clerical-militarist-big business-monarchist dictatorships on the countries liberated from the Fascist and Quisling tyrannies.

How the thing works out is being made pretty clear in the case of Italy. On the one hand we have the regime set up by AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories). This regime relies on building up local administrations by officials who have not been 'active Fascists'. In practice they mostly turn out to be 'passive' Fascists, or the local priest, or some similar 'non-political' figure. No political activities by Anti-Fascists, nor any revival of democratic local government is allowed.

As the General who presides over AMGOT in Sicily, Major-General Lord Rennel of Rodd, in private life an eminent banker, put it in an interview in the *News Chronicle* of August 13, 1943: 'We do not seek the help of any political group here, anti-Fascist or otherwise'. He added that we shall encourage the Church to assist in elementary education for the time being. Moreover 'there is no freedom of assembly in Sicily at present, and until I get further orders there will be none'. As for law and order, AMGOT, he explained, are using the Carabinieri, Mussolini's Civil Police; 'they have worked well, and most of them are dependable. There are few real Fascists among them, as their oath was always to the King of Italy rather than Mussolini'.

Industries owned by Allied capital which were taken over by the Italian Government when Italy came into the war, were now held in custody by AMGOT for their former owners. AMGOT had no plans for social and economic reorganisation nor would it allow

such plans to be carried out by Italians, because, in the Banker-General's words: 'Neither international law nor the mandate AMGOT has, as a military government, allows any schemes of social reform to be applied. We can redistribute no property of Italian nationals. We can apply no new taxes, we cannot rearrange the economic pattern in the occupied territory'.

The Allies, through AMGOT, are in fact doing in the parts of Italy that they occupy exactly the job that the Victor Emmanuel-Badoglio dictatorship tried to do in the rest of Italy, namely to substitute a military-big business-clerical-monarchist dictatorship for the Fascism that has been broken, and preventing the Italian workers and peasants taking advantage of the *interregnum* to assert their social claims and democratic rights.

The motive was made almost indecently clear in the campaign conducted in the *Daily Telegraph* for Allied support of the Victor Emmanuel-Badoglio dictatorship, in spite of the fact that it was continuing to make war against us, in order to forestall any possibility of social revolution in Italy. On August 7th the *Daily Telegraph*, through its diplomatic correspondent, explained that the way out for Badoglio was to cease fighting. 'If he tries for too long to fight the Scylla of war, the Charybdis of popular fury will get him. He had better give up his attempt to steer in midstream, and make for an Allied harbour while there is time.'

Most of the *Daily Telegraph* campaign was conducted by Signor Franzero, who until Italy's entry into the war was a prominent Fascist journalist in London and still seems to be far from democratic. Signor Franzero devoted a good deal of space to explaining that the mass of the people was behind the King and Badoglio, and that too much attention should not be paid to the revolutionary movement. On August 12 he revealed his real preoccupation by explaining that 'under the surface there are various parties; one of them is a so-called "Liberal Party", which however is futile ... There is no Socialist party - or rather there is a Socialist Party which is in fact the Communist Party. It is not very numerous but it is powerfully organised. It is well provided with funds. It has an excellent paper ... it conducts an excellent propaganda ... If Badoglio should be obliged to withdraw, there may be a short-lived Liberal Government, which might or might not capitulate to the Allies, but would, with or without capitulation, be swept away by a Communist administration.'

As Mr Sam Grafton, writing in the *New York Post* (reported in *Reynolds News* in August, 1943) puts it: 'Until the people of Europe rise we consider them to be a heroic underground, suffering all manner of torment in our cause. The moment they do rise we instantly hear them described as a Red anarchic mob which wants to pull all Europe down in flames. The same people both times.'

Mr Walter Lippmann, the well-known American author and journalist, is best described as a conservative liberal, and certainly

can by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as a revolutionary. But he has publicly drawn the lesson from events in Italy, that the whole conception of AMGOT is out of date, for it is based on the idea of mile by mile reconquest, and military government being set up in the wake of the slowly advancing armies. ... Mr Lippmann concludes that if Hitlerite Europe collapses before the Allies are well established on the Continent, their present policy will produce anarchy and civil war.

At this point the memorandum quoted the *Manchester Guardian*, September 15, 1943.

Some anxiety has been caused by a recent statement by an American journalist, who professed to report the views of the State Department. He said that when the Allies land in France 'it is the intention to leave civil affairs to the French authorities as was done in North Africa'. The whole of Metropolitan France is now under direct Nazi rule. The authorities to whom civil affairs would be left would in very many cases be active Nazi partisans. The Mayor of Bordeaux, for example, is Marquet, one of the chief supporters of collaboration and an active leader in the betrayal of France. If this represents an official view, American policy is to combine AMGOT with Pétainists. Could anybody imagine a better way of creating chaos and bitter strife and frustrating all hope of effective co-operation against the German armies?

The memorandum continued:

Certain things are not said by Mr Lippmann, but the omission is made good in the despatch reporting his utterances in *Reynolds News*, which declares that:

'There is no doubt whatever that the State Department finds the political facts of life in Europe utterly distasteful. Hence the emphasis on military necessity to explain a devious diplomacy ... One spokesman for the State Department defined American policy - and this probably goes for British too - as being to prevent at all costs the outbreak of revolution in Europe or anywhere else, which would irretrievably shatter the possibility of re-establishing capitalist democracies.

'This is a very natural policy, since the Anglo-American Governments are fighting to re-establish capitalist democracies, not socialist democracies. They are acutely aware that the collapse of Hitlerite Europe will most likely result in social revolution, and clearly the political purpose of AMGOT was to provide a medium whereby the revolutionary steam generated by years of Fascism and defeat in war can be released in small harmless jets, not one big bloody explosion.'

Unfortunately, from the point of view of the Allied Governments, democracy in Europe cannot be restored, let alone survive, except on a largely Socialist basis and through movements that are predominantly working class. The British and American Govern-

ments would no doubt prefer to restore Capitalism *and* democracy. But they are quite determined to preserve capitalism and prevent social revolution at all costs and by any means.

Therefore they will find themselves, in the end, reluctantly compelled to support regimes that are fundamentally reactionary, authoritarian, anti-democratic and anti-working class. They will do so in response to the kind of arguments quoted above from Signor Franzero, who advanced them, it will be noted, in favour of supporting a reactionary dictatorship which was still fighting against us, against a revolutionary movement that was fighting on our side.

That these enterprises are wicked and foolish, would cause endless human misery, would promote civil war, and might bring on a conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, is no argument in the eyes of the persons concerned why they should not be attempted.

Any one who is acquainted with the record and temper of the American, British and Continental propertied classes during the last war, in the inter war-years, and in this war, and has some idea of what is going on to-day, will know that the danger is real and serious, and that the defenders of the present social order can and do co-operate not only across frontiers, but even across fronts.

This analysis, made in August and September, 1943, has been broadly confirmed by the subsequent course of events. Some of its fears have, fortunately, not been realised. In particular, the collapse and retreat of the German forces in France were too swift and the French resistance movement was too strong and took over too promptly after the Germans for the Anglo-American liberators to get away with clamping an Amgot-Pétainist regime on the country. They could not even make De Gaulle a dictator, though he did become Prime Minister. But all too many of the predictions made then have turned out to be accurate forecasts of what has since come to pass.

The general picture that emerges from the Anglo-American liberation of Europe is one of the support, on a variety of pretexts – military expediency or necessity, administrative efficiency, technical competence, and of course political impartiality and concern for democracy – of reaction and counter-revolution, represented by a choice assortment of Fascists, near-Fascists, quislings, collaborators, broken-down aristocrats and similar representatives of the old order, fighting a series of rearguard actions under Allied patronage against the advancing forces of social revolution embodied in the resistance movements.

This, of course, is a simplification; there were patriotic minorities among Right Wing political parties and the pro-

pertied classes, who worked and fought with the resistance movements. There were progressive minorities in Catholic Parties and the Catholic hierarchy (generally in the lower ranks in the latter and among poor Catholics in the laity, but including a sprinkling of high Church dignitaries and Catholic intellectuals) who also identified themselves with the struggle for freedom of their peoples and took an active part in the resistance movements. There were liberal streaks in Anglo-American policy and scattered Leftists in their armies of occupation and even among their officers. Because they are democracies, their policy was at times deflected, or at least diluted and made to waver, by criticism in Press and Parliament.

But in its main features and broad outline the above 1943 analysis of the shape of things to come corresponds to what has since happened and is still happening. The weight of Anglo-American diplomatic, economic and military influence and power has been thrown in Europe against the forces of social revolution, even where they represent those who fought on our side in the war, and has supported reaction and counter-revolution, including a broad twilight zone of *'attentistes'* (wait-and-see-ers), profiteers, collaborators, appeasers and racketeers, and not a few who ardently worked and fought with the enemy against the Western democracies and/or the Soviet Union.

It would take another book to fill in the details of this general picture of Anglo-American counter-revolutionary intervention that began in the middle of the last war, as a continuation of long years of pre-war appeasement and of post first world war intervention, and that is swelling towards the grand climax of a third world war unless stopped in time. But a few leading episodes may be recalled.

NORTH WESTERN EUROPE

The problem for Anglo-American policy was relatively easy in North Western Europe. The *émigré* governments of Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway were restored to the bosoms of their peoples and came to terms with the resistance movements without great difficulty, because of the pre-war existence of democracy. But there was the episode of Mr Churchill sending tanks to Brussels in order, as he claimed, to defeat a Communist revolution which, however, British, French and other correspondents on the spot declared to be non-existent and a figment of his imagination.

What really happened was that considerable American and

British pressure on behalf of the forces of the Right and Centre was applied against the more militant section of the resistance movements. The restoration of democracy in these small West European countries has taken place on lines that have created something like a social impasse and have led to a sense of frustration, because, after all the turmoil and sacrifice, nothing has changed and the collaborators began first to creep out of the woodwork and then to climb to power.

FRANCE

France was a special case. There was no *émigré* government but only on the one hand General de Gaulle, who although himself Right Wing, did not take kindly to the idea of fusion with Vichy under Anglo-American patronage. He wanted to run the whole show himself. On the other hand there was the resistance movement in France. Although it accepted De Gaulle as a symbol, it was predominantly Left in its social composition, political attitude and reconstruction programme. The nature and partial failure of Allied policy in this situation has already been mentioned.

ITALY

In Italy Anglo-American policy was just as determined to prevent the defeat of the Fascist regime from leading to the overthrow of the capitalist social order by the resistance movement.

The way this policy was applied in Italy has been sufficiently indicated in the 1943 report quoted above. The general principle of action was to use Mussolini's police and near-Fascists to frustrate and checkmate the resistance movement and freeze the social *status quo*. Wherever the Italian resistance movement had thrown out Fascist authorities and had encouraged villages and towns to elect their own representatives, AMGOT deposed the elected authorities and replaced them by reactionary Catholics and near-Fascists of their own choice. In Northern Italy, where the workers had got rid of their Fascist bosses and taken over the factories, the Workers Councils were dissolved and the Fascist bosses were put back. King Victor Emmanuel and General Badoglio of poison gas in Abyssinia fame became the principal agents of Anglo-American policy.

Officially, of course, all this was done in the name of not taking sides between Right and Left, i.e. between pro-Fascists and anti-Fascists in Italy. But, in fact, the resistance movement fighting

on our side was first cold-shouldered, and then cold-warred against, whereas the King and General Badoglio were assiduously courted while they were still our enemies.

The *Daily Telegraph*, as we have seen, was quite open about begging them to seek salvation with us and in expressing its abhorrence of a Liberal government, which was regarded as a half-way house to Communism.

This is the same point of view that Mr Churchill took when he preferred the rigours of Tsardom to the hazards of an approach to Parliamentary government in Russia, and that has been taken by Anglo-American interventionists in Greece. The idea that our Tory class warriors care a tinker's anathema for democracy or Western civilisation or peace or humanity when their blood is up dies hard. But it is a complete and really dangerous illusion.

THE BALKANS

In the Balkans Anglo-American policy was summarised in Mr Churchill's broadcast from Quebec on August 31, 1943, when he expressed the fervent hope that the kings of Yugoslavia and Greece would be restored to their thrones. In Yugoslavia energetic attempts were made to foist the *émigré* government and King, discredited by their association with the pre-war Fascist dictatorship, on the Yugoslavia of Tito and the partisans. When Marshal Tito refused all attempts at cajolery or blackmail, the sending of UNRRA relief supplies was made conditional upon their being accompanied by Anglo-American troops. The Yugoslavs resisted this proposal, even although it meant their being deprived for months of UNRRA supplies while the people were half-starved. After that, however, a great deal of UNRRA help was given. It was gratefully acknowledged by the Yugoslav authorities, who distributed it efficiently and honestly. But it stopped short of industrial rehabilitation and was cut off when still badly needed.

The whole story of the manipulation of UNRRA supplies and of their premature winding up in the teeth of energetic protests, even by the American heads of UNRRA, while there was still a crying need for their continuation, is singularly like the discreditable story of how the United States after the first world war exploited the necessities of the starving peoples of Europe to impose reactionary regimes by control of food supplies. But whereas last time this policy succeeded in preventing social revolution in many countries, in breaking it in Germany, and in overthrowing the revolutionary regime in Hungary

and imposing the White dictatorship and terror of Admiral Horthy that lasted until it joined Hitler and was defeated with him, after the second world war the revolutionary regimes of Eastern Europe and the Balkans resisted and survived American blandishments and American blackmail, which included not only the withholding of UNRRA supplies but the refusal of credits, support of Right Wing elements and other kinds of interference in the interests of capitalist counter-revolution – always, of course, in the name of the defence of freedom and democracy and of not taking sides between Right and Left or interfering in internal affairs.

INTERVENTION IN GREECE, 1943

The only part of Europe where the policy of intervention in the interests of capitalist counter-revolution was carried out successfully was in Greece. Mr Churchill's broadcast from Quebec, already mentioned, took place shortly after his instructions to the BBC to give no further credit to the resistance movement (EAM) for its achievements in fighting the Nazis in Greece.

The Greek people had some cause, even in 1943, for taking the view, as *The Times* Smyrna correspondent cabled in the despatch of September 15, quoted above that 'the British Government are seeking to impose the King on the Greek people'.

For about the time of Mr Churchill's broadcast from Quebec, the Greek King (who after a pro-Nazi record second to none surprised everyone by joining the Allies – as the best means of preserving his power and his dynasty – and had been fighting the war gallantly at Claridges Hotel, London, and in the even more luxurious Shepherd's Hotel in Cairo) received representatives of EAM, who came to ask for a place in the post-war coalition government commensurate with the part they were playing in fighting the Germans.* They wanted their status to be acknowledged as the representatives of the overwhelming majority of the Greeks loyal to the Allies and to the cause of the common people. The King proved obdurate and negotiations

*Cf. Mr William Shirer, in the *New York Herald Tribune* of March 22, 1947: 'Though Mr Churchill vehemently denied it, I think there is little doubt that the principal resistance movement in Greece was the E.A.M., with its combatant branch known as E.L.A.S. The secret documents of the German High Command which I saw at Nuremberg left no doubt that the German Army considered E.L.A.S. as almost the only serious armed resistance movement it had to deal with. A British General who had worked with E.L.A.S. for 2 years told Allied correspondents in Athens after its liberation that the only real resisters and fighters against the Germans were the E.L.A.S., a remark which seems to have resulted in his sudden withdrawal from Greece.' Cf. also, *The Times* Smyrna correspondent, quoted above, p. 75.

broke down. He then wired to President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill asking for support. This was refused by the President but promised by Mr Churchill, whereupon the King hardened his heart, refused all concessions and dismissed the representatives of EAM.

The immediate result was a mutiny in the Greek armed forces under British command. At first the British officers in charge arrested some of the Greek officers who had beaten soldiers for protesting against the refusal of concessions to EAM and proclaiming their Republican faith. But on direct instructions from Mr Churchill, the Monarchist officers were released, and instead no less than five-sevenths of the Greek armed forces were interned for being Republicans. The remaining two-sevenths, consisting of hand-picked Monarchists and near-Fascists selected by a few 'right thinking' senior Greek officers, were organised into the fanatically Royalist Mountain Brigade and Sacred Battalion.

At the same time British agents in Greece contacted the leaders of the quisling Security Battalions and Security Police in Athens and reached an agreement with them, with the knowledge and approval of the quisling Rallis Government, similar to that made with Mussolini's police force in Italy and attempted with the Vichy and Laval police in France, namely that on the withdrawal of the Germans the Security Police and Battalions were to assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order under British patronage.

Great efforts were made to discover anti-EAM resistance or pseudo-resistance groups. No further money and arms were sent to EAM, but some thirty million gold pounds were lavished on an adventurer by the name of Colonel Zervas, who had been all things in turn and none for long, Republican, Royalist, collaborator, and nominal resister. In *Collier's Weekly* of September 20, 1947, Mr Paul A. Porter, President Truman's emissary in Greece, describes this bearded butcher, who had in the meantime risen to dizzy heights as a defender of democracy and fighter for freedom in the Anglo-American puppet government in Greece, as follows: 'An even more controversial figure [than Tsaldaris] is General Napoleon Zervas, the Minister of Public Order. During the war Zervas ran a small resistance group around whose activity hangs the smell of Nazi collaboration. To-day Zervas is foremost among those who want to exploit the present situation ... to rub out everyone in Greece who is critical of the present Government.'

INTERVENTION IN GREECE, 1944

In June 1944 manoeuvres were held at Tripolis in Lebanon of the British troops that were to carry out the landing in Athens that autumn. The manoeuvres, which were a rehearsal of the landing, were undertaken on the theme that British troops landing in Athens were to be received by the Security Police and Battalions guarding the harbour and its installations and supplies against ELAS (that is, the armed forces of EAM) coming down from the mountains to the attack.

The landing duly took place in September, according to plan – but with one small difference: ELAS had already arrived and chased away or imprisoned the quisling Security Police and Battalions, and stood on the quay cheering their British comrades and allies, weeping with joy, garlanding them with flowers, carrying them shoulder-high and trying to show in every way how overjoyed they were at meeting their friends and liberators from the West. They were not good enough democrats nor sufficiently advanced in the ways of Western civilisation to suspect that their allies had already decreed their destruction, had secretly established relations with their enemies and Nazi Germany's tools and agents, the Quisling Security Police, and were plotting actively to accomplish the assassination of the Greek resistance movement.

Acting on Mr Churchill's orders to be tough with EAM and ELAS, General Scobie immediately demanded the complete disarmament of the resistance movement. The latter, anxious not to make trouble, agreed provided the Monarchist Mountain Brigade and Sacred Battalion were also disarmed. This the British Government refused to do, on the ground that these units were under British command and must therefore be regarded not as a Greek force, but as part of the British Army.

EAM then negotiated a compromise with their Right Wing colleagues in the Greek Government, providing that the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion should stay armed, but should remain in Italy and not be brought to Greece. This was logical if they were to be regarded not as Greek forces but as British units. Again, on instructions from Mr Churchill, the compromise was peremptorily rejected by General Scobie and the demand renewed for the immediate and total disarmament of ELAS.

Mr Churchill's secret instructions to General Scobie, published in the American press by Drew Pearson, were to be peremptory

and 'tough' with ELAS on landing. They amounted to a hint to 'crowd' ELAS and lose no chance to pick a quarrel with them. An attempt to reshuffle the Coalition, so as to substitute a Liberal Prime Minister more representative and less obnoxious to EAM than Mr Papandreou, was also vetoed by the British Embassy in Athens, on Mr Churchill's orders, after agreement had been reached between EAM and their colleagues in the Coalition.

The next act in the tragedy was the peaceful procession of December 3 to protest against the one-sided disarming of ELAS, that was fired upon by the quisling Security Police, as well as by Royalist irregulars and volunteers from the X-ite Fascists (some of them wearing British uniform). This was the match that fired the train.

What happened is fairly clear. The American Liberal weekly, the *New Republic*, of December 8, 1947, records an interview with the Australian Colonel Sheppard, who fought in a combat unit in Greece, then worked for UNRRA and afterwards was the head of the British Economic Mission in northern Greece. Speaking as an eye-witness and 'with the London *Times* and the accounts of U.S. and British correspondents in Athens at the time to back him, the Colonel described how Royalist troops machine-gunned a peaceful ELAS demonstration in December, 1944, to start the civil war. 'The enraged people of Athens', he continued, 'fought the troops and the lend-lease tanks to a standstill, until the Royalists freed the quisling Security Battalions still in their German uniforms and set them on the people'. Even that was not enough, and so there was direct military intervention by the British, including British Indian units and Spitfires smashing up the working-class quarters of Athens.*

'Late one night at this time' (December 6, 1944), says Mr Churchill in an article in the American weekly *Life* of April 19,

*The same picture of events is given by Captain Raymond Blackburn, M.P., who can scarcely be accused of pro-Communist or anti-Royalist sympathies, in his speech to the December, 1944 Annual Conference of the Labour Party:

'What about the armed Greek police? They had arms. They were the men who were executing the orders of the German Government when EAM was fighting the Germans. They were the men who helped to keep the semi-Fascist dictator Metaxas in power. On December 3, 1944, in Athens, which was the cradle of modern civilisation and democracy and which is the capital of the first country to put up a successful resistance to Fascism in this war, a peaceful unarmed demonstration of men, women and children carrying the banners of the United Nations came slowly along the streets. What happened has been described in a broadcast by John Nixon. "Volley after volley of revolver shots was poured into that crowd, killing men, women and children and grievously wounding many more. The number killed was 16 and the number wounded 148."'

1947, 'I drafted a telegram to our General Scobie, who had come to Athens with 3,000 men to fight the Germans, that he must no longer consider himself neutral between the Greek parties, but on the contrary, should sustain Premier Papandreou and not hesitate to fire on the Communist assailants. As the fighting in Athens developed, two or three British divisions moved gradually into the city. For forty days of street fighting we battled for the life and soul of Athens. And it is upon the foundation of this work that the United States is able to take its stand to-day.'

The German forces were, of course, out of Greece long before General Scobie landed in Athens. The pretence that he was sent to fight the Germans is as veracious as the official allegation that British troops went to Vladivostok, Archangel and the Caucasus to fight the Germans at the end of the first world war.

Another reputable eye-witness, the well-known American foreign correspondent, Mr Leland Stowe, in the *New Republic* of September 15, 1947, says:

It is patently impossible ... to discuss the Greek civil war, and the persistent political deterioration in Greece ever since, without weighing most carefully the Churchill government's very great responsibility for both the Greek 'mutiny' and the creation of the Royalist Mountain Brigade. The introduction of that brigade into the heated, partisan atmosphere of newly-liberated Athens was planned and hastened by the Churchill government. The monarchist Brigade's presence touched off the controversy which touched off the civil war.

When Athens was a battleground, in those days of anguish, betrayal and shame, I checked the roles of every faction and important personality concerned. I could reach only one conclusion, but the British Ambassador, Sir Reginald Leeper (without the slightest suggestion on my part), made the answer crystal clear. With a satisfied smile, he wound up a long interview with the remark: 'I think we have smashed here any chance of a dictatorship of the Left. It will have a big effect in Italy; in France, Belgium and Holland as well ...' But the EAM had never proposed a dictatorship. They had only demanded a national coalition government of 'all political parties'. What the Churchill-Leeper clique obviously sought to prevent in Greece was any kind of popular republican government. The king had to be restored in Athens - even against the unquestioned republicanism of 70 per cent or more of the Greek people.*

* The sentiments of the British Embassy in Athens at that time were summed up in the remark of a senior diplomat: 'The last thing we want is Liberal democracy; it would turn into Communism.' (On the authority of a Labour M.P. who was then an officer serving in Greece and to whom this remark was made).

In the light of this record of events it is obviously true, as Mr Seymour Cocks, M.P., then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party, said in the House of Commons on February 21, 1946 that 'One reason why we went to Greece at that time was to prevent the Left Wing movement forming the government of the country. The Regent of Greece told me himself that but for the British the Left would have won.'

Mr Eden's rejoinder on the same occasion, delivered with a great show of moral indignation, that 'It is not true to say that we went into Greece to prevent a Left government being returned' is an example of official mendacity in the heroic or classic tradition, comparable only to similar government pronouncements during intervention in Russia, or to Mr Eden's denial, when he was Foreign Secretary, of any knowledge of the presence on Franco's side in the civil war of 100,000 Italian troops.

INTERVENTION IN GREECE, 1945

The next stage in the tragedy was the conclusion of the Varkisa Agreement, by which the Greek Parties of the Right undertook not to exercise reprisals against the defeated and disarmed resistance movement. The promised amnesty was to extend to all who had taken part in the 1944 rising, except only those who had committed crimes against civil law not justified by the revolutionary state of the country. It specifically provided that reprisals would not be taken against revolutionaries, partisans or their families.

A British officer serving in Greece at the time has contributed the following eye-witness account in the *New Statesman and Nation* of November 22, 1947, of what actually happened:

Within a week of the signing of the agreement I saw the most flagrant and atrocious violations carried out by the newly-formed National Guard – mainly composed of ex-collaborators. All those who had believed in the words of the agreement (guaranteed by the British) and had not fled were imprisoned and abominably beaten and assaulted. In one so-called prison – about the size of a kitchen in a small flat – I saw sixteen men, women and children. Two of the men were lying unconscious in their own blood after a beating on the head and back; each person was allowed to visit the lavatory only once every three hours for three minutes; there was one small window in the room which the guards would not permit to be opened; one man of 65, arrested for selling EAM newspapers, was weeping softly as he lay against the wall – he had been tied up and beaten for an hour on the soles of his feet. None of these people had been informed of the reason for their arrest; none was ever tried; most of them remained in prison for nine months.

This was not an isolated incident at this period when there were *no* Communist bands, and *no* Left Wing activity, even of the kind permitted to any political party. When the Left at length realised that the authorities were not making even a pretence at carrying out the terms of Varkisa, they began meetings of protest, telegrams to friendly Powers, newspaper agitations. When these legal methods were brutally stifled, military reprisals inevitably began and led to the disastrous Civil War now taking place ...

It is perhaps not generally known that the British Army, which had put down the excesses and finally the revolution of the Left, received strict instructions when Varkisa was signed that they were not to interfere in Greek affairs. This gave the Government forces *carte blanche* to wreak their vengeance, while British troops stood by and pretended not to notice anything.

The *Daily Mirror* published photographs and an eye-witness account from a British sergeant of the savagery of the Greek Government forces. They included beatings, torture, mass slaughter, cutting off the heads of their victims (including a girl of sixteen) and attaching them to their saddles or sticking them on pikes.

INTERVENTION IN GREECE AND THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

In June 1944, Mr Churchill had suggested to the Soviet Government that 'the Russians should deal with the Rumanians and Bulgarians and that Britain should deal with the Greeks, who were in Britain's theatre of operations, were Britain's old allies and for whom Britain had sacrificed 40,000 men in 1941. The same,' he added, 'was true of Yugoslavia'. (In a message to President Roosevelt of June 8, 1944. The whole episode is described in Chapter 33 of Mr Cordell Hull's *Memoirs*.) The attempt to mark out Yugoslavia as a British preserve failed, because Tito wasn't having it. But the Russians agreed to the British proposal and the Roosevelt Administration reluctantly gave its assent, influenced by Mr Churchill's explanation that 'there was no question of spheres of influence being involved. But ... although we all have to act together, someone must play the hand'.

The way this agreement was interpreted in action by Mr Churchill in Greece had a profound effect on Soviet policy and on that of Greece's neighbours in the North. For they had worked harmoniously with the Greek resistance movement and considered the revival of Greek Fascism a direct threat to their national security, as well as a violation of the spirit and even the letter of

inter-Allied agreements, casting a sinister light on the real purpose of the Foreign Office in Eastern Europe. This was one of the first 'outside' influences working against moderate and compromise solutions of internal problems by the victorious resistance movements in Eastern Europe.

In February 1945 the three principal victors met at Yalta in the Crimea and agreed on a common attitude toward liberated Europe, summed up in the following paragraphs of the Report of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference:

They [United Kingdom, U.S.A., U.S.S.R.] jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments, in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite States of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

This establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice ...

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise those rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated State or former Axis satellite State in Europe where in their judgment conditions so require: (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the populations and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated State or any former Axis satellite State in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

Unfortunately, by the time this Treaty had been drawn up there had already been the agreement at the instigation of Mr Churchill, mentioned above, to give Britain a free hand in Greece in exchange for giving the leading role in the rest of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. How the British and later the

American Governments used their free hand in Greece has already been referred to and is discussed further in the following chapters. Mr Churchill, in his speech in the House on January 23, 1948, admitted that the Soviet Union had faithfully observed the terms of the agreement throughout 1944. The Soviet Press had kept silent when *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian* violently attacked Mr Churchill's policy and the Soviet Government made a very 'correct' remonstrance at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, invoking the Yalta Conference agreement. This was followed by a further remonstrance to the Foreign Minister's Conference in September, and to the Security Council in December.

Meanwhile the situation went from bad to worse in Greece, and the United States, dragging Britain in its wake, began to infringe the terms of the pre-Yalta June 1944 agreement with the Soviet Union by interfering in the internal affairs of the Balkan and East European States.

EFFECT ON THE U.S.S.R. OF INTERVENTION IN GREECE

Mr Churchill's intervention in Greece, coming on top of his 'East European' and anti-western front strategy, made a deep impression on the Soviet Government. It went a long way to convince the Russians that they must abandon hope that they could pull together with the Capitalist powers in the post-war world and must resign themselves to facing their hostility after the war. For in its international aspect, intervention in Greece was quite clearly part and parcel of a general policy of returning to the Crimean War conception of British interests in the Middle East.

Mr John Lawrence, who was British Press Attaché in Moscow during the war and so speaks with authority, has this to say of Soviet feelings about intervention in Greece:

During the war, the Soviet press stopped criticising the political systems of Allied countries and, in particular, there was a truce to attacks on the British Empire. In the autumn of 1944, when civil war broke out in Greece, there was for several months no attack on British policy there, in spite of heart-searchings by some party members. It was only when our press began to criticise Russian goings-on in Rumania and Bulgaria that the Soviet press began to attack British policy in Greece. Since then the slanging match has gone from bad to worse. (At the Liberal Summer School in August 1946).

Mr Churchill's and Mr Lawrence's authoritative testimony

disposes of the curious legend, so assiduously spread that it now passes widely for truth, that the Soviet press and radio violently, and without provocation, attacked this country and the United States the moment the war was ended. Soviet press attacks came only after the severe and sustained provocation of a British policy in Greece and the Middle East, started by Mr Churchill before the war was over and continued by Mr Bevin, that persistently treated the Soviet Union as our next enemy, and after the Anglo-American combination had added insult to injury by attacking Soviet policy in the rest of the Balkans, and interfering in the internal affairs of East European countries in disregard of the June 1944 agreement mentioned above.

As this point is of some importance, it is worth submitting further evidence. On October 19, 20 and 21, 1948, the *New York Herald Tribune* (Paris edition) published an analysis of the way the Soviet press reports the United States, by an American research worker, Mr Whitman Bassow, based on a study of the contents of the Moscow *Izvestia*. The Soviet Press, he points out,

is not merely a medium for informing the public of current events, but it is the means by which the masses can know what the Communist party is thinking and doing, and what the party wants them to think and do ...

The contents of *Izvestia* for January to June, 1945, must be examined against the background of the friendly relations that then existed between America and Russia.

During this period, the war against Germany had been successfully concluded, and at Yalta the Soviet Union had committed itself to fight the Japanese. At San Francisco, June 25, both countries signed the United Nations Charter.

American-Russian unity was reflected quite clearly by *Izvestia's* coverage. The news was overwhelmingly favourable towards the United States; unfavourable items were rare and did not have any special significance. As a result, the United States appeared as a great nation endowed with admirable qualities, a loyal ally, hard working and united.

The news items were cabled from the United States and based largely on American agency reports. The 'event' items plugged the theme that the U.S.A. is going all out to win the war and played up the value and contribution to Soviet successes of the equipment supplied by the United States, as well as the gratitude of Soviet leaders for American help. 'Opinion' items included American expressions of admiration for the Red Army and of the view that co-operation between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. must be strengthened and continued.

On the whole, the picture of America in the pages of *Izvestia* during the first six months of 1945 was a favourable one. With a few minor exceptions, the entire country was behind the war effort. Industry was turning out vast quantities of war materials, much of which was going to the Russians under the Lend-Lease Act. Congress was appropriating huge funds for the war with a minimum of discussion and delay.

The capitalist system in the United States was a productive one, fully capable of meeting the exacting requirements of a war situation. There were no hints of economic defects inherent in the system. American democracy had certain shortcomings like the poll tax, but attempts were being made to abolish it.

The people of the United States admired the Russian people for their splendid struggle against the Nazi invaders. Americans wanted to continue in peace-time the collaboration of the war years that could be achieved despite differences in the economic systems of the two countries.

This favourable picture of America was undoubtedly what the Soviet leaders wanted their people to have. It may be explained by the fact that it was good for the morale of the Russians to know that they had a loyal and hard-working ally. But this does not explain the frequent and lengthy quotations on the need for continued co-operation between the two countries that appeared after the German surrender. It may be assumed, therefore, that these quotations reflected the Russian desire for friendly relations with the United States.

There is no doubt about it that the Soviet Union entered the peace hoping and wanting to continue the war-time association with her great allies in the West. Whereas, as we have seen, from the end of 1943 onward the die-hard defenders of Capitalism were getting ready to 'switch the peace' and fought the concluding stages of the second world war in the spirit of what Sir Henry Wilson, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, wrote in his diary toward the end of the first world war: 'The war against the Boche is turning into a war against the Bolshie.'

CHURCHILL'S *Billet-Doux* TO STALIN

In the light of all these developments, Stalin's feelings may be imagined when he received Mr Churchill's private and personal letter of April 29, 1945, claiming that 'In Greece we seek nothing but her friendship, which is of long duration, and desire only her independence and integrity. But we have no intention to try to decide whether she is to be a monarchy or a republic. Our only policy there is to restore matters to the normal as quickly as possible and to hold fair and free elections, I hope within the

next four or five months. These elections will decide the regime and later on the constitution. The will of the people, expressed under conditions of freedom and universal franchise, must prevail; that is our root principle'.

The letter also spoke of the 'very warm and deep desire' that had 'grown up throughout the English speaking world ... to be friends on equal and honourable terms with the mighty Russian Soviet Republic' after the war. 'I', concluded Mr Churchill, 'who in my years of great responsibility have worked faithfully for this unity, will certainly continue to do so by every means in my power'.

There is no reason to believe that Mr Churchill wrote this letter with his tongue in his cheek. On the contrary. He was certainly perfectly sincere, for his fanaticism is so intense that he lives in a private world of his own, in which facts assume colours and shapes or become invisible to fit Mr Churchill's fancy. But whatever else Stalin may be, no one has yet thought of calling him a sucker. He would have had to be a prize sucker to take seriously a letter that was so flatly contradicted by so many and such obvious facts. He probably looked upon it as Mr Churchill's *alibi* before history, to be produced at a suitable moment in order to impress public opinion – which indeed was the case, for Mr Churchill read it out in the House on December 10, 1948, as part of a reply to a charge of war-mongering against the Soviet Union I had made against him in the Foreign Affairs debate.

Mr Churchill's letter to Stalin concluded with a striking passage which showed he was perfectly aware of the conflict that was impending, although unconscious of the relationship between cause and effect in this vast field.

There is not much comfort in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist parties in many other States, are all drawn up on one side and those who rally to the English-speaking nations and their associates or Dominions are on the other. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces and that all of us leading men on either side who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history.*

* Cf. Mr Neville Chamberlain in the General Election of 1935 promising to defend Abyssinia and uphold the Covenant against Mussolini 'The choice before us is whether we shall make a last effort at Geneva for peace and security, or whether by a cowardly surrender we shall break all the promises we have made and hold ourselves up to the shame of our children and their children's children'. The cowardly surrender took place and the quarrel now tearing the world to pieces was duly started, but the leading men responsible remained entirely unashamed, now as then.

Even embarking on a long period of suspicions, of abuse and counter-abuse and of opposing policies would be a disaster hampering the great developments of world prosperity for the masses which are attainable only by our trinity.

Here again it is important to understand that Mr Churchill was passionately sincere throughout his letter and that he really meant it when he referred to it as 'this outpouring of my heart to you, my friend Stalin'.

The point is that the causes of the conflict lie below the threshold of Mr Churchill's consciousness. It is literally unthinkable to him that the present social order could cease to work to the point where it has to be drastically changed, if it is to provide the minimum of satisfactions without which civilisation cannot survive. Therefore he cannot recognize the ultimate source of the conflict between those he represents and the workers of this country and of Europe, not to mention the countries which have gone through a social revolution and have come out on the other side.

His letter represented Dr Jekyll Churchill, fervently hoping that we should hear no more of this nonsense about Socialism after victory and that the Bolsheviks would show themselves worthy of holding the title deeds of National Russia by taking a view of Soviet interests in world affairs that did not needlessly and perversely clash with the Tory desire to preserve the Imperial and social *status quo* everywhere. At the same time Mr Hyde Churchill had been busy for years getting ready to crush resistance movements and back counter-revolution all around the frontiers of the Soviet Union as well as throughout Europe, and to return to the Crimean War idea of holding the Middle East in thrall and making a protectorate of Greece, in order to bottle up the Russians in the Black Sea and keep them out of the Mediterranean.

When self-righteousness and fanaticism reach the pitch of the absolute it is perfectly possible to combine these beliefs and policies with the feelings so movingly expressed in Mr Churchill's letter. But it is not surprising that the combination did not impress the Russians. They could not forget the harsh realities of Mr Churchill's record and its influence on his war strategy. They never wholly trusted him.

U.S.A., U.S.S.R. AND THE ATOM BOMB

On the other hand the Soviet Government showed considerable confidence in the goodwill and liberalism of President Roosevelt

and his top-ranking representatives. General Eisenhower testifies in his book, *Crusade in Europe*, with the authority attaching to the war-time C-in-C. of the Western Allies, that in everything that mattered the Russians co-operated with him loyally. He was invited to Moscow in 1945 and cordially received by the Government and the people. Stalin spoke with him frankly, as with a friend, about the future relations of their two countries.

'There are many ways in which we need American help' Stalin told Eisenhower. 'It is our great task to raise the standard of living of the Russian people ... We must learn about your scientific achievements in agriculture. Likewise, we must get your technicians to help us ... We want to know more about mass production methods in factories. We know that we are behind in these things, and we know that you can help us.'

General Eisenhower says that good relations between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union reached their peak in the early autumn of 1945, and wonders why they went wrong after that. Co-operation of the American State Department and War Department with the British Foreign Office and War Office, against the resistance movements and for the 'non-political' counter-revolutionary politics of AMGOT is part of the answer. We have seen that our Tories never really dropped the idea that the Soviet Union was the enemy of their class (which they identified with the nation) even when she was our ally, and began active preparations for post-war hostility from about 1943 onwards. American Tories were almost as quick off the mark.

'I began the fight for peace,' says Henry Wallace, speaking of the time (1944-5) when he had just ended his term as Vice-President, and was still Secretary of State for Commerce and one of Roosevelt's intimates, 'because I realised, even before the war was ended, that there were powerful groups in the Army, Navy and State Department, working closely with important businessmen, who looked on Russia as the next enemy and were therefore getting ready for the next war'. (*New Republic*, July 19, 1948.)

The explosion of the atom bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki blew to pieces the rickety structure of friendship between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, the foundations of which were already being attacked by the termites of reaction and counter-revolution. The Russians were shocked at what they regarded as the cold-blooded treachery of their Allies in withholding knowledge from them of this vastly important war weapon. Professor Blackett, in *The Military and Political Consequences*

of *Atomic Energy*, marshalls impressive evidence for the view that the dropping of the atom bomb was not due to military necessity, because Japan was on the verge of collapse anyway. The fact that General Eisenhower strongly urged that it be not used confirms this view. For he would hardly have pressed this advice on his Government if the atom bomb had really been necessary in the circumstances to save American lives by ending the war quickly. The real reason for this unparalleled act of barbarity, says Professor Blackett, and pretty well proves his case, was to deprive the Soviet Union of a share in the victory big enough to give her an important influence on the peace settlement.

The two bombs that struck down a couple of hundred thousand civilians, old and young, men, women and children, in strange and hideous ways, many dying in long-drawn agony, were intended not so much to end the anti-Japanese war as to begin anti-Soviet and anti-Communist intervention in the Far East. That aspect of the matter did not escape the Russians. Nor did they fail to observe, and to draw appropriate conclusions from, the American seizure and fortification of bases all the way across the Pacific to within striking distance of the shores of Soviet Siberia and China.

It was clear by the middle of 1945, after AMGOT, Greece, the San Francisco and Potsdam Conferences, and dazzlingly clear after the dropping of the atom bomb and subsequent Far Eastern and Pacific developments, that the moment the overriding common interest of beating our common enemy disappeared with victory a major clash was inevitable between Anglo-American policy, which identified the restoration of Capitalism and support of counter-revolution with the defence of democracy and civilisation, and the Soviet Union and the victorious resistance movements in Eastern Europe, as well as the working-class leadership of France and Italy, that had moved far to the left in the underground struggle against Fascism and the invader.

Only a change in basic conceptions of vital national interests in world affairs on the part of one of the three principal victors could avert a conflict. The Soviet Union were not likely to change, for they did not have the initiative in international affairs and their foreign policy consisted largely of parrying or adjusting themselves to, or protesting against and counter-attacking initiatives and moves made by Britain and the U.S.A. Moreover, there was an inner consistency and stability for good or ill about the Soviet regime that made it difficult to see how the Soviet Govern-

ment could adopt a radically different view of Soviet interests in world affairs, unless there was some big change outside the Soviet Union.

In the United States the situation was more confused, but the whole trend of development was towards power politics and Imperialism and a less liberal, generous and international view than that taken by President Roosevelt. Given the measure of agreement between the two major parties and the superficiality of the differences between them, it seemed unlikely that any major shift would occur in American foreign policy unless brought about by some unforeseen event of first-class importance, either external, such as a radical change in the foreign policy of Britain or the U.S.S.R., or internal, such as another big slump.

On the other hand, there were many who believed that Labour's overwhelming election victory in 1945 would mean a break with the past, a rejection of continuity and national unity in foreign policy, and the blazing of a new path along which mankind might find its way to peace. The next chapter explains why this did not happen and British foreign policy continued along the ruts worn smooth by tradition, running far back into the nineteenth century and bomb-cratered by two world wars within living memory.

CHAPTER V

Mr Bevin Carries On

(1945)

GREAT EXPECTATIONS

WHEN the news of Labour's great victory swept over Europe a thrill of hope shot through millions of war-weary hearts. Men and women with hideous memories of the extremities of suffering and humiliation endured during the nightmare of enemy occupation, mourning their dead, many bearing the marks of long years in gaols and concentration camps or of the rigours of partisan fighting in the hills and forests, lit bonfires and danced amidst the bomb-shattered ruins of Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, Athens, yes, and in Budapest, Sofia and Bucharest too, and in remote villages and hamlets all over Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Clear through to France in the west and from Norway in the north to Italy and Greece, the liberated peoples gave themselves over to rejoicing. Spanish Republicans, still carrying on their unrelenting fight against Fascism in the prison house that is Franco Spain, believed the hour of freedom had struck.

'The common people of Britain have spoken. Those who were responsible only one degree less than the Nazis for plunging us into the hell through which we have passed have at last met their deserts. There will be no return to the bad old ways, for our friends, our comrades in Britain have won. They want what we want. We can understand each other. Together we will build a new world.'

That was the burden of many excited conversations, of innumerable articles, speeches and broadcasts in many tongues all over Europe. Perhaps the hopes were naive, or at any rate pitched much too high. Certainly there was little understanding of the difficulties of our position or the power and tenacity of the traditions with which Labour was so confidently expected to break. The victorious resistance movements and the peoples rejoicing in their new-won freedom failed to grasp that a general election necessarily changes things far less than a revolution.

But there were, it must be admitted, solid reasons for hoping that Labour's coming into power would make a real difference for the better in British foreign policy. For in all the years between the wars Labour had clashed with the Tories on every major issue, from Russian intervention and the Versailles Treaty to Munich. And the clash arose at bottom out of the deep-seated differences between the two parties and the economic classes that respectively composed their dominant members and supporters, on the all-important issue of the defence of Capitalism against the challenge of Socialism.

During and after the first world war the Labour Party had stood for a negotiated peace against a dictated peace; had been sympathetic to the idea of holding an international Socialist conference at Stockholm to take the job of peacemaking out of the hands of the Capitalist governments; had provided the main drive behind the demand for a League of Nations and an International Labour Office and come forward with bold ideas for international economic planning and the beginnings of world government; and had fought the iniquities of the Versailles peace settlement. It had opposed intervention in Russia to the point of organising nation-wide Councils of Action and threatening a general strike.*

The first Labour Government had recognised the Soviet Union and made a bold attempt in the Geneva Protocol to turn the League into a body capable of settling disputes, keeping the peace, reducing and limiting armaments by international agreement and organising economic co-operation. The second Labour Government had renewed this attempt, had once more recognised the Soviet Government, from which the Tories had again withdrawn recognition, and had given effect in the teeth of Tory and Foreign Office opposition to the pledges in foreign policy they gave to the people during the election campaign.

From 1931 on the Labour Party fought the Tories' policy of pro-Fascist appeasement towards Japan, Italy and Nazi Germany, and put forward the alternative policy of alliance with the Soviet Union and co-operation with the United States within the framework of the League, for the purpose of arresting Fascist aggressions and upholding the Covenant.

Mr Attlee expressed the view of the whole Party and drew the lessons of this long experience when he wrote in his book *The Labour Party in Perspective* (published 1937; re-issued 1949) that:

* See Chapter X, 'Labour in World Affairs'.

It must be perfectly clear that the Labour Party rejects altogether the theory that foreign policy is something which must be kept out of party politics. It does not agree that there is some policy to be pursued by this country irrespective of what party is in power, a policy which is national and so transcends party differences. There is a deep difference of opinion between the Labour Party and the capitalist Parties on foreign as well as on home policy, because the two cannot be separated. The foreign policy of a government is the reflection of its internal policy. Imperialism is the form which capitalism takes in relation to other countries ... Particular instances of action which can be approved by Socialists do not affect the truth of the general proposition that there is no agreement on foreign policy between a Labour Opposition and a Capitalist government.'

This statement, of course, applies equally well to the situation of a Labour Government faced by a capitalist Opposition - unless one assumes that the Labour Party on coming into office is entitled to throw overboard its Socialist principles and election pledges in foreign policy.

The Labour Party fought the General Election on a statement of foreign policy called 'The International Post-war Settlement', that was framed by the National Executive, adopted by the Annual Conference, and summarised in the electoral programme entitled 'Let Us Face the Future'. This policy called for co-operation with both the Soviet Union and the United States on equal terms, within the framework of the United Nations and on the basis of the principle that none of the three Powers can dictate to the others and that they must seek settlement of their differences by agreement. This is also the fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations.

Bases on the continent of Europe, both in enemy and, by agreement, in Allied territory should be held on behalf of the United Nations. Jews should be allowed to immigrate freely into Palestine and to own land, and Britain should 'seek to win the full sympathy and support both of the American and Russian Governments for the execution of this Palestinian policy.'

Throughout the emphasis was that Anglo-Soviet-American co-operation should be the 'solid nucleus of a world organisation'. The latter would be fatally weakened by the absence of either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. Britain must everywhere and in all things work to make both these powers come in and must associate with both on equal terms and refuse to line up with either against the other.

The Labour Party further declared in the 'International Post-

war Settlement' that Socialism was essential to the attainment of its international aims, and notably in order to stamp out Fascism and the causes of war, to make a success of economic reconstruction and to promote the spread of democracy and political freedom in Europe. A special tribute was paid by the Annual Conference to the resistance movements, in a resolution declaring that the future belonged to them.

Let Us Face the Future said: 'We must consolidate in peace the great war-time association of the British Commonwealth with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Let it not be forgotten that in the years leading up to the war the Tories were so scared of Russia that they missed the chance to establish a partnership which might well have prevented the war ... The British Labour Movement comes to the tasks of international organisation with one great asset: it has a common bond with the working peoples of all countries, who have achieved a new dignity and influence through their long struggle against Nazi tyranny.'

At Blackpool, on the eve of the Election, Mr Bevin made a resounding speech, greatly appreciated by the Labour Party Conference, in which he spoke much of economic reconstruction, raising the standards of living of the people, collective security and peace. The Left, he said, understands the Left, but the Right does not. If the Labour Party won the General Election they pledged themselves in their foreign policy never to use small States as an instrument of policy against the big States.

'I would ask the conference to bear this in mind. Revolutions do not change geography, and revolutions do not change geographical need. Ever since 1920, when I formed the Council of Action to stop further war against Russia - I am not a new convert - I have always believed that the tragedy in making the last peace - or armistice, which it really was - was the failure, largely out of prejudice, to bring Russia to the Conference at Versailles. Had they been brought there, the problem of the warm water ports, which is the fundamental problem of Russia's foreign policy - an absolute need for her in a great country of that kind - would have been solved. I think it was the late Lord Beaconsfield who once said: "Britain and France joined together is an insurance for Peace, but Britain, France and Russia joined together is a security for Peace". Now, with the wider development of the weapons of war we go further, and our aim has been, and the insurance premium for which we have to pay in commitments must be the United States of America, Britain and Soviet Russia.'

But the speech that received the greatest ovation, because it voiced the heart and mind of the Conference, was made by a young officer still in uniform and just back from several years' service on the Continent. This is what he said:

I think it is most important that the Labour Party should have a clear foreign policy of its own, which is completely distinct from that of the Tory Party. There are two most important facts which are not very clear to people who have been living in England during the last five years. One of them is the significant fact that the Socialist revolution has already begun in Europe and is already firmly established in many countries in Eastern and Southern Europe. The crucial principle of our own foreign policy should be to protect, assist, encourage, and aid in every way that Socialist revolution wherever it appears.

The Labour Party must be extremely alert and vigilant in judging its friends and enemies in Europe. It is quite easy for a person like myself who has spent the last three years in Europe to tell who are our friends and who are our enemies. The upper classes in every country are selfish, depraved, dissolute and decadent. These upper classes in every country look to the British Army and the British people to protect them against the just wrath of the people, who have been fighting underground against them for the past four years. We must see that that does not happen. There is very great danger, unless we are very careful, that we shall find ourselves running with the Red Flag in front of the armoured cars of Tory imperialism and counter-revolution, very much as in the early days of the motor car a man ran with a red flag in front of the first automobiles.

The struggle for Socialism in Europe has not been like the struggle for Socialism in Great Britain. During the last five years it has been hard, cruel, bitter, merciless and bloody. The penalty for participation in the Liberation movement in Europe has been death for oneself, if caught, and, if not caught oneself, the burning of one's home and death by torture of one's family. That is a very high price to pay for fighting in the Labour movement, and it gives the man when he has won the determination on no account whatsoever to let what he has won go.

We may think, when occasionally facts are brought to our notice, that our comrades on the Continent are being extremist, that there is danger of a dictatorship of the Left Wing being set up. I thought I caught snatches of that sort of attitude in Mr Attlee's speech. But do not let us be too pious and self-righteous and say, 'I am not as other men are'. Remember that one of the prices for our survival during the last five years has been the death by bombardment of countless thousands of innocent European men and women. That is a price we have all been prepared to pay. But if the Labour movement in Europe finds it necessary to introduce a

greater degree of police supervision and more immediate and drastic punishment for their opponents than we in this country would be prepared to tolerate, we must be prepared to understand their point of view.

That speech was received with a burst of cheering that went on for several minutes and almost raised the roof. It deserved it, for it got down to essentials and put the issue as the Labour Party must see it if it is to break with the past and win the peace.

But that young officer's name was Denis Healey. He is now head of the International Relations Department at Transport House, the author of *Cards on the Table* and *Feet on the Ground*, those *apologias* for Mr Bevin's foreign policy, and the co-author with Mr Morgan Phillips of the intrigues, plots, bans and ex-communications from Transport House that have helped to split and ruin European socialist parties and have made the Labour Party officially the enemy of the great majority of the European working class.

The melancholy tale is told and the moral pointed in Chapter X on Labour in World Affairs, 1914-48, with a rider in Chapter XI (Communism and the Soviet Union).

WHY THE RUSSIANS KEPT THEIR FINGERS CROSSED

There is reason to believe that hope flickered even in the bosoms of some Soviet statesmen when the news of Labour's decisive victory reached Moscow. But outwardly the Russians kept their fingers crossed. Their attitude was 'Wait and see'.

It is arguable that an eager welcome of Labour's victory and the taking of the Labour Party's election assurances at their face value, followed up by the maximum contacts between the British and Soviet trade unions, etc., would have helped to set in motion forces in this country that would have made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Government simply to ignore their election pledges and carry on with the foreign policy inherited from the Tories. As this tale unfolds it will be seen again and again that the besetting sin of the Soviet Government in world affairs is to take a too cut-and-dried and rigid view of what happens and is likely to happen in other countries, to neglect the enormously important 'imponderable' of public opinion, and to think solely in terms of governments and Foreign Offices.

But it must be remembered that the Soviet leaders, who are responsible for the destinies of their great country and have had a long and painful experience of the inveterate hatred and bad faith of the Western powers, cannot, like most Western Leftists,

afford the luxury of thinking that resolutions, protests and moral judgements recorded at meetings, conferences and in Left-Wing weeklies are an acceptable substitute for government decisions and political acts. It may be that Soviet scepticism about the capacity of progressive opinion in the West to deliver the goods may have helped to weaken the public opinion that really wanted our Government to act. But a glance at the record unhappily shows that the Soviet Government had only too good reason for doubting.

It took more than two years of violent struggle between Left and Right within the Labour Party before its leaders were compelled by pressure from below to do more than pretend to oppose the Tory war of intervention in Russia. By that time the Bolshevik victory was assured – if they had waited for the Labour Party to save them, the Tsar would have been in power again and most of the members of the C.P.S.U. would have been pushing up the daisies long before the Labour Party got round to doing the job.

Mr Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of the first Labour Government acted as the tool and agent of the Foreign Office in insisting on the acknowledgment of Tsarist debts as the condition for recognising the Soviet Government. It was only when he had almost wrecked the negotiations by this course that a revolt in the Parliamentary Party and a flood of protests from all over the country forced him to abandon his Tory policy. MacDonald and Snowden had no more use than the Tories and Liberals for the Protocol, negotiated by Mr Henderson at Geneva.

The first Labour Government was brought down by the Zinoviev Letter fraud, arranged by some Foreign Office officials with part of the Tory press, because of Ramsay MacDonald's blind and insensate fear and hatred of Communism.

The second Labour Government was brought down because its leaders took the view in the crisis of Capitalism that the country could be saved only by yielding to the pressure of the U.S. banks and establishing national unity with the Tories.

In the years of pro-Fascist appeasement the Labour Party presented the same picture of half-hearted leaders who had to be pushed hard by the rank and file and whose position became weaker the more disastrous the consequences of Tory foreign policy. The leadership was completely confused by the Tories over Abyssinia in the 1935 election. It has a heavy part of the murder of the Spanish Republic on its conscience for its support of the scandal of non-intervention, for it abandoned this policy

only under heavy pressure and then diverted the attention of the rank and file from the real issue by limiting its action to humanitarian relief for Spain. The great majority of the Parliamentary Labour Party was guilty of at least passive complicity in the shame and scandal of Munich.

In short, during these years of deepening distress, while the Tories appeased the Fascists the Labour leaders appeased the Tories – they carried out a decorous, mild Parliamentary opposition but never took the gloves off and never carried the fight into the country.

The Labour Ministers in the Coalition exercised some influence on social and economic legislation, based on the Party's long-established policies and aided by pressure from the Parliamentary Party and the rank and file. A great deal more could and should have been done – the leadership should have made conditions for entering the Coalition, just as the Tories did when they entered the Coalition with the Liberals at the time of the first world war. But at least something was done.

In foreign affairs, on the contrary, there was no team work and no attempt by Labour Ministers in the Cabinet to take a line different from that of the Tories. When Mr Churchill sent his letter after the defeat of Germany proposing that the Coalition should continue until victory over Japan, which was not expected for another eight or nine months, Mr Attlee and Mr Bevin were among the Ministers who wanted to accept the offer and who put up a stiff fight before they were pulled out of the coalition like a cat with its head stuck in the cream jug.

There was nothing morally wrong in this. It was a judgement that was perfectly reasonable in the circumstances. There is no doubt that those who took that view did so as firmly convinced that it was their patriotic duty to maintain national unity for yet a while longer as Mr MacDonald was sincerely convinced of the necessity for establishing national unity in 1931.

After all, we had agreed that coalition was necessary during the war and the war was not yet over. The aftermath of the war was enough to daunt anyone, and it was difficult for Ministers who had worked closely together with their colleagues of other parties for many years in the common cause to feel that in the circumstances it was right and necessary immediately to revert to party politics.

Labour's leaders had been so many years in office that they had lost touch with the rank and file and the people. No fresh thinking is ever done by political leaders while in office – the best that

can be expected of them is to carry out efficiently the policies on which they were elected.

Policies have to be thought out by the leaders, criticised, amended and accepted by the Party, and put over to the people, while a Party is in Opposition or in preparation for an election. War work was such a severe strain on physical energy and time that it was simply not humanly possible for Labour's leaders to do any serious thinking or make a fresh approach to the great problems with which the Coalition was wrestling day by day as the fortunes of the war waxed and waned.

In home affairs the existence of militant, informed minorities and the pressure of the rank and file from below, as well as Labour's past record and the lessons of 1931, did suffice to commit the Party to policies that broke with the past. But the fundamental weakness of the Labour Party is precisely that there is no corresponding state of militancy, knowledge and pressure and no such lesson taught by the past on the life and death issues of world affairs as there is on questions of economic organisation and social legislation. That weakness is further discussed in Chapter X.

What it meant in practice was that leaders who had been separated from the people and had had no time or energy to do any fresh thinking through long years of war service in the Coalition, and who were further compromised by their association in the Cabinet, at San Francisco and at Potsdam with the Foreign policy of their Tory partners, could not be reclaimed and set on a Socialist path as they were in home affairs, because of the lack of interest and democracy in the Party on foreign policy.

THE PERSONALITY AND POWER OF MR BEVIN

A third important factor, which is a particular application of the general case already discussed, is the personality and record of Mr Ernest Bevin. He is one of the most powerful personalities in the Labour movement and has a great record as a trade union leader and as Minister of Labour. But in foreign affairs he has for many years been on the extreme Right Wing of the Labour Party. He was one of the most impenitent non-interventionists in Spain and made no secret of his view that since there were Communists on the side of the Spanish Republic there did not seem much reason for taking any risks or making any exertions to save the Republic from Franco.

The very energy and drive, courage, pride and power that make him such a formidable personality, carry with them corres-

ponding weaknesses. They were summed up as long ago as May 5, 1944, in the *Tribune* by Mr Harold Laski, then Vice-President of the National Executive Committee, in an article entitled 'A Word to Mr Bevin'. The following extracts, bearing in mind the date, are revealing as showing what was already visible of the shape of things to come if Mr Bevin became Foreign Secretary. The article was written because Mr Bevin at Bristol on April 29 had protested that:

It has become the fashion of men like Harold Laski, Aneurin Bevan and Silverman, who claim to be members of the Labour Party, to ridicule and denounce their leaders and say they are slow and reactionary. The creators of the Labour Party have never been selfish. Why do these people now turn upon them in a way which can throw disrepute and discredit on them?

Mr Laski's article was cast in the form of a comment on this statement and the underlying issue:

Mr Bevin is in many ways a man of big ideas, and, as Minister of Labour, he has done a remarkable piece of organisation with energy and determination. But Mr Bevin has never, ever since he emerged as a trade union leader of importance, liked criticism, still less opposition. It has been the unstated assumption of all his activities that to doubt the wisdom of the policy he supports is a kind of political blasphemy. He must not be asked to discuss; he must be permitted to lay down the law. He does not want colleagues but followers.

He is always certain that he is right; and he is unwilling to admit that any other view than his is legitimate. Masterful in temper, obstinate in disposition, accustomed, over long years, to give orders which must be obeyed without question, he has come to regard the measures he recommends as good because he recommends them. And it follows that he has become able, as a consequence, to regard a doubt of those measures as the proof that his critics are wrong.

They lack experience; they are disloyal; they are hostile to trade unionism; and perhaps, worst of all, they are "intellectuals" who have not come into the Labour movement through the gateway of trade unionism in general, nor by the special road, in particular, which Mr Bevin believes that the Labour movement should tread. It does not occur to him to consider that there are occasions when it is at least possible that he is mistaken ...

I say frankly to Mr Bevin that the main body of Labour Party supporters are profoundly dissatisfied with the record of their leaders ... Nor is it easy for people with Socialist convictions to be happy about the international policy of the Government, a policy, let us not forget, to which the Labour leaders are committed ... For Mr Churchill's insistence commits Mr Bevin, let there be no

mistake about that ... As good a test case as any is the support given King George of the Hellenes, who has not been notable for a democratic outlook. But there is, also, their acquiescence in France and Italy, in policies which do not easily square with the fulfilment of the Four Freedoms. There is their acceptance of continued appeasement of Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal, neither of which, if the Labour Party were in opposition, would Mr Bevin regard as exactly a paradise for trade unionists. On a vital matter like oil ... it does not look exactly as though the Labour leaders are fighting those vested interests which ... may well be laying already the foundations of the third world war ...

In his Bristol speech Mr Bevin denounced Mr Aneurin Bevan, Mr Silverman and myself as people who had made it the fashion to denounce the leaders of the Labour Party as 'slow and reactionary'. If he means by that attack that it is my duty as one who, in his curious phrase, 'claims to be a member of the Labour Party', to applaud whatever Labour Ministers do, I cannot share that view. If he means that I must keep silent where I am dissatisfied lest the unity of the party be jeopardised, the answer is the very simple answer: that it is free criticism which makes the Labour Party a living party. It is able to push forward the frontiers of Socialism only by an insistence that the achievement of Socialism is the purpose for which the Labour Party exists ... The allegiance of a Socialist is due to Socialism first, and to Mr Bevin only as he fights for the achievement of Socialism ...

The Labour Party came to express the soul and spirit of a great movement because it fought with tenacity for those fundamental changes which the workers have known to be urgent ever since the Industrial Revolution. It will cease to express that soul and spirit on the day when its rank and file cease to think for themselves. If the result of such thinking arouses in Mr Bevin the kind of anger he has expressed in his speeches that can only be because he has forgotten Lord Acton's dictum about the danger of being corrupted by great power.

Mr Bevin put his own point of view, and again it must be emphasised, it is a perfectly reasonable and honest view for a Minister who is a member of a coalition Cabinet – and there is no doubt that it was the patriotic duty of the Labour Party to enter the Coalition in order to win the war – in the course of a full-blooded defence of Mr Churchill's policy in Greece, delivered at the annual conference of the Labour Party in December 1944:

'These steps that have been taken in Greece are not the decisions of Winston Churchill. They are the decisions of the Cabinet ... I took part with my Labour colleagues in the Government in the whole of these discussions, going on for nearly four years, trying to work out the best way to handle these terrific problems that would

arise at the end of the war, and I say boldly – because I am not going to hide behind anybody – that I am a party to the decisions that have been taken. Looking back over all the efforts that have been made, I cannot bring it to my conscience that any one of the decisions was wrong.

It would have been equally possible for the Labour Ministers in the Coalition to take the view that while they disagreed with Mr Churchill's decisions on Greece they felt it a lesser evil to acquiesce in them than to break up the Coalition. Therefore they would not publicly either oppose or support this policy. But the practical difficulty was that the Labour movement at that time felt so strongly about Mr Churchill's butchering of the Greek resistance movement as the ally and patron of Greek Fascists and quislings that, unless Mr Bevin had been sent down to put over Mr Churchill's policy on the Labour Conference, it would have taken a hostile decision that would have constrained Labour's leaders to take a tougher line with Mr Churchill than most of them were prepared or dared to do.

THE COALITION GOES MARCHING ON

When the House of Commons met for the first time after the election in August, 1945, and Mr Ernest Bevin made his maiden speech as Foreign Secretary, he was wittily complimented by Mr Oliver Stanley for the Tories, on evidently having read a 'famous old play called "The Importance of Being Anthony".' Mr Eden eschewed rhetorical flourishes or wit in giving a heartfelt tribute to 'my Rt Hon. friend the Foreign Secretary – if I may still call him "my Rt Hon. friend" – upon the speech which he has just made ... He and I served four years together in the war Cabinet –

'Mr Churchill: Five.

'Mr Eden: Well, I was not in the Cabinet all the time. During that period there were many discussions on foreign affairs but I cannot recall one single occasion when there was a difference between us. I hope I do not embarrass the Foreign Secretary by saying that.

'Mr Bevin: No.

'Mr Eden: There were no differences on any important issue of foreign policy.'

There have been no important differences on foreign policy between Mr Bevin and Mr Churchill and Mr Eden ever since. The coalition's body is dead, but its soul goes marching on in world affairs. The U.S. State Department were justified in reporting to Congress in May, 1948 that there was no basic

difference between the foreign policy of the Labour Government and the Conservative Party.

Mr Brendan Bracken fought his by-election at Bournemouth on an election address which claimed that the Labour Government were continuing the foreign policy of the Coalition and promised that he would support the Labour Government's foreign policy so long as it continued to carry out coalition policy. The existence of national unity in foreign policy between the Labour Government and the Conservative Party has been proclaimed again and again by the press and by Conservative leaders, and has never been challenged by Labour leaders. Mr Churchill, in the Foreign Affairs debate of January 23, 1948, was not contradicted from the Labour front bench (nor by any back bencher) when he said:

On the whole the Government have maintained a continuity in foreign policy with that pursued under the National Coalition Government ... We have therefore tried to give them all possible help and thus keep the foreign policy of Britain outside the area of party controversy ...

In Greece the Government have pursued exactly the same policy which my Rt. Hon. Friend [Mr Eden] and I flew to Athens that stormy Christmas-time in order to assert ... Not only has this policy been carried through with persistence and perseverance by this country, but has now also received the active and growing support of the United States, who have relieved us of a large part of the burden and responsibility which we were finding it hard to bear.

When I look back at the attacks made on our Greek policy three years ago by *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian* and by hon. Members, some of whom are important Ministers to-day, at the bitter prejudice that existed and still exists in some quarters in the House, and at the violent attacks that were made upon it by men who now fill the important offices of Minister of Health [Mr Aneurin Bevan] and Secretary of State for War [Mr Shinwell], who are now leading Ministers of the Crown, I must congratulate the Foreign Secretary [Mr Bevin] on having been able to make his will effective and to procure the support and acquiescence of the Socialist Government and Party, including these Ministers, for a clear, steady policy ...

I cannot help also feeling content to see that not only the British, but the American Government, have adopted to a very large extent the views which I expressed at Fulton nearly two years ago, and have, indeed, gone in many ways far beyond them ... I was much criticised on both sides of the Atlantic for the Fulton speech, but in almost every detail, and certainly in the spirit and in its moderation, what I there urged has now become the accepted policy of the English-speaking world. The language used by the Prime Minister [Mr Attlee] and the Lord President of the Council [Mr Herbert Morrison] about

Soviet Russia and about the dangers of a new war far exceed in gravity and menace anything which I said at that time or indeed have ever said on this subject since the war. The joint use of bases, the maintenance of the common Staff arrangements between Great Britain and the United States, and the close integration of our foreign policies are being pursued throughout the English-speaking world.

It is scarcely necessary to argue that national unity with the Tories in foreign policy has not been achieved through the Conservative Party coming over to Labour's view that Socialism is essential to economic reconstruction in Europe, to getting rid of Fascism and the causes of war and to promoting the spread of democracy and political freedom; nor that Mr Churchill, Mr Eden, Mr Brendan Bracken, etc. share the view that we must stand by the workers and against the capitalists of Europe; and the Chamberlain White Paper policy of restricting Jewish immigration into and purchase of land in Palestine, and invite the Russians into partnership in the Middle East; put strategic bases under the United Nations and co-operate with both the Soviet Union and the United States on equal terms on the basis of the Charter. All these things, to which the Labour Party pledged itself at the general election, are anathema to the Tories.

Unity with the Tories in foreign policy has been maintained by the simple process of Mr Bevin and the Labour Government, from the day they took office until the present time, tranquilly ignoring Socialist principles, Party policies and election pledges in world affairs, and carrying on with the policy inherited from the Tories in the Coalition. This disastrous 'continuity and national unity' in foreign policy was put over by Mr Bevin on the Cabinet. It was 'sold' to Mr Bevin by the Foreign Office.

HOW IT WAS DONE

The Foreign Office, like the Mounties, has the reputation of always getting its man. In the course of a somewhat extensive experience of its ways gained at Geneva, I have seen it fail only once, and that was with Mr Arthur Henderson, who was also the only successful Foreign Secretary, from the time Sir Edward Grey landed us in the first world war until the present drift to the third world war under Mr Bevin.

The Foreign Office officials are past masters at studying the idiosyncrasies, characteristics, weaknesses and strength of a Foreign Secretary in order to 'sell' him the imperial and balance of power tradition in world affairs that has dug itself in at the Foreign Office and defied the march of time for the last hundred years.

They had two clues to Mr Bevin's thinking to work on: the first was his genuine and deep devotion, strengthened by a lifetime of service as a Trades Unionist, to the cause of the common people; his belief in raising standards of living, in providing work, in the constructive, economic and social approach to international problems.

The second was Mr Bevin's speech at Bournemouth in 1946, revealing a frame of mind long familiar to those around him:

Is there any man in this conference who historically did more to defend the Russian Revolution than I did? It is forgotten in this age, but when the Soviets did not have a friend I got dockers and other people to assist in forming the Council of Action and stop Lloyd George attacking them. I fought the Arcos raid and I called it silly. I fought Churchill's intervention policy for which we are paying now. I fought every attempt to break off relations ... The thanks that I got was an attempt by the Communists to break up the Union that I built. I said to Maisky [the Soviet Ambassador] on one occasion: 'You have built the Soviet Union and you have a right to defend it. I have built the Transport Union and if you seek to break it I will fight you.' That was a proper position to take up. Both were the results of long years of labour. After that there was a slightly greater respect for my view. I think that is fair.

This quotation shows Mr Bevin's overweening pride and self-confidence and his romantic rewriting of history to fit his enlarged ego (for in point of fact Mr Bevin's part in organising the Council of Action, fighting intervention in Russia, etc. was nothing like as great and glorious as he would have us believe to-day; the dockers who struck rather than load the Jolly George forced his hand as the rank and file pushed other reluctant Labour leaders into tardy action). It voices his simple view that the Communists in Moscow are a kind of prolongation and extension of the British Communists who have incurred his righteous wrath in the past by stirring up trouble in his trade union. There is all too much truth in the ancient jest that the trouble with Mr Bevin as Foreign Secretary is that he cannot distinguish between the Soviet Union and a breakaway from the Transport and General Workers Union.

The Foreign Office went to work on these characteristics of Mr Bevin with conspicuous success. They sold him the disastrous idea that the Soviet Government were just ungrateful Communist wreckers making trouble and opposing Mr Bevin's beneficent efforts to raise the standards of living of the common people

everywhere; that the only thing these Russian Communist miscreants – just like the fellows he had had to stand up to in the T. & G.W.U. in the dear old days – really understood and respected was the language of force; and that he, Mr Bevin, was the strong man who could do in peace time what even Mr Churchill could not do: if Mr Churchill attempted to be tough with the Russians, Labour would unite half the country against him. But Mr Bevin, the modern Palmerston in a Keir Hardie cap, could tell the Russians where they got off and have a united nation behind him. That was the way to reach agreement with the Soviet Union.

Mr Bevin swallowed the bait, hook, line and sinker and has been played by the Foreign Office ever since. During the first couple of years he was never tired of explaining that Stalin was a bonnie fighter and so was he, Mr Bevin, and that by speaking frankly and dealing each other a few hard knocks they would reach a good understanding. It was a boyish view and overlooked the fact that if the Labour Government continued to take Mr Churchill's view of British interests in the Middle East and Europe we were heading for a head-on collision with the Soviet Government and the countries of Eastern Europe, and there would be no possibility of discovering common ground or reaching a compromise. Trying to be tough with the Russians by strong talk would merely aggravate that situation.

CONTINUITY IN GREECE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

But this is exactly what Mr Bevin did. It never entered his head to try to think out afresh the foundations of British foreign policy in terms of the changed world, our changed position in the world and the Labour Party's view of the British people's interests in world affairs. He simply carried on Mr Churchill's and Mr Eden's foreign policy and accepted unquestioningly its underlying assumptions – without indeed realising that they were merely assumptions; to Mr Bevin they must have appeared as part of the order of nature. In the speech defending Mr Churchill's Greek policy at the Labour Party Conference in December, 1944, Mr Bevin admitted that the fundamental motive of British policy in Greece was strategic:

'The British Empire cannot abandon its position in the Mediterranean.' That was an admission that intervention in Greece was part and parcel of the policy of going back from the Crimean Conference to the Crimean War in our view of Anglo-Soviet relations in the Middle East. 'The present world situation',

writes Mr W. N. Ewer, the diplomatic correspondent of the *Daily Herald* and a strong and well-informed supporter of Mr Bevin's foreign policy, 'is not the result of a Soviet-American conflict in which Britain has no direct part or direct interest. On the contrary, the Soviet-American conflict is the result of a situation in which, initially, Britain has been more directly concerned than the United States.

'It is, except in the Far East, the result of Russian pressure, of suspected Russian expansionist tendencies in Europe, in the Eastern Mediterranean area, in Persia. And in the last two certainly, resistance to Russian expansion has been a canon of British policy for a century or more. Whether that policy is right or wrong is another matter. My point at the moment is that this is not a new American policy which Britain is being asked to support. It is an old British policy which the United States has decided to support. The 'Truman doctrine' is no American invention. It is, in effect, simply the announcement that the United States is prepared to support, or even to take over material responsibility for, an already existing British policy.'

(In his critical comment appended to Mr Leonard Woolf's Fabian pamphlet on *Foreign Policy: The Labour Party's Dilemma*, published in 1947).

The same view is taken in Transport House's semi-official defence of the Government's foreign policy, *Cards On The Table*, which says that the United Nations organisation is by its very constitution formally prevented from dealing with disagreements between the Big Three because the unanimity rule prevents a decision by the Security Council to use force against the Soviet Union. Therefore, the pamphlet argues, as does Mr Ewer, Anglo-American policy must be to unite their forces in order to check or, if necessary, thrust back Soviet expansion (which is about as reasonable as to suggest an Anglo-Soviet line-up to thrust back American expansion in Europe and the Middle and Far East).

Cards On The Table says with cynical frankness that the reply to those who object that this means Britain supplying the men while the United States supplies the dollars is that this is better than Britain having to supply both the men and the dollars. The only thing overlooked by Mr Ewer and Transport House in their plea for this view is that it means the United States not only supplying the dollars but the policy, while we supply the cannon fodder that is to bleed and burn for causes decided upon not in London but in Washington.

MR BEVIN'S HISTORIC DECISION

Mr Bevin's decision to carry on with Mr Churchill's policy in Greece and the Middle East was a turning point in history. For this area is of vital concern to the Soviet Union as well as to Britain. The Dardanelles, that is the straits separating Europe from Asia Minor, are the direct road to the puddle at Russia's back door, that is to the Black Sea, which laps the shores of some of the richest agricultural and industrial regions, the great oil-fields and coalfields of southern Russia. As Mr Alaric Jacob, the Moscow correspondent of the *Sunday Express*, put it in an article on March 16, 1947:

Turkey and the Straits are a nerve exposed for centuries of Russian history.

Turkey's northern airfields are barely 170 miles from Sebastopol. The very thought of foreign 'military personnel' getting access to those airfields is as intolerable to Marshal Zhukov and his southern command as the arrival of foreign military personnel in Belgium and Holland would be to Britain.

During the first world war Tsarist Russia concluded secret treaties with the Allies that gave Russia Constantinople and the Straits as well as the whole southern shore of the Black Sea, including purely Turkish territory and Kars and Ardahan, the two Turkish provinces inhabited by Armenians and adjoining what is now the Soviet Armenian Republic. The Bolsheviks published and denounced these imperialist secret treaties and the whole policy of annexations. They renounced Russian imperial concessions and privileges of all kinds throughout the Middle and Far East (with the partial exception of the Chinese Eastern Railway).

This policy was part and parcel of the early Bolshevik view that either the capitalist world would intervene and crush the Russian Revolution or the Russian Revolution would rapidly spread to a large part of the world and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics would find herself associated with other Socialist States, between which there would be no enmity or suspicion and therefore no need for defence precautions. The Soviet Union at the end of the second world war had long ago abandoned the idea that the rest of the world was going to go rapidly Socialist or Communist and felt it necessary to look to its defences against the gathering menace of Anglo-American counter-revolutionary intervention after the war. This danger was regarded as particularly acute in the Middle East and the Dardanelles.

The Soviet Government therefore put forward the demand that

the two Turkish Armenian provinces, Kars and Ardahan, should be joined with the Armenian Soviet Republic and that Turkey should share with the Soviet Union in the control of the Straits, which should be fortified for the purpose of making this control effective. At the same time the Soviet Government, since Britain and the U.S.A. were discussing the disposal of Italy's colonies, demanded a naval base in Italian Tripoli.

These claims were put forward quite obviously as bargaining counters, at the outset of what the Soviet Union expected to be long and close negotiations at the conference of Foreign Ministers of the principal victors in London, in September and October, 1945. These were Russian power politics. It could be argued, first, that they took rather an out of date view of the strategy and weapons of modern warfare, and second, that once again the Russians were thinking purely in terms of governments and Foreign Offices, and not of the great and friendly body of opinion in Britain and the U.S.A. that they could have appealed to effectively over the heads of the governments if they had put forward a policy seeking to safeguard the same vital interests but framed in terms of the Crimean Conference and the United Nations rather than in those of the Nineteenth Century.

But on the evidence before them of Mr Churchill's preparations to treat the Soviet Union not as an ally and fellow member of the United Nations but as a potential enemy after the war, the continuation of Mr Churchill's foreign policy by Mr Bevin, and the signs that the United States were about to move in the same direction, the Russians had a strong case. They had to face the facts.

Here was the new-born Labour Government's great opportunity. Here was the chance to break with the long and disastrous past and to strike out on a new course, that indicated by the Labour Party's foreign policy statements and election pledges and taking a modern view of our relations with the Soviet Union.

There were two possible alternatives if the Labour Government had been prepared to act on the assumption to which we were pledged, namely that the Soviet Union and Great Britain were going to be friends and partners and leading fellow-members of the United Nations, bound by the provisions of its Charter, in the post-war world. The first was to do a deal with the Russians readjusting our power relationships in the Middle East in the light of the new assumption. The second was to propose an alternative policy based on the Charter of the United Nations. The two alternatives were by no means mutually exclusive. On

the contrary a realistic solution would probably have combined elements of both.

The one thing necessary was to make the assumption that we and the Russians were going to be friends and not enemies after the war. It is a pity that the Soviet Government itself did not make proposals based on this assumption. But it cannot be said that the proposals they actually made assumed enmity between us. Moreover, what the Russians did or did not do does not absolve the British Government from responsibility for its own policy in the circumstances.

The view we should have acted on was expressed by the *Manchester Guardian* in its leader of July 9, 1945, discussing the Soviet claim to protect the seaway to their greatest industrial and agricultural area:

Once Alexandria was equipped as a naval base and made available for the British fleet there was no need for the old precautions, and as long ago as 1903 the Committee of Imperial Defence decided that the opening of the Straits to Russian warships would not affect, or weaken, our Mediterranean strategy. In 1907, during the negotiations for the Anglo-Russian entente, Sir Edward Grey told the Russians that British policy no longer cared about the closing of the Straits; the only obstacle, he said, was British opinion, still influenced by past prejudices, and therefore he must wait until Anglo-Russian friendship became a popular reality ...

Russia's strategic aim at the Straits has always had two sides: to prevent foreign warships entering the Black Sea and to be allowed to send her own warships into the Mediterranean. Of the two the first, the aim of security, was always by far the more important, and if British opinion had grasped that Russian policy was based on fear and suspicion, not on aggression, British policy would have been less suspicious in its turn and we should have been spared the calamities of the Crimean War and of the near-war of 1878. In the new light of Anglo-Russian friendship we should see more clearly. If it is reasonable for the United States to lease strategic bases in Newfoundland and in the British West Indies, it is equally reasonable for the Russians to desire strategic bases at the Straits and unreasonable to expect them to depend on the good graces of the Turks, however good those graces may be. We who hold strategic bases all over the world cannot grudge the Russians the right to protect the seaway to their greatest industrial and agricultural area, the Ukraine.

But the F.O. was not going to base British policy in 1945 on the new-fangled ideas of 1903 and 1907. It had turned the clock back to 1854. And Mr Bevin missed the first chance to make peace without even realising what he was doing, by plunging

straight ahead with Mr Churchill's Crimean War, anti-Soviet power politics. He refused even to discuss the Soviet claims at the London Conference in September-October, 1945, and instead went in for a bout of violent denunciation, table thumping, etc. behind imperfectly closed doors, as part of his policy of making the Soviets accept the Tory view of British interests in the Middle East by talking tough to them.

'One cannot help being a little suspicious,' he afterwards told the House on November 7, 1945, 'if a great power wants to come right across shall I say the throat of the British Commonwealth, which has done no harm to anybody but has fought this war.'

That statement, of course, did not refer to the United States, which, on the contrary, was being courted and bribed with oil to come into the Middle East in order to help us keep out the Russians and bottle up the Soviet Union in the Black Sea. The Labour Party's pledges to Palestine were sacrificed as part of this policy, for it involved appeasing the Arabs lest they turn to the Russians.

The effect on the Russians of Mr Bevin's and later the Anglo-American Greek and Middle East policies was well summed up in Professor H. Seton-Watson's broadcast of June 6, 1947:

Ever since the end of the 18th Century, the rulers of Russia have felt themselves bottled up in the Black Sea. Their path into the Mediterranean was blocked by Turkey, who commanded both sides of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Turkey was supported in the 19th Century by Britain, and now the Truman doctrine has brought in the United States to reinforce the barrier. To anyone looking south from Moscow it seems as if the Anglo-Saxon powers have built an iron wall from the south of Italy right across to the Himalayas just to keep Russia cut off from warm seas. This iron wall cuts the Balkans in two along Greece's northern frontier, which borders on Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

Mr Bevin took the wrong turning in 1945 or rather continued the wrong course along which the country had been led by Mr Churchill. Since then he has never looked back and we have gone from deadlock to crisis and are drifting from crisis to disaster. Before the Soviet Government ever had a chance to display either post-war friendship or hostility, at a time when the Soviet press was still friendly in its references to this country, Mr Bevin went ahead with a policy that assumed that our next enemy was our ally the U.S.S.R.

MR BEVIN AND MR BYRNES

The tragic irony of the situation was that at the time when the Labour Government was making a false start by continuing the Churchill-Foreign Office tradition in international affairs, the United States Administration was still living on the tradition of the late President Roosevelt. And so the grotesque situation arose at the September-October 1945 conference in London, at the December conference in Moscow and at the January 1946 meetings of the Security Council and General Assembly in London, that the United States delegation was conciliatory and tried to mediate between Labour Britain and the Soviet Government, whereas Mr Bevin maintained an attitude of self-righteous intransigence throughout. He did more – he allied himself with the Right Wing of the American delegation, Senators Vandenberg and Connally, against Secretary of State James Byrnes, whom Mr Bevin freely accused of being a weak-kneed appeaser of the Soviet Union. And when the Americans reached agreement with the Soviet Government on a number of important points at the Moscow Conference, while Mr Bevin agreed on nothing, our Foreign Secretary returned home to complain through the usual channel of Foreign Office press bureau leaks to diplomatic correspondents, that the Americans had 'let us down' by coming to terms with the Russians and leaving us out in the cold.

The danger of the Americans reaching direct agreement with the Russians has always been referred to by apologists for the Government's foreign policy as only one degree less menacing than that of the present disagreement ending in a third world war. The Foreign Office is haunted by the fear that President Truman may one day stab Mr Bevin in the back with an olive branch. The danger would not appear to be imminent.

The fantastic, indeed almost unbelievable episode of Mr Bevin, supposedly representing a Socialist Government, outdoing the representatives of the capitalist United States in his hostility to our ally the Soviet Union in his first few weeks of office was referred to in the American press only some months later and then in connection with Mr Byrnes' collapse under the pressure exerted jointly by gathering reaction in the United States and by Mr Bevin and the Foreign Office. Thus Mr Stewart Alsop in the *New York Herald Tribune* (Paris edition) of May 28, 1946, wrote as follows of the Paris Conference in the early spring of that year, where Mr Byrnes fell into line with the 'tough' anti-Soviet policy of Mr Bevin and Senators Connally and Vandenberg:

After the return from London a serious split threatened between Mr Byrnes and the Senators. On their return from Paris they are completely united ... As a world figure also Mr Byrnes has gained stature. His relations with the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had been exceedingly bad. From Moscow onward Mr Bevin had rather openly accused him of weakness and appeasement. But at Paris, while Mr Bevin was perhaps too much inclined to impute U.S. firmness of policy to Senators Connally and Vandenberg, he worked in thorough accord with Mr Byrnes.

Referring to the same episode, Walter Lippmann, in the *New York Herald Tribune* (Paris edition) of June 5, 1946, says that:

As respects Europe and the Middle East, the United States was attempting to play the role of mediator between the Soviet Union and the British Empire until about February, when Secretary Byrnes changed his policy radically and renounced it. He did this under heavy pressure from the British Government and from influential elements in the State Department and in Congress.

The role of the mediator, it is said, is immoral. You cannot mediate between right and wrong. Lord Vansittart cried out angrily that to choose to be the mediator in 'the area of Anglo-Russian contention' in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East was 'self-righteous abstention ... six of one and half a dozen of the other.' It was 'the new isolationism' and it was 'appeasement'. Mr Byrnes, in renouncing these iniquities, 'has', said Lord Vansittart, 'evolved into a statesman'. [Lord Vansittart, it may be remarked in passing, was one of the gravediggers of peace last time. His record as a leading balance-of-power appeaser and assassin of the League of Nations is as black as Chamberlain's. He has since evolved into a noisy and poisonously self-righteous warmonger.]

Mr Lippmann concludes by pointing out that 'The line followed by Mr Bevin in his first ten months was not consistent with the promises and the doctrines of the British Labour Party. Mr Bevin's policy has been to carry on the policies he found when he took office and to adhere to the line laid down by Mr Churchill and the old hands at the Foreign Office.'

This bad start was unfortunately no accident. It was part and parcel of the Tory view of the British people's interests abroad, on which the Labour Government have invariably acted ever since coming into office.

The Russians may be blamed for not doing enough to help British public opinion see that the real issue between us and them was whether or not we could discover common ground on which to base peace and cooperation between the two countries. But whereas their fault has been one of how to present their case,

plus errors of judgement on important issues and the general handicap imposed by the official control of news and views (see the discussion of these points in Chapter XI, Communism and the Soviet Union), the Labour Government made agreement impossible with the Soviet Union, whether its policy was reasonable or not, by continuing, with the best intentions no doubt, to base British foreign policy on Conservative imperial and social assumptions.

That is the answer to the frequent question why the Soviet Government did not treat us as friends when the Labour Government first came into power. The Labour Government beat them to it by going straight on with the Tory policy of treating the Soviet Union as our next enemy.

THE OFFER TO PROLONG THE ANGLO-SOVIET ALLIANCE

Against the background of that portentous fact, Mr Bevin's offer to 'prolong' the Anglo-Soviet alliance for fifty years looked less impressive in Moscow than it appeared at the annual conferences of the Labour Party – especially as the treaty ran on without any time limit anyhow, so long as the parties wanted it, and could not even be denounced by either party (and then only on giving a year's notice) until after the lapse of twenty years. Stalin's reply was to welcome the proposal but to point out that the treaty was concluded with reference to our common fight against Germany, and needed revision if it was to apply to post-war conditions.

The subsequent negotiations for revision broke down because the Russians wanted it made clear that we would not join the United States in fighting our ally, the Soviet Union, and Mr Bevin wanted to preserve a free hand on this issue.

It is difficult in the light of these facts to avoid the conclusion that the offer to prolong the Anglo-Soviet alliance to fifty years was Foreign Office humbug meant to conceal and not to change the policy, taken over by the Labour Government from Mr Churchill, of lining up with the U.S.A. against the U.S.S.R. The Anglo-Soviet negotiations broke down in fact on the very issue and for the very reason that Anglo-German negotiations for what would now be called a 'non-aggression treaty' broke down in 1909 and again in 1912.

The two governments were at that time engaged in a race for arms, and Britain was anxious to secure a naval agreement regulating the relative sizes and pace of building of the two fleets. As both sides played the great game of power politics, each was

building up armaments in order to be able to use the threat of war against the other in diplomatic bargaining. Both considered that war used in this way as an instrument of national policy was self-defence. It soon became clear that a naval agreement was impossible unless there was also an agreement that would satisfy the two powers that neither was preparing to attack the other in self-defence, each of course remaining sole judge of when, how and why it might have to resort to war in self-defence. To make a treaty that meant anything within the framework and on the assumptions of power-politics was obviously a job like squaring the circle. But both Governments were willing to try.

The German Government accordingly suggested a formula by which Great Britain would undertake to be neutral if Germany were attacked. This was understood by the British Government to mean that if Germany attacked France, Britain would have to keep out.

So a British counter-formula was proposed by which this country would undertake not to make any 'unprovoked attack' on Germany. This was regarded by the Germans as leaving Britain a free hand to join in with France in a war against them by saying that even if the French first resorted to arms and invaded German territory, their attack had been 'provoked' by Germany's attitude in whatever diplomatic crisis had ended in a 'showdown.'

Finally, as a concession, the German Government proposed that Britain might water down her undertaking to be neutral by saying that she would not join in a war in which Germany 'cannot be said to be the aggressor'. This was regarded by the British Government, probably correctly, as a further perfidious attempt to separate Britain from France.

The underlying reality was, of course, the balance of power - Britain was already secretly tied up to France by the military and naval staff conversations, although Sir Edward Grey lied himself black in the face in the House of Commons denying that Britain was in any way committed to France, and asserting that the Government had kept their hands free and would judge all issues on their merits as they arose and not take sides between Germany and France.

The Anglo-French General Staff conversations and the resulting joint arrangements, as Mr Churchill pointed out in his book *The World Crisis*, were in fact 'a step of profound significance and of far-reaching reactions. Henceforward, the relations of the two staffs became increasingly intimate and confidential. The minds

of our military men were definitely turned into a particular channel. Mutual trust grew continually in one set of military relationships, mutual precautions in the other. However explicitly the two Governments might agree and affirm to each other that no national or political engagement was involved in these technical discussions, the fact remained that they constituted an exceedingly potent tie.'

Britain's tie-up with France on one side of the balance of power against the German-Austro-Hungarian combination on the other, meant that whatever the merits of the issues in any dispute between the two sides, and however the French behaved, Britain was bound to join with France if and when war resulted. It may be that any possible alternative in those days would have been no better. It is arguable that the Anglo-Franco-Russian Entente was the best policy in the circumstances. It is certain, however, that British public opinion would not only never have allowed the Entente to harden into an open avowed alliance, but would have violently opposed the Anglo-French General Staff arrangements if it had known they existed. Therefore public opinion had to be thoroughly humbugged and misled, and advantage taken of the heedlessness and deliberately-fostered ignorance of the people in foreign affairs. In the end, this realistic policy did not keep the peace. Judged by the test of results it failed.

Similarly, the Foreign Office and War Office officials before the second world war ended were already preparing for the third. They were thinking in terms of an Anglo-American balance of power against the Soviet Union in the post-war world, as a direct continuation of the alignment that had begun to form in 1943 when the U.S.S.R. was still our fighting ally. But they knew very well in 1945-7 that public opinion would never stand for an Anglo-American alliance against the Soviet Union. It was therefore necessary to proceed cautiously, slowly, but tenaciously, step by step, humbugging and manoeuvring Labour Ministers as well as public opinion all the way until the consequences of this policy (since what we prepare for in these matters is what we get) had produced an international situation and a national state of mind in which its nature and aims could be openly avowed. The job was made easier by the fact that it was a matter of continuing and developing wartime arrangements rather than initiating anything new. It was not so much a matter of deliberate, Machiavellian decisions, as of reactions to events as they arose, in the light of traditional assumptions about our position and interests in the world and parabola about social change.

Anglo-American General Staff conversations, through the war-time Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee that is still functioning, and other channels, tied Britain up to the U.S.A., from a defence point of view, two years before the Government stopped strenuously denying the fact and returning evasive, misleading and false answers to its own back benchers who questioned Ministers. The Soviet Government, of course, was suspicious, and therefore pressed for an undertaking that Britain would not join the U.S.A. if the latter were to attack the Soviet Union. The subsequent conversations followed almost exactly the same course and ended in the same way as the Anglo-German conversations forty years earlier.

The permanent officials who were 'working' British policies to these power-political ends, were sincere, able and upright men, labouring in what they believed to be the best interests of their country. But they were operating on traditions and assumptions that bore little relation to the realities of the post-war world. They treated the obligations and institutions of the United Nations, on which the world's hope of peace and British foreign policy were supposed to rest, as so much thin air.

One great difference between the situation before the first world war and that after the second is that to-day democracy is supposed to exist in foreign affairs. The Government promised the people that they would base our policy on the treaty obligations of the United Nations Charter, which rests on the fundamental principle that the permanent members of the Security Council must trust each other to the point where they settle all their disputes by peaceful means and never prepare, contemplate or threaten to use force in their dealings with each other. British foreign policy has not so much torn up the Charter as never dreamed of attempting to take this fundamental principle seriously. From the moment the Labour Party came into office until to-day, the Government have on the contrary acted as though the only 'realistic' basis for British policy was an Anglo-American alliance building up a balance of power against the Soviet Union.

The Labour Ministers directly responsible for this policy have pursued it, firmly convinced that there was no real alternative and that they were justified in rigging and concealing the facts to the extent needed to secure the acquiescence of Parliament and public opinion in what they were doing. This appeared to them to be their patriotic duty and part of the responsibility of power and the art of government. It may be conceded that up to a point

they were entitled to take this view, which has been held by all Governments in all ages. It is a question of degree. But those who practise 'realism' can get away with it only if their policy succeeds. If it fails they may be hoist with their own petard. Having rejected treaty obligations, honesty, justice and mercy in order to get results, they must abide by the test of results. The results are set forth in the following chapters.

THE FAR EAST

In the Far East the same forces were at work as in Europe and the Middle East, and similar counter-measures were taken by Britain and the U.S.A. during the last year of the war.

In China there had been a revolution in 1911 which developed a Communist left wing and the strategy of a national revolutionary coalition (the Kuomintang) in the early twenties, conquered most of China and then broke apart when General Chiang Kai-shek turned on the Communists and fell a prisoner to the merchants, bankers, rackrenting landlords, war lords and corrupt officials who had been the backbone of the Old China and saw no reason why things should change. The Communists held some Chinese provinces and intermittent civil war raged.

So deep was the cleavage that even the Japanese invasion and the ensuing long struggle could not close the breach. During the world war the Communist Eighth Route Army did the lion's share of the fighting against Japan. The Communists led practically the whole of the resistance and guerilla movement. Chiang Kai-Shek was armed and subsidised by the United States, but preferred to keep most of his forces in reserve and build them up for attacking the Communists after the war, when they had exhausted themselves fighting the Japanese, and the Japanese had been defeated by the Allies.

In Burma, Indonesia and Indo-China the smashing of Western Imperialism by the Japanese and the subsequent imposition of an even worse Japanese Imperialism had powerfully developed nationalist movements and raised the demand for independence. These movements regarded Japan and the West almost equally as oppressors and were divided on grounds more of tactics than of principle as to how to use one against the other.

When Japan collapsed the Labour Government, with the help of Lord Louis Mountbatten, the leading man on the spot, adopted a relatively enlightened policy towards Burma that eventually conferred Dominion status and the right of secession (promptly exercised) on that country.

This progressive policy, also followed in India, and due in part to the advice of the Colonial and India Offices, contrasted with the policy adopted by Mr Bevin and the Foreign Office toward French Indo-China and Dutch Indonesia. In both cases the Labour Government helped the French and the Dutch back into control, on the basis of policies for oppressing and beating down the nationalist resistance movements that provoked colonial wars which have gone on ever since.

The French, although supplied with British arms, were left to do most of their own fighting. But in Indonesia British troops were used, and the Japanese troops left on the island, whom we were supposed to round up and make captive, were instead pressed into service to slaughter Indonesian nationalists.

Our soldiers behaved with great steadiness and restraint and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr (as he then was), who had been our Ambassador in Moscow, was sent out to mediate between the Dutch and the Indonesians and did as good a job as was humanly possible within the limits of his instructions. But the nature of the Government's policy was such as to saddle Britain with part of the responsibility for the hideously cruel and destructive colonial war that has been raging in Indo-China and Indonesia for four years.

'British troops went to Indonesia', Mr Bevin explained to the House on November 23, 1945, 'first, to disarm and concentrate the Japanese forces, secondly, to rescue and bring home our prisoners of war, and thirdly, to rescue the thousands of internees in the camps throughout this large island. We had no intention of using any British forces for any other purpose, or against the inhabitants ...

'We had no intention of being involved in any constitutional dispute between the Netherlands and the people of the Netherlands East Indies. Once the military objectives had been attained and civil administration placed on its feet again, we were resolved to withdraw our troops as rapidly as possible. It must be remembered, however, that the Netherlands stood by us when we were attacked by Japan. They were, I believe, the first actually to declare war on Japan. It was not their fault or the fault of the Netherlands East Indies that they were unable to assume control. It is quite clear that His Majesty's Government have a definite agreement with them to provide for the Dutch Netherlands Indies Government to resume as rapidly as practicable full responsibility for the administration of the Netherlands Indian territories. We had no indication that our forces would be op-

posed. Accordingly, we are now faced with a very difficult and intricate situation. It is impossible for us to avoid becoming involved in the political affairs of the island in view of the developments that have subsequently taken place.'

On December 11, 1945, Mr T. Driberg pressed the Government to say just what were our obligations to the Dutch and the French with regard to Indo-China and Indonesia. He also gave a devastating analysis of the Dutch offer to the Indonesians, making clear that it fell far short of Dominion status and could not possibly satisfy even the moderate Indonesians, although Mr Noel Baker, the Minister of State, had described it as 'going very far' and being 'extremely liberal'. Mr Driberg supported his contentions by quoting *The Times* special correspondent on the spot, Mr Ian Morrison, a highly responsible journalist and authority on the Far East.

Mr Morrison, after analysing the Dutch offer, came to the conclusion that 'It is more full of loopholes than most official declarations of policy. Nearly all its provisions, when put into plain language, represent either pious hopes ... obvious statements of fact ... or evasions of the issue. Even the proposed round table conference is to have only advisory powers. No dates are given, and nothing specific is said about elections'.

Mr Noel Baker replied that 'The only agreements made with the Dutch Government, and with the French Government about Indo-China, which my hon. friend the Member for Maldon [Mr Driberg] also mentioned, were the ordinary civil affairs agreements made with all the Allied Governments for the taking over by them of the administration when the Allied Armies had finished their job'.

Mr Noel Baker's and Mr Bevin's admissions on this point show that the Government set out deliberately to beat down the resistance of the nationalists and restore their Empires to the Dutch and French, or at least to put them into a position where they could reconquer them for themselves. In pursuance of this policy Britain has armed and trained many of the Dutch troops being used in Indonesia and supplied France with arms for her colonial war, which is being waged with every circumstance of atrocity by forces that include Foreign Legion units recruited from former Nazis and Fascists, German as well as French.

Moreover, his concluding admission, confirmed by Mr Noel Baker, flatly contradicts and cancels out Mr Bevin's opening statement, quoted above, that 'we had no intention of using any British forces for any other purpose' than that of disarming

the Japanese and rescuing prisoners and internees, and that we did not intend to use them 'against the inhabitants'. It is quite plain that from the outset the policy was to do exactly the things Mr Bevin disclaimed any intention of doing. It is possible, of course, that the Foreign Office were really so abysmally ignorant as Mr Bevin suggested when he said 'We had no indication that our forces would be opposed'. But it strains credulity to believe that even the Foreign Office could be ignorant of the existence of the Indonesian nationalist movement, and was really deluded enough to believe that it would take kindly to the reimposition of Dutch Imperialism by British (and Japanese) troops.

Mr Noel-Baker went on to say that the job in Indo-China was practically finished and he hoped British troops would soon be able to come away.

Mr Driberg (who had just come back from visiting Indo-China): 'Does that mean that the Annamese people are to be left with the French in control, without any guarantee of future independence?'

Mr Noel-Baker: 'What does the hon. Member mean by independence?'

Mr Driberg: 'Self-government.'

Mr Noel-Baker: 'Is it certain that the people of Indo-China are all united in desiring a complete changeover to independence, as my hon. Friend suggests? These are assumptions which to-night I cannot possibly admit from others, and which I could not allow myself to make.'

Mr Driberg: 'Ninety per cent hate the French, and justly.'

Mr Noel-Baker: 'I want to come to what he said about Indonesia and Java, which is more important. He said that we were employing Japanese troops, that Indonesian villages had been burnt, and so on.'

It was true that Japanese troops had been employed, but only once offensively. A village had been burnt by way of reprisal. The situation was difficult, but there was disorder and it had become necessary to restore order.

'I know that the phrase "restoring order" has a sinister connotation in Colonial history. I know that any use of it justifiably arouses suspicion. I know it has been too often used as an excuse for the suppression of political aspirations by force. But what are the facts in this case? The suppression of the Indonesian terrorist groups will not in any way weaken the presentation of the Nationalist case by the Indonesian leaders in their negotiations with the Dutch ...

'I am confident that that well-known phenomenon, the colonial diehard, who will not admit that the old days of easy and unchallenged ascendancy have gone and cannot return, will not prevail against men like the present Prime Minister of Holland, Professor Schermerhorn, and the Minister of Overseas Territories, Dr Logemann, both of whom have been personally involved for several years in the promotion of movements for the more democratic and progressive administration of the Netherlands East Indies'.

The subsequent Dutch war of re-conquest in Indonesia, undertaken in flat defiance of the United Nations, made these confident hopes, while they were no doubt a tribute to the lingering tenderness of Mr Noel-Baker's conscience, look as silly as they sounded at the time.*

In short, by the end of 1945 the Labour Government were already deeply committed to continuity in foreign policy, based on the Imperial and social assumptions of the defenders of the old order, who were still in control in the Foreign Office and the fighting services, and determined that things were not going to change merely because the British people had been foolish enough to put Labour into power instead of Mr Churchill.

* But Mr Noel-Baker, who in private life is one of the most amiable of men, is a melancholy example of what happens to a politician who puts office before principle and salves the resulting wound, to his conscience with make-believe. He, who was a lifelong friend and supporter of the Greek Republicans supports the restoration of Royalism and Fascism by foreign intervention; he, who bitterly denounced the Chamberlain White Paper policy and predicted it would lead to the use of British troops and ships to keep Jews out of Palestine, supported the carrying out of that policy by Mr Bevin; he, who had been the great champion of the Covenant and Collective Security, spoke for the Government in defence of the Atlantic Pact, which tears up the U.N. Charter and returns to the statecraft of the balance of power and an arms race that he exposed and fought so brilliantly at Geneva.

CHAPTER VI

The U.S. Takes Over

(1946)

THE CHANCE THAT WAS MISSED

Mr Bevin's return to the outlook and policy of the Crimean War from the moment he assumed office not only made agreement impossible with the Russians, even if they had been broad-minded, reasonable, well-informed and friendly, which was far from being the case. An equally serious consequence of the Labour Foreign Secretary acting like a pinchbeck Palmerston was that he speeded up the disastrous triumph of the 'be tough with Russia' school in the United States. If the Labour Government had broken with the past and acted on its election pledges in world affairs, instead of riding on the Churchill-Foreign Office tradition, the Roosevelt tradition might have survived long enough in American foreign policy to have brought off the initial and all-important agreement between the great powers that was missed in London and Moscow. As it was, Mr Byrnes found himself in the weak and vulnerable position of being more royalist than the king – that is less anti-Soviet than the Labour Foreign Secretary – and swiftly collapsed.

In 1945-6 the situation was still fluid, and there were immense reserves of mutual goodwill in the liberated peoples of West and East Europe and of the great Allies who had won the war together. If only the new-born Labour Government had used the prestige and popularity it enjoyed in the eyes of the peoples to blaze new trails and propose fresh solutions, compromises on the outstanding issues of the peace settlement could in all human probability have been reached between New Deal America, Socialist Britain and Communist Russia, and the history of the world might have been different.

As it was, Mr Bevin blocked solutions at the critical moment when they might have been achieved if he had been constructive instead of obstructive, and in so doing turned the crack in Allied unity into a rift, and the rift into a breach, and hastened the triumph of anti-New Deal and anti-Soviet reaction in the U.S.A. As we have seen, Mr Byrnes' resistance to Senators Vandenberg

and Connally and to the 'be tough with Russia' school in the State Department ceased and he caught up with Mr Bevin about February or March 1946. From then on Secretary of State Byrnes and his successors, Chief of Staff General George Marshall in mufti and Mr Dean Acheson, have gone from strength to strength and never looked back. They have rumbled along the road to war with increasing noise and momentum and Mr Bevin has lumbered in their wake, urged and prodded along by Mr Churchill.

The timing, or rather mistiming, of measures or proposals has been the result of the policies of statesmen, not least of Mr Bevin; better timing might have resulted in agreement; and agreement between the three great powers in the Middle East might have changed the course of world history. But the scale of these events is immeasurably greater than any individual, however exalted his position and powerful his personality.

THE SOURCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The basic compulsions and drives, the underlying urges in U.S. world policy, lie deep in the economic foundations and class structure of American society.

The great slump gave American capitalism a big jolt and a severe fright. U.S. industry never got back to the 1929 level and ran at only 60 per cent capacity until war preparations, including Allied war orders, caught up the slack. During the war American industrial plant was further vastly expanded and now amounts to nearly two-thirds of the world's total industrial capacity.

President Roosevelt, his Secretary of Commerce, Henry Wallace, many of the more far-sighted members of his Administration and various war-planning boards, gave anxious thought to the problem of how the huge plant and colossal labour force of the United States were to be kept in employment after the war. A survey of the situation produced evidence that some 60,000,000 jobs would have to be provided to keep things going. In his famous speech on the Century of the Common Man, Henry Wallace gave a pre-view of how the Roosevelt Administration could tackle this problem on New Deal lines. The general idea was to increase the consuming power of the American people by redistributing wealth through taxation and social legislation and going in for large-scale housing programmes, price controls and planning measures. The United States was also to give generous help to the reconstruction of other countries, without any political or military strings. In this connection Mr Wallace spoke at some length of the mutual advantages that would result from

the United States providing the Soviet Union with capital goods and equipment of all kinds to help the latter carry out a vast scheme for developing Siberia, improving and multiplying its roads, railways, etc., in return for Soviet raw materials, minerals, precious metals and other goods wanted by the U.S.A.

Wendell Wilkie, in those far-off days, and more recently Walter Lippmann, also aired the idea of what the United States could do to develop the economies of backward nations in the Middle and Far East, as well as taking a big and active part in co-operation with the Soviet Union and the Western powers in the reconstruction of all Europe.

But the economic developments hastened by the war had increased the concentration of economic and financial power in comparatively few hands and had meant big business earning higher profits and a greater share of the national income than ever before in American history. The first result of war is to produce a feeling of national unity and arouse militant, intolerant and unthinking patriotism that operates against all who want social change and increases the influence and aggressiveness of those who want to keep things as they are. The great offensive of American big business and reaction against the New Deal was unleashed during the war and carried all before it after Roosevelt's death.

The reconstruction plans of New Dealers ceased to count. The reconstruction programme of N.A.M. (National Association of Manufacturers), on the other hand, became practically a blueprint of the policy pursued by the Administration under the pressure of vested interests and of Congress, itself subject to big business lobbies and dependent on big business contributions to party coffers. N.A.M. rejected the whole idea of increasing consumption at home – for this would have meant redistributing wealth and some measure of planning and control of production. Such ideas were anathema to those who were skimming the cream of the country's wealth and wanted a free hand to go on piling up profits. Instead N.A.M. declared that controls must be lifted, private enterprise given a free hand and every encouragement by easing the burden of taxation, and American foreign trade must be trebled. Capturing foreign markets was to be the great remedy against the return of unemployment at home. Re-armament, at first furtively and shamefacedly, later openly, came to be looked upon and advocated as a necessary and laudable way of keeping America's unplanned economic system in full production.

Free enterprise, foreign markets and rearmament were the answer of American capitalism to the problems of the post-war world. There was a further answer: the fear for the future of the capitalist system, which is so strong in the Tories of Britain and Western Europe, is even stronger in their American counterparts. It was rationalised and 'projected' in hostility to Communism and the Soviet Union, used practically as interchangeable terms to denote some vague, external menace that was threatening to come in from outside and make gratuitous trouble between workers and employers to the ruination of the otherwise safe and happy American Way of Life. 'The questioner is soon driven to the conclusion', writes a special correspondent of *The Times*, February 17, 1948, from the West Coast of the U.S.A., 'that fear of Russia ... is far more psychological than military ... Dislike and fear of Russia are closely bound up with a domestic *malaise* of which there are many other symptoms as well.

'What is new and surprising in American opinion to-day is a growing inclination to dig at the roots of the capitalist economy – to question, not, indeed its value, but its capacity to maintain itself. And since belief in inherent weaknesses and contradictions in the capitalist system would have too Marxist a flavour to be acceptable doctrine, the Russian bogey provides a more convenient explanation of the threat. Hatred of Russia and anxieties for the future of the capitalist order in the United States are two facets of the same phenomenon'.

These are the economic, social and psychological factors that account for the main trends in American foreign policy. At first the carry-over from Roosevelt liberalism and the feeling of partnership for common ends between the Allies was strong enough to induce the United States to take a big part in providing humanitarian aid through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). But as time went on a 'business' view of America's economic relations with other countries and increasingly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet political motives began to influence and later to dominate the actions of the Administration.

THE U.S. GETS TOUGH

The 'prepare for the next war' policy was put in hand in the Far East and Pacific in the closing stages of the war. After a struggle between the Navy Department and the State Department, the former won and seized most of the islands captured from Japan for conversion to American naval and air bases.

The usual tribute of vice to virtue in the form of hypocrisy was paid by devising a form of trusteeship unknown to the United Nations Charter, by which the U.S.A. was to hold these islands nominally on behalf of the United Nations, but with a free hand and no obligation to submit any reports, let alone allow an investigation. The U.S.A. continued to wage peace bloodily in China. General MacArthur also made no bones about his policy of converting Japan into an outpost of American big business and a base for anti-Soviet and anti-Communist power politics.

But at first the United States hung back in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and had to be coaxed and urged by the Labour Government as well as lured by the smell of oil before moving in and associating herself with the policy of anti-Communist intervention in Eastern Europe, officially extended to Greece only in 1947, and anti-Soviet oil and power politics in the Middle East. The latter involved the United States in considerable confusion. The State Department desired to appease the Arabs for fear lest they turn to Russia and also because they controlled the territories in which the oil was to be found. The President was anxious not to jeopardise the Jewish vote and the votes of those Progressives who wanted justice for Palestine.

Walter Lippmann wrote very frankly in his *New York Herald Tribune* column that the United States were quite ready to come into the Mediterranean and the Middle East in order to help Britain restore the balance of power. But she would come in on her own terms and for her own purposes, not as a catspaw for Britain. She wanted to become a Mediterranean power in her own right. The decision to embark on this 'forward' policy was one of the first fruits of Mr Byrnes' capitulation in February, 1946, to the 'be tough with Russia' school.

'Early last winter,' wrote Mr Lippmann in the *New York Herald Tribune* of September 12, 1946, 'the United States Government made the momentous decision to take the leading part in repelling the expansion of the Soviet Empire. As a result, we are now engaged in a world-wide diplomatic struggle of the utmost gravity. We must realise that it cannot be won and that it may lead to a catastrophic war unless the diplomatic campaign is planned on a correct appraisal of what it is essential to accomplish and of the power and influence we can muster in order to accomplish it ... The direct American policy would be to build up American power at a selected point where, if war comes, the Soviet Union would from the outset be on the defensive. That point is manifestly in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the direction

of the Black Sea. For at that point American sea and air power can be brought within reach of the vital centres of Russia, and can, therefore, most surely counteract the striking power of the Red Army.'

THE UNAVOWED ALLIANCE

Britain and the United States had emerged from the war pretty well 'mixed up together' as regards their defence arrangements. The leasing by the United States of air and naval bases in the West Indies and Bermuda in exchange for a quantity of American destroyers before even the U.S. came into the war had been vastly extended during the war. By the end of it the United States was freely using and establishing bases on British territories in Africa, Asia and the Pacific; Anglo-American forces had fought under joint command and a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee had been established in Washington.

These arrangements were simply continued after the end of the war and began, early in 1946, to be transformed into a *de facto*, although one-sided, military alliance dominated by the United States.

In his speech of March 5, 1946 at Fulton, Missouri, with President Truman in the chair, Mr Churchill put in a plea for extending and consolidating these arrangements so as to array Anglo-American power against the Soviet Union and the spread of 'Communism' (i.e. social revolution). He drew a sombre picture of a fierce and intractable Soviet Union and malevolent Communist Parties moving inexorably forward to blot out civilisation, blind and deaf to reason or good feeling, and to be stopped only by Britain and the U.S.A. establishing not a 'quivering, precarious balance of power' but an overwhelming preponderance of strength.

The comment in the lobbies of the House at the time was that 'Winston is drawing a map of the way Ernie is going.' There was a vigorous reaction at the time in the Parliamentary Labour Party. But all attempts to make the Government clearly and categorically repudiate Mr Churchill's policy failed. However, the Government was sufficiently impressed by this display of feeling in the Party to proceed cautiously and as quietly as possible with the working out of Anglo-American military arrangements on the lines suggested at Fulton.

The American press, less well trained and reticent than our own, from time to time published information that led to questions in the House by various Labour M.P.s. The fat was really

in the fire when on October 30, 1946, the Associated Press, London Office, sent a long telegram to its New York headquarters that gave a circumstantial account of the progress made in Anglo-U.S. standardisation of arms, exchange of military information and mutual defence arrangements.

The telegram stated that this information had been obtained in 'authoritative circles', which is the conventional phrase in journalism to describe an official source that cannot be quoted publicly. A service message to the editor gave the name of a War Office Public Relations officer as the source that had been consulted, in order to make clear to A.P. headquarters that this was 'hard' (i.e. authentic) news and not mere speculation.

Anyone who is interested in the arts of government evasion, subterfuge and quibble can look up Hansard of December 17, 1946, and February 11, 1947, to see how the Minister replying for the War Office dodged my attempts to dig out the truth. The standards of official mendacity do not seem to have changed very much since the days before the first world war, when Sir Edward Grey did his best to mislead those of his back-benchers who got too curious about the Anglo-French 'General Staff conversations' that committed us to go to war but the very existence of which was denied right up to the outbreak of war.

EASTERN EUROPE

The nature of Anglo-American policy toward Eastern Europe, that began in earnest after Mr Byrnes had caught up with Mr Bevin at the Paris Conference in the winter and spring of 1946, was made clear at that conference and still clearer when it resumed again in the summer. The object of the conference was to reach agreement on peace treaties with Eastern Europe. The following passage in the despatch of *The Times* Paris correspondent reporting the conference and appearing on September 13, 1946, sufficiently indicates what was happening:

In the European Economic Commission this morning a debate arose over the status to be granted to foreign business interests in Rumania; and from that starting point it developed into an argument between free enterprise and State control. In opposing the British proposal to grant foreign interests the same advantages as they enjoyed before the war, the Russian delegation have been led step by step to an almost open attack on the Capitalist system and to the defence of controlled economy. The British in resisting this attack have been themselves arguing the case of liberalism and free competition. It was clear that the United States and the British

delegates were talking the same language. Between them and the Russian group the gap remains unbridged.

In a leader of October 12, 1946, *The Times* pointed out that Mr Byrnes and Mr Bevin were insisting upon free entry into the Danube Valley and Eastern Europe for the goods and capital of the Western countries, which the Russians (and the governments of the countries concerned) were resisting, because they were afraid that the consequence for the impoverished East European countries might be 'their domination as economic colonies by the immense and unmatched wealth and productive power of the United States'.

This policy at the Paris Conference was accompanied by the winding up of UNRRA when its work was not half done, as a means of economic pressure; the withholding of credits and even the cancelling of loans to East European countries; direct interference in their internal affairs by taking the side of returned Right-Wing *émigrés* in Yugoslavia and Poland against their colleagues in the coalition governments; demanding an election in Poland before even a constitution had been adopted and when there were still 40,000 armed men in the underground fighting the Government because it pursued a policy of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union, etc. Special efforts were made to split the working class by driving a wedge between Social Democrats and Communists, who were continuing the co-operation they had begun in the war-time resistance movements and even before, in the long underground struggle against Fascist and near-Fascist dictatorships.

A study of the provisions of the Yalta Agreement quoted in Chapter IV makes it clear that Anglo-American action had no legal foundation. In view of what was happening in Greece it had no moral justification either, and the plea that the two Governments were concerned for democracy and political freedom in Eastern Europe was mere hypocrisy. The real political motive was to support the Right against the Left and to try to undo the social revolution that was already an accomplished fact.

The practical result was to delay and bedevil reconstruction in these countries, make the dollar famine come earlier and be more severe than would have been the case if UNRRA had completed its work, and to force the governments of those countries to be harsher in self-preservation against doubtful and disloyal elements, encouraged by Anglo-American intervention, than they would have been if Britain and the United States had respected the spirit and letter of their Yalta Conference obligations.

INTERVENTION IN GREECE, 1946

In Greece Mr Bevin had continued faithfully to follow in the bloody footsteps of Mr Churchill. His explanations as to what he was doing and what was actually happening in Greece were as wide of the reality as those of his illustrious predecessor in the spacious days of intervention in Russia.

When defending Mr Churchill's policy at the December 1944 Conference of the Labour Party, Mr Bevin had described the general purpose of intervention as being to help to restore order in Greece, provide food and emergency relief, get rid of the black market, restart industry, and then hold a fair and free election. The condition for giving British help was that 'the Greek Government must represent all parties, and the Papan-dreou Government when it was established did represent the six main parties.'

Even a year later, December 12, 1945, when Mr Eden was explaining the Churchill-Bevin policy in Greece to the House, he said that 'our aim is to maintain law and order and establish a Greek Government broadly representative of all opinion in Greece, including E.A.M.' And again, on February 21, 1946, Mr Eden told the House that 'we went to Greece at the invitation of all Greek Parties, including those of the Left.'

These statements are worth recalling because they show how immediately after the war even the Tories did not dare to say openly that the object of their policy was to smash the Greek resistance movement, which had done most of the fighting against Germany, because the Communists, although a minority in it, were its toughest, most militant and clear-headed element. The process was gradual by which the Greek Communist Party, from being one of the main parties in the State and the backbone of the patriotic resistance movement that was our ally, came to be openly treated by Mr Bevin and the Tories as though it was the agent of a foreign power and the enemy of Western civilisation and democracy. But the change in official language marked the evolution from humbug to cynical frankness rather than any substantial change in policy. For the Communists were in fact treated as enemies even when they were fighting and dying on our side - but in the beginning under the seven veils of hypocrisy and secrecy.

When Mr Bevin made his all-in defence of Mr Churchill's intervention in Greece to the Labour Party Conference in December 1944, Mr Aneurin Bevan commented as follows:

Mr Bevin has described what has been happening in Greece. I have no time to answer him. But there is one complete answer to him. Only three bodies of public opinion in the world have gone on record in his support, namely, Fascist Spain, Fascist Portugal, and the majority of the Tories in the House of Commons. If there were time, one could show that Mr Bevin's description of the situation in Greece is garbled and inadequate where it is not unveracious. Mr Bevin has asked us to be hard-headed. Let us reverse the position and think what a hard-headed Greek would say. What is Mr Bevin suggesting that the hard-headed Greek should do? That the Socialists, the workers, the Liberals and the Republicans in Greece should surrender their arms to the Papandreou Government, that the Monarchists and the Junkers and the Fascists in Greece should retain their arms.

E.L.A.S. is asked to surrender its arms. What, then, will be the situation? The only guarantee that the Greeks will have for the restoration of democratic principles in Greece is the word of a Tory Government in Great Britain. Mr Ernest Bevin says that he always stands by his word; he does.* Why should he persuade his people to accept a pledge he himself may not be able to fulfil? Remember that this hard-headed Greek Socialist is asked to trust a Tory Government which praises Papandreou. Is it reasonable to expect the Greek Socialists to accept guarantees from people of that sort?

Mr Bevan touched on an important aspect of the situation when he said that Mr Bevin's description of what was happening in Greece was 'garbled and inadequate where it is not unveracious'. There is no doubt at all that the Government in general and Mr Bevin in particular have been as copiously and tendenciously misinformed by the British Embassy in Athens and higher-ups in the Foreign Office as the Lloyd George Government was by its officials at the time of intervention in Russia – only this time there was no Lockhart to try, even for a time, to report the facts objectively. In Mr Churchill's day the information supplied had to suit the boss's policy; while Mr Bevin reigns but does not rule at the Foreign Office, it is tailored to fit his prejudices.

There is no reason to doubt that Mr Bevin believed the information he was given and felt himself in duty bound to carry on the policy with which he had agreed while in the Coalition Cabinet. He meant what he said when he told the House on November 23, 1945:

It has always been our desire that the Greek people should decide for themselves both about their future Government and

* This statement might be regarded as controversial by, say, Greeks and Jews, possibly by some who remember Mr Bevin's speech at Blackpool and the foreign policy on which Labour fought the General Election.

about their future regime. But we have always insisted that these decisions should be taken when conditions of normal tranquillity have been restored to the country. I do not think that any member of the former administration or of this one can say that I have experienced any normal tranquillity in Greece since I have been in office or that at any moment I could have taken an election or plebiscite ... In what reasonable period can I get this country into a tranquil state to vote on the institutional issue? I have no objection to monarchy in any country as an institution, but let it be a constitutional monarchy and not a party monarchy. I said to myself that Greece may desire to return to a constitutional monarchy; that is her business that she must decide without one word of influence from Great Britain. But how long is it going to take me to get Greece out of what I call a party monarchy into a tranquil state? ... When the head of a State is to be elected a country ought to be in such a tranquil state and as prosperous as possible that judgement and not prejudice and starvation should be the guide.

When he announced a financial and economic agreement with Greece, Mr Bevin told the House, on January 25, 1946, that:

It is my profound conviction that democracy cannot be imposed from above but must grow from below. It must be firmly based on the people and it cannot flourish unless the common man is assured of a reasonable standard of living. The Greek people have suffered untold hardships during the war, but it is my hope that the present agreement will offer them a fresh start and will pave the way to recovery.

Unfortunately, British, and later American, policy never even began to look like translating Mr Bevin's good intentions into action. For the main motive from the beginning was 'anti-Communism', meaning thereby the determination that in no circumstances should the resistance movement be allowed to share power.

At first attempts were made to form governments composed of various 'Centre' parties and groups, shadowy and ill-defined, but possessing the common characteristic that they had little support in the country and were entirely dependent on the British occupation for their existence. This attempt at a foreign-sponsored 'Third Force' revealed the inherent shortcoming of this form of 'geo-politics': there was something profoundly paradoxical in attempting to impose democracy from outside by propping up groups that professed to be equally opposed to both the Right and the Left, but were incapable of governing because, having little support anywhere, they did not dare to do anything that would offend any section of the community. To use them to

govern Greece was like trying to use a jelly-fish as a ramrod. The user merely got stung and made a mess.

There were only two real forces in Greece. One was based on the propertied classes and dependent in the last resort on the fanaticism of the Royalists and the former supporters of the Metaxas dictatorship and quisling regimes. The other was based on the peasants and workers, represented the interests of the poor against the rich and was broadly identical with the resistance movement (EAM) of which the most militant and toughest part were the Communists.

The synthetic third force experiment conducted in these conditions ended as 'third force' governments always have ended when the issue is between social revolution and capitalist counter-revolution, namely in the triumph of the extreme Right and a reign of terror against the Left and moderate Left. But this time the process went on at the instigation of Mr Churchill, with the direct support of the Labour Government, until President Truman took over the business of policy-making and supplying the sinews of war, leaving Britain to provide conscript soldiers to help hold down the Greek people.

The decisive stage in plunging Greece into the civil war that has gone on ever since was the election that Mr Bevin forced the Greek Government to hold on March 31, 1946, in spite of its anguished protests.

The Greek Prime Minister, the then 88-year-old 'Liberal' Mr Sophoulis (a striking symbol of the 'Third Force' in Greece) argued that it was not possible to hold fair elections because the electoral registers were faked, the police force was so packed with Fascists that it could not be trusted to keep order,* the Civil Service and army were no better, and in fact 'all Government measures are paralysed by the 'X-ites' [Fascist Royalists]. Four-fifths of the Civil Service, of the judiciary, of the gendarmerie, police and army command are in the hands of X-ites. The Sourlas [another brand of Fascist] bands are lording it in the provinces and have established their own State authority. They

* The head of the police force is the Greek Colonel Evert, who commanded the quisling police in Athens under the Germans, and who recruited the present police force on the principle of excluding any former member of E.L.A.S., but admitting X-ites, followers of Colonel Zervas and other collaborators, quislings, Fascists and Royalists. The British training officer who helped to form this police force is General Sir Charles Wickham, an Ulster Irishman who served under Major General Sir Alfred Knox in the British Military Mission in Siberia from start to finish of intervention in Russia, and later, as head of the Royal Irish Constabulary, commanded the Black and Tans in Ireland. The ideal preparation, it will be observed, for recruiting an 'impartial' and 'non-political' police force against E.A.M.

are very well armed and do what they please ... According to information arriving from all over Greece nobody, with the exception of the Royalists, is free to make nominations and express opinions'.

This statement of Prime Minister Sophoulis, made on the eve of the elections, was backed by the resignation of the two Vice Premiers, Kaphandaris and Tsouderos, in protest against holding the election in conditions in which, as Mr Kaphandaris said, they would be a farce and produce a situation 'pregnant with tremendous danger'.

Three Labour M.P.s, Mr Dodds, Mr Tiffany and Mr Solley, in their book *The Tragedy of Greece* record Mr Sophoulis' statement to them when they saw him in Greece that 'Mr Bevin knew from the information that I gave him that the election would result in a victory for the extreme Right. I also told him that the first action the extreme Right would take would be to restore the king'.

Mr Sophoulis also claimed in the same conversation that he had made an agreement with Mr Bevin not to hold a plebiscite for the king's return until two years after the election. He added: 'I hope Mr Bevin, who is known to be a man of honour, will keep his word and insist upon the second part of the programme - the date fixed for the plebiscite. If not, I fear the danger of civil war. I should like to convey to Mr Bevin, if he remembers me and loves Greece, that he must keep to the agreement as regards the plebiscite'.

Mr Bevin didn't. The plebiscite was held in a few weeks and duly returned the king, as desired and worked for by Mr Churchill and the Foreign Office since 1943. The incident is the more curious in that Mr Bevin told the House on November 23, 1945, that he had suggested to the Regent that he should lay before the Greek politicians the following programme and stick to it:

First, elections to be held at the latest by the end of March, 1946.

Secondly, the plebiscite to be held in March 1948 ...

Then, at the last moment, I was told that if I forced this issue of the institutional question before I got tranquillity in the country, I should run the danger of civil war, disturbances and economic disaster, and, God knows, Greece has had enough of that.

Since then, she has had to take a lot more and worse, thanks to Anglo-American intervention.

Prime Minister Sophoulis finally yielded to the insistence of his British masters and agreed to the election being held on March 31, 1946, because, as he observed, while it was a bad thing

from the point of view of the domestic interests of Greece, the election had now become a matter of international concern. Mr Bevin, on the other hand, told the House of Commons on February 21, 1946:

It is not for me to postpone them or anything else. The line I have taken is this. Everybody is agreed that these elections should be on 31st March and I take this view rightly or wrongly that the thing for Greece is for once to be consistent. Once a thing has been decided let it be carried through as the best contribution to the stability of that country ... We have been through discussions on this business in perfect good faith and on the advice of that Government I have said these elections will take place. It is not my decision; it is their decision. If you want to stop this bickering between great allies about a particular country, in my view it is better to be consistent and go through with it and get it done. That is the only point there is in it, and I think in the interests of Greece it should be done because what we are anxious to see is the elections over and a stable government established.

Mr Bevin's statement, it will be observed, is more remarkable for its use of the word 'I' than for clarity and consistency of thought. It was simply not true that 'everybody was agreed' on holding the election on March 31, and nearer the truth to say that everybody, except the Royalists, Fascists and their allies, objected strenuously to holding the election while Greece was in an uproar. It is, of course, quite impossible to reconcile Mr Bevin's action in forcing the election on the Greek people in the situation that then existed, with his frequent denials of interference in Greek internal affairs and his declaration to the House on November 23, 1945 on the state of tranquillity that must be established in Greece before it was fair to hold an election.

The *Manchester Guardian* of September 19, 1946 published a despatch from its New York correspondent, reporting that eyewitness accounts by their correspondents in Greece appearing in the two great Conservative American newspapers, the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *New York Daily News* of September 17, gave 'the most impartial and disturbing evidence that has been offered on the existence in Greece of wide, well organised and pitiless terror that the Greek Government is undoubtedly waging against Liberals, Labourites and their families'.

These correspondents had themselves seen 'truck-loads (in UNRRA trucks) of women and children being hauled off to gaol or exile and whole communities forcibly deprived of the food and anti-malaria projects which UNRRA had consigned to them. They claim that throughout the nation the workers trained to

administer the anti-malaria programme have been removed as Communists.

'These correspondents went from Athens to the Yugoslav and Bulgarian frontiers. They quote various slogans painted up everywhere such as "Democracy Equals Murder" or "Democracy Equals the Hammer and Sickle". They report the wholesale disfranchisement of villages in the recent elections. Both were appalled at the systematic starving of harmless families and the hysteria that accompanies a terror which they conclude is "trying to wipe out not only Communists but all democratic, liberal and republican elements".'

Colonel Sheppard (reported in the *New Republic* of December 8, 1947) records how in little villages he had watched the Greek Government handle last year's 'free elections'. A Royalist officer, encouraged to confide by Sheppard's British uniform, explained: 'We will arrange an almost 100 per cent Monarchist vote; just five against. We have already picked out five Government enemies to be the opposing votes. It will give us an excuse to take care of them later'.

It is not clear from the context whether this refers to the election itself or to the plebiscite for the King that took place a few weeks later. But the two were run on similar lines. As the then Minister of the Interior Havinis observed, in the election in the Epirus there was 'nothing other than nominations made by Zervas by means of violence and terror'.

It is true that a number of international observers were sent, who did their best. They knew nothing about Greece but were familiar with electoral procedure in Western democracies. It was thanks to their presence that the elections in the big cities were formally correct, although even here they could not check what was done to intimidate voters before they appeared at the polling booths, or what was the condition of the electoral registers. Nor presumably could they help the dead voting and the number of votes cast for the Right in some constituencies being greater than the total number of registered voters. But it was physically impossible for a few hundred observers to cover all the country districts and small villages and towns of Greece where the reign of terror was frank and unashamed.

According to the figures of the Greek Ministry of the Interior, out of 2,211,000 entitled to vote, only 1,117,000 actually did vote, and 1,094,000 abstained from voting. The reasons why they abstained were not obscure: they literally risked life and limb by showing republican, let alone liberal or progressive sym-

pathies. For as the *New York Herald Tribune* of October 17, 1946, pointed out, 'Under the Royalist Government's unmitigated reign of terror against every Republican in the North, you are either a Royalist or a Communist. No compromise is permitted'. The Royalists and their police took that view even before polling day.

According to an American Intelligence Officer who served in Greece from 1943 to 1946, first with EAM and then in Athens (quoted by Mr William Shirer in the *New York Herald Tribune* of April 25, 1947, with the perhaps superfluous assurance that he could not be suspected of any Communist sympathies), British intelligence reports showed that the Communists formed less than ten per cent of EAM at the time Mr Churchill was waging his war of intervention against the latter, and are still a minority of the guerrillas in the mountains.

As to the Greek Parliament, neither the Centre nor the Left is represented in it. There are men prominent in the Greek Government who collaborated with the Nazis and others who did nothing to oppose them. Army leadership has been recruited almost exclusively from Royalists, most of whom regard even a Conservative Republican as a 'Communist.' Quisling forces formed by the Germans to fight non-collaborationist Greeks, have been incorporated into the new Greek Army. The police force in Greece is substantially the one that served the dreaded Metaxas dictatorship and later the Germans.

This American Intelligence Officer then goes on to explain that during the war the Germans had set up a number of quisling 'Security Battalions' whose announced purpose was to 'stamp out Communism in Greece'. They were a motley assortment armed by the Germans and wearing German uniforms. 'These singular Greek battalions were used by the Germans to burn villages and track down patriotic Greeks. Later the British used them against the Greek resistance forces and to-day they constitute an important element of the Greek Army which Mr Truman is bent on strengthening'.

Colonel Sheppard, in the interview already quoted, says that these quisling Security Battalions are now the backbone of the Royalist Gendarmerie, and Mr Richard Mowrer of the American Overseas News Agency reports from Athens that this largely ex-quisling gendarmerie is using Nazi proscription lists to round up suspected persons.

What of the situation after the election? On April 24, 1947, the *New York Herald Tribune* published a despatch from its Athens

correspondent, Mr Seymour Freidin, containing the following passages:

Nothing has been attained in the twelve months of Royalist rule but broader dissension, increased misery and bitterness ... In a year the record of the Greek Government is appalling. The only policy pursued by this Government is that anyone in the Opposition is a Communist. The uniting cry of Tsaldaris and the fumbling incompetents whose clique is described euphemistically as a Cabinet, is that everything must wait until the Communist threat is removed. While girding for the struggle the Government managed to fritter away virtually all its foreign exchange, drive more people into the mountains because they were being treated as outlaws for having dared to express opposition and to hold a club over the Western powers that unless abundant aid is immediately forthcoming Greece would go Communist. Several years more of this Government and Greece would be easy political pickings for the Communists ... It is high time that policy-makers in Washington realised that the 'Greek question' cannot even be placed on the path to solution by a meaningless, flatulent, anti-Communist policy.

Mr. Stewart Alsop, in a despatch from Athens appearing in the *New York Herald Tribune* on February 28, 1947, adds the following touch to the picture:

The Greek Government has often been described as Fascist. Its main characteristic seems to be rather its total incompetence.

It is a Government of the Right 'largely dominated by a small group of rich traders and merchants who religiously avoid the payment of income tax. These men are totally incapable even of discussing the kind of sweeping social and economic reforms which alone could counteract the quite natural attraction of Communism for this misery-ridden country ... Most Greek politicians have no higher ambition than to continue to taste the profitable delights of a free economy at American expense. To the skirts of politicians clings a vast mass of civil servants astonishingly inefficient who are guaranteed by law a lifetime place at the public trough. There is some Fascist talk in the smart bars in Athens, but the real failure of the Greek Government is better typified by American luxury goods bought with precious dollars displayed in the windows of rich shops while small boys beg at the doors of the foreigners' hotels. But more tragic than Government incompetence is the new and bitter hatred between Greek and Greek'.

A few months earlier, on October 8, 1946, a BBC correspondent, reporting on a visit to Greece, broadcast that 'There is no rationing and the lavish display of luxuries and food in the capital provides an uneasy contrast to the hungry orphans who fish out rotten oranges from Salonika's infested waters'.

As early as June 6, 1946, the Athens correspondent of the *Continental Daily Mail* reported that 'the cleavage between the "haves" and the "have nots" is greater now than ever before in the city's modern past.'

An UNRRA mission sent to investigate the situation issued a strong condemnation of the way a large proportion of UNRRA supplies had got into the black market and feathered the nests of corrupt Greek officials and politicians. A major scandal broke out when no less than £20 million worth of UNRRA goods were found stored in Athens warehouses for so long that much had become unfit for human consumption. This was governmental black market and official profiteering on a scale so gigantic as to be embarrassing to the American and British Governments (the whole affair was handled very gingerly and delicately by the British press when the news came out).

Colonel Sheppard in the *New Republic* interview already quoted mentions this particular scandal and suggests that the American Economic Mission should also 'visit Salonika and examine the Pega warehouse, in which 30,000 tons of UNRRA supplies have been piled for more than eighteen months'.

The *New York Nation* of December 6, 1947, reports Colonel Sheppard as saying that "There is no organised "austerity" in Greece to-day except in the areas under control of the rebels. In Athens there are as fine cars as in New York, mainly driven by black marketeers and former collaborators with the Germans. Confectionery shops and high-class restaurants sell better cakes and sweetmeats than I have been able to find in New York, Paris, Brussels or London'. Although exports and imports have been nominally controlled by a licensing system 'from June 1946 to April 1947 you could have searched the import list in vain for the lathes and machinery necessary to get Greece on its feet. But you would have found at the top of the list cosmetics, perfumes, coloured scarves, artificial jewellery, motor cars (American), watches and fountain pens'.

Against this economic, social and political background it is no wonder that the condition of the people has gone from bad to worse and that resistance to this iniquitous tyranny has grown steadily. So has the terror. The men and women banished to the islands, where they live in subhuman conditions, have crept up to the 50,000 mark. The burning of villages and the slaughter of their inhabitants, head hunting, beatings and torture and all the hideous accompaniments of a Balkan Fascist terror have been remorselessly spreading in Greece since December 1944.

Men and women of the resistance movement are being tortured and killed for having, during the war, executed quislings whom they captured fighting or spying for the Germans.

PALESTINE AND PERSIA

During 1946 Mr Bevin continued the Chamberlain White Paper policy in Palestine, on the plea that to resist the Arab chieftains would set the Middle East in flames and that they must be appeased lest they turn to the Russians. The consequences of that policy have been indicated in the previous chapter and are further analysed in Chapter VIII.

Persia (now officially known as Iran), like the other backward, impoverished and semi-feudal countries of the Middle East, began to be invaded and eaten up economically by Western concessionaires from the eighteen-nineties onwards. The usual technique was employed of advancing large sums to the ruler of Persia, the weak, extravagant and corrupt Shah, in exchange for his selling his country's resources piecemeal to the Western money-lenders.

The end came when Britain and Tsarist Russia, as part of the Anglo-Russian Entente established in 1907, concluded an agreement to respect the independence and integrity of Persia and not to interfere in its internal affairs, like the similar agreement with France over Morocco a few years earlier and the Anglo-Franco-Italian agreement over Abyssinia in 1906, which remained in cold storage until 1935 and then became the basis of the Hoare-Laval Deal. Treaties of this sort generally heralded the carving up of the victim for whose welfare the great powers showed such sinister solicitude.

The fate of Persia ran true to form. Four years after the 1907 agreement the Northern half of Persia was under Russian military occupation and more than half of Southern Persia, including a tremendous oil concession, had been taken over by Britain. At that time Great Britain favoured a Liberal reform movement in Persia, while Tsarist Russia backed the corrupt old regime in a policy of bloody repression.

After the October Revolution the Russians cleared out and renounced all their concessions and privileges in Persia. Britain retained her oil concession, but came to terms with the post-war Nationalist dictatorship that cleaned up some hoary abuses without changing the social foundations of the regime.

By the outbreak of the second world war Persia had relapsed into the bad old ways and was ruled by a regime remarkable even

in the Middle East (which is saying something) for sloth, incompetence, corruption, cruelty and general oppressiveness and obscurantism. This regime was, of course, pro-Nazi.

In the course of the war Northern Persia was again occupied by the Russians and Southern Persia by the Anglo-Americans (the forces were mostly British, the policy joint), and served as a transit route for conveying British and American military supplies to the Soviet Union. The Allies built roads and railways, with the accessories, in the way of rolling stock, locomotives, lorries, machine-shops, go-downs, garages, accommodation for personnel, harbour equipment, cranes and other installations to load and unload and keep the stream of supplies going.

The three powers agreed that they would jointly help the Persian regime after the war to reform and modernise itself, making a new start with the aid of the modern equipment provided by the Allies in the course of their war effort. Soviet and British troops were to be withdrawn on March 2, 1946. This agreement in effect applied to Persian conditions the general principles of the Crimean (Yalta) Conference agreement described in Chapter IV.

But during the later stages of their occupation Soviet and Anglo-American policies began to take markedly divergent lines in North and South Persia. By the end of 1945 the retreat from the Crimean Conference to the Crimean war outlook had produced a deadlock of mutual fear and suspicion.

This time the roles of the previous Anglo-Russian occupation were reversed. The Russians backed a radical reform movement, the Tudeh Party, while the Anglo-Americans supported the feudal old regime. North Persia (Azerbaijan) is inhabited by people who have a common language, religion and history with their neighbours across the frontier in Soviet Azerbaijan. But whereas Soviet Azerbaijan had made great strides since the revolution, Persian Azerbaijan remained in the Middle Ages.

On the Soviet side of the border the peasants own the land and work it collectively by modern methods; women are no longer veiled and held in subjection but are full citizens; there is education for all and Azerbaijanians staff the administration and the educational, scientific and research institutions. On the Persian side the population is still poverty-stricken, diseased and priest-ridden, ignorant and backward.

'The peasants can see that north of the border the feudal magnates have gone, irrigation works are in full swing and tractors plough the land on collective farms, where the peasant reaps the benefit of his labour. Meanwhile they scratch the land with

primitive ploughs, as I saw with my own eyes the moment I crossed the border into Persia, and have to deliver anything up to 50 per cent of their produce to absentee landlords who live in fine houses in Teheran' (Mr Phillips Price, M.P. in a despatch in the *Manchester Guardian*, date-lined Teheran, December 20, 1945).

Instead of co-operation between the great powers in supporting reforms, the Tudeh Party became the Russian Party and the Persian Government turned into the puppet of Britain and the U.S.A. The contest was complicated by the Russian desire to secure an oil concession in North Azerbaijan, said to be connected with and to drain part of the Baku oilfields, or at least to make certain that the Persian Government's long-standing obligation not to grant concessions in this area to other powers would be respected. The Russians intimated that they might not be able to leave on the prescribed date but would do so as soon as possible afterwards.

The Soviet Government had three aims in taking this stand, Mr Phillips Price told the House of Commons on February 20, 1946, fresh from a visit of several months' duration to Soviet and Persian Azerbaijan, Teheran and the Arab States of the Middle East:

The first is to prevent the U.S.A. and Britain from having oil concessions in the North, where she feels she has a perfectly reasonable right to get in first. The second point is that she wishes to raise the whole question of the Russian participation in a settlement in the Eastern Mediterranean, and particularly to reopen the whole question of the Montreux Convention in regard to the Dardanelles and the Straits. Russian diplomacy is indirect. It is a question of making trouble in Azerbaijan in order to gain a point somewhere else. After all, let us not forget that in 1915 we signed a secret treaty with Tsarist Russia to give Russia, lock, stock and barrel, the whole sovereignty over the Dardanelles and a large part of Asiatic Turkey. I do not advocate that we should go anywhere near as far as we went in that treaty. I am simply pointing out that years ago we were prepared to give Russia far more than she will reasonably ask to-day. Russia certainly would have a very strong case in asking for the internationalisation of that great international waterway of the Dardanelles, and I think we have an equal right to ask from Egypt, and other Powers of the Eastern Mediterranean, for a similar state of affairs in the Suez Canal.

Thirdly – and this is rather a subsidiary point – the Russian aim is to bring about a reform and a progressive regime in Persia. Our traditional policy in Persia is not of a kind which will, I think, commend itself to the House. Traditionally we have been fond of keeping in power in Persia, by our diplomacy and influence, a Government

of the Persian nobility, which is anything but in keeping with the spirit of modern times.

The Iranian Government, continued Mr Price, was quite incapable of handling the affairs of the country 'in such a way as to lead it towards the things that are urgently needed - land reform, social reform and war against poverty ...

I regret to say that the atmosphere I found among the British colony in Teheran was such that among the less responsible elements there was talk of the next war against Russia and among the more responsible elements no great desire to find a way of co-operation with Russia. They were taking a purely legalistic line: 'Russia has broken the Treaty and that is that'.

Mr Price went on to say that he was a strong supporter of the Arab League (and he might have added an equally strong anti-Zionist) but that, unless Britain used her influence 'on the side of progress and reform in the Arab countries and the Middle East', the U.S.S.R. would gain prestige among the discontented populations suffering under the oppressive regimes. He had constantly told the Arab politicians he met that the Soviet Union would be a danger to them until, but only until, they had put their house in order.

In the *Manchester Guardian* of January 27, 1946, Mr Price had already stressed the point that 'If we are not careful it will be the Soviet Union and not the Anglo-Saxon powers who will become the champions of reform throughout the great Moslem world of the Middle East.'

The 'purely legalistic' view was taken by Britain and the U.S.A. The Soviet Union was summoned before the Security Council by the puppet Persian Government and treated as practically an aggressor. The Russians withdrew, Persian Government troops marched into Azerbaijan. Some 10,000 progressives were slaughtered. The old order triumphed. The Americans encouraged the subservient Persian Government and its docile Parliament to refuse the oil concession in North Persia it had promised to grant the Soviet Government.

Technically, of course, the Soviet Government was wrong in staying after March 2, 1946. But the wrong was mitigated by the previous history of relations between the great powers in Persia. And to the Russians the fate of Persia was part of their concern about home defence.

The American stand would have been more impressive if the U.S. had not just then been squeezing an air base out of the Icelanders by refusing to withdraw her troops until she got it, and

adopting similar tactics toward Denmark in Greenland, and if U.S. troops had withdrawn from China by the agreed date (U.S. troops are still in South Korea, it may be observed, in spite of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from North Korea at the end of 1948. Korea is next door to the U.S.S.R. and thousands of miles away from the U.S.A.)

In the rest of the Middle East, Anglo-American oil and power politics led to support for the corrupt, feudal Arab regimes, and a continuation by Mr Bevin of Mr Eden's policy of arming and consolidating the Arab League made in Britain, with consequences that fall to be described in later chapters.

GERMANY

Meanwhile British policy in Germany was developing on similar lines. The Labour Party, as has been mentioned above, is pledged to the hilt, ever since 1942, to the view that the only way to make Germany safe for peace and democracy is to insist on the nationalisation of key industries, transport and finance, with trade union participation in their management. This view was amply confirmed by the facts of the situation in post-war Germany. On April 6, 1946, the *Economist*, hardly a paper that can be suspected of Leftist sympathies, published a series of five articles entitled: 'The German Crisis' by members of its staff who had studied the situation on the spot in the British zone in Germany. The articles concluded that the only way to establish democracy in Germany was through Socialist reconstruction:

The conditions of the British zone make far-reaching socialist experiments a necessity. There is, once again, no other workable alternative. Instead of being driven reluctantly into them, let the British administration openly and deliberately evolve a plan for public ownership of the essential industries and services in North-West Germany. No amount of backing of Dr Schumacher, the leading Socialist in the western zone, in his fight against fusion with the Communists, will be effective so long as the Communists can compare the 'social backwardness' of the British zone with socialisation and land reform in the eastern zone.

This conclusion was presented as a reluctant admission pointing to a distasteful necessity. It was proposed that British policy should support the German Social Democratic Party as an instrument with which to fight both the Nazis and the Communists, lumped together by the *Economist* as equally the enemies of democracy. On the other hand it was also admitted that 'the division of the workers is rightly seen to be a possible

contributory factor in the rise of neo-Nazism. In last Sunday's vote on fusion in Berlin, while the Socialist vote against the methods employed by the Communists to secure fusion was decisive, in those wards in which the vote was taken the vote for a common partnership by legitimate means was as large.'

At about the same time the *Observer*, another paper that may be regarded as free from any Leftist taint, published two articles on April 7 and 14 by its correspondent in Germany. The first made the point that:

Unity of German labour is potentially the only effective bar to reassertion in Germany of that authoritarian and nationalist spirit of which Nazism has been the fullest but not the only possible expression. The objective which Communists pursue – the creation of a united Socialist party – is a legitimate and sound objective. If its achievement is still remote, this is in no small measure due to the methods used by the Communists, to their suppression of non-conformist views, to their heresy huntings, and to their unscrupulous distortions of facts and suppression of truth in inter-party politics. But, whatever the faults of the Communists, it is a fact that the now deepened division of German labour is gladdening ex-Nazi and crypto-Nazi hearts all over Germany, and that it is emboldening all those political forces that have been lying low since the collapse of the Third Reich.

The April 14 article said that the only reliable, anti-Nazi political forces in Germany were the parties of the Left and the trade unions representing German Labour. This meant that:

German labour ought to be encouraged to reorganise German economy according to its ideas – that is, on Socialist lines. Without public ownership of key industries and without comprehensive economic planning the reconstruction of Germany will bog down in a succession of phoney booms and real slumps. Full employment within the frame-work of a predominantly Socialist economy is the only possible method by which Germany can be both economically rebuilt and spiritually and politically de-Nazified. This is also the pre-condition for the re-establishment of democratic freedom in Germany.

As early as February 21, 1946, Mr Bevin told the House: 'I am convinced that you have got to settle the ownership of the Ruhr, that is to say the ownership of the industries of the Ruhr. The heart of the General Staff in Germany was the industrial lords of the Ruhr, and the Ruhr must not go back to their possession and it must not be controlled for that type of mentality.'

On October 22, 1946, he pointed out again in the House, that

the basic German industries 'were previously in the hands of magnates who were closely allied to the German military machine, who financed Hitler, and who in two wars were part and parcel of Germany's aggressive policy. We have no desire to see those gentlemen or their like return to a position which they have abused with such tragic results.'

Mr Bevin said that it was the Government's intention that the coal, steel, heavy chemical and mechanical engineering industries 'should be owned and controlled in future by the public. The exact form of this public ownership and control is now being worked out. They should be owned and worked by the German people, but subject to such international control that they cannot again be a threat to their neighbours ... The case for the public ownership of those heavy industries was never stronger than it is in Germany to-day. The Germans know this themselves. I am satisfied that this statement by me in the House to-day will give hope to those Germans who never again want to see themselves the victims of these cartels and trusts which led them to disaster, those magnates who used the labour and skill of the German workmen with such ingenuity and with such disastrous results to them and to the whole world ... We should give active support to the German plan for the socialisation of their basic industries.'

These glittering assurances and promises have been kept in the same Pickwickian sense as Mr Bevin's policy declarations about Greece, or as the Labour Party's election pledges with regard to Palestine and standing for Socialism and with the workers in Europe. So far from 'giving active support to the German plan for the socialisation of their basic industries', the British Military Government, acting as the representative of the Labour Government and under Mr Bevin's responsibility, although possibly behind his back, vetoed the law for the nationalisation of these industries that was passed by a large majority, including not only the Social Democratic and Communist Parties, but also many Christian Democrats, by the Parliament of North Rhine Westphalia, representing a population of 11 million and the territory containing the industries of the Ruhr.

In fairness to Mr Bevin it may be assumed that he would genuinely have desired to keep his promise and broke it only with reluctance because he could not help himself. He was, in fact, the prisoner of his own anti-Communist and anti-Soviet policy, which made him helplessly dependent on the United States.

I pointed this out in the Foreign Affairs debate on October 23, 1946, the day after Mr Bevin had given his ringing assurances:

Much as I welcome the Foreign Secretary's announcement that we propose to socialise heavy industry in our zone, I would like to be certain what it means and what is to happen ...

Can the good intentions of the Foreign Secretary survive his utter dependence on the policy of the United States?

There is a grave danger that whatever our intentions may be we shall find that, in view of the fusion of the two zones, and because of the complete dependence of this country in world affairs on the United States to-day, we shall not be able to carry our policy into effect.

HUMBUGGING PARLIAMENT AND THE PEOPLE

Against the background of this general situation the reader may gauge the value and veracity of Mr Bevin's further assurances in the House on February 21, 1946, that:

It is said we are drifting into war with Russia. I cannot conceive any circumstances in which Britain and the Soviet Union should go to war ... I cannot see about what we have to fight. And certainly it never enters my mind and I am certain it does not any of my colleagues in the Government. I approach America in the same spirit. I would never think of, and I never could see – and I am sure no party in this House ever sees – the possibility of war between us and America. I do not think of it in the other case either. I say this very emphatically that in considering in our minds all organisations or states there can be no policy or anything else which will lead to a conflict with either of these great Allies.

The humbug of this statement was so obvious even at the time that it made me feel the time had come to draw attention to the character and danger of the Government's foreign policy. I did so in the Defence debate on March 4, 1946. I quoted Mr Attlee's remark before the war (March 9, 1936) that 'You cannot separate foreign policy from defence, and we do not separate foreign policy from defence. Defence is the result of foreign policy. Very often defence proposals show what is the reality of a foreign policy and it is so in this case.'

We were spending far more than we could afford on armaments and we would have to lower our standard of living in order to maintain them.

Why did we have to pay this suicidal price for our foreign policy?

'I believe that the trouble is that we have not got a foreign policy, that we have failed to relate our policy to our power.'

The Foreign Secretary had inherited our commitments and the foreign policy attached to them from the Coalition, and the

Government had had no time to draw breath since coming into office.

'Foreign policy has been made on the cables, as they say in the State Department at Washington. That is, we are living from hand to mouth and meeting each case and circumstance as it arises in the light of the information presented through Foreign Office telegrams and reports.

'Our foreign policy, so far, has shown... no sign of any realistic insight into what is happening in the world, no sober appraisal of our own position or the limitations of our power. There has been no evidence of any clear-cut purpose guiding our foreign policy. We seem to be blindly impelled by the momentum of Imperial inertia. We are not blazing new trails to world peace. We have sunk into ancient ruts, running back to the nineteenth century, and punctuated by two world wars.'

The Government were keeping too many troops in Europe and holding up economic reconstruction (although the responsibilities of others were even greater) 'because the Labour Government have chosen to don the moth-eaten mantle of Scheidemann* and Noske* in Europe. We have set our faces against the unity of the working classes and against the resistance movements, which alone are capable of reconstructing Europe.'

In the Middle East we were trying to make the ghost of Palmerston walk again, and in the Far East we were helping the Dutch to wage war on the Indonesians. The Government should apply the Labour Party's own policy as set forth in the 'International Post-war Settlement'.

'That means sweeping concessions to the forces of social revolution in Europe even when those forces are led as they are largely led by Communists ... In Asia and in the Colonial Empire we will have to make sweeping concessions to the forces of national emancipation.' Above all we had to seek agreement with the Soviet Union, for the only alternative was to drift toward a third world war.

By the autumn of 1946 anxiety in the Parliamentary Labour Party about the Government's foreign policy had reached such a pitch that a number of Members tabled an amendment to the Address asking for a change in the Government's foreign policy, and over 100 Members abstained when a division was called on

* Right-Wing German Social Democratic leaders who began by fighting Communists in the name of defending democracy, allied themselves with Capitalist parties, and opened the door to Hitler. Noske called himself 'the bloodhound of the revolution', by which he meant that he shot down the workers in the service of counter-revolution.

the amendment. Mr Attlee endeavoured to allay the apprehensions that had been aroused by a skilful speech in which he denied that we were in any sense or at any time taking sides with the United States against the Soviet Union or *vice versa*, or that we were 'trying to form an exclusive American alliance'. If the theme of Mr Churchill's Fulton speech 'was the establishment of an exclusive Anglo-American alliance then we do not agree with that point.'

Mr Attlee presumably included the word 'exclusive' in order to salve his conscience. Because if it were omitted his statement would obviously be entirely untrue. We had already started then and we have gone full steam ahead, as Mr Churchill pointed out on January 23, 1948, in the passage already quoted, with the policy of Anglo-American alliance as outlined at Fulton and as officially confirmed by the Atlantic Pact. Only we have included Western Europe.

Mr Attlee also said that 'in matters of economic planning we agree with Soviet Russia ... when it comes to a matter of what we consider to be democracy - a matter of freedom of thought and of the individual - we agree with the Americans and disagree with the Russians.' The reader can judge of the truthfulness of that statement by comparing it with the facts related above of Anglo-American policy toward Eastern Europe and in the next chapter about the way the Labour Government associated itself with the Truman doctrine proclaiming the necessity to restore capitalism in Europe.

But once more it must be emphasised that however misleading may be the statements of Ministers it would be wrong and unfair to draw the conclusion that they are not doing their best to govern wisely and well. They merely suffer from the idea that in matters of life or death they know better than the common people what is good for us, and, as to tell the truth would arouse such a storm as to make it doubtful whether their policy could be carried out, they regard it as a lesser evil to mislead public opinion for the good of the country.

CHAPTER VII

The U.S. Makes the Running

(1947)

By 1947 many of the trends and developments analysed in the preceding chapters, that had been gathering strength in the dark since 1943, and that plunged their roots deep in the class structure of our society and in the years between the wars, rose into view and became a sign and a portent. The first overt act was the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine. It was closely connected with the fact that Mr Bevin had spent the British taxpayers' money so freely in Greece and the Middle East, that the Government said they really could not afford it any longer (the bill was well over £130,000,000). Whitehall and Downing Street then sent a S.O.S. to the State Department and the White House that was favourably received.

The Administration decided to take over where Britain was being compelled by semi-bankruptcy to leave off. It did so as part and parcel of a wider policy of 'global intervention' against Communism and the building up of a balance of power against the Soviet Union, of which the beginnings have been traced in the previous two chapters and that is further described below.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

This further development of American policy in the post-war world was proclaimed in President Truman's speech of March 5, 1947, which identified the defence of freedom and democracy with the restoration of capitalism in Europe:

There is one thing that the Americans value more than peace. It is freedom. Freedom of worship, freedom of speech and freedom of enterprise. The pattern of international trade which is most conducive to freedom of enterprise is one in which major decisions are made not by governments but by private buyers and sellers, under conditions of active competition and with proper safeguards against the establishment of monopolies and cartels. That pattern of trade that is least conducive to freedom of enterprise is one in which decisions are made by governments. That was the pattern of former centuries. Unless we act and act decisively it will be the pattern of the next century.

The New York *Herald Tribune* headlined this statement: 'President Says Americans Love Free Enterprise More Than Peace'. It was a declaration of diplomatic, economic, financial and ultimately military intervention against Socialism in Europe and the world. As such it marked a further development and the official proclamation of what had begun to be American policy, as worked out for AMGOT, as long ago as 1943.

At the time it was officially proclaimed by President Truman this policy of counter-revolutionary intervention to restore or prop up capitalism had already failed in Eastern Europe and was failing in China. It was a continuation of British policy in Greece and the Middle East. It had also begun to be applied to Italy and Western Europe even before it was formally launched in the Marshall Plan, of which more is said below.

It was officially applied to Greece and Turkey in President Truman's speech to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947. The President explained that he had received from the Greek Government 'an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.'

Material destruction resulting from the war and inflation had produced tragic conditions and as a result 'a militant minority exploiting human want and misery was able to create political chaos which until now has made economic recovery impossible.'

While admitting that the Greek Government was not perfect the President claimed that it was democratic and added that Turkey too needed help and that Turkey's integrity was essential 'to the preservation of order in the Middle East.' He did not even claim that Turkey (which is a military dictatorship of semi-Fascist character, with a sham Parliament) was democratic.

In the rest of his speech Greece and Turkey were lumped together as countries which had 'struggled so long against overwhelming odds' that it would be 'unspeakable tragedy' if they should 'lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much'.

To this it may be observed that Turkey did not fight at all but made a good thing out of blackmailing each belligerent side, by saying she would join the other unless handsomely paid to desist, and that the Greek resistance movement fought among other things to liberate themselves from precisely the Fascists, quislings, Royalists and racketeering business men and bankers that

have been put back and are being propped up on British bayonets and American dollars. This policy was described by President Truman as being 'to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjection by armed minorities or by outside pressure' and to 'assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way'. American intervention, of course, did not count as 'outside pressure'.

INTERVENTION IN GREECE, 1947

As proclaimed by the President, American policy in Greece was straight intervention, undertaken in entire disregard of America's obligations as a member of the United Nations. It was undertaken also, it may be added, without consulting the British Government, according to Minister of State Mr Hector McNeil's explanation to the House of Commons. But at the Security Council in April 1947 Sir Alexander Cadogan on behalf of his Government promptly and wholeheartedly endorsed American policy and the Truman doctrine.

There was anxiety and alarm in the State Department, says Mr James Byrnes, who was Secretary of State at that time, in his book *Speaking Frankly*, when the news came through that, since the Americans were taking over, British troops would at last be withdrawn from Greece. But Mr Byrnes did not worry. He knew that all he had to do, he says, was to speak to Mr Bevin and it would be all right. He did, and it was – for the Americans, not for the Greek people or our soldiers, some thousands of whom are still in Greece, despite repeated assurances by Mr Bevin ever since 1945 that they would soon be withdrawn.

Remonstrances by American and British public opinion at the cavalier disregard of the United Nations constrained the Administration to pay lip service to the U.N.O. by promising that, if a majority in the General Assembly or Security Council decided for a change in policy, the United States would accept the decision. This undertaking, of course, was given because the Administration was confident that the General Assembly would yield to the accomplished fact and that thanks to the subservience of Great Britain, France and the other countries dependent on American favours, it could always command the necessary majority in the Security Council...

The United Nations Charter, it is true, is based on the fundamental principle that no international dispute or situation can be dealt with by the General Assembly if it has been brought before the Security Council by any member of the United Nations

(Article 12), and that the Security Council can decide on such questions only by the unanimous agreement of the great Powers who are its permanent members. This principle is fundamental, for it makes it impossible to use the United Nations as a medium by which some great Powers can mobilise a group of smaller States and use them for power politics against a fellow permanent member of the Security Council.

But in the case of Greece American policy has consisted precisely in trying to mobilise a majority in the United Nations against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For this purpose Article 12 of the Charter was violated, in spirit if not in letter, by transferring the issue to the Assembly and using the Assembly to send a United Nations Commission of Enquiry of eleven members to Greece, with a safe Anglo-American majority and with terms of reference that prevented it examining the whole situation, and instructed it to confine itself to ascertaining whether or not any help had come to the Greek partisans from Greece's neighbours in the North.

The eleven members of the Commission of Enquiry were, of course, not independent, but virtually appointees of their governments and, if not bound by instructions from their Foreign Offices, at any rate extremely sensitive to the views of their Foreign Ministers. This came to light in the subsequent discussions of the First or Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, when M. Bebler, the Yugoslav delegate, asked M. Spaak, the Belgian delegate and Prime and Foreign Minister, how it was that the Belgian member of the Commission of Enquiry had first voted with the minority of five that said there was no evidence of any transgression by Greece's neighbours, thus turning it into a majority of one, and then reversed his vote and thereby the majority on the Commission, upon receiving a telegram from M. Spaak, instructing him to vote according to his conscience but to take the American draft as the basis of discussion. M. Spaak gave an explanation which sounded a little lame and embarrassed to his colleagues, stressing the first part of his instructions and slurring over the conclusion, but he admitted the authenticity of the telegram. And yet, the whole case for holding that Greece's neighbours are in any way responsible for the fight of the Greek partisans in the north (not even the Commission could claim that help from Greece's neighbours had or has anything to do with the partisan fight in the south), rests on this majority of one in the Commission of Enquiry, reached quite patently not on the evidence but on what were virtually

instructions from M. Spaak, who himself was concerned to curry favour with the United States and not with the truth about what was happening in Greece.

When the matter was discussed by the Political Committee of the Assembly, the vagueness and unsatisfactory nature of the evidence was stressed by several of those who in the end found it necessary to go most of the way with their dominating American colleagues, since their governments were pursuing a policy of all-in reliance and dependence upon the United States and wished to appease that power at any price.

Thus the Norwegian delegate declared that in his opinion: 'The evidence presented to the Committee is insufficient to permit us to establish beyond doubt that the governments of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania rendered direct assistance and support to Greek guerillas in violation of the Charter'.

The French delegate, M. Delbos, put his comment in a way that suggested that he too felt doubtful: 'It seems to us that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania took some part in the civil war in Greece, rendering some assistance to the guerillas, since without their assistance the guerillas could not have crossed the border ... I do not wish to say that the Albanian, Yugoslav and Bulgarian Governments render assistance to these guerillas, since in our opinion this was not established legally - presumption is not proof'.

M. Delbos was further of the opinion that 'the sources of the disturbances which have brought about the present situation should be looked for inside Greece herself'.

Even the pliant M. Spaak tacked and veered in his speech and at one moment said 'I do not think that anyone could even hope to assert that Greece's northern neighbours are instigators of the civil war going on in that country. I personally do not believe that they are doing so and if someone asserts the contrary, I think this is exaggeration and hyperbole ... I am sure that the situation in Greece is caused by domestic difficulties, resulting from political, social and economic conflict between two large groups of the Greek nation. Consequently, as I have said, this accusation seems to me excessive'.

Spaak added that in addition to domestic difficulties the situation in Greece appeared to be due partly to 'an undeniable measure of American interference in the internal affairs of Greece'.

On October 20 M. Vyshinsky, at the Plenary Session of the General Assembly, produced a mass of detailed evidence, with

names, facts, places and dates, showing that eighty per cent of the witnesses produced by the Greek Government were, to say the least of it, suspect. After giving full particulars in every case he adduced, M. Vyshinsky summed up his indictment as follows:

The General Assembly should know that the Greek Government submitted both to the Commission and to the auxiliary group a 'White Book' in which the testimonies of 60 witnesses heard under oath were given. Twenty-six of these 60 witnesses appeared in hearings at the Commission. What kind of witnesses were they?

It transpired that ten of these witnesses, i.e. 39 per cent, proved to be perjurers who were exposed in the course of the investigation by their own contradictions and false testimonies. Some of them admitted receiving money from the Greek authorities in payment for false testimonies (for instance, witness Zafiridis). Some of them, like Bobtsis, who on the suggestion of the Colombian delegate, Mr Urrutia, was refused a hearing at the Commission, made nonsensical statements, contradicting obvious and well-known facts; or like Velianidis, who proved to be such a suspicious character that the Commission decided to check up on him especially.

Six persons, or 23 per cent, were common criminals and provocateurs, such as Vlachos, who had assassinated the former Minister Zevgos, and Partulas, Tsauassis and Sidiropoulos, who were his accomplices; Sidiropoulos, who, in a letter published in the Greek press, admitted receiving money from the Greek authorities for his false testimony against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania; Kontopanos, who was exposed as a provocateur by his own brother; Gologanov, who under the Germans was president of a military tribunal and was condemned to death by a Bulgarian court for treason.

Five persons, or 16 per cent, were men condemned to capital punishment, or were under threat of capital punishment during their interrogation, or gave testimony after beatings and after being subjected to torture. These are Baltadoros, Patis, Zachos, Ekonomov and Serbakov.

In addition to these witnesses, the Greek Government presented several more witnesses not mentioned in the 'White Book', a considerable number of whom also proved to be perjurers enlisted from criminal and corrupt elements to give testimony to the Commission and auxiliary group.

Thus the overwhelming majority of witnesses presented by the Greek Government to confirm the charges against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania proved to be unworthy, corrupt and immoral characters, provocateurs, common criminals, or simply unfortunate victims of the Government terror forced to testify against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania and paying this terrible price for their lives granted them by the hangmen under this condition.

No serious attempt was made from any quarter to refute these precise and damning charges, or to deny that hundreds of reputable witnesses had been produced by the other side to testify that there had been no outside interference or assistance to the partisans and that the civil war was due to the oppression and terror exercised by the Greek Royalists and their Fascist auxiliaries and allies. It was hardly an adequate reply for instance for M. Spaak to say that the witnesses mentioned by M. Vyshinsky were evidently 'not pillars of society and that their testimony could hardly be taken at face value', nor for Mr Hector McNeil to fall back on the evidence of the small percentage of the Greek Government witnesses who had not been specifically proved to be criminals, quislings or men speaking under duress. For their testimony, if that of the guilty men be set aside, was too scanty and inconclusive to make even a plausible case.

Nevertheless, it is highly probable that guerilla units have from time to time crossed the invisible and unmarked northern frontier of Greece running through forests and mountains. They may even have received hospitality in some of the neighbouring Bulgarian, Albanian or Yugoslav villages. For during the war the partisans on both sides of the frontier were comrades-in-arms against the Fascists who ruled Greece under the Germans and have been restored to power by Anglo-American policy.

But it has been calculated that it would take 50 divisions to close the frontier from the Greek side. An equal number would be required to close it from the north. Even if they wished to, the governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia could not afford to mobilise and maintain under arms 50 divisions, since, unlike the Greek Government, they cannot rely on foreign subsidies and equipment. Nor, presumably, would a general mobilisation by these countries on the Greek frontier be welcome to the United States.

The fact remains that, in spite of the best efforts of the Commission of Enquiry and of the permanent United Nations Committee, composed largely of Anglo-American and Allied military officers, retired diplomats etc., stationed in Greece, no evidence whatever has been adduced to show that any partisans have been supplied with arms from the Soviet Union or Greece's neighbours and all partisans captured have been Greek citizens. The permanent U.N. Committee in Greece, it may be remarked, is so closely associated in spirit with Anglo-American intervention that it refers to the partisans in its reports, proceedings and con-

versations, as 'bandits'. It is looked upon by the partisans as practically an organisation for spying on them at the service of the American Occupation Authorities.

As American intervention on the side of Greek Fascism develops, some real help may eventually be given to the Partisan Government. For not only do the governments of Greece's neighbours, that issued from their respective resistance movements, feel sympathy with their old comrades-in-arms, the partisans and resistance movement of Greece; they also feel that it would be to their national interest to have a Socialist Republican Greece, prepared to pursue a policy of friendship and cooperation with the rest of the Balkans: Whereas the present regime in Greece has made no secret of its irredentist and expansionist claims, notably for annexing Bulgarian territory and taking half of Albania. The whole present set-up in Greece is naturally and inevitably regarded by Greece's Northern neighbours as a direct and growing menace to their security.

They cannot for the life of them see why it should not be just as legitimate for them to support and even to recognise the Partisan Government, as it is for the United States and Great Britain to intervene in support of the Tsaldaris dictatorship, which they regard as made in Washington and having no mandate from or claim to represent the Greek people. Indeed, in view of the history of the origins of the Athens Government, beginning with the shadowy claims of the *émigré* Greek King and his reactionary associates, with the oath-breaking Metaxas dictatorship as their background, and going on through the series of manipulations by Britain and the United States that has produced the present Greek regime, its 'legality' rests on little but Anglo-American recognition and support. If those were withdrawn the Greek people would not long delay to change its rulers.

During 1947 the United States poured vast quantities of materials, money, advisers, instructors, training officers, civilian administrators, engineers, technicians and experts into Greece. The net result was summed up in an article, revealingly entitled 'Wanted - a Miracle in Greece' in *Collier's Weekly* of September 20, 1947, by Mr Paul A. Porter, who had recently returned from that country, where he had investigated the whole situation as the Special Emissary of President Truman. The account glosses over some aspects of the situation and still cherishes several illusions. But the following extracts speak for themselves:

The whole country, from top to bottom, is in the grip of a grey, unrelieved, profound lack of faith in the future – a lack of faith which produces simple inertia for the present ...

The despair in Greece to-day is crucial, because our whole programme of aid is based on the assumption that the people will be able to snap out of the prevailing inertia ...

The late King George of Greece, in my first talk with him, referred to many government employees as 'camp followers' and 'coffee house politicians' and described the whole civil service as a kind of pension system for political hacks. These were harsh words, but not unwarranted. The civil service is over-expanded, underpaid and demoralised ... The result is complete disorganisation. I have never seen an administrative structure which, for sheer incompetence and ineffectiveness, was so appalling. The civil service simply cannot be relied upon to carry out the simplest functions of government – the collection of taxes, the enforcement of economic regulations, the repair of roads ...

The present government has not, on the record, shown any affirmative philosophy or any inclination to do the things necessary to end the nation's travail ... So far as I could see, the Greek Government had no effective policy except to plead for foreign aid to keep itself in power, loudly citing Greece's war-time sacrifices and its own king-size anti-Communism as reasons for granting the foreign aid in unlimited quantities. It intends, in my judgment, to use foreign aid as a way of perpetuating the privileges of a small banking and commercial clique which constitutes the invisible power in Greece ...

Behind the government is a small mercantile and banking cabal ... determined above all to protect its financial prerogatives, at whatever expense to the economic health of the country. Its members wish to retain a tax system rigged fantastically in their favour. They oppose exchange controls, because these might prevent them from salting away their profits in banks in Cairo or Argentina.

As the situation got worse and resistance increased, the United States plunged ever more deeply into intervention, spent more and more money, took on bigger and bigger responsibilities and interfered more and more directly in every aspect of the administration and government of Greece. At the same time the whole scheme, which was at first 'put over' in the States as an economic aid and humanitarian relief scheme with military aid as a secondary factor, has more and more openly become straight intervention on the Fascist-Royalist end of a civil war, with military agents and advisers, arms, supplies, equipment and money to a Greek Army of 200,000 driven and bullied into fighting by American officers.

The American Economic Mission under Mr Griswold assumed responsibility (unsuccessfully) for balancing the budget, arresting

inflation and reforming the civil service. It placed Americans in key positions in order to see to it that the measures approved by the American Economic Mission were, in fact, carried out.

American officers were put in to act as tactical and strategical 'advisers' in Greek combat units so that, as an American correspondent remarked, 'actually the U.S.A. is waging the civil war in Greece which it previously was financing'. Of the original 350 million dollars appropriated by Congress, the greater part went in military expenditure and much of the civil supplies provided by the rest were embezzled and diverted into the black market by Uncle Sam's Greek protégés to feather their own nests.

The reactionary Greek politicians are perfectly well aware of the fact that no matter what they do the U.S.A. is bound to support them, for the United States is in Greece not for the sake of the Greek people but in pursuance of its own interests as interpreted in Washington and Wall Street. 'The U.S. experiment in Greece', says Mr Thomas Reynolds, in a despatch from Athens to the *New York P.M.* of December 15, 1947, 'has produced intervention much more complete than will be possible elsewhere in Europe. The basic objective of the U.S.A., of course, was to prevent Greece from falling into the Russian orbit and opening a window on the Mediterranean for the Soviet Union'.

The two well-informed Washington political correspondents, Joseph and Stewart Alsop*, in a revealing article in the *Saturday Evening Post* of February 21, 1948, give a remarkably frank account of the extent, nature and purpose of American intervention, which, it will be observed, has nothing whatever to do with the welfare of the Greek people:

~ If you told the average American in the street that his country was in the business of breaking and making foreign governments, he would not believe you. Yet precisely this was the first astonishing sequel of the Greek-Turkish Aid bill. The State Department rightly judged that the intensely reactionary, grossly inefficient government of Premier Tsaldaris could not hold Greece against the Soviets. A hint was dropped in Washington that was heard in Athens. The Tsaldaris Government fell. In the ensuing crisis, Ambassador Lincoln

* There is no Official Secrets Act in the U.S.A., and the contacts of Government Departments with the press are not canalised so strictly through P.R.O.s as is the case in Britain. Government Departments in Washington therefore pick favourites among the political correspondents and use them as channels of communication with public opinion. The Alsops are used in this way by the 'forward school' in the State and Defence Departments. They enjoy access to official documents, off the record talks with V.I.P.s, etc., and use what they get in order to put over the case for anti-Communist intervention and anti-Soviet power politics. They are generally well-informed, although always sensational and prejudiced journalists.

MacVeagh, former Gov. Dwight Griswold, of Nebraska, who heads AMAG, and State Department Expert Loy Henderson all intervened forcefully and continually. The new, more broadly based government of Premier Themistocles Sophoulis satisfactorily emerged from the temporary turmoil.

Then certain things had to be done in Greece which, in the post-war disorganisation, no Greek leader could quite encompass. So the Greek budget was prepared by Gen. Lucius D. Clay's brilliant nephew, Eugene, and the former assistant budget secretary of Pennsylvania, William Sponsler. A Nebraska highway commissioner went to work to rebuild the roads of Greece. Other Americans set themselves to improving agriculture, stabilising the tottering drachma, controlling exports and imports, reconstructing harbours and purging the padded bureaucracy.

Then Premier Sophoulis himself spontaneously asked for an even more crucial and delicate sort of aid. Last fall, after agonised indecision in Washington, AMAG was strengthened by a large group of American officers, who assumed something pretty close to control over Greek Army operations.

These extraordinary interventions in Greek affairs might almost be classed as un-American activities, so sharply do they depart from our past traditions of foreign policy.

Greece has been vivisected and drowned in blood by the United States because 'in plain language, if the Soviets gain Greece, Turkey will be open. If they gain Turkey, the Middle East will be open. If they gain the Middle East, they will hold the crossroads between Europe and Asia, and control the oil which is Europe's lifeblood and America's last great reserve ... These are the highly practical considerations which have led to our intervention in Greece.'

If United States intervention in Greece were really concerned with the well-being of the Greek people, the United States could obviously insist on whatever reforms it wanted on pain of ceasing aid if the reforms were not carried out. As it is, the U.S.A. must back the Royalists and Fascists, whatever they do and whatever the consequences to the Greek people, because the United States is in Greece for imperialist and power political purposes, and so cannot effectively control its Greek tools and agents, although the Greek Government is a creature of American intervention.

'The present Greek Government... is American-made', reports Mr Joseph Alsop from Athens to the *New York Herald Tribune*, on November 4, 1947.

'Intervention in the formation of a cabinet in itself constitutes acceptance of an unprecedented measure of responsibility for the affairs of another country'.

'The political centre', reports Mr Thomas Reynolds in the despatch from Athens already quoted, 'on which the U.S.A. presumably hoped to base its reconstruction and political fortifications against Communism, has been made the complete captive of the extreme reactionary Right Wing as represented by Deputy Prime Minister Constantin Tsaldaris. Prime Minister Themistocles Sophoulis in a conversation with this correspondent admitted that he was a "captive liberal" in the grasp of Tsaldaris, and the disillusioned non-Communist Liberals now charge that Sophoulis is no more than an "international political decoration" to give a defensive colouration to what is dangerously close to American-sponsored Greek Fascism'.

The same correspondent reported that business and industry had stagnated, that the business of the port of Salonika was down to half of what it was before American intervention a year ago, and that 'a tremendous new American-financed bureaucracy is growing as a result of American attempts to enforce exchange controls'. Merchants found themselves unable to work in the mazes of this 'paper kingdom' and in spite of American efforts the country was in the grip of a runaway inflation.

American intervention in Greece, concludes Mr Reynolds, 'has proved an almost utter failure during the last five months and is heading for additional and greater financial and military obligations on the U.S.A. ...

'At the beginning of last winter, on testimony of top U.S. military men in North Greece, there were two thousand or a few more guerillas in the mountains actively resisting the government. At the beginning of this winter the number is estimated by the same American officers at 20,000 to 25,000, of whom not more than ten per cent at the most are Communists. Aside from the great cities and their environs the Greek Government actually has no control over the Greek countryside.'

Similar testimony is given, again from eye-witness sources, by the *New Republic* of February 23, 1948. It reports that in the summer of 1947 a Greek army of 120,000 men, armed and paid by the United States, fought with 20,000 guerrillas. 'The net result, according to the State Department and U.S. military men on the spot, was an increase in the number of guerillas and an extension of their holdings until they now dominate in rough terms all of Greece above 1,000 foot elevation, or some 80 per cent of the land area.'

This account of American intervention in Greece in 1947 may

fittingly close with the following extract from the same report in the *New Republic*:

We went to Greece to bolster a democracy. Anyone who looked behind the front pages of the newspapers knew that Greece was an oligarchy. But few suspected how tenaciously the small group of millionaires who have run Greece for a century would frustrate the U.S. men at every turn. The last thing these men want is Communism, but the next to the last is real democracy.

With an effrontery that is breath-taking they have said 'Yes' and done 'No' with great effectiveness. U.S. experts have worked out many useful fiscal and administrative reforms which have been accepted. Few have worked in anything but principle. The imposition of an income tax has been avoided by the delightfully simple expedient of saying that no one in Greece keeps the records needed to impose one. Parliament grudgingly accepted a leadership more moderate than that of the arch-reactionary Tsaldaris, only to pass a law saying strikers would be shot.

The last reference in this quotation is to the anti-strike law, which completed the virtual destruction of the Greek Trade Union movement. The Government had previously removed its freely elected leaders, purged it of all members connected with the resistance movement, and imposed 'yellow' leaders from the days of the Metaxas dictatorship and quisling rule. With no elected leaders, exercise of the right to strike punished by death, no rationing, no social legislation, wages hopelessly out-stripped by inflation, widespread unemployment and starvation knocking at the door, and an ever-present, pitiless terror, the Greek workers may be pardoned for not appreciating their share of the blessings of Western civilisation and democracy as meted out to them by Whitehall, Washington and Wall Street.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAST

In the Middle East, Anglo-American policy wove a tortuous pattern. Mr Bevin blindly accepted the counsels of his military advisers.

The policy of our military men in the Middle East was quite simple: the Arabs were to be given a free hand against the Jews of Palestine as the price of winning them over to our side against the Soviet Union. The first step in this 'policy' was to tear up Labour's election pledges and to continue the Chamberlain policy towards the Jews.

The result was that Britain's great popularity waned; hope was followed by disappointment and disappointment by despair and bitterness. The Jewish Army, Haganah, was denied the right to

possess arms and treated as an illegal force. It had to go underground. Faith in Britain's goodwill and honesty disappeared. The result was terrorist outrages by the Irgun Zvei Leumi and the Stern Group. Mr Bevin's policy had made it physically impossible for the Haganah to stamp out the murder campaign and had deprived most of the civil population of the desire to take any risks in stopping the terrorists. The result was much loss of life and suffering among our soldiers. The further result was to turn our forces in Palestine and the Palestine Police into a hotbed of anti-Semitism and to supply grist to the mill of the Fascists and near-Fascists in this country.

Whereas British policy was more or less straightforward iniquity, based on the violation of election pledges and deluding a public opinion that did not require much fooling, there was real duality of purpose in American policy: President Truman was still anxious to keep the Jewish and pro-Jewish vote; the State Department was anxious not to offend the Arabs, who said bluntly: 'No Palestine - no oil concessions'. The price of oil in Arab territories was Jewish blood and martyrdom. The State Department and the big business interests behind them were of course not finicky about making the Jews pay the price. But they found it a little awkward to square this policy with the attitude and expectations of American public opinion and President Truman's difficulties. That accounts for the fluctuations and inconsistency in American policy in the Middle East.

Broadly speaking, the object of both governments has been oil and anti-Soviet power politics. This has involved propping up regimes in Persia, Iraq, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia that are for all practical purposes Fascist police states, crossed with Oriental feudalism and tempered by assassination. These regimes are at grips with the growing sections of the population in their own countries that object to back-breaking toil for rack-renting landlords, usury, rapacious exploitation, disease, illiteracy and poverty on the hunger level. Such objections are of course classed as 'Communism'.

In the Far East, the French continued their colonial war in Indo-China, which Britain had helped them to wage by granting transport facilities and supplying arms. During 1947 the Americans took an increasing interest in Indonesia, and both Britain and the U.S.A., through the United Nations, attempted to help the Dutch achieve a compromise settlement through 'mediation', based on the Dutch occupation of part of the country as a result of the initial British help mentioned in the previous chapter.

In China, the American war of intervention continued to rage with fluctuating fortunes, killing thousands and spreading suffering, starvation and disease among hundreds of thousands.

EASTERN EUROPE

In Eastern Europe, the effects of Anglo-American hostility and intervention began to make themselves felt. Apart from Czechoslovakia, a Central European country that is discussed in the next chapter, the States that had been liberated with Russian help and under Soviet responsibility, were countries that had either never known democracy or known it only briefly and then mostly on paper for a few years after the first world war. Since then they had been ruled for 10, 15 or 20 years by dictatorships, representing a coalition of landlords, big business, senior officers, higher civil servants and leading prelates, all inter-related and interlocked economically and socially, grouped around a king as in the Balkans or a dictator as in Poland (Hungary combined the two in a Regent, Admiral Horthy). These regimes were easily overrun by Hitler and with equal facility turned from appeasement to collaboration (Poland was a partial exception – there the regime simply fell to pieces).

Whereas the Western allies spent the last two years of the war in elaborating plans for preventing the resistance movements taking over power in the hour of victory, the Russians gave them a free hand and encouraged and helped them to carry out their programmes of semi-Socialist reconstruction.

The way the Russians and these new regimes carried out the general programme laid down in the Yalta Agreement quoted above, compares favourably with what the Western allies did in Greece in similar circumstances.

Victory meant the overthrow, dispersal and flight of the ruling class, resting on landlords, big business and banking, the officer caste and the higher civil servants and judges, with some kind of clerical cement. That left the apparatus of State, factories, mines, banks, railways, etc. derelict (and mostly heavily damaged in the war – in Poland and Yugoslavia the damage meant total destruction on a huge scale).

With the disintegration of the old ruling class the two great classes of the peasants and the workers rose to the surface. They had been represented, together with parts of the professional class and middle-sized or small merchants and manufacturers, by the coalitions of parties, running from the centre to the left, that had comprised the resistance movements and now took over

the countries they had helped to liberate. These coalitions set up provisional governments and got their countries going again before holding elections.

The fundamental problem of the new regimes has been how to weld together the interests of the two great and hitherto submerged classes, the workers and the peasants, so as to make the foundations of the new social order solid and enduring, as well as how to give these hitherto mostly illiterate and 'a-political' masses the education, training and leadership necessary to enable them to play their part as citizens and rulers of their countries. Those faced with this question necessarily took a social engineering rather than a Gallup poll view of how to establish democracy while at the same time laying the foundations of a new social order – a novel and tremendous task for which there are no precedents in the experience of the Western democracies.

The Co-operatives were the main mechanism for connecting the economic interests of the towns and the countryside; the Trades Unions transmitted the energy of the working class and the economic directives of the national planning organs and the Government to the reconstruction and production drive in the mines, factories, railways, workshops and ports; the political dynamo of the whole system was a Left-Centre peasant-worker-professional and middle-class coalition centring on Communist parties or on Communists and Socialists in conjunction.

The elections in these countries were far from satisfying Western purists (who have a way of forgetting the almost total absence of democracy and the presence of a colour bar throughout most of the British Empire, and the parody of democracy and mockery of Western civilisation that keeps the negroes in subjection in the Southern States of the United States; not to mention the semi-Fascist tyranny in Ulster, resting on the Special Powers Act, and the semi-slavery in which a black majority is kept by a ruling white minority in the Union of South Africa). But they made far better sense than the bloody and hypocritical farce staged in Greece by Britain and the U.S.A. They did represent the first step, from the provisional governments that had issued from the resistance movements, toward full democracy, and were a tremendous advance on what the mass of the people of those countries had known before the war and indeed throughout most of their history.

The resulting regimes are deeply rooted in the necessities of the situation and have a firm hold on the loyalty of the mass of

their peoples. There is no constructive alternative to their programme and no organised opposition with a policy of its own – only Fascists, old regime reactionaries and *émigrés*.

The Times of November 11 and 12, 1946 published two articles by its special correspondent on 'The Danubian States'. What he says applies equally well to Poland. The correspondent's (Mr Hugh Seton Watson) hostility to the present regimes in these countries, which he knew well from pre-war days, and had just visited and studied again, did not prevent him concluding that: 'The ruling minorities possess great constructive qualities. Unlike the pre-war regimes, they understand their countries' basic social problems. They have ambitious plans for the future and sincerely intend to carry them out ... On the other hand, though the opposition leaders merit respect for their honesty, courage and patriotism ... they are almost entirely negative, have no constructive social and economic programme, and are almost insanely nationalistic. From these movements a new Fascism could easily grow ... based on the bureaucratic middle class and part of the peasantry, and inspired by anti-semitism, clericalism, and extreme nationalism'.

The Western allies did their best to 'defend democracy and freedom' in these countries on the lines of their policy in Greece. They were pledged by the Yalta Agreement to join with the Soviet Union in helping the revolutionary regimes in these countries to feed and house their peoples, start the wheels of economic life turning again, establish law and order, uproot the remnants of Fascism, all under a government composed of anti-Fascist democratic elements, and then, as soon as by these measures conditions had been created enabling an election to be held, to settle the future of these countries by free elections. The United States interpreted these obligations to mean that the U.S.A. could interfere in the internal affairs of these countries, with the usual slavish British support, for the purpose, thinly disguised as solicitude for democracy, of backing Right-Wing elements in the coalition regimes as well as underground illegal oppositions in taking an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet line.

This, of course, encouraged such elements to be intransigent and bold in reliance on American backing. It also resulted in the leaders of these regimes, who were generally all too willing to take that line even without the justification obligingly supplied by Britain and the U.S.A., regarding all forms of opposition as practically foreign intervention and a counter-revolutionary assault on the regime.

In all these countries there was in 1945 and 1946 enthusiasm and warm friendship for the Western democracies and a great hope that the social revolution could be carried out by gentler means than in Russia and accompanied by the rapid establishment of democracy and political freedom, because instead of having to fight a civil war, fomented and sustained by foreign intervention, as was the case with the Russian revolution, there would be co-operation between the leading allies in East and West and in particular, because the Labour Party and the Labour Government would treat the workers and those building Socialism in Europe as partners and comrades. These hopes had faded by 1947, and the East European regimes grew sterner as they faced the grim realities of Anglo-American hypocrisy, hostility and intervention.

BULGARIA

'Many opposition leaders', says *The Times* of January 17, 1947, in a leader page article on Bulgaria, 'have wrongly interpreted the efforts of Western diplomacy to secure a more democratic development of Bulgarian political life. Thus objections against the abuse of power on the part of the Communists have been considered as the camouflaged first steps of a future 'Anglo-American' military offensive against the Russians in the Balkans. This highly dangerous trend of events could only be averted by a common allied policy in Sofia, which presupposes an agreement between London, Moscow, and Washington upon the major Bulgarian political issues'.

When I was in Bulgaria in the autumn of 1946 I spoke at length with Dr Mushanov and Mr Petkov, the leaders of the Opposition. What they told me, and the moral of Petkov's subsequent trial and death, I told the House on January 22, 1948:

I do not believe that we can fight ideologies with weapons. But I believe that we as Socialists ourselves can find common ground with our fellow workers in Europe and Asia. We can, through full trade and friendly political relations, create the kind of Europe and the kind of world in which there is secure peace and prosperity. It is only in that atmosphere and in those conditions that these revolutionary regimes – some of them in very backward countries which have never known democracy – can get rid of their harsh and ugly features. It is only in those conditions that democracy and freedom can develop out of these regimes.

Democracy cannot be imposed by atom bombs. Democracy can only grow in an atmosphere of friendship and security. That was what Petkov, about whom we have heard so much, said to me when I saw him last. 'Tell your friends in England' – and I told the House

this when I last spoke on foreign affairs – ‘that if they really want to help us who are in opposition in Eastern Europe and if they really want to promote the cause of democracy and freedom in our countries, then the Western powers should compose their quarrels with the Soviet Union and have a common policy with that country. That would be our salvation.’ (An Hon. Member: ‘Why was he killed?’) He was killed because, instead of a policy of concord between the great Powers, the United States announced their cold war and President Truman went into Greece, which sent a thrill of fear through all Eastern Europe.

I put this to the Government – do they wish to base our policy with the Soviet Union on the Charter, or on Fulton? They must stop humbugging and make up their minds and take their stand either on an Anglo-American alliance run from Washington, or on the Charter, which says we must settle all our differences even with the U.S.S.R. by peaceful means, and must never use force in our dealings with that country. On that choice hangs the issue of peace or another world war.

In the West Petkov’s trial is too easily dismissed as a frame-up. The evidence indicates that, on the contrary, the tradition of conspiracy, which is endemic in Bulgaria, had not died and was kept alive partly by the hope of Western intervention. But the one thing clear from, among other things, Dimitrov’s answer to Mr J. Mack, M.P.’s plea to imprison instead of executing Petkov, is that his death may be laid directly to the door of the Truman Doctrine. Anglo-American hostility and intervention created a sense of fear and emergency and the feeling that it was a matter of prestige not to show ‘weakness’ and ‘yield to the enemy’ by being merciful. The Communist-dominated regimes of Eastern Europe are like those islanders of whom the explorer who discovered them wrote indignantly: ‘The natives are morose and intractable savages, who, when fired upon, do not scruple to retaliate’.

YUGOSLAVIA

The premature winding up of UNRRA (and in the case of Yugoslavia, the attempt to accompany UNRRA supplies with British troops) in order to promote the political aims of the West has already been described. The Yugoslavs were so tough and so united that the attempts to use some of the returned London *émigrés* against the regime failed ludicrously.

Groll, the hero of the British and American Embassies in Belgrade, collapsed in ridicule when eleven British M.P.s interviewed him at the Soviet Embassy reception, celebrating the 1945 anniversary of the revolution, where he was doing himself proud

as a guest while loudly proclaiming that his life was in continual danger and that he dared not speak. (He said plenty to us M.P.s in a loud voice, but it was not impressive).

POLAND

In Poland, the Western powers were able to do more damage. They put their money on Mr Mikolajczyk, the leader of the Right wing of the Peasant Party and a London *émigré*, who became the hero not only of the British and American Governments but of the Polish emigration and of General Anders' army, with its largely old regime and even Fascist officers and N.C.O.s. It was in response to Anglo-American pressure and promises that Mr Mikolajczyk, who was then a member of the Polish Coalition Government, decided to take the plunge, break out of the coalition and insist upon elections before the new Polish Constitution had been drafted, while the economic situation was still extremely serious, and in face of the existence of an armed underground fighting opposition to the Government and the new Poland of at least 40,000 or 50,000 men (out of a total population of 20,000,000; the equivalent in Great Britain would be between 100,000 and 120,000; and in the United States about 280,000 to 350,000).

In order to support Mr Mikolajczyk against the Government the United States Administration refused a loan to Poland. Mr Bevin had no money to lend the Poles, but resourcefully thought of holding up £4,000,000 of the Polish Government's own money, which had been brought to London during the war. An agreement was negotiated settling claims on both sides, and actually signed by the Poles, when they were suddenly told that Mr Bevin would not return them their money until they held an election that he regarded as satisfactory. There was no shadow of a justification in international law for this attempt at democracy by blackmail. These tactics were followed up by the refusal to recognise Poland's Western frontier, and the failure to conclude a trade agreement.

The net result of these measures was to increase the internal difficulties of the Polish Government, hold up reconstruction, prolong and aggravate the sufferings of the Polish people, and encourage the Fascist underground.

The climax came during the election, when the Polish police, going to arrest Count Grocholski, one of the leaders of the underground, found the British Ambassador, Mr Cavendish-Bentinck, hobnobbing with him. The Foreign Office explained

blandly that the Ambassador, who during the war belonged to the Intelligence Service, was only paying a social call on an old friend, and that his visit had no political significance. The 'old friend', who was a dispossessed and ruined Polish aristocrat and ex-landowner, was subsequently executed, but not before he had admitted that he had, during the war, received money from and worked for Werner, the head of the German police in Warsaw. Werner corroborated this testimony.

A strict parallel would be British troops arresting an Irgun Zvei Leumi leader at the height of the terror campaign in Palestine and finding a Soviet envoy in his flat. Imagination pales at what the Tory press would have said if this incident had occurred, and the Soviet Government had airily dismissed it as merely a case of two old buddies hobnobbing in a purely private and personal capacity.

The Polish underground had consisted of three sections: an extreme left grouping, which included Ukrainians and White Russians, was largely under Communist direction and friendly to the U.S.S.R. and to the Polish Committee and Army in that country; an extreme right near-Fascist group; and a large centre running from near-Fascism to Socialism, acknowledging the London Government, but with an advanced social programme. After the Polish C-in-C. General Sikorski's death in an aeroplane accident, the Polish *émigré* Government in London appointed as his successor Gen. Sosnkowski, an extreme reactionary. His first act was to reinstate Col. Okulicki, dismissed by Sikorski for his violently anti-Soviet and anti-Left views, and to parachute him into Poland as the Commander of both the NSZ (the near-Fascist underground) and the A.K. (the centre resistance movement acknowledging the London Government). After liberation practically the whole of the extreme right underground and a considerable part of the 'middle' group remained underground in opposition to the new regime in Poland, partly out of sympathy with the old order, but mostly because of the traditional Polish policy of regarding both Russia and Germany as hereditary enemies: now that Germany had been beaten, the enemy had become the Soviet Union. This feeling was re-enforced by the bitterness caused by the taking over by the U.S.S.R. of the territories inhabited by White Russian and Ukrainian majorities east of the Curzon Line. The Right Wing of the Peasant Party under Mr Mikolajczyk became more and more heavily infiltrated by former adherents of the old regime and some of its members were mixed up with the underground movement.

The Warsaw correspondent of *The Economist*, July 20, 1946, wrote an interesting analysis of Mr Mikolajczyk's position, concluding that he was tending more and more to fish for support among Fascist and near-Fascist elements, the so-called 'Lumpen-Bourgeoisie', and for that reason would not condemn either the Fascist underground or the pogroms of Jews. More and more Mr Mikolajczyk came to be looked upon by the *émigré* Poles around Anders and the London 'Government' (which had previously detested him and now lauded him to the skies) and by the Fascist underground, as the Kerenski of the Polish counter-revolution, and the political agent of Britain and America in their vendetta against the Soviet Union and the social revolution, which they identified with 'Communism'.

In these circumstances, what took place in Poland on January 19, 1947 was a cross between a general election and a civil war. For, as the Warsaw correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* reported on December 23, 1946, after giving a terrible account of wholesale political murders by the Fascist underground (according to Polish Government figures, 7,000 men and women had been assassinated for being 'Reds' or 'pro-Soviet' - i.e. loyal to the Government - during this period):

It seems that the Polish terrorists are determined to make the election the bloodiest possible affair. As the election date of January 19 approaches it is increasingly clear that the two years of the partly open and partly secret fight for power is coming to a head. Underground terrorists become more desperate every day and not even the numerous death sentences passed appear to intimidate them. The authorities are trying to stop the increasing campaign of murder and the papers to-day bring reports of veritable battles with the police using armoured cars against the gangs at the very gates of the Polish capital. How, in circumstances like this, even with the utmost effort the authorities are making to secure order, the elections can take place remains to be seen.

The elections were held in these conditions because the British and American Governments had pushed our ally the Polish Government, against its own better judgement, and that of the Soviet Union, which was a co-signatory of the various agreements and undertakings concerning Poland, into holding them before even the new Constitution had been drafted. (The Provisional Government had temporarily revived the 1921 Constitution as a basis of action. Poland was the only country in Europe that returned to party politics before even drafting its constitu-

tion). At the same time they pushed Mr Mikolajczyk into breaking out of the coalition and reverting to party politics.

The result was much bloodshed and disorder and a crushing defeat for Mr Mikolajczyk, for the near-Fascist underground and for Anglo-American policy. The British Government recalled its badly compromised Ambassador, returned the Polish Government its money, resumed trade negotiations, and abandoned the hope of using Poland's Western frontier as a bargaining counter with the U.S.S.R. It would have been better for Polish democracy and British prestige if these things had been done a year earlier as part of a positive policy of friendship and co-operation, and not as a sign of weakness and the acknowledgment of defeat.

HUNGARY

Hungary shows the same social and political pattern. Hungary was for a thousand years a feudal state and then for six years a Fascist State, as the former Social Democratic Prime Minister, Count Karolyi, once remarked.

At the end of the war, the Soviet Government upheld the view, against Britain and the U.S.A., that only anti-Fascist parties should be allowed to exist. But Britain and the U.S.A. carried their point, that everyone should be allowed to vote except for a small number of proved war criminals. The 'legal' parties were composed of the Hungarian Smallholders, the Socialists and the Communists, the latter two working together.

The Hungarian Smallholders won a handsome electoral victory that gave them a small majority over the Communists and Socialists and allied groups combined. But they did so partly because they were supported not only by peasants, but by former bankers, industrialists and landowners as well as by the adherents of the old regime, who could no longer vote for a party of their own and therefore concentrated on infiltrating the most right wing of the parties in the coalition.*

The Smallholders Party also enjoyed the patronage of the British and American Embassies in Budapest, and dangled glittering promises during the election of ultimate American assistance. Several of their candidates and supporters went so far as to conduct a semi-public 'terror-campaign' among the

* *The Times* special correspondent in Budapest, March 28, 1947: 'The Smallholders, like the Austrian *Volkspartei*, are peasants, farmers, businessmen, what is left of the big land-owning interests after the land reform and people who would have voted further right if they had had the chance. It is under Catholic influence to some extent.'

peasants in the more backward areas, telling them that the Allies would never recognise their taking over of the estates of the big landlords and that the United States was going to use the atom bomb with devastating effect to drive out the Russians and restore the old order in Central Europe.

The next step was the formation of an all-party coalition, consisting on the one hand of the Socialists, Communists, Trade Unionists and a left-wing 'National Peasant Party', grouped in a left block, and on the other, of the Smallholders Party. The coalition was based on an agreed programme of emergency measures followed by urgent measures of reconstruction.

The Right Wing of the Smallholders Party however, began increasingly to oppose and default upon this agreed programme and to reveal more and more clearly that it was heavily infiltrated by adherents to the old regime and the old order. In January, 1947, a large-scale counter-revolutionary plot was discovered among former supporters of the Horthy dictatorship, implicating the Secretary General of the Smallholders Party, one of its minor ministers and several of its members of Parliament. The plot was devised in anticipation of the departure of the Soviet Occupation forces.

There was, of course, the usual outcry in the West that the whole thing was merely a Communist mare's nest, an excuse for tyrannising over the democrats of Hungary. But *The Times* special correspondent in Budapest, in the article already quoted, says: 'That the plot existed, cannot be doubted ... The Smallholders have officially admitted that members of their party were involved'.

The *Manchester Guardian* of February 26, 1947 published an account of this conspiracy by its obviously well-informed special correspondent in Budapest. 'The world,' says this correspondent, 'has been inclined to suspect that the alleged conspiracy was a Communist fabrication to justify the attack on the Smallholders Party.'

'Yet, there was a plot. Even on the Right few will deny its existence. But there is considerable disagreement as to its seriousness, extent, and aims. The Right explains that the object was purely defensive, to safeguard the country against a Communist coup when the Russians withdrew, to give cohesion and a sense of security to individuals resolved to withstand a Communist ascendancy. Others maintain that the plotters wanted to overthrow the Republic and undo the land reform. This is more or less the version of the Left'.

The plot was apparently directed 'against a political system that permitted the existence of a Communist Party ... Once the Communists had been dealt with the plotters might have been carried farther by their own momentum. They might have set up a regime on the lines of Horthy's simply because that is the only one they were familiar with.

'The conspiracy had a hard military core. Round it were grouped civilian elements of various shades of opinion, some better organised than others, some legitimately concerned with fighting the Communists by constitutional means'.

ITALY

Italy emerged from the long night of Fascism with much the same political set-up as in the other liberated countries. That is, there was an anti-Fascist resistance movement, composed of a coalition running from the centre to the Communists, in which most of the fighting had been done by workers and politically conscious peasants under the leadership of Communists and Socialists.

Italy had fallen a victim to Fascism because of the splits in the Socialist Party between those who clung to the Second International and those who wished to join the Third. During the twenty years underground struggle against Fascism and in the six years of the war-time resistance movement, the Socialists and Communists had fought shoulder to shoulder as comrades-in-arms. This association they felt it necessary to continue in the peace, as they were agreed that the Italian propertied classes would unhesitatingly resort to Fascism again if they got the chance, in order to stop any advance towards Socialism, and that only the unity of the working class could ensure that Capitalist counter-revolution should not once more triumph.

The Labour Party paid generous tribute to the Italian resistance movement in general, and the Italian Socialist Party in particular, in a message sent on February 25, 1944, on behalf of the National Executive Committee, which spoke in glowing terms of the 'representatives of the popular and democratic forces of Italy' who, 'inspired by the most precious of its historic traditions, have agreed to make an earnest and continuous effort to reconstruct Italian social and political life on new foundations', and were fighting 'the discredited ruling classes' responsible for Fascism and war, that still endeavoured 'to maintain their power over the destinies of the Italian people'.

In the same message the Labour Party reciprocated the 'warm

fraternal greetings of the Italian Socialist Party', rejoiced that it had emerged 'from more than twenty years of Fascist corruption and bondage' and hailed it as 'the heirs of the glorious tradition of Filippo Turati and Giacomo Matteotti and of all those other martyrs and victims of persecution who never bowed their heads in thought or deed to tyranny'.

On October 30, 1944 the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party sent a message to the Italian resistance movement and to the Italian Socialist Party, expressing 'pride and gratitude' at the heroism of the resisters and of 'the workers, the railwaymen, the peasants, the partisans', aiding the Allied advance. 'By your courage and endurance, under conditions of bitter mental and physical suffering', they declared, 'you have earned the trust, confidence, and admiration of your fellow democrats throughout Europe'.

The message recognised that the efforts of the Resistance movement 'to reorganise and reconstruct the social, economic and political life' of Italy would be 'frustrated by a Fascist legacy of ignorance, corruption and mis-government. Your task of wiping out all traces of Fascism will be long and difficult ...

'The British Labour Party salute their Italian Socialist friends, who have carried on unbroken the glorious tradition of Italian Socialism ... Fascist fire and murder, followed by twenty years of darkness and shame, have failed to quench the flame of Socialist and anti-Fascist conviction in Italy. They have indeed strengthened it, and have brought fresh lustre and inspiration to the Socialist cause.

'The British Labour Party is looking forward with particular eagerness and pleasure to the time when they can renew contact with their Italian comrades'.

At the time these messages were sent to the Italian resistance movement and Socialist Party, the National Executive Committee knew very well that Italian Socialists and Communists were working closely together in the resistance movement and were, between them, the backbone of the resistance. The National Executive Committee knew that 'the workers, railwaymen, peasants and partisans' who fought on our side against Fascism were led by Communists as well as by Socialists and that the two were comrades-in-arms. Indeed, the National Executive Committee, on June 28, 1944, in a resolution paying tribute to the resistance movements of Europe, said that out of them would 'grow the free European communities of the future' and in them 'the men and women of the political parties of the

Left have taken their full share of risk and sacrifice'. That meant, and was intended to mean, Communists as well as Socialists.

The reference in *Let Us Face the Future* to Labour standing with the workers and for Socialism in Europe has been quoted above (p. 102). But while the Labour Party was sending messages and tributes to the resistance movements in general and the Socialists and their Communist allies in particular, Mr Churchill was busy, as previous chapters have shown, trying to smash up the resistance movements and working-class parties in the liberated countries. In particular he strove to make Italy safe for capitalism through King Victor Emmanuel, Marshal poison-gas Badoglio and the very landlords and big business men who had been the backbone of the Mussolini regime, but were perfectly prepared to be saved by Western Toryism.

The policy of intervention was a partial failure in Italy. But it did weaken and frustrate the resistance movement and particularly its left wing and freeze the social *status quo*. UNRRA officials reported scandalous leakages of UNRRA supplies into the flourishing Italian black market. But after the winding up of UNRRA (in the countries where, again on the testimony of UNRRA officials, there was no wastage and no black market), the United States decided to continue giving help to Italy. There was, however, one difficulty.

The coalition emerging from the resistance movement, and representing the only legally recognized parties, had been returned to power by the Italian people on a programme of drastic social reforms. The Socialist-Communist alliance was the driving force in this coalition. It represented the very social classes and forces that had been so fervently greeted by the Labour Party, and found itself in ever-stronger opposition to the parties and groups representing the 'discredited ruling classes', to use Labour's phrase, who had been responsible for Fascism and war and were still endeavouring through the Right Wing of the coalition 'to maintain their power over the destinies of the Italian people'.

There was nothing for it but for these ruling classes to appeal to the ready rescuer in Washington. The story is told in considerable detail in Joseph and Stewart Alsop's *Saturday Evening Post* article of February 21, 1948, 'Must America Save the World', already quoted with reference to Greece:

In September, 1947, they relate, De Gasperi, the head of the Christian Democratic Party, who was Prime Minister because it was the largest in the coalition, told the American Ambassador in Rome that: 'It all depends on you. Without your help we have

only a few weeks to last, only a few weeks. The Government will be finished on the day we have to cut the bread ration. Then will come an impotent government of national unity' – he almost spat the words – 'and after that the Communists in full control. And if American aid isn't promised soon, the bread ration must be cut in half – in half, I tell you – and our people live on bread'.

Secretary of State Byrnes and his staff had long ago decided, say the Alsops, that they must break up the co-operation of the Communists with other parties in the coalition regimes that had issued from the victorious resistance movements in Europe. Therefore when Premier De Gasperi, following on this talk with the American Ambassador in Rome, paid a visit to Washington in the winter of 1947-48 and held a series of conversations at the State Department, 'the American officials intimated that the United States wished to aid Italy, *but would find it hard to do so, as long as the Italian Government included Togliatti and his Communists*. On the other hand, Premier De Gasperi professed confidence in his power to defy the Communists, *provided he could be sure of getting food and fuel for his people*. There was no bargain, certainly. But there was at least a shadow of a hint of an outline of a tacit understanding. Soon after De Gasperi went home there was another governmental crisis in Rome. The Communists thundered their usual blackmailing threats. This time they were ignored. De Gasperi formed Italy's first Communist-free post war cabinet of any duration'. (Italics as in the original).

From then until the general election in April 1948, De Gasperi was continually begging Washington to give him his daily bread and forgive him his trespasses, because, as he told an American visitor with 'a certain sad dignity', his Government was 'based on close links with the United States' and frankly could not carry on without support. The U.S. Ambassador James C. Dunn's telegrams from Rome during this period 'became a series of frantic, almost daily variations on the same grim theme: "Make the needed aid available or prepare to see a communist dominated government in Italy in the spring".' Mr. Dunn is a Catholic.

The exclusion of the Communists and their Socialist allies from the coalition as the condition for receiving American help meant that the working class was deprived by foreign intervention of any share in government, and that political power became the monopoly of the parties representing the very propertied classes that had brought in Mussolini and supported him through thick and thin in his policy of holding down the workers and peasants by force and guile, after destroying Italian democracy.

The first result of this change was that all pretence of carrying out the social reforms, on which the resistance movement coalition had won its victory, was dropped. The regime moved sharply to the Right, and life became a paradise for the rich and hell for the poor. No attempt was made to collect income tax. Rationing and price controls were abolished. A huge black market flourished with impunity. Poverty, degradation and unemployment spread among the workers and the landless and nearly landless peasants.

There is abundant evidence to support the eye-witness testimony of Mr Henry Wallace, writing in the *New Republic* of April 5, 1948:

When I was in Italy last fall I found greater contrasts of wealth and poverty than anywhere else I had ever been ... In their backwardness, parts of Italy are almost reminiscent of pre-revolutionary Russia.

The programme of the resistance movement had remained on paper because

every Italian Government since the war has been dominated by the Right Wing ... Italy has been a paradise for black-market operators. Price controls and rationing are largely meaningless. Monetary reform has amounted to very little. No real programme has been created for taxing the wealth of the black-market racketeers and the former collaborators ... No wonder Italy suffers so terribly from inflation. I shall never forget the utterly abject poverty I saw there. the hunger, filth, disease and terrible unemployment. The rich live as well as ever, buying on the black market, but the working people are near starvation.

FRANCE

France is the key country in Western Europe. She is to-day the greatest power on the Continent next to the Soviet Union and is a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, as well as ranking as one of the Big Four in international conferences.

The split in French society caused by the French Revolution never quite closed under the Third Republic. There is a section of the French propertied classes which has remained Royalist and counter-revolutionary to this day. There is also a revolutionary tradition in the French working class and even part of the peasantry.

Both the French Socialist Party and the Trade Unions began as a number of small scattered movements and groups with wide differences of outlook and organisation. Before the first world war the Socialists fused on officially Marxist lines (although

Marxism was reformed and applied to the prevailing traditions of French democracy by Jean Jaurès, the leader of the French Socialist Party before the war). The French Trade Unions, on the other hand, were dominated by the anarcho-syndicalist tradition, stemming ultimately from Bakunin in the First International and strong in the Latin countries. They therefore took their stand on a charter that pledged them to be independent of political action.

After the first world war there were splits in both the Socialist Party and the French Trade Unions. In the former, the Left obtained a majority at the Congress of Tours in 1920 for their policy of joining the Third International. That is, the majority of the French Socialist Party turned Communist after the first world war and took the party newspaper *Humanité* and most of the party machine and funds with them. The Right broke away from the Party rather than accept this majority decision. That is, the present French Socialist Party was born after the first world war as a Right Wing break-away minority from the original Socialist Party.

On the other hand, the Right got control of the majority in the French Trade Union Congress and used it to expel the Marxist Left, which was then in process of going Communist. Paradoxical as it may seem, the Right in the French Trade Unions meant the former anarcho-syndicalists, who had become respectable in their old age. The original anarcho-syndicalist theory was direct industrial action, strikes, etc., to carry through revolutionary changes in society. But in course of time the only part of this doctrine to survive was the unwillingness to have anything to do with political action. 'Non-political' trade unions, although anarcho-syndicalist in origin, became the form of trade unions desired by the Right not only in the French T.U.C. but in French politics. That is, it became the type of trade union dear to French Toryism.

It may be noted in passing that the Right, both in the French Socialist Party and the French Trade Unions, showed themselves highly intransigent: where they were in the minority, they split the party rather than accept the decision of the majority; where they were in the majority, they split the trade unions rather than tolerate the presence in their midst of the Left minority.

In the ensuing years the Communists showed themselves Machiavellian and power-political and made a number of bad mistakes, summed up in their general subservience to the directives of the Comintern, which were not only amateurish in practice

but objectionable to most Frenchmen in principle. But they did fight. The Socialists on the other hand, retrieved some of their errors, benefited from those of the Communists and regained some of the ground lost after the first world war. But they were ultimately profiting by the success of Allied intervention in arresting the social revolution in Europe and reconsolidating Capitalism, for this favoured the Social Democratic strategy of shrinking from power and preferring to remain in perpetual opposition.

This state of affairs came to an end with the great slump. It did not hit France hard until about 1933. The resulting danger that discontented peasants and workers, who between them had a majority of votes, would use their democratic rights to return a government pledged to drastic social reforms, frightened the French bourgeoisie into attempting unconstitutional action. The noisy public Fascist movement of the Croix de Feu (Fiery Crosses), under Col. de la Roche, was accompanied by the dangerous and sinister secret conspiracy of the Cagoulaards or hooded men. Later investigations revealed the close connections between the conspirators and a number of senior army officers, as well as brought to light large stores of arms and munitions that had been smuggled in and paid for by the Hitler regime (with assistance from Mussolini's blackshirts) and 'salted down' in the cellars and vaults of the country houses of big businessmen and landed aristocrats.

French Fascism in alliance with the Royalists delivered a determined assault on the French Parliament in February 1934. The riot was carefully organised and nearly reached its objective. Prime Minister Daladier did not dare to call out the troops for he could not rely on the loyalty of all his officers.

The cry that the Republic was in danger was immediately raised from the Left. Under pressure from below, for the respective leaders of the Socialist and Communist Parties were none too eager, there were tremendous parades and demonstrations, showing the unity of the working class and the defenders of the Republic, and leading to the formation of the Popular Front of Radical Socialists, Socialists and Communists that won the 1936 election. The thrust from below for working class unity, in face of the menace of Fascism and foreign intervention, was strong enough to heal the breach in the trade union movement as well, by bringing the red C.G.T.U. into the fold of the C.G.T.

The next stage of the story was the sabotage of the Popular Front by a large-scale policy of passive obstruction by the

Capitalist classes: taxes were not paid. There was a deliberate and organised 'go slow' policy in production, and vast amounts of capital were smuggled abroad, mostly to Egypt, South America and the United States.

The Fascist assault on the Spanish Republic in 1936 gave the French Right exactly the opportunity it was looking for. The Fiery Crosses assumed the mantle of pacifism, howled for peace at any price and denounced the Left as bloodthirsty warmongers. The Fascist powers backed by the British Tory National Government threatened the Popular Front Government with dire consequences if they did not betray and abandon the Republican Government of Spain in its hour of need. The late Miss Ellen Wilkinson told me a revealing story at that time of her talk with M. Pierre Etienne Flandin, a leading French appeaser, who later sent Hitler a telegram congratulating him on Munich.

She found herself sitting next to M. Flandin at a dinner in Paris, on her way back from a visit to Spain, where the Republic was fighting for its life: 'France already has two Fascist potential enemies on her eastern and south-eastern frontiers. Surely, you do not want a third one on your southern frontier, M. Flandin?'

'Why not', replied M. Flandin airily, 'after all, that is the only way we can keep our workers in order'.

Under these pressures and threats, the French Socialist Party capitulated. It supported non-intervention, which it knew was wrong and shameful, because it did not dare to stand up to the foreign Fascist and British Tory bluff, aiding and abetting the threats from the French Right that they would 'go into the streets' if the Government acted in accordance with international law and the provisions of the Covenant. The result was the moral degeneration and political collapse of the Popular Front and the betrayal of Munich ('When', said M. Leon Blum, who to this day stoutly defends his adoption of the policy of non-intervention against Spain, he felt 'a shameful relief'. The French Socialist Party backed the Munich betrayal wholeheartedly, although shamefacedly).

The Communists had fought the good fight on all these issues right up to the outbreak of the war. They then committed the same fateful mistake as the Communists of Britain, namely followed the Comintern directive to regard the war as an 'Imperialist war' in which it did not matter which side won. They lost heavily in membership and popular support as a result of this attitude. But the harshness with which they were treated by

French reaction during the year of the phony war, when the Communists were outlawed, the Parliamentary immunity of their deputies was raised, they were flung into jail etc., gave them the prestige of martyrdom. After the Soviet Union entered the war, they threw themselves wholeheartedly into the resistance movement and more than redeemed themselves by their courage and leadership in that epic struggle, in which the Communist Party lost forty thousand dead.

The French Socialists on the other hand were correct in their initial support of the war. But when France collapsed, half the French Parliamentary Socialist Party at the historic session of both Houses of Parliament at Vichy voted for giving Marshal Pétain dictatorial powers to save the country by collaborating with the Germans. A large section of the party under M. Paul Faure, who had been violently anti-Communist pacifists and appeasers, turned into out-and-out collaborators and quislings. In the Trade Union movement the Right Wing leaders, MM. Belin, Dumoulin, Froideval, Delmar and Vigne, who had been violently anti-Communist and 'non-political' supporters of appeasement, also turned into collaborators and formed a phony 'corporate' Employers and Workers organisation on the model of the Nazi National Front, as part of the labour policy of the Vichy Government.

The Communists took the lead in forming an underground illegal trade union organisation which upon liberation became the nucleus of the new and united French T.U.C. (C.G.T.).

On liberation France presented the same pattern as other countries, namely a coalition of the parties that had held together in the resistance movement, the M.R.P. or Christian Democrats, the Socialists and the Communists, plus a diminished Radical Socialist Party under a new name, corresponding to the Liberal or professional and middle-class parties in other countries. The Communists and Socialists together had a comfortable majority in the French Parliament after the 1945 election.

But the Socialists rejected an alliance with the Communists, refused to govern without the M.R.P. and clung to General de Gaulle as long as they could. The result was to create a state of perpetual deadlock in the coalition government, as there were hardly any major issues on which the M.R.P., with its predominantly middle class, prosperous peasant and Catholic background could see eye to eye with the two secular working-class parties.

This policy led to steady losses in votes, membership and working-class support by the French Socialist Party. It became

more and more a party of the lower middle class – petty traders, artisans, clerks, employees, civil servants, teachers, etc. – and less and less a party of the trade unions and the workers. By 1949 it had since 1945 shrunk from half a million to less than 150,000 members, of whom only about one-fifth were workers, and had lost half its voters, having dropped from nearly one-third of the electorate to less than one-sixth.

The Communists on the other hand, although they committed mistakes of over-boldness and intransigence, steadily climbed to the position of the biggest party in the State, representing one-third of the electorate, 6 million votes (at the 1946 election nearly 190 M.P.s, which is about one-third of the whole French Parliament) and became as fully the party of the French workers and the trade unions as the Labour Party is the party of the British workers and trade unions.

Immediately after liberation the French people were in a condition of exhaustion and demoralisation. The urgency and magnitude of the problems to be solved were so appalling that there was a general mood of apathy and despair.

The Communists did a great deal at this crucial time to put heart into the French workers. They gave a militant lead through the trade unions in carrying out emergency and salvage work, repairing railway lines, rolling stock, locomotives, bridges, roads and factories, restarting production in the mines and so forth.

From there they went straight on to becoming the driving force behind reconstruction. In the *New York Herald Tribune* of July 1946 Mr Joseph Alsop gave his impressions of the situation in France, based on his own investigations on the spot.

French reconstruction, he explained, hinged on the Monnet plan, worked out by Jean Monnet (who was the first Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations and in charge of its Economic, Financial, Transport and Health organisations). The plan provided for a council composed of commissions for each of the key sectors of the French economy, such as mining, steel and so forth. On these commissions representatives of workers, owners and the Government (without the owners in the case of nationalised industries) conferred on the best methods of modernising plant and technique in their sectors and estimated their requirements of manpower and new investment. Investment was to be planned on a large scale over a period of years and financed partly by credits secured abroad, such as France's American loan, and by intensive exports.

'The key to the success of this plan to date, which has been considerable', writes Mr Alsop from Paris on July 12, 1946, 'is the enthusiastic collaboration of the French Communist Party. The Communists control the most important unions of the C.G.T., the great French confederation of labour unions. Communist leadership has been responsible for such surprising steps as acceptance by the key French unions of a kind of modified piecework system, by which a high output per worker is duly rewarded. Before initiating his plan, Jean Monnet discussed it with the leaders of the French Communist Party, and especially with the shrewd Billou, Minister of Reconstruction, and obtained assurances of help ...

Reconstruction comes first, is the party line. Communist labour leaders sit on the more important planning commissions, and the manpower and mining commissions are actually presided over by them.'

The next day Mr Alsop describes how the '200 families', that is the 'small closely knit French higher bourgeoisie' who throughout the Third Republic 'exercised a predominant, almost uninterrupted influence over the political life of France through their control of the banks, heavy industries and other sources of economic power', have been replaced in the nationalised coal industry by 'brisk, impressively intelligent French Communist labour leaders'. The Communists have replaced the '200 families' in control of the coal and electrical industries, the former through the direct action of the Communist Miners' Union immediately after liberation. They are also almost certain to control the electrical industry and have 'infiltrated the new national administration of the banks and the old railroad administration'.

They have eighty per cent control of the French T.U.C. and dominate the 'unions in mining, railways, steel and virtually all other heavy industries'. They have the largest women's organisation in France, a big veterans' organisation, and are receiving a heavy vote in country districts, besides controlling key posts in the Government. 'They have the most dynamic leaders in France, with the possible exception of General de Gaulle'. Party membership is just under 1,000,000 regular members and they have 'a huge war chest guessed at anywhere up to 10,000 million francs, captured from banks and other sources in the resistance period.'

A few days later, July 19, Mr Alsop says that the ultimate choice of the French people would appear to be between the Left led by the Communist Party and the Right led by General de Gaulle. 'It is becoming more and more clear that General de Gaulle is France's chief anti-Communist leader. He is reported

to be so convinced that war will come between the Soviet Union and the West that he is already studying the terrain of eastern Europe'.

On July 18 Mr Alsop discusses what he himself describes as decisive for the future:

The great political question in Europe to-day is whether the Communist parties in France and elsewhere have changed their character or only their spots. The test case is here in France. The French Communists have adopted an ultra-nationalist line on certain foreign questions, such as the future of Germany. They are co-operating valuably in the reconstruction of their war-torn country. When you visit their leaders, they disclaim any connection with a central party authority in Moscow, and assert that the Communist Party in France is purely national and purely French.

The future may well be decided by the truth or falsehood of these assertions. As your correspondent has previously reported, the Communists are the most dynamic and best organised of the French parties. They already hold the 'levers of command' in so many vital sectors of the national economic and political life that their power would not be greatly diminished by a temporary electoral set-back. If they are truly French, first, last and always, their strategic political position will not prevent the evolution of France as an integral part of the Western world. If, however, they have only changed their spots, and beneath those spots remain faithful members of a close-knit international party dictatorially directed from Moscow, their power has an obviously different meaning.

In conversation with a long series of M.R.P., Socialist and other non-Communist leaders, Mr Alsop testifies, he was generally given the answer that the Communists, by appealing to the electorate in terms of French national interests and the interests of the peasants and workers and others whom they addressed, would ultimately become committed to and prisoners of their own propaganda, and that when they assumed the chief place in the Government on the basis of their election platform, would 'remain faithful to their platform rather than to their training as orthodox Communists'.

'These ideas', he adds, 'are shared by the industrialists working with the Communists on French reconstruction. Both non-Communist politicians and industrialists are, in fact, doing everything they can to encourage their Communist colleagues to accept full political naturalisation. They believe, entirely soundly, that it will no longer be necessary to worry about the Communists if large numbers of them can be induced to become mere members of the purely French political Left Wing. They hope, rather against hope it must be said, that this can be done.'

Mr Alsop himself opts for the 'changing spots but not character' theory, on the ground principally that the Communist press is bitterly anti-American and that the French Communist Party opposed resistance to Germany until the U.S.S.R. was attacked. He says one must be pretty simple-minded to suppose that 'they have now become pure nationalists as a result of their fine subsequent struggle'.

In his final article, however, Mr Alsop unconsciously sheds light on what appears to him the mystery of the anti-American attitude of French and other European Communists.

'As the conclusion of this series of reports on France', he points out, 'it is necessary to state an unpleasant truth. France is one of the main cockpits in which the Western and Soviet systems are testing strengths all over the world. The contestants here are the Communists on the one hand, and the non-Communist parties, chiefly the M.R.P. and the Socialists, on the other. But, like boxers in a ring, the French contestants also have their foreign backers - for the Communists, the Soviet Union, and, for the non-Communists, the United States, Britain, and other lesser Western powers.'

He then depicts the situation in terms of the Anglo-American combination as a sort of Siamese twin Western heavy weight pitted against the Soviet Union, and urges the United States 'to employ all its economic and other resources to support the non-Communist Social Democratic forces here in France and elsewhere in Europe', so that the mass of the people should gradually regain faith 'in the Western system's ability to fill their bellies as well as give them individual freedom ... When that faith returned to the whole mass of the people the contest in France as well as elsewhere would be decided in favour of the West and against the Soviet Union. The responsibility belongs to us, because no other nation in the Western system has the resources to do the job'.

The United States has since followed the course indicated with a vengeance. But it does not of course support Social Democratic Parties, except in so far as they are content to abandon the cause of the workers, join Capitalist coalitions and support them in a policy of restoring capitalism and preparing for war against the Soviet Union, with the United States as pay and task master for both enterprises.

U.S. intervention in Italy was accompanied by similar intervention in France. As early as May 10, 1947, the *News Chronicle* carried the report from its New York correspondent, Mr Stuart Gelder, that:

America is preparing plans to help France to stop the growth of Communism, as part of a world-wide policy of resisting it wherever it has prospects of gaining control of Governments.

This means that America has decided ... that even where there is no question of Russian pressure, as in the case of France, Communism must be avoided at all costs.

There is as yet no clearly drawn scheme for help to France, but I am informed on high authority that the State Department policy is that 'it is in the interests of America to see the establishment of an independent democratic moderate Government in France.'

It was expected that very substantial aid would have to be given during the next two years.

This decision means that even if the French people decided to elect a Communist majority under the present French Constitution, the American State Department would not regard this as democratic government, nor France as an independent country.

In short, the State Department's view is that countries are democratic and independent only when they have Governments made to order for the State Department. The story of how this view was applied to France is told by the Alsop Brothers in the *Saturday Evening Post* article of February 21, 1948, already quoted.

The French Communists were pushed out of the governing coalition (on the double issue of opposing an anti-strike law and the continuation of the colonial war in Indo-China) as a condition for receiving American aid, after a visit of M. Leon Blum to the U.S. to negotiate a loan, following a period of 'frantic telegrams to Washington from the Paris Embassy'. The resulting monopoly of power for the parties of the propertied classes (including the French Socialist Party, who had become the equivalent of Ramsay MacDonald's National Labour Party of unsainted memory) was used to drop social reforms and the collection of income tax, to end rationing and price controls for all practical purposes and to allow the rich to do themselves proud on the black or 'free' market while the workers saw their real wages going down and down.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

While these policies were developing in Eastern, Southern and Western Europe in application of the Truman Doctrine, Secretary of State Marshall made a speech at Harvard, throwing out the idea that the United States wished to contribute economic aid without political or military strings to any and all countries in need of American assistance. This was immediately taken up by Mr Bevin and the French Government.

In his speech Mr Marshall had seemed to imply that only Western Europe was being considered for this aid but on being asked in a Press Conference, whether the Soviet Union was included, he said anyone was welcome who wished to co-operate. A fortnight later, in a speech to a conference of State Governors, he made it quite clear that economic aid to Western Europe would in fact be provided subject to the political directives of the Truman doctrine.

The Soviet Union was nevertheless invited to the conference in Paris where the British, French and American Governments, after preliminary discussions to which the Russians were not invited, declared their agreement with what were, in effect, the American proposals.

The Russians turned up in force at Paris: M. Molotov arrived at the head of a delegation of sixty members. But he decided after only three days' discussions that he was not really wanted and the conference ended with the Western Powers agreeing on a plan rejected by the Russians.

The issue was twofold: in the first place, the Soviet proposal was that information should be gathered about the national plans of European countries and about what those plans called for in the shape of goods or credits from outside. These data and requirements were then to be added together and presented to the United States as the aggregate demands of Europe for American assistance.

The Anglo-French proposals on the other hand, which had had the preliminary blessing of the United States, called for the gathering of information on the assets and requirements in food, agriculture, coal and other forms of fuel and power, iron and steel and transport, with the object of gathering the data necessary to frame a Four Year Programme of European recovery. This programme should state '(a) To what extent it can be achieved by increasing the production of European countries themselves and by the interchange of available resources between them. (b) What external assistance the European countries require'.

The difference between this proposal and that of the Soviet Union was more apparent than real. For the national plans of the East European countries in fact include programmes for raising production, increasing exports and imports, concluding commercial treaties and co-ordinating the national plans of a number of countries. Consequently, gathering the information which the Soviet Government proposed should be collected

would in fact result in providing and even assembling and collating the very data required for framing the Four Year Programme of European recovery, that were asked for in the Anglo-French proposals.

The gap was still further narrowed by M. Molotov's explanation that the Soviet Government wanted 'co-operation based on the development of political and economic relations between States possessing equal rights' and that it favoured 'the fullest development of economic collaboration between European and other countries on a healthy basis of equality and mutual respect for national interests'. The difference all but vanished when the Soviet *New Times*, in a semi-official commentary on the Soviet proposals, said they meant that a co-ordinated programme should be drafted, based on the plans and the estimated needs of the European States.

The real stumbling block was the question of the body to be entrusted with the carrying out of the work of co-ordinating national economic plans and collecting and assembling the data required for drawing up a European Recovery Programme. The Anglo-French plans proposed setting up a brand new body which was to consist of a Steering Committee composed of the three leading European powers and a small number of other States. In the words of the British plan: 'The Steering Committee will, as suggested by Mr Marshall, seek the friendly aid of the United States in the drafting of the programme'.

This proposal was strongly objected to by the Soviet Government as constituting an attempt by the Western great powers, acting in conjunction with the United States, to impose their will and in particular to impose the policies of the United States on the Continent. It was on this issue that the break came.

The Soviet Government did not clearly propose and tenaciously argue for any detailed positive alternative. For a short time they tentatively suggested, as was mentioned in the Soviet Press, that the European Economic Commission to the United Nations should be the body to be entrusted with this task. The suggestion was only half-hearted and promptly dropped when the idea was opposed by the British Delegation.

The fact is that the Soviet Government had made the same objection to the European Economic Commission of the United Nations when it was set up as they did in Paris to the machinery of the Marshall Plan. The Poles, on whose initiative the UNEEC had been created, were told that it would be used by the United States and Britain to impose their economic policies on Europe,

as they would command a majority. To this the Poles replied that: (a) if there was no UNEEC, Anglo-American economic policy would be imposed on Europe anyway, without Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. even having a voice in the matter; (b) it was not true that the West would have a majority in the UNEEC. The Eastern and Western groups were so evenly balanced that the casting vote would lie with the Scandinavians, the leader of which, Sweden, had very important economic relations with the Soviet Union and Poland as well as with the West. When Roumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary and Finland came into the United Nations and its EEC, the Eastern group would actually outnumber the West. The Russians yielded to these arguments and the vigorous Polish representations in Moscow that they must not be let down. But they were evidently not convinced.

The Soviet view about the embryonic Marshall Plan was in short that the American and British Governments had made up their minds to go through with the policy of dividing Europe; that invitations to the Russians were a mere insincere afterthought and no American money would be forthcoming in any circumstances for the Soviet Union – nor for the East European States, except on condition they joined the Western camp against the U.S.S.R. – and that therefore there was not much use putting up a fight in Paris. This view appears to have been taken after M. Molotov had brought his large delegation to Paris, which he would hardly have done unless he expected to achieve something.

In a speech in the House on July 10, 1947 I appealed to the Government not to give up the attempt to bring in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, because their co-operation was essential and the differences revealed at Paris could be overcome if we genuinely wished to do so. In this speech, as in subsequent speeches, both in the House and in the country, I deplored the Soviet decision, which I believe to be one of the historic mistakes of Soviet foreign policy and due once again to the inveterate Soviet tendency to think solely in terms of governments and Foreign Offices and to ignore the imponderable of public opinion. But at the same time I regretted profoundly that the British Delegation had seen fit

to oppose the idea that we should have recourse to the European Economic Commission of the United Nations, because if we had accepted that proposal I think we would have been on the way to solving the chief difficulty that caused the breakdown. I believe our

refusal to entertain the idea of using the European Economic Commission of the United Nations has left us with some share of the responsibility for the breakdown of the proceedings in Paris. After all, we are pledged to base our policy on the United Nations. After all, the European Economic Commission of the United Nations was established only four months ago, after long and laborious negotiations, and its task, in the terms of its constitution, is:

‘To initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic reconstruction of Europe, for raising the level of European economic activities, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of the European countries both among themselves and with other countries of the world.’

In addition, the Commission is to make or sponsor such economic investigations within European countries, or within Europe in general, as it may deem appropriate. The Commission is composed of all the 17 European members of the United Nations, including the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia, whose co-operation we have temporarily lost. It also has the right to invite European non-member states of the United Nations to take part in its work – such as, for instance, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, not all of whom are likely to come to the conference in Paris, more is the pity. The field of action of the Commission is the whole of Europe including, specifically, Germany.

The Commission has already begun to gather and to analyse data precisely of the type called for both by the Soviet and by the Anglo-French proposals. The Commission has the right to appoint sub-committees and already there is a coal sub-committee and a transport sub-committee which have acquired considerable experience, as they pre-existed the Commission. The Commission absorbed these bodies. It has worked out its relations with the Food and Agriculture Organisation, with the International Development Bank, and with other specialised agencies of the United Nations. It is, of course, also in relations with its parent body, the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations. It has a secretariat of international officials which forms part of the general Secretariat of the United Nations and it can draw on the general Secretariat for information, for documents, for additional personnel with expert knowledge, and so on. In every way, so far as I can see, the European Economic Commission is an instrument admirably fitted to carry out the work for which it was designed.

I would address to the Government the old familiar question, ‘Why bark when you keep a dog?’ I do not understand why we have not attempted to use the European Economic Commission, having taken all the trouble to set it up, and being under an obligation to use it as a loyal member of the United Nations.

Once the Russians were out, of course, the other East European States would not come into the plan. It had become in their

eyes a political wedge that the West wished to drive between them and the Soviet Union. The revolutionary regimes of Eastern Europe needed no prompting or pressure from Moscow to take the view, which they did as a matter of vital national interest, that they must not in any circumstances be separated from their only reliable friend and ally, the U.S.S.R. For by this time the United States and Britain were regarded, in the light of their policies in Greece and Eastern Europe, as, to say the least of it, doubtful friends and ambivalent allies.

THE COMINFORM

By the same token, the formation of the Cominform in October 1947, was a measure of retaliation and self-defence against what was regarded by the great working-class parties of France, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe as preparations for an all-out assault on them and on the independence of their countries. For whereas the Marshall Plan was at first regarded by American, British and West European Liberals and optimists as a constructive and non-political alternative to the Truman Doctrine, these parties came to the conclusion, soon after the Paris fiasco, that it was a further extension and development of American anti-Communist intervention and anti-Soviet power politics, as initiated by President Truman in March 1947.

When the Marshall Plan was first announced, Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communist Party, had welcomed the scheme and said Italy needed and would take aid from any quarter. The French Communist Party's initial attitude too was cautious rather than hostile.

As the French, Italian and other Communist parties saw it, they were driven into opposition in self-defence against the manifest hostility of the West. They had not, to begin with, been hostile to the Marshall Plan. But they very soon came to the conclusion that the Marshall Plan was inspired by hostility to them. Their decision, be it right or wrong or mixed, was certainly arrived at on their own judgement of what the situation called for, and not on orders from Moscow.

It may be argued that if the Soviet attitude had been more constructive and less suspicious the outcome of the Paris Conference might have been different. If so, however, in the light of the course of Anglo-American policy as described in previous chapters and of the discussions in Congress on the Marshall Plan, it is most improbable that any American money would

have been voted. The plan, as understood and applied by the State Department, was from the outset a development of the American policy of anti-Communist intervention, first officially proclaimed in the Truman Doctrine. President Truman himself, in his message to Congress presenting the plan, emphasized that it was a 'major segment' of American foreign policy and must be applied in conformity with the aims, strategy and tactics of the State Department. Secretary of State Marshall made the same point in his explanations to Congress.

At the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in Warsaw, Zhukov in a violently-worded report for the Soviet Communist Party denounced the power politics and intervention of the U.S.A. and Britain, and condemned as traitors the Right-Wing Socialist leaders who were joining with the Capitalists and Interventionists against the workers. He pledged the nine Communist parties constituting the Cominform to combat the alleged attempts through the Marshall Plan to subvert the independence of their countries.

But he exempted the great majority of the Socialists of the West from the charges made against their Right-Wing leaders; reiterated the desire of the Communist Parties to whom he was speaking to co-operate with all Democratic and anti-Fascist forces, and concluded by stressing that they would welcome economic aid from the United States or anyone else to help in building up and developing their countries, provided such aid was given without any political or military axe to grind.

GERMANY

Meanwhile the situation in Germany had been going from bad to worse. General de Gaulle had originally prevented the carrying out of the Potsdam Conference policy of uniting Germany, as was admitted by Mr Bevin in the House on October 27, 1947, during the crucial period when the situation was still fluid enough and the reserves of mutual good will in the peoples that had won the war together still sufficiently large to have brought off a settlement, if it had not been for his intervention.

The result was to allow Western and Eastern Germany to harden into different patterns. The Soviet Union stimulated and promoted the movement for working-class unity that had spontaneously begun during and immediately after the war. It allowed the Left-Centre Coalition Government to go ahead and nationalise some sixty per cent of German industry in the Soviet zone. It encouraged it to carry out a great land reform, dividing

up the estates of the Junkers and settling three million peasants on the land, mostly refugees from the parts of Germany that went to Poland and the U.S.S.R. It carried out its bargain with the Western Allies to provide certain quantities of food and raw materials in exchange for products from Western Germany lacking in the Eastern zone. But it also adopted a policy of large-scale reparations from current production in the Soviet zone on the ground that they were bitterly needed and that the Western Allies were, in fact, under a variety of legal subterfuges, doing the same thing on a smaller scale.

Meanwhile the split between East and West deepened. In the resulting tension, the Soviet zone regime tended to become more and more dominated by the Socialist Unity Party which, in its turn, approximated more and more to straight Communism and looked less and less like a genuine fusion of the two working-class parties; whereas in the West, as American influence grew after the Labour Government muffed its opportunities to carry out a Socialist policy, British support of Right-Wing Social Democrats, who put anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism before the fight for Socialism in their zone, passed over into growing Anglo-American support for the Christian Democrats. Within that party power passed to its Right Wing which, on the old familiar pattern, was more and more heavily infiltrated by the representatives of impenitent German big business and Junkerdom, as well as near-Nazis and former members of the Nationalist and other Right Wing parties.

As early as January 1947 Mr John Foster Dulles, in a speech in New York, had pleaded strongly for a policy of all-in anti-Communist intervention which would revive heavy industry under private ownership in Western Germany and Japan as the bastions and outposts of American economic and military power. This policy had been taken over from ex-President Hoover, who, in an open letter, had urged it strongly as early as the end of 1946. The matter was carried further in a report of the International Economic Relations Sub-Committee of the Foreign Policy Committee of the House of Representatives, which endorsed ex-President Hoover's recommendations. In his book *Speaking Frankly* ex-Secretary of State Byrnes also pleaded for the splitting of Germany and the conclusion of a separate peace with Western Germany, to be followed by an ultimatum to Moscow to evacuate Eastern Germany, on the ground that the Russians were in no condition to fight and would therefore go quietly. (The *London Times*, commenting editorially on this

proposal, said it was nothing more nor less than a recipe for starting a third world war.)

During the summer and autumn of 1947 American pressure and propaganda, seconded and echoed by the British Conservative Party and Press, for going ahead with this policy, became stronger and stronger. So far had American plans advanced that banknotes for a separate West German State were printed and held in reserve.

Mr Bevin resisted this pressure for months. On April 25, 1947, in the course of a press statement, he said that: 'H.M. Government cannot allow the development of Germany, coupled with this question of reparations, in such a way that loans from outside are involved as after the last war. Then the result of it was the creation of a war potential for the second world war.' As late as October 27, 1947 he told the House of Commons that 'reference has been made to linking Germany with the Marshall Plan. May I say that nothing would have been more fatal to the Marshall Plan itself than to have done that. Hon. Members forget that it would have created a situation in Eastern Europe far worse than the present situation. Poland would have said and rightly said "You are taking Germany and putting her ahead of all those who fought against her, and placing Germany in a preferential position". I really cannot ignore the opinions of other countries.

'If one has sat in conferences and listened to ... the real feeling of those countries in Europe, one realises that in dealing with Germany it is useless not to take them into account when arriving at conclusions.'

But his resistance steadily weakened, for his all-in anti-Sovietism carried with it as a logical corollary total dependence on the United States. The American Delegation arrived at the December 1947 Conference of Foreign Ministers, where the final break occurred, with a cut-and-dried scheme for provoking a split. They were imprudent enough to confide it on arrival to the American correspondents attending the meeting. They reckoned that opposition to any further reparation payments by Germany would be an issue which would make the U.S.A. popular in Germany and that the Russian insistence on reparations would put them in the wrong. That was the issue they had picked beforehand as the one on which to force a break.

And this in fact was what happened, although here again, as on other occasions, Soviet policy was, to say the least of it, neither adroit nor helpful. However, Mr Molotov did, on the

specific issue on which the break occurred, make proposals which should have obviated the break if there had been a reasonable minimum of goodwill and statesmanship on the Anglo-American side: he proposed a moratorium on reparations until German industrial production had reached seventy per cent of pre-war. This, he pointed out, was all of pre-war industrial production that went to civilian purposes in Nazi Germany, for 30 per cent of industrial production had been devoted by Hitler to preparing for war. After this point had been reached, industrial production should still be allowed to expand, but a percentage out of current production for a limited number of years, say 10 per cent for 10 years, should be set aside for reparations. That offer should have been made a basis for discussion and not the occasion for a break. The deadlock about which came first, full information about what the Russians had already taken by way of reparations, or agreement on a scheme for further reparations, could equally well have been solved with more statesmanship and good will on either side.

By December Mr Bevin's October stand had been abandoned. He had gone so far indeed in subservience to the United States that, when Mr Molotov said yes to a British proposal at the conference, making a tentative and timid approach to setting up some kind of shadowy central financial and administrative agencies for Germany, and Mr Marshall said no, Mr Bevin, when his turn came to reply, turned down his own proposal in order to join Mr Marshall against Mr Molotov.

THE U.S. POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERVENTION

By the summer of 1947 it had become clear that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were only fragments and outward manifestations of a wide and coherent foreign and defence policy. This policy was the work of a small group of able men representing broadly the 'forward school' in the Defence and State Departments, plus the big industrialists, interested in expanding U.S. foreign trade, markets and concessions, and in bumping up rearmament. Their influence made itself felt through an official Committee concerned with industrial defence and economic mobilisation that is represented, together with the Departments mentioned, on the National Security Council. This policy is the chart and course along which the plunging and veering American ship of State is being steered through the stormy post-war seas by those who guide the hands of the little man at the helm.

The outline of this policy, and the view of what is happening in the world on which it is based, appeared under the signature 'X' in the American quarterly *Foreign Affairs* of July 1947 in an article entitled 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct'. 'X' was almost immediately identified by the American Press as Mr George F. Kennan, who, after a tour of duty at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, had been appointed by Secretary of State Marshall to be the Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State and its representative on the National Security Council.

'The attribution was not denied. After that Mr X's article was no longer just one more report on the Soviet regime and what to do about it. It was an event, announcing that the Department of State had made up its mind (at least as of March 15 approximately) and was prepared to disclose to the American people, to the world at large, and of course also to the Kremlin the estimates, the calculations, and the conclusions on which the Department was basing its plans.

'Mr X's article is, therefore, not only an analytical interpretation of the sources of Soviet conduct. It is also a document of primary importance on the sources of American foreign policy – of at least that part of it which is known as the Truman Doctrine.'

Mr Walter Lippmann, from whose book *The Cold War* this comment is taken, may be regarded as a reliable judge of the importance to be attached to Mr George F. Kennan's exposition of American foreign and defence policy. Mr Kennan is a graduate of the famous Jesuit College of international relations at Georgetown. He is a Roman Catholic of the same Right Wing political school as the United States Chief Adviser in Germany, Robert Murphy, who sprang into ill fame as the all-in appeaser of Pétain, Weygand and Darlan during the Vichy regime and its aftermath in North Africa. He proceeds in his article to lay down a series of premises from which he unflinchingly draws the political conclusions that are in point of fact being acted upon by the United States to the increasing jeopardy of world peace:

Innate antagonism between Capitalism and Socialism, he asserts is the concept 'embedded in the foundations of Soviet Power'. This means that 'there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the Capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls ...

Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be

no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when ... backed up by facts of unchallengeable validity.

At the same time the Russians are cold-blooded, cautious, circumspect, flexible and guileful in their realistic policy, and have no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. They are 'more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power,' than most countries. But they are not easily discouraged.

The United States must therefore 'continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and Capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and all rival power'.

To meet this situation, the United States must 'embark on a policy of long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies ... designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world'.

Mr Kennan is at pains to deny that the possibilities of this policy are 'limited to holding the line and hoping for the best'. For the result of thus frustrating and checkmating Soviet initiatives, policies and purposes all around the frontiers of the Soviet Union would, he says, be to make the aims of Russian Communism 'appear sterile and quixotic', thus causing the hopes and enthusiasms of Moscow's supporters to wane, adding to the strain imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policy, and showing the peoples of the world that the United States is a country that knows what it wants and is

coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with its responsibilities as a world power ...

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behaviour unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this

way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet Power ...

Soviet power ... bears within itself the seeds of its own decay. The sprouting of these seeds is well advanced; if anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and the efficacy of the Party as a political instrument Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies ... Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential ... This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved.

Mr Lippmann subjects this policy of what he calls 'Cold War' to a deadly criticism, all the more valuable because he shares the fundamental premise that we cannot do business with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of common interests and purposes and that 'Soviet power will expand unless it is prevented from expanding because it is confronted with power, primarily American power, that it must respect'.

The context makes it clear that Mr Lippmann, like Mr Kennan, confuses Soviet power with the advance of Socialism and that what American power (plus subservient British and West European power) is to be mobilised to stop is the processes of social change and social revolution that are threatening the Capitalist social order all over the world. His objection therefore is to the strategy and not to the intellectual and moral foundations of the American Cold War as preached by Mr Kennan and practised by the United States.

It means, he points out, since the U.S.A. cannot herself keep vast land armies in the field unless the American Constitution and social set-up are drastically changed, that the counter-forces required by U.S. policy

have to be composed of Chinese, Afghans, Iranians, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Greeks, Italians, Austrians, of anti-Soviet Poles, Czechoslovaks, Bulgars, Yugoslavs, Albanians, Hungarians, Finns and Germans. The policy can be implemented only by recruiting, subsidising and supporting a heterogeneous array of satellites, clients, dependents and puppets. The instrument of the policy of containment is therefore a coalition of disorganised, disunited, feeble or disorderly nations, tribes and factions around the perimeter of the Soviet Union.

He fears that the Soviet Union may appeal to the peoples of the countries pressed into American service, over the heads of their subsidised governments, with disastrous results. Moreover, satellite States and puppet governments are not good material out of which to construct unassailable barriers. A diplomatic war con-

ducted as this policy demands, that is to say conducted indirectly, means that we must stake our own security and the peace of the world upon satellites, puppets, clients, agents about whom we can know very little. Frequently they will act for their own reasons, and on their own judgements, presenting us with accomplished facts that we did not intend, and with crises for which we are unready. The unassailable barriers will present us with an unending series of insoluble dilemmas. We shall have either to disown our puppets, which would be tantamount to appeasement and defeat and the loss of face, or must support them at an incalculable cost on an unintended, unforeseen and perhaps undesirable issue.

The serious thing is that the very policy so unanswerably condemned by Mr Lippmann is nevertheless the policy that has been officially adopted by the United States and which the American strategic plan, including militarised Western Union and the North Atlantic Pact, is intended to subserve. American policy in China, Persia, the Arab States, Turkey and Greece is precisely the policy adumbrated by Mr Kennan and described by Mr Lippmann. It means subsidising and arming Fascist or feudal regimes, tyrannous, corrupt, anti-social and oppressive to a horrifying degree, against their increasingly refractory peoples. Attempts are even being made to press Pakistan and India into the service of this policy.

It was given definite shape in the Truman Doctrine proclaimed on March 7, 1947 (three days after Mr Churchill's speech at Fulton, with President Truman on the platform, proclaiming the same policy). It was applied to Greece on March 12th of that year. It was expanded, stepped up and applied to Western Europe and Italy in President Truman's message to Congress of March 18, 1948, discussed in the next chapter.

As this policy with its attendant plans and pacts, rearmament and military aid, is taking shape in Western Europe, it bears out Mr Lippmann's further remark that:

The failure of our diplomatic campaign in the borderlands, on which we have staked so much too much, has conjured up the spectre of a third world war. The threat of a Russian-American war, arising out of the conflict in the borderlands, is dissolving the natural alliance of the Atlantic community. For the British, the French, and all the other Europeans see that they are placed between the hammer and the anvil. They realise, even if we do not realise it, that the policy of containment, in the hope that the Soviet power will collapse by frustration, cannot be enforced and cannot be administered successfully, and that it must fail. Either Russia will burst through the barriers which are supposed to contain her, and

all of Europe will be at her mercy, or, at some point and at some time, the diplomatic war will become a full-scale shooting war. In either event Europe is lost. Either Europe falls under the domination of Russia, or Europe becomes the battlefield of a Russian-American war.

Because the policy of containment offers these intolerable alternatives to our old allies, the real aim of every European nation, including Great Britain, is to extricate itself from the Russian-American conflict. While we have been devoting our energies to lining up and bolstering up the Chinese Nationalists, the Iranians, the Turks, the Greek Monarchists and Conservatives, the anti-Soviet Hungarians, Rumanians and Poles, the natural alignment of the British, French, Belgian, Dutch, Swiss and Scandinavians has been weakened.

And so in any prudent estimate of our world position they are no longer to be counted upon as firm members of a coalition led by the United States against the Soviet Union. We must not deceive ourselves by supposing that we stand at the head of a world-wide coalition of democratic States in our conflict with the Soviet Union.

The aim of the leading democratic States of Europe and probably also of the Americas is at best to hold the balance of power between Russia and America, and thus to become mediators of that conflict. At worst, their aim is to isolate themselves in some kind of neutrality which will spare them the dual catastrophe of being overrun by the Red Army and bombed by the American air forces ...

They are alienated also by the fact that they do not wish to become, like the nations of the perimeter, the clients of the United States, in whose affairs we intervene, asking as the price of our support that they take the directives of their own policy from Washington. They are alienated above all by the prospect of war, which could break out by design or accident, by miscalculation or provocation, if at any of these constantly shifting geographical and political points the Russians or Americans became so deeply engaged that no retreat or compromise was possible. In this war their lands would be the battlefield. Their peoples would be divided by civil conflict. Their cities and their fields would be the bases and bridgeheads in a total war which, because it would merge into a general civil war, would be as indecisive as it was savage.

CHAPTER VIII

The U.S. Prepares for War

(1948 - ?)

IN 1948 the vicious circle began to revolve in earnest. On the one hand the U.S. launched a huge rearmament programme, extended the Truman doctrine to cover anti-Communist intervention anywhere and everywhere, 'stepped-up' intervention in Greece, began to foment counter-revolutionary unrest and violence in Eastern Europe, to restore Capitalism in and militarise Western Europe, and provoked a crisis over Berlin.

On the other hand the governments and working classes that were the objects of these attentions grew tougher and more extreme under such treatment, met the U.S.A. half-way in playing it rough, and began to lose hope of being able to compromise and co-operate with the powers that be in the West.

PLAN X AND POLITICAL FREEDOM IN EASTERN EUROPE

Senator Bridges introduced a resolution into the Senate proposing that the United States should contribute money and arms to underground fighters resisting the East European regimes. The American press has been quite frank about it that late in 1947 or early in 1948 an organisation, the so-called 'Plan X', was actually set up, much on the lines demanded by Mr John Foster Dulles, one of the chief architects and agents of the present 'bi-partisan' foreign policy of the United States. Addressing the Bond Club at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, in May 1948 Mr Dulles called for a 'non-military defence organisation' in Europe, headed by a special American Government officer, and acting in effect as a branch of the E.C.A., for which the West European nations receiving American aid under E.C.A. should be called upon to pay. Mr Dulles' brother Alan, who was a high official in the Office of Strategic Services during the war, was then sent to Europe to organise 'Plan X'.

The *U.S. News*, an outspoken organ of American big business, published a feature article on the plan under which 'strong-arm quads would be formed under American guidance' and 'assas-

sination of key Communists would be encouraged'. The various spy and conspiracy trials in East European countries, although invariably treated by the Anglo-American press as being instances of tyranny and oppression against democrats and fighters for freedom, have in fact unearthed an impressive amount of evidence of spying, smuggling and passport forgery, illegal radio stations, rumour factories, 'black' propaganda, gun and explosive running, provocation, sabotage and murder.

Mr Hanson W. Baldwin, the military critic of the *New York Times* complained of the indiscreet and clumsy way in which 'young and exuberant Intelligence Officers' made contacts 'almost openly with anti-Communist leaders in Rumania' and 'to impress their superiors' kept written records of their subversive discussions. The activities of American Intelligence Officers have indeed been clumsy and indiscreet, but have gone far beyond mere discussions with whatever 'anti-Communists' they could find to work for them. American sponsored 'anti-Communists' in Yugoslavia, for instance, as the Zagreb trial in the summer of 1948 revealed, included known Fascists, in this case former members of the hated Pavelich quisling government, with evil records of tortures and killings, sent in by the U.S. Army command in Germany equipped with radio senders and plenty of money.

These activities have been the logical development of Anglo-American anti-Communist intervention in Eastern Europe described in previous chapters. But the effect on the East European regimes was naturally to create the atmosphere of a state of siege, to make all forms of opposition suspect, to frustrate the attempts of Social Democrats and more moderate Communists to 'liberalise' the regimes, amnesty political prisoners, etc., and to provide extremists, who wanted a tough policy and a free hand for the secret police, with unanswerable arguments.

These developments have led to a steady tightening in the East European regimes. Whereas in the first year or two after liberation they had proceeded on the assumption that the process of transition from Capitalism to Socialism could take place by peaceful and constitutional means and there could be a wide measure of democracy and civil liberty as soon as the initial stage of reconstruction had been passed and the new social and economic order was successful enough to enlist the loyalty of the great majority, it was now felt that there was no middle road between the Russian Revolution and aggressive interventionist

Western Capitalism. The position of the East European Social Democratic parties became steadily more difficult.

As early as October 23, 1946 I pointed out in the House that 'there are three major factors to consider - American Capitalism, European Socialism and Russian Communism. If we go with American Capitalism against European Socialism we shall throw the latter into the arms of Soviet Communism.' That was the position as the East European Socialist parties saw it after they had been banned by bell, book and candle by the West European Social Democratic parties, led by the British Labour Party. The East Europeans regarded these parties as traitors who had thrown in their lot with the capitalists of their countries by accepting junior partnership in capitalist coalitions and/or climbing on the band wagon of American intervention.

Fusion between the Socialist and Communist parties had always been regarded as the logical outcome of the co-operation between the two that had begun in these countries in the war-time resistance movements, or against the pre-war near-Fascist dictatorships, and that continued after liberation. But the Socialists had hoped that this would come gradually, in the context of establishing democracy as well as Socialism in their countries, and in co-operation with Western Social Democratic parties as well as with their own Communist parties, in a world where the great powers were pulling together and not lined up in rival camps.

This was not to be. The conclusion drawn by the Socialists as well as the Communists in these countries was that they must, because of the attitude of the West and the growing danger of sabotage and intervention, hasten to complete the process of social revolution even if this meant more resolute government and a more acute class struggle than had seemed either desirable or necessary in 1945-46. At the same time full working-class unity must be created by the fusion of Socialists and Communists into single working-class parties, accepting the Marxist-Leninist analysis of society and being guided by the lessons in strategy and tactics derived from a study of the Russian Revolution and of events in Europe between the wars and after the second world war.

THE COMINFORM V. TITO

Somewhere in the course of the discussions between the Cominform countries that accompanied the process of speeding up the social revolution, drawing closer together, co-ordinating

policies for nationalising most of what was left of private industry and trade and encouraging the spread of consumers' and producers' Co-operatives among the peasantry, the Yugoslav Communist Party disagreed with the rest. Both sides regard the matter as an issue of principle: the Cominform parties say it is a matter of principle not to challenge Soviet leadership or to get out of step with the group of Socialist States in the present international situation, although privately many of them profess sympathy and agreement with the 'right of self-determination' on which the Yugoslavs have taken their stand.

The Yugoslav view is that Socialist States must co-operate closely and fraternally and not insist on sovereignty as do capitalist States. But this relationship must be based on equality and reciprocity and not on the majority imposing its will on the minority, even if that majority is dominated by the Soviet Union, to which the Yugoslavs acknowledge their great indebtedness and which they continue to regard as their big Slav brother.

The issue of principle underlay a number of drastic criticisms made by the Cominform against the way in which the Yugoslav Communist Party conducted its internal affairs. It was accused of running the Party as a secret conspiracy instead of openly; of lack of democracy within the Party; of giving the peasants their head as practically the ruling class instead of laying emphasis on the leading part that should be played by the workers; of having bitten off more than it could chew in the Five Year Plan, etc., etc. The Yugoslavs, while stoutly rejecting all these criticisms, have in fact shaped their policy on several of the points mentioned in ways that went a long way to meet the objections that had been raised.

Nevertheless drastic and increasing measures of economic pressure are being applied by Yugoslavia's neighbours, relations have grown worse and the conflict seems likely to drag on for a long time. The Yugoslav Government are accused of joining 'the Imperialist camp', and retort that nothing could induce them to leave the Socialist camp, but that if they are boycotted by the Socialist States they must trade with the West to live.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The position of Czechoslovakia became unbearably anomalous and painful in the situation created by the growing tension between East and West. The Czechs were the only country in the Socialist group that had attained Western standards of Parliamentary democracy and civil liberty before the war. This was

ultimately due to the fact that the Czechs emerged from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire after the first world war as a modern community, with a well-developed industrial and trading middle class experienced in self-government and democratic Parliamentary institutions. The amount of autonomy they had wrested from their Austrian masters stood them in good stead.

Their whole policy between the wars had been to co-operate and remain friends through the League of Nations with both France and Great Britain on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. But Czechoslovakia's devotion to democracy and freedom did not cause British or French Tories to hesitate for a single instant to sacrifice her to German Fascism at Munich. The Russians on the other hand offered to stand by the Czechs and fight, although they were not pledged to do so after the French had gone back on their treaty obligations as an ally.

The Czechs remembered this after liberation. Like other liberated countries they dealt faithfully with the big business men, bankers and landlords and their political representatives who had collaborated with the enemy. There was a further measure of land reform (much had been done after the first world war), some 80 per cent of industry was nationalised and the only parties legally recognised were those which had issued from the resistance movement.

These parties held an election in 1945 in which they fought as a coalition, each with its own list of candidates but all with the same programme and all pledged to co-operate as a coalition after the election (proportional representation made this procedure possible, which it would not be in this country). The election gave the Communists nearly 40 per cent of the total vote and made them the biggest party in the Czech Parliament. The Socialists had less than half the votes and M.P.s of the Communists and were increasingly based on the lower middle class rather than the workers. Together with the Communists they had a bare majority (51 per cent) in Parliament.

A Two Year Plan was adopted by all the parties in the Coalition and set in hand. Its principal author was the Economic Committee of the Communist Party.

The foreign policy of the new regime was to regard the Soviet Union as its ally and partner but to strive for friendly relations and the maximum of co-operation, both economic and political, with the Western powers. To the post-war Czechs the choice could never be between France and Britain on the one side and

the U.S.S.R. on the other. For if and when France and Britain fell out with the Soviet Union they would have to try to revive German economic and military might on their side, thereby recreating the threat to their existence which the Czechs and the Poles were determined to end for ever at the peace settlement.

After the second world war the Western allies, as has been indicated in the previous chapter, showed no more sympathy for Czechoslovakia because she was Parliamentary, democratic and free than they had done before the war or displayed toward the other Socialist States. In the eyes of the executors of British as well as U.S. foreign policy the preservation of democracy in Czechoslovakia was regarded as hardly, if at all, mitigating the offence of having introduced a good deal of Socialism.

The growing hostility of the British, French and American Governments to the new Czechoslovakia was paralleled by the efforts of Transport House and officious Labour M.P.s to induce the Czech Socialist Party to part company with the Communists. The result was to encourage the Right Wing of the Czech Socialist Party to attempt to split the Party at the Brno Conference in July 1947. They almost succeeded. This in turn led the non-Socialist parties in the Coalition to conceive the idea that they could win over the Right Wing of the Socialist Party and thereby have a majority against the Communists. At the same time they were convinced that if the elections were not held until the end of May, as had been agreed in the Coalition, the Communists would win a majority, whereas if they provoked a Cabinet crisis they might be able to form a government of their own which could rush an election immediately and snatch a victory against the Communists.

A further factor was the deadlock that had held up all legislation on social issues for months before the final crisis broke: the Two-Year Plan had revealed widespread failure in the private enterprise sector, the diversion of manpower and materials to satisfy the desires of the rich through the black market, etc. The Left in the Coalition demanded further measures of socialisation to cope with this situation and were resisted by the Right, who felt that the winds of reaction were blowing harder and harder from the West and believed they could spread their sails and ride to harbour on the storm.

According to the Catholic weekly, *The Tablet*, of March 6, 1948, the twelve non-Socialist Ministers (i.e. half the Cabinet) who precipitated the crisis in Czechoslovakia by resigning in the second half of January from the National Front coalition, did

so because they intended, 'there can be no doubt, to force the resignation of the whole cabinet and to secure the formation of a new coalition without the Communists, as had been done in France and Italy'.

It is equally certain that they derived encouragement from American policy in Europe. Whether or not they received direct encouragement and specific assurances from the American Embassy has been hotly debated. Whereas there is no disputing the interventionist pronouncements of the President, the Secretary of State and leading Senators and Congressmen, every instance of the application of the policy of intervention on the spot is always indignantly denied unless and until the evidence becomes overwhelming.

There is at any rate no question that the American Ambassador in Prague, Mr Steinhardt, who had returned from the United States the day after the crisis broke, made a public statement, reported, e.g. in the *New York Herald Tribune* (New York edition) of January 20, to the effect that he had not abandoned hope that Czechoslovakia might yet qualify for the benefits of the Marshall Plan.

The result of the crisis provoked by the anti-Communist parties was unexpected and, for the plotters, disconcerting: the Communists and Left-Wing Socialists carried out a lightning campaign among the workers and rank and file of their own parties, explaining the situation, saying that Czechoslovakia would not be another Greece and the Czech workers would not suffer the fate of the French or Italian workers, but would know how to defend their revolution, and demanding the formation of a new coalition from the same parties but excluding the men who had resigned. Under the pressure from below the Socialist Party reclosed its ranks, with the Left Wing once more in control.

The new Government was composed of the left wings of the Coalition parties, with the Communists as very much the leading element.

Whereas the 1945 election had been fought as a coupon election with no opposition, the 1948 election was fought with a list of candidates agreed upon by all the parties in the Coalition, and still no opposition. Anyone who could gather a thousand signatures, however, was entitled to stand as an independent candidate. Two attempts were made, one in Prague and one in a small town. In both cases the candidates were given every facility by the Czech Home Office, including the supply of paper for

posters, but were unable to get as many as a thousand signatures.

The February upheaval was a bloodless semi-revolution carried out in constitutional forms. President Gottwald undoubtedly spoke the truth when he said that whereas Czechoslovakia before February was a country in which Capitalism could have been restored, that had become impossible in the new Czechoslovakia.

In general the workers are relatively better off and the middle class worse off than they were before February. There is less civil liberty and parliamentary democracy in the Western sense, but more drive in reconstruction and more power to the workers through their trade unions and political parties.

Life is drab and hard, there is a good deal of discontent and an unsatisfied demand for freer access to news and the untrammelled right of discussion. But the lurid stories of terror, a police state, etc., spread by *émigrés*, are merely ludicrous.

Whether one regards what happened in February as bad, good or mixed, the one thing clear and certain is that it was the unaided work of the undivided Czechoslovak working class, acting through its trades unions and political parties, including not only the Socialists and Communists, but also the left wings of the other parties in the Coalition. The stories of Soviet intervention or dictation are simply not true, and the comparisons made with Munich by the very Tories who shared in that outrage are an insult to the Czechoslovak people that covers the malodorous ex-Munichers with fresh infamy.

THE EXTENDED TRUMAN DOCTRINE

On March 17, 1948 President Truman in his address to a joint session of Congress extended the Truman doctrine to mean a policy of 'global' counter-revolutionary intervention. He accused 'the Soviet Union and its agents since the close of hostilities' of 'having destroyed the independence and democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe. It is this ruthless course of action and a clear design to extend it to the remaining free nations of Europe that have brought about the critical situation in Europe to-day'.

He blamed the Russians for what he called 'the tragic death of the Republic of Czechoslovakia', accused the Soviet Union of bringing pressure to bear on Finland and jeopardising the entire Scandinavian peninsula, and said that 'Greece is under direct military attack from rebels actively supported by her Communist-dominated neighbours. In Italy a determined and aggressive

effort is being made by a Communist minority to take control of that country'.

He welcomed the fact that the West European nations were drawing together, not only for economic recovery. That was essential, but not enough. 'The free nations of Europe realise that economic recovery if it is to succeed must be afforded some measure of protection against internal and external aggression. The movement toward economic co-operation has been followed by a movement toward common self-protection in the face of the growing menace to their freedom'.

The President then recommended Congress, first, speedily to 'complete its action on the European Recovery Programme' as the foundation of America's policy of assistance 'to the free nations of Europe'.

Second, he recommended 'prompt enactment of universal training legislation' because 'until the free nations of Europe have regained their strength and so long as Communism threatens the very existence of democracy the United States must remain strong enough to support those countries of Europe which are threatened with Communist control and police state rule'.

Thirdly, he asked for further legislation to maintain United States armed forces 'at their authorised strength'. This was a proposal to conscript men, pending universal military training, for maintaining the American Navy at its present level of six times the size of the British Navy and more than twice the size of all the navies of the rest of the world (including Britain), combined, and to provide the manpower for the programme of doubling the U.S. Air Fleet by 1952 in order, as the Air Policy Commission reported, to make it 'capable of delivering a sustained assault on the vital centres of the Soviet Union'. This policy goes hand in hand with the development of American naval and air bases across the Pacific within striking distance of Soviet Siberia, as well as in the Middle East, in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Western Europe, French North Africa, Greenland, Iceland, etc.

It is a scarifying revelation of how these great world issues are handled that towards the end of 1948 an official United States Committee, headed by the former chief of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, Mr Ferdinand Eberstadt, in a report to the Government's Commission on Organisation, made a sharp and public attack on the U.S. Intelligence Service for making irresponsible espionage reports that have intensified war hysteria. In particular, the Air Force Intelligence was accused of turning

in reports during the spring of 1948 indicating that the Soviet Union constituted an immediate menace to the United States (an excessively foolish report, for the U.S.S.R. has neither the bases nor the types of planes needed to make an attack on the United States physically possible; the Soviet Air Force is a fighter and tactical bombing force which works in close co-ordination with the Army, as contrasted with the long-range strategic bombing force being built up by the United States avowedly to attack the 'vital centres' of the Soviet Union).

This mistaken Air Force Intelligence report, the Committee points out, formed the basis of President Truman's message to Congress announcing conscription and talking of the Soviet Union's 'clear design' to overrun Western Europe. 'Too many such Intelligence estimates have been made by the Departmental Intelligence Services. These estimates have often been subjective and biased and the capabilities of potential enemies have been interpreted as their intentions,' concludes the report.

But this information, revealed as phony a few months later, served its purpose in providing the justification for the menacing extension of the Truman doctrine to cover the whole world. If President Truman's declarations are to be taken at their face value, the United States are now arming to the teeth and preparing to plunge humanity into a third world war by attacking the Soviet Union, in pursuit of a policy of direct intervention and interference in the internal affairs of any country anywhere where a Communist Party, or alliance of parties including the Communists, might win a general election. The threat of military intervention has now been added to the fact of economic, financial and diplomatic intervention for this purpose.

INTERVENTION IN ITALY, 1948

In addition to the phony intelligence report, the totally false allegation that the February semi-revolution in Czechoslovakia was instigated and forced on the country by the Soviet Union was used as a pretext for beating the war drum and working up a state of hysteria in both Britain and the United States. Hysterical denunciations of alleged and non-existent Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia mingled with threats and preparations for massive American intervention in the Italian general election. So menacing were some of the statements emanating from Washington, including remarks of President Truman, that De Gasperi, the leader of the Christian Democrats, was reported by the *New York Herald Tribune* as saying delightedly:

'They will *have* to vote for me after this, out of sheer fear if nothing else'. There were threats that United States troops would return to Italy; naval units demonstratively visited Italian ports in strength; the campaign was run largely on promises of more favours to come from the United States, praises of what had already been done and threats of American aid ceasing if the Democratic Front were voted into power. Congressional action was speeded up so as to allow of the delivery of the first instalments of Marshall Plan food and other supplies before polling day. The Catholic Church was mobilised with great effect.

The *Saturday Evening Post* of June 5, 1948, gleefully recounts this episode in an article entitled: 'How the Church Licked Communism in Italy':

The most sweeping Catholic pronouncement against the Front came from Milan, traditional centre of Communist strength. Ildefonso Cardinal Schuster, Archbishop of Milan, announced in a pastoral letter that 'followers of Communism or other movements opposed to the Catholic faith cannot obtain absolution'. It would be 'strictly illicit for the faithful', the cardinal pointed out, 'to give their vote to candidates or to a list of candidates who are clearly against the Church or against the application of religious principles and Christian morals to public life'.

Schuster's 'no absolution' message provided the biggest bombshell of the campaign. The Communists never got over it ...

It is impossible to overrate the impact of such thunderous warnings, coming from the highest Church authorities, in this solidly Catholic country. Out in Sesto San Giovanni, the dreary industrial suburb of Milan nicknamed 'Little Stalingrad', I found Communist workers gravely perturbed by the prospect of voting themselves straight into hell.

In the red glow of the furnaces of the Breda steelworks, Sesto's largest plant, I discussed the campaign with a group of workers. Almost all of them were ex-partisans and staunch party-line Communists. But they were also Catholics, and every so often our talk gravitated back to their dilemma. 'We men don't go to church much, anyway,' one of them finally observed, 'but what the priest says affects our women. He'll ask, for example, "What newspaper do you read at home?" and, "Does your husband listen to Togliatti?" and sometimes he'll come right out and say, "I am very sorry, signora; I cannot give you absolution".'

The Italian Communist Party, it may be mentioned, not only raises no objection to its members being Catholics – and tens of thousands of them are – but voted in the Italian Parliament for the continuation of the *concordat* between State and Church, the maintenance of Catholic religious teaching in State schools,

etc. It has not pursued an anti-clerical policy since the war, although naturally sticking to its socialist home policies and defending itself when attacked.

Mr Bevin wanted to do his bit in the election by offering the Italians the return of at least some of their colonies, but fell foul of the War Office, which wanted the said colonies for strategic purposes, in order to carry out grandiose plans for preparing for world war three. So that, as a poor second best, the National Executive of the Labour Party threw overboard the Party's policy of recognising and working with the Italian Socialist Party, which was part of the Democratic Front representing the Italian working class, and transferred its favours to the Italian MacDonaldites, the Right-Wing middle-class splinter group led by the ex-bank clerk Saragat, that had split off from the Socialist Party and was firmly embedded in De Gasperi's Capitalist coalition. (The 'Unity Socialists' took with them 16% of the delegates at the Party conference where they broke away; they have 2 out of 100 representatives on the General Council of the Italian T.U.C., as compared with 82 for the combined Communists - 60, and Italian Socialists - 22.)

That was why the Labour M.P.s who sent a message of goodwill to Pietro Nenni, the leader of the Italian Socialist Party, were severely reproved for having allegedly infringed the principles of the Labour Party - by siding with the Italian workers against the Italian Capitalists.

After the election, Mr Howard K. Smith, the Columbia Broadcasting Company's European representative, who had covered the election, broadcast as follows from Rome:

Suppose that the access of both sides to the press in the campaign had been equal. Suppose the election funds had been approximately equal.

Suppose that the most powerful religious institution and the richest nation on earth had not intervened on one side in the elections.

There is no doubt in anybody's mind here that the Reds would have dealt the Democratic Government a crushing defeat.

By free choice the Italian people in that case would have chosen Communism over democracy without a Russian soldier or a Kremlin kopek around to induce or force them.

There were great rejoicings in Washington, Whitehall, the Vatican and Transport House at the victory of the Capitalist coalition and the defeat of the working-class Democratic Front by these means. But in what the *Daily Mail* of April 22, 1948,

called 'a cautionary cable from post-election Rome' its correspondent gave a warning that should give food for thought to anti-working-class interventionists in Britain and the United States:

'From Rome one seems to hear the warning echoes of the Western World's applause, the dying sighs of relief.

But don't think the whole matter is now closed. Don't sigh too finally with relief. Communism hasn't unconditionally surrendered in Italy. It isn't even all that much smaller than it was before.

The point of this election has not been a Communist defeat but a Christian Democrat victory.

Premier de Gasperi's merit is that he has prevented the Communists from winning and has produced the biggest party in the country.

But he hasn't scotched Communism. He hasn't even started.

It is important to realise what has happened. Millions of Italian voters, under enormous pressure from abroad and as the result of unprecedented propaganda at home, have been scared into voting for the Christian Democrats.

Some of them – especially in Sicily and the South – had previously almost decided to vote Communist and changed their mind at the last minute.

But most of them were attached to small unsuccessful parties which never did anything but split the vote.

Now they've all jostled their way into the Christian Democrat fold. And the result is that the Christian Democrats are to-day a vast jumbled chaos of a party.

It stretches Right and Left as far as the eye can see from doctrinaire Socialism through Clericalism to authentic Fascism.

And it is only held together by the fear of Communism ...

The Popular Front, which includes the Communists, still commands one-third of Italy's votes.

Its strength is only slightly less than at the previous election and the defections were Left-Wing Socialists rather than Communists. Communists are right in claiming that they stood up well to the tremendous attack on them.

And the conditions which encouraged Communism in Italy remain. The huge parched villages of Apulia are as poverty-stricken as ever. Their peasants still trudge forth to work for inadequate pay on the vast estates of landlords they never see.

The bomb-stricken slums of Naples and Milan are no prettier than they were. The prosperous peasants of Emilia and Tuscany might be even still more prosperous if they owned the land instead of working for a share of the crop.

The unemployment figures haven't shrunk. Homes are still being built for the rich and not for the poor. The danger of inflation still haunts the country ...

And one new feature has been added. The M.S.I. (Italian Social Movement), which is openly proud of being Fascist, has emerged as a serious party ...

Unless Premier De Gasperi very quickly puts into practice a land-reform scheme he cannot hope to beat the Communists another time.

The huge estates, especially in Southern Italy, must be broken up and distributed to the peasants, because if they aren't the peasants won't miss the next opportunity of taking them.

The unemployment problem must be seriously tackled – and soon. It has resulted partly from the attempt to run an economy of free enterprise in a country of grim shortages.

De Gasperi, says this correspondent, 'must also try to steer Italian politicians between the extremes of Communism, Fascism and the Church. For since the main opposition to Communism has rallied round the Christian Democrats, the Catholic Church must be considered a political body'.

As a political body, the Church in Italy certainly manages to avoid the extreme of Communism. But the unchecked activities and sensational success, for instance, of Father Ricardo Lombardi, Jesuit radio-priest and popular preacher, who has taken Rome by storm, suggest that the Church in Italy, as a political body, may be no more successful now in avoiding the extreme of Fascism than it was in the days of Mussolini. Speaking in Turin Cathedral in December 1948, on the subject 'Crusade for the Good' Father Lombardi declared that the Arab Jihad (Mahommedan holy war), then being waged in defiance of the United Nations against the State of Israel, was 'just' and a 'defence of the body and the home of Christ ... The Jews are revengeful, they must be destroyed; Communism and the Jews must be destroyed. And blood will flow, maybe much blood ... We fight Communism to-day, just as a century ago did the Pope, the Tsar, Metternich, Guizot, and as yesterday did the Pope, the Mikado, Hitler and Mussolini'.

The situation has not improved in Italy since the election. On the contrary, in spite of the pouring in of American aid and supplies, the rich are still growing richer and the poor poorer. Controls and rationing have been abolished; the landless peasants toil for a pittance on the huge estates; inflation has destroyed the value of social legislation, unemployment insurance, etc.; according to the Italian Ministry of Labour there are more than 2½ million unemployed and the real wages of the Italian workers are just above starvation level and half of what they got under Mussolini. The American veto permanently excludes representa-

tives of the Italian working class from sharing in the government, unless they give up their stand for Socialism.

The Right Wing of the De Gasperi Capitalist coalition continually urge an all-out attack on the Communist Party and the Trades Unions, which are overwhelmingly under Communist and allied Left-Wing Socialist leadership. They claim American support for a 'strong' policy. They all but openly boast that the E.C.A. agents in Italy are on their side on social and economic issues.

That this boast is at least partly true is borne out by the *New York Herald Tribune's* (Paris edition) despatch from its Rome correspondent on January 21, 1949, announcing that Mr James D. Zellerbach, the head of the E.C.A. American mission in Italy, was opposing Italian land reform. He admitted in a public statement that it was an internal affair of Italy's but objected to it nevertheless on the ground that it might lower Italian production.

The statement was one for which large landowners and social reformers have been waiting in Italy for months, explains the Rome correspondent. Owners have bitterly objected to the idea of a land revision, but Communists and even members of the Christian Democratic (mainly Catholic) party, which dominates Italy, have urged the dismembering of all estates of more than 250 acres.

A redivision based on a 250-acre ceiling would have an enormous effect on Italy. At present 69 per cent of the land is concentrated among less than 7 per cent of the owners. The average Italian holding is only four acres, but 105 owners average 13,000 acres. Only one-fifth of Italy's 8,600,000 farmers own their own land. One-fifth of Italy's farmers are day labourers who earn only \$1.60 [8s.] a day, according to the Communists in command of the Farmhands' Union.

Many of Italy's large landowners have been able to enjoy a life of idleness and ease, even in troubled post-war Italy, as the result of earnings from the share-croppers and tenants on their ancestral estates.

Even Mr Joseph Alsop, on investigating the situation in Rome, was moved to write (*New York Herald Tribune*, Paris edition, January 28, 1949) that

It is downright shocking that American policy is rapidly acquiring the reputation of being reactionary ... The Zellerbach statement has really explosive implications. American influence is now strongly felt in every sphere of Italian politics. Premier De Gasperi is strongly committed to land reform, and he and the majority of his Cabinet wish to begin the job immediately. They are being powerfully obstructed, however, by the Rightist parties in the Government. And now Zellerbach has played directly into the Rightists' hands. The Rightist parties have hitherto proved strong enough to

block social reform even without American assistance.* But what Mr Alsop says is true. And American policy is no more likely to be liberal in Italy than in Greece. For in Italy, as in Greece, the United States is intervening, not out of love for the common people of those countries, but out of fear of 'Communism', meaning thereby any rapid and radical social reforms. And so Uncle Sam is bound to play ball with the reactionary, privileged minority that wants to hold down the people, exploit them and keep them poor, and calls this 'anti-Communism'.

U.S. policy in Italy is based on the very people and classes that were the mainstay and prop of Mussolini's regime, just as American policy in Greece depends on the former supporters of the Metaxas dictatorship and the collaborators and quislings of the Nazi occupation. Neither in France, Italy, nor Greece are there anti-Communist progressives capable of governing their countries. They are too few and too confused. The choice is between a Right-Centre coalition dominated by the Right and incapable of solving the burning social and economic problems, and so evolving toward Fascism instead, or a Left-Centre coalition dominated by the Communists, that will find socialist solutions, and therefore can evolve toward social democracy in the context of secure peace and economic prosperity. But those responsible for American policy, as judged by their deeds and not their words, prefer Fascism and the ultimate certainty of a third world war in defence of Capitalism to the prospect of peace and democracy through moving toward Socialism.

ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

The Marshall Plan has in practice mobilised a great deal of American goodwill and given real and substantial help to the European countries to which it is being sent. The great bulk of American opinion accepts it as a progressive measure and an earnest of the American desire to help Western Europe recover.

But Western Europe will be no nearer the prospect of being able to stand on its own feet at the end of the Marshall Plan than it was before the plan started. On the contrary, American interventionist and anti-Soviet foreign policy is tending to cut the economic throat of the countries being aided by cutting them off from their natural markets and sources of raw materials in Eastern Europe and splitting them internally.

The American veto against the French or Italian working class having any share in power and its economic and social consequ-

* Although they have had to pass a fake land reform bill, covering one-twelfth of the large estates on paper and not tackling even them in earnest.

ences has already been described. It is not possible to reconstruct France or Italy (or West Germany) without the full confidence and co-operation of the workers and their Trades Unions. This will not be forthcoming so long as American intervention restores capitalism and denies them their democratic rights.

When the Marshall Plan was first adopted the plan itself, as well as President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall in their messages to Congress, emphasised the need for industrial Western Europe to resume and expand its trade with agricultural Eastern Europe if the plan was to succeed. The European Economic Commission of the United Nations, in a report issued in the summer of 1948, made a careful analysis of the situation and concluded that Western Europe would still have a deficit of 5,000 million dollars at the end of the four years of the Marshall Plan, unless in the meanwhile it had increased five-fold its trade with Eastern Europe and had comprehensively planned its economy.

Mr Hoffman, the Chief Administrator of American aid, has given a number of sunshine talks, vague and cheery as to facts, taking the view that Western Europe can recover without increasing its trade with Eastern Europe. The Marshall plan as passed by Congress included a 'joker' giving the United States Administrator the right to insist that no goods should be sent to Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, by countries receiving American aid, that the United States objected to exporting to those countries.

The U.S.A. officially objects to the export of any goods that might increase the war potential of these countries. This in practice can mean all forms of capital goods and most articles of consumption. So far the United States has used this right cautiously. It has gone further in stopping exports to Eastern Europe from France, Italy or Benelux than in the case of Britain.

But Poland, Czechoslovakia and other East European States have complained bitterly at the United Nations General Assembly and in the European Economic Commission of the policies of discrimination against them being practised by the United States and imposed by the U.S.A. on Western Europe. 'America has been refusing many Yugoslav export licences, and requiring Britain and other Marshall-aid countries to do the same' admits Mr Joseph Alsop, from Belgrade (*New York Herald Tribune*, Paris edition, February 16, 1949), on the ground that 'Soviet satellites ... cannot be permitted to buy equipment which may assist Russian rearmament'.

Mr Leslie Solley, M.P., revealed in the House of Commons in December 1948 that an Anglo-American Committee with Mr A. V. Alexander as chairman had been set up to go through the lists of British exports to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Russians attribute the sudden and unexplained cancelling by Britain of the promised deliveries under the trade treaty of equipment for the Soviet mining, chemical and oil industries to the intervention of the Americans.

On July 2, 1948, the *Manchester Guardian* commented:

Much uneasiness has been caused here by Mr Paul Hoffman's reply in Washington on Wednesday to a question on goods which may not in future be exported to Eastern Europe or Russia. The American Act instructs the administrator to stop the delivery under the aid programme of any commodity that would be used to manufacture a product for export to Eastern Europe which the United States itself would not export there.

Such goods are contained in an unpublished export control list at the Department of Commerce and are supposed to include mainly articles of potential military value.

The effect of the provision would be that any product made here from raw material received as E.R.P. aid could not be exported to Russia or Eastern Europe if it was on the American 'contraband' list. Certain machine tools might well come within this range.

But the decision of the U.S.A. Government was now much more serious, the leader writer continued:

Mr Hoffman has now gone a stage farther. Asked whether it would make any difference if no aid-financed commodities were used in the goods exported to the East, he replied: 'A jet engine is a jet engine, whether it comes from this country or a participating country.' Here we have the germ of the terrible old lend-lease controversy all over again.

That dispute had been complicated and long drawn out. 'Under that system we agreed not to export goods made from materials received from the United States "or any like materials". A whole department of lawyers was formed in the United States in the middle of the war to examine minutely whether any of our export goods contained anything comparable with lend-lease materials. If that is the meaning of the new export restriction it had better be made crystal clear from the outset.'

Up to now the Board of Trade has been successful in concluding trade treaties with the Soviet Union and a number of East European countries, although the Foreign Office has often cut across and delayed these treaties. The greatest of these treaties is that with Poland.

But the impetus seems to be slackening and the difficulties multiplying. Partly this is due to growing pressure from the United States, seconded as usual by cries from the Conservative Party in this country to accept the logic of the cold war and risk starving our people rather than trade with the Socialist third of humanity. But partly too there really is a logic in the cold war that cannot in the long run be resisted: trade between Britain's partly planned economy and the almost wholly planned economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union means arrangements between governments. And as Foreign Minister Modzelewski of Poland said on February 25, 1948:

Poland wants to trade with the West. But we should like Mr Bevin to take into consideration that production and commerce demand a proper atmosphere. Discrimination and attempts to restrict sovereign rights and a plan for a so called Western Union cannot but injure trade between Eastern and Western Europe.

On March 29, 1949, Mr Harold Wilson, President of the Board of Trade, ate his brave words of a few days previously, to the effect that we consulted our economic advantage and not military considerations in trading with Eastern Europe, and produced a long list of the goods of possible strategic value that could be exported to East Europe only on licence. This capitulation followed on Tory and American pressure. It may be taken for granted that the list will grow on representations from, and the granting of licences will be ultimately subject to approval by, Washington.

The British Four-Year Programme, irreverently described as 'Old Cripps' Almanack,' or alternately as 'Prospectus for Congress' assumes that British trade with Eastern Europe by 1952 will be only 75 per cent of what it was before the war. Even *The Times* (January 15, 1949) complained editorially about the difficulties for British trade with Eastern Europe caused by American objections to the sale of certain types of goods.

At the same time as it is tending to cut down economic intercourse between Western and Eastern Europe, American policy is restoring uncontrolled Capitalism in Western Europe, including Western Germany, and in Italy. This has resulted in pushing down the standards of living of the workers in France, Italy and Western Germany to levels lower than they have been for half a century. The natural consequence has been widespread discontent and increasing social strain.

Hitherto Labour Britain has succeeded well enough at home

to inspire respect and has victoriously defended our right to run our own affairs in our own way. But here too American pressure is growing: Britain has had to agree to providing goods in the shape of so-called 'unrequited exports' and sterling credits to Western Europe to the value of 40 per cent of the aid received under the Marshall Plan. This has not saved Great Britain from the charge that we are 'dragging our feet' and showing reluctance to go all the way into Western economic union. Walter Lippmann has said bluntly that this reluctance, contrasted with Mr Churchill's eager alacrity, is due to the fact that the Labour Government does not see how to reconcile its partly-planned socialistic economy with the capitalist economies of Western Europe, and that therefore it may be asked whether the survival of Labour rule is compatible with the carrying out of America's policy in Western Europe. Various Senators and Congressmen have spoken of the need for putting pressure on Great Britain to make whatever sacrifices are necessary to achieve economic unity in the form desired by the United States.

Thus, in the economic field the Marshall plan is increasingly cutting Western Europe off from Eastern Europe, assuring a monopoly of power to the propertied classes and restoring Capitalism in France, Italy and Western Germany. It is turning the heat on Labour Britain to fall into line. As the U.S. slides toward another depression, U.S. business pressure, anxious to drive us out of the South American market, interferes with our attempts to buy Argentine meat with British goods; tries to make us devalue the pound and make it convertible into dollars; uses the Marshall Plan to dump goods in Europe becoming unsaleable in the U.S.A., etc.

MILITARISATION OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

In the field of military affairs too Western Union is fast developing into an American bridgehead against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and becoming an integral part of the American security system and strategic plan. The Brussels Treaty of March 1948 and the North Atlantic Pact pay elaborate lip service to the United Nations Charter, but are in fact alliances against the Soviet Union and therefore violate the fundamental principle of the Charter, which requires the permanent members of the Security Council to trust one another to the point where they are prepared to settle all their differences by peaceful means and will never resort to force or the threat of force as a means of settlement. Arrangements that contemplate and prepare for

war and the threat of war in our dealings with the Soviet Union are obviously inconsistent with this principle.

The Atlantic Pact links these Anglo-Franco-Benelux military arrangements with the vast American strategic plan on which the Alsop brothers cast a good deal of light in a report in the *Saturday Evening Post* of September 11, 1948. The article describes the so-called 'master plan to protect America against the Russian threats' agreed upon at the highest policy level by the U.S. Combined Forces General Staff.

This strategic plan is 'the politico-strategic complement to the politico-economic Marshall Plan ... The Marshall Plan - E.R.P. was the first phase of the job. The strategic effort with which this report is concerned is the second phase'.

It provides first for 'an American army, navy and air force in full peace-time readiness'. A huge rearmament programme, it may be observed, has been adopted for all three arms, including a plan for doubling the present air force by 1952 and providing it with enough long-range fast heavy bombers to attack Soviet cities and industries.

The second part of the plan is 'a strong complex of alliances, more especially with the nations of the new Western European Union formed by Britain, France and the Benelux countries last spring'. This, of course, is the North Atlantic Pact. The report stresses the absolute necessity for incorporating Britain and Western Europe in the American strategy, and the impossibility of America getting at the Soviet Union unless she has these countries as allies.

Thirdly, the strategic master plan contemplates 'measures to restore our allies' power and particularly peace-time lend-lease to safeguard Western Europe from the Red Army'. This is the scheme to pay for the militarisation of Britain and Western Europe. Although the fact is strenuously denied it may be taken for granted that the lengthening of British conscription to 18 months is the first instalment of this scheme and that if this period is quietly accepted it will eventually have to be raised to two years. For, as the report goes on to make clear, the United States requires Britain, France and Benelux to raise 45 divisions*

* According to later information, the American demand has now been reduced to 35 divisions. Captain Liddell Hart, one of our foremost military critics, studied the defence requirements of Western Europe as part of the American strategic plan in the U.S. weekly *New Republic* of February 14, 1949. He believed that 20 highly trained heavily armed and mobile divisions were the bedrock minimum - and calculated that to provide the required amount of soldiery, Britain and Western Europe would have to accept three years conscription.

in order to hold a new Maginot Line on the Rhine when the U.S.A. goes to war, and at present only about 15 divisions exist.

The Transport House pamphlet *Feet on the Ground* shows itself fully aware of the American scheme and argues that the United States must go in for 'military lend-lease' in order to help build up a militarised Western Union in alliance with the U.S.A., and directed in war and peace from Washington. It is interesting to note that Transport House brought out a pamphlet putting forward as the Labour Government's policy and pleading for exactly the policy that was condemned by the Scarborough Conference of the Labour Party in a resolution accepted by the National Executive. This resolution said that the Conference 'believes that the Conservative conception of Western Union on a Capitalist basis and in military alliance with the U.S.A. against the U.S.S.R. cannot solve Europe's economic problems and will lead only to a third world war'.

The fourth instalment of the American master plan is 'arrangements for overseas bases from which we can strike at the enemy's vitals with the absolute weapons'. This means, it is explained, a zone of air and naval bases and military footholds, nearly 500 in all, stretching from the United States clear around the globe, in a vast half-moon from Greenland and Iceland down through Britain, Western Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, the South coast of Asia, Japan and the Pacific and Aleutian Islands and Alaska, within bombing distance of the territories of the Socialist third of humanity and particularly of the Soviet Union.

The fifth and final element in the United States' overall plan of security is 'a small specialised offensive force' consisting of long-range fast bombers capable of delivering the 'absolute weapons on Soviet targets ... From Baku north to Leningrad, from Smolensk to Novosibirsk, the vitals of the Soviet State will be scorched and destroyed with the terrible fire of the atomic bomb'.

The general scheme, as explained in this report, is that when war breaks out the 45 divisions of Western Europe, with help as soon as possible from the 12 divisions of the United States, will hold the line of the Rhine against the advancing Red Army until such time as the United States offensive air force, which will be hastily flown to the prepared air bases 'reduces the Soviet Union to a smoking desert of ruins, without industrial output, transport or communications'. The United States air authorities believe this task could be accomplished in about four months by the atom bombing of 'chief targets in only 80 cities'.

MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES

The report is as frank in discussing the difficulties of this plan as it is in revealing its nature and objects.

In the first place, although the principles have been agreed upon, the plan does not yet exist and there are formidable practical difficulties and disagreements between the different arms of the services as to their respective parts. The Navy and the Army do not see eye to eye, and there are wide differences of opinion about what the air arm and the 'absolute' weapons can accomplish.

Moreover, 'the political experts and more sophisticated military planners argue the attack should be made at purely industrial targets ... sparing the great population centres ... in order to avoid Hitler's error of forging a link of common suffering between the Russian masses and their masters, whilst some of the soldiers discount these careful political calculations ... There are differences also over the use of exposed advanced bases for hit-and-run attacks. And *a minority of one*, composed of the President's Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, *even objects to employing the absolute weapons without warning, on grounds of humanity*'. (Italics mine.)

The authors also complain of the secretiveness of the Soviet Union, resulting in the 'absence of accurate maps of Russia' that the U.S. pilots must have 'before the absolute weapons can be delivered to Soviet targets'.

It would take five years of intensive rearmament for the U.S.A. to possess the equipment necessary to carry out the plan.

The second difficulty is the necessity for incorporating Western Europe in the plan. Britain in particular is necessary, because she alone of America's prospective allies 'controls sufficient real estate along the crucial half-moon from Scotland to her Arabian protectorates' on which to build the bases that the U.S.A. is to use for her air offensive against the Soviet Union. These have to be got ready.

Certain of these basing areas are quite obviously not going to be available in practice. Scandinavia for example presents insuperable political obstacles. In other areas the difficulties may be less. Whatever basing areas may be used, the bases must be virtually completed in peace time. There must be 18,500 ft. runways capable of withstanding the landing impact of 145,000 lb. and providing 10 miles of level flight from take-off. There must be taxi ways and hard standings. There must be some housekeep-

ing facilities for the men and at least 60 days' supplies of gas, oil, ammunition and spare parts and all must be maintained for use at any moment so that on 24 hours' notice the great bombers may fly in and start operations.

Whereas Denmark and Norway are only half in and Sweden is standing out, Benelux, France and Britain are regarded by American strategists as being politically in the bag. The U.S.-West European strategic plan is now taking shape in military lease-lend, the North Atlantic Pact and the Anglo-Franco-Benelux alliance.

The militarisation of Western Europe will require U.S. materials and equipment, which will be competing severely with the requirements of American rearmament, not to mention the output of civilian goods for the Marshall Plan. The haggling between the West European and American staffs will therefore be 'very bitter' and the negotiations 'difficult and painful'. The resulting burden on American production almost certainly 'cannot be carried without reflection in the tax rates and without temporarily reviving limited controls, priorities and allocations'.

The French don't like Field-Marshal Montgomery as the Commander-in-Chief of the combined forces of Britain, France and Benelux, particularly as initially the French, Belgians and Dutch will have to provide most of the soldiers.

There are other problems making combined Staff work difficult also, such as the remaining Communist infiltration in France. Neither the British nor Americans will discuss matters involving atomic energy with the French as long as the known Communist Professor Joliot-Curie remains at the head of France's Atomic Energy Committee.

(Professor Joliot-Curie is one of the most distinguished French scientists. He has announced that he regards it as his patriotic duty as a Frenchman to keep inviolate any secrets of which he may become possessed in the course of his official duties.)

The Transport House pamphlet 'Feet on the Ground' is more realistic than this American report in referring to the political set-up in the countries selected to serve as aeroplane carriers, bridgeheads and purveyors of cannon fodder for the American Security System. It points out that the Scandinavian countries, who refuse to enter the scheme [Denmark and Norway have since yielded to Western pressure and propaganda to come half in], are ruled by Socialist Governments, whereas Benelux and France are governed by Capitalist coalitions into which their Socialist parties have entered (on terms, it may be added, that

make them impotent to resist the drift to war and the restoration of Capitalism). Moreover,

in France the government consists of an unstable coalition between the Socialists and some centre parties, menaced not only by internal divisions but by two mutually hostile opposition groups – the Communists and the Gaullists – which together amount to almost two-thirds of the country. In Italy the government is controlled mainly by a large Catholic party, which though supported by half the country cannot easily agree on policy with the progressive groups, whose aid it needs in Parliament. The Communist-led opposition represents a third of the population, and the Socialists are split between government and opposition. Thus the two largest countries of continental Europe are both weakened by instability and civil unrest as well as by the economic consequences of inflation.

What this account leaves out is that the Communists in France represent about seven-eighths of the working class politically (i.e. as electors) and about four-fifths of the trade unions, including the heavy industry unions and the miners, and that the so-called Socialists have about as much claim to that name as MacDonald's National Labour Party was entitled to call itself Labour, or, for that matter, National. The French Communists are the largest party, with six million votes at the last election, one-third of all the M.P.s and, as public opinion tests and by-elections alike have shown, tending to increase, whereas Gaullists have dropped from over 40% a year ago to about 26% to-day. (They may, however, shoot up again in a crisis, as they are attractive to the frightened middle-class floating vote).

In Italy the Communist-Socialist alliance also represents practically the whole of the trade union movement and working class, as well as the more politically conscious of the land-hungry peasants, and the 'Unity' Socialists in the Capitalist coalition are middle-class MacDonaldites.

In both countries the workers are so strongly opposed to their countries being used by the U.S.A. for a counter-revolutionary war that the outbreak of hostilities would almost certainly precipitate civil war.

Even official France grows more and more perturbed as it becomes clear that the American strategic plan regards a revived and remilitarised Western Germany, Franco Spain and Bevin-Churchill Britain as the three chief pillars of U.S. strategy in Europe. The report of the Alsop Brothers, being based on official sources, slurs over the point that American strategy regards France as eminently expendable. But this view has been taken

strongly in discussions of American strategy by U.S. legislators and generals, notably General Omar Bradley.

There would appear to be weighty support in U.S. military circles for the view that the tough Germans, burning for a war of revenge and still impregnated with Nazi ideas, would make more reliable defenders of the Rhine Line than the militarily weak, socially divided, one third Red and profoundly pacific French. Britain across the Channel and Spain behind the Pyrenees are, on this view, the American outposts and aeroplane carriers to be held after the new Maginot Line breaks and France is overrun, until such time as the U.S. can atom bomb their way back through Europe to victory, leaving radio-active rubble heaps and a vast charnel house in their wake.

AMERICAN STRATEGY RESTS ON A GAMBLE

The central idea of the 'optimistic' U.S. strategic plan as expounded by the Alsops is to keep a foothold in Western Europe until the U.S. Strategic Air Force has smashed up the Soviet Union. But this central idea is itself mere guesswork, a gamble and a question mark.

The Alsop report admits that 'the first question is whether the American strategic concept is valid at all. More people have talked more nonsense about whether air attacks will be effective against the Soviet Union than in almost any controversy since the quarrel of Homoiousian versus Homooousian disturbed the peace of Byzantium. Yet the whole new strategic concept stands or falls by the gamble on the special offensive air force to destroy the enemy's vitals'.

THE IMPOSSIBLE ODDS IN THE GAMBLE

In point of fact the odds are overwhelmingly against the gamble coming off. Professor Blackett, one of our top-ranking scientific defence experts, who has taken part in the official discussions on this subject has, in his book *The Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*, torn to shreds the view that the United States, even with the help of Britain, can use the atom bomb, even if it is improved and its manufacture speeded up as much as can be expected, in order to win a war against the Soviet Union in four months or even four years. General Fuller's writings on the character of modern war bear out this conclusion from a wholly different political point of view.

Even if Mr Churchill's calculation at Fulton, in March 1946,

repeated in the House in January, 1948, that the Soviet Union would have the atom bomb in 1949 be an exaggeration (and some U.S. authorities think the Soviet Union already has the bomb), it is almost certain that she will possess it by 1952, which is the minimum period within which the United States can rearm, militarise Western Europe and equip her far-flung system of air bases, according to the U.S. General Staff's view, as reported by the Alsops. Long before then the whole of China will be Communist and allied with the Soviet Union against the present American policy.

It is more than doubtful whether the social *status quo* can be preserved and the French and Italian working class held down for even the next four or five years – even if in the meantime another American slump does not cause a political and social landslide in the Marshall Plan countries.

The proposal that the Rhine Line should be held for at least four months, quite apart from the fact that the period may easily stretch to four years, by the combined forces of Benelux, France and Britain, seems optimistic when one remembers that Benelux held out for less than a week and France and Britain less than two weeks against the German blitz that broke the last Maginot Line – and that the Red Army proved superior to the German Army.

In the light of these considerations, the gamble on which American strategy is based is not so much a gamble as competing against a dead cert, the operative word being 'dead'. If the gamble does not come off, the war will become what the Alsop report calls 'a war of continents'. This is, in fact, what the more 'pessimistic' school of American strategists seems resigned to accept as inevitable in any case. That is the meaning of the assumption that France will be overrun and the United States will have to fall back on Britain and Spain. What such a war would be like is depicted graphically in the Alsop report:

The Red Army would first rapidly overrun defenceless Europe, and very probably deny us Africa. There would follow a war between continents, hideously prolonged, devastating and altogether ghastly, unleashing upon the world again and again all the horrors of the new weapons, chemical and biological as well as atomic. The foundations of Western civilisation, already weakened, would be wholly undermined. Even the precarious balance of nature in the world might be upset by the scourges thus let loose.

After dreadful years, we should probably win. But it would be such a victory as might not bring us the sole poor prize that victors can now hope for, which is mere survival.

PROSPECTS OF WESTERN UNION

Pending this happy consummation, the Marshall Plan is evolving on lines that constitute a real and growing threat to the national independence of the countries receiving Marshall aid. The danger to France may be summed up in the name 'De Gaulle'. The regime of the Centre parties, cut off by the American veto from co-operation with the working class because the workers will persist in using their democratic rights to vote for Communists rather than 'Third Force' Socialists who join the Capitalists, became steadily more weak and unrepresentative during 1948 and 1949. At the same time it leaned more and more heavily on De Gaulle and his supporters; the M.R.P. has been cut to ribbons in successive elections and the survivors for the most part became crypto-Gaullists. The same applies to the Right Wing of the 'Rassemblement des Gauches', representing roughly the old Radical Socialists and their nearest allies. Even the Socialist leaders, to an increasing extent, came to regard De Gaulle as a lesser evil than the Communists.

This does not mean that assumption of power by the General is imminent, still less inevitable. What it does mean is that economic prosperity, social justice and peace are in the long run the only barriers against Fascism and/or civil war in France, and that America's drive to war is depriving France of her chance to enjoy any of the three.

In Italy the Christian Democratic Party is falling more and more under the influence of its Right Wing, representing increasingly aggressive business men and landowners dreaming of the moment when they may, with American encouragement and help and perhaps in company with De Gaulle in France, outlaw the Communist Party and make a full-blooded assault on the trade unions.

At the time of the framing of the Brussels Treaty of Alliance, diplomatic correspondents dropped broad hints, obviously inspired from the Foreign Office, that protection of the contracting parties from 'internal aggression', as promised by President Truman in his address to Congress, was a leading topic of discussion.

Mr Stephen King-Hall, much in demand by the B.B.C. as an 'impartial' radio commentator on politics, put into words a widely prevalent Tory and Right-Wing fellow-traveller view in his 'National News Letter' for December 16, when he said that we must have eighteen months' conscription and boost the

recruiting campaign because Western Europe must be sufficiently strong (a) to intimidate the Russians, who in his view would start a major war if they thought it would be a push-over, and (b) in order to have 'a well-equipped force able to go at once into any Western nation threatened by an internal upheaval conducted by the Communists. The same force would be available to keep the Russians *out* if the Czech Democrats overthrow the Communists'.

The Americans are, as usual, even more outspoken than British interventionists. As long ago as December 5, 1947, Mr James Reston, the diplomatic correspondent of the *New York Times* reported from Washington that there was growing talk in the lobbies of Congress and the fastnesses of the State Department about the necessity for following up American economic aid under the Marshall plan by military intervention, in order to make sure of the maintenance in power of reliably anti-Communist regimes in France and Italy. The argument ran that it was no use wasting money on propping up anti-Communist regimes unless the U.S.A. was ready to back economic intervention with military power in case of need to prevent the social order being subverted and the Marshall Plan set at naught by 'Communism'.

The North Atlantic Pact is a cross between the Anti-Comintern Axis and the Holy Alliance, committed to crush social change and revolution by force just as the old Holy Alliance was committed to suppress political, liberal revolutions. The U.S.A. plays the same part in the Atlantic Pact as Metternich did in the Holy Alliance and Hitler in the Anti-Comintern Axis.*

THE U.S. PUTS THE CLOCK BACK IN GERMANY

The implications of this policy coupled with its military corollary in the U.S. strategic plan, were also being discussed with increasing frankness, with reference to Germany, in the American press during 1948. On March 31, 1948, Mr John O'Donnell wrote in the *Washington Times Herald*:

... we are now about to make military sense in Germany. Despite denials from some sources, we have drawn up plans to reactivate some of those tough fighting German Panzer and S.S. divisions. Give them plenty of food and first-rate American equipment and let them, led by American officers, fight the rear-guard action when and if Pal Joey decides to send a few Commie armies against the M.P.'s and non-combat service troops we have now dispersed in pathetically thin lines all the way from the Baltic to the Mediterranean ...

* For a further discussion of the North Atlantic Pact, see Chap. IX, pp. 287-96.

The Germans, always good soldiers, would rather fight against their historic enemies – the Mongol-Slavs of eastern Europe – than against their blood cousins to the West – Scandinavians, British, Americans and French ... Years and years ago, we pointed out that F.D.R. was backing the wrong horse in this war – that the continent of Europe, so far as sternly isolationist America was concerned, was better off under Germanic rule than under Joe Stalin ...

The well-informed and Conservative *U.S. News* of July 30, 1948, reported:

U.S. military officials in Germany are talking in terms of a rebuilding of the German army as an offset to Russian strength in Europe. This talk is causing a rather sharp reaction in France and among other countries in western Europe.

This was followed up one week later, in the issue of August 6, with a few other interesting items:

George Marshall, United States Secretary of State, is getting tougher and tougher on issues of Russian policy as a preliminary to renewed talks with the Russians. Some officials have about concluded that the only way Russian leaders will negotiate seriously is when they feel a bayonet in their ribs ...

U.S. military men, who have been shaping U.S. policy in Germany, favour rebuilding of a German military force as an offset to the Russians. The military attitude is that the Germans are now more ready to take on military obligations than are the French, who are slow to make serious moves toward rearmament ...

There is reason to believe that these U.S. military plans are based on Hitler's policy of building up a shadow army after he had started rearmament in earnest and before he had openly repudiated the disarmament chapter of the Versailles Treaty. There is even reason to assert that the outline of these plans has been communicated through our military authorities to the Labour Government for their consideration.

No wonder that Otto Strasser, one of Hitler's earliest henchmen, has been emboldened to start a neo-Nazi movement, or that Jews are once more being assaulted and Jewish cemeteries defiled. One of Strasser's earliest pronouncements was that a third world war would be to the advantage of the Fatherland, for it would kill off so many millions of Russians, British and West Europeans as to strengthen Germany's position on the Continent. His 'National League for the Revival of the Fatherland' is claiming the return of Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar as well as the restoration of Germany's pre-war eastern frontier.

Whereas Capitalism is being openly restored by the U.S. with the Labour Government's passive acquiescence in Western Germany, and Nazism is being so openly tolerated that anti-Nazis are already anxious and on the defensive, and a pro-Nazi past is an asset and a passport to promotion to positions of economic or political responsibility in the Western zone, the first moves towards forming a 'shadow army' are proceeding with the utmost caution and secrecy. But they are the inevitable outcome of the whole of American world policy and strategy, of its purposes and of the view of world events by which the U.S. is being guided in world affairs.

THE GLEICHSCHALTUNG OF GREAT BRITAIN

So far Labour Britain has been more successful in resisting American pressure than the West European States, partly because of its success in home affairs and partly because little or no pressure is required to make Mr Bevin co-operate with the United States in international matters (except in Palestine). But the power to resist will be lost when military lend-lease begins. Rearmament and the expansion of our forces, although paid for partly by U.S. military equipment, will not save us from economic disaster and will mean total surrender to the United States in our defence and foreign policy, including the right to decide on the issue of peace or war. That situation is increasingly being exploited by the Conservative Party and its well-wishers in the United States to put pressure on the Labour Government and to seek to divide the Labour Party, on the lines discussed in the next chapter.

In Britain too, although their operation is delayed and diluted by Labour rule and the reality of British democracy, the forces making for Fascism and war, released by American intervention, have begun to operate.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE WRECKING MARSHALL PLAN

To sum up, the Marshall plan contains good as well as bad. The good could and should be disentangled by separating economic aid from anti-Communist intervention and anti-Soviet power politics. But in the present mixture of all three the bad increasingly predominates. American policy, by splitting industrial Western Europe from agricultural Eastern Europe, restoring Capitalism and excluding the workers from power in the West (with the exception so far of Britain) and finally by pushing Western Europe into an arms race, is making certain that at the

end of the four years during which the plan runs Western Europe will be economically insolvent, socially unstable and politically explosive.

Even the bowdlerised interim report on the Joint European Recovery Programme, issued early in January, 1949, by the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, gives some disquieting glimpses of what lies ahead. As things are going now the end of Marshall aid on June 30, 1952 will see Western Europe with a population one tenth higher than before the war, able to afford only three-quarters of its pre-war imports and with a heavy deficit in its balance of payments. The reduction in imports necessary to restore the balance, says the report, 'would mean misery' for some countries. An earlier draft even spoke not only of mass unemployment but of inevitable widespread revolution. This, however, was thought too strong meat for Congress, which, after all, was to be coaxed to vote another instalment of the Marshall Plan on the basis of the report.

The chronic dilemma of the European States is that if they are frank and truthful about the situation they will sound too pessimistic to convince Congress, whereas if they smooth and sweeten the report for American consumption they cannot make the case for the changes that are necessary to avert ultimate disaster. The result is that some of the estimates and calculations have been so wildly optimistic that even the cautious interim report, as *The Times* of January 5, 1949, put it, 'leads to the chastening conclusion that in each case, except that of North America, availabilities have been overestimated.' That applies also to the experts' forecasts. The E.C.A. States' plans show they expect to sell each other £400,000,000 more than they are prepared to buy from each other. The planned exports of 1952-53 suggest an increase of one thousand million dollars over the present level, which would mean capturing at least one half of the United States' markets in South America.

Considering that N.A.M., whose influence is preponderant in American international economic policy, are all out to treble the pre-war export trade of the U.S.A., it is really ludicrous to assume that the big business lobbies in Congress, with wires to the Administration and State Department, would not be employed to insist on European countries in receipt of aid under the Marshall plan not injuring U.S. export interests. The U.S.A. has ample power under the plan to protect and promote the interests of her business men in Western Europe and with regard to the trade of Western Europe. U.S. big business,

frightened by the approach of another slump, is already trying to queer Britain's pitch in the Argentine, to break up her bilateral trade treaties, devalue the pound and make it convertible into dollars. The net effect of these measures would be to wreck most of what the Labour Government have accomplished, export U.S. unemployment to Britain, and deliver us into economic vassalage to Wall Street.

Not to put too fine a point on it, American policy in Western Europe is doing something to help economic recovery but a great deal more and more rapidly to split Europe, foster Fascism, incubate violent social revolution and launch a ruinous race for arms.

THE WEST GERMAN STATE AND THE BERLIN CRISIS

The conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies in Berlin is generally presented to the Western public as though it were a case of the Western Allies suddenly being set upon by the wicked Russians while they were going about their lawful occasions in Berlin. The Russians, without rhyme or reason, runs the story, started to blockade and inflict great suffering upon the people of Berlin in order to force the Allies to leave, in spite of their undoubted Treaty rights to occupy certain zones in the city.

That version is as thoroughly false and misleading as the rest of the vast structure of malice and propaganda that has been built up to conceal and distort the reality of our relationships with the Socialist third of humanity.

The real issue was put succinctly by Walter Lippman in the *New York Herald Tribune* on September 24, 1948:

The Berlin crisis has been developing over a period of nine months - since the break-up of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was held in London last autumn. The four powers were unable to agree on any important features of a German peace treaty. The failure of those negotiations led to the decision that since there was no prospect of an acceptable four-power agreement on all of Germany, the three Western Allies should make a three-power agreement on as much of Germany as they controlled.

But this grave decision left out of account the fact that though the three Western powers have a vital interest in maintaining their position, they do not control Berlin. Berlin can be administered as a community only by four-power agreement. The Russians were quick to see the anomaly in our position: that we stood for three-power control of western Germany and for four-power control of Berlin.

There is no real mystery, I believe, about the fundamental issue

of the Moscow negotiations. It was whether, in return for the recognition of four-power rights in Berlin, we would recognize four-power rights in western Germany. It was never possible, we must, I believe, suppose, that we could induce the Russians to lift the blockade unless they had some kind of commitment from us to review and reconsider the three-power arrangements for western Germany. For if the Russians had recognised our rights in Berlin without a corresponding recognition of their rights in an all-German peace settlement, they would have suffered an immense diplomatic defeat.

That is the position in a nutshell. Both Mr Lippmann and former Secretary of State Sumner Welles have pointed out again and again that the Western Allies' right to be in Berlin, which is 120 miles within the Soviet zone, was recognised by the Russians in consideration of the Western Allies agreeing to the view (in fact it was taken for granted by all concerned) that the British, Americans and Russians should work together to build up a single democratic German republic, of which Berlin would continue to be the capital. The moment the Western Allies abandoned this basis of agreement, formally recognised at the Potsdam Conference, and substituted a policy of their own of building up a West German State, Berlin ceased so far as they were concerned to have the special status of the capital of the future Germany, and they had no more claim to remain in that city than in Leipzig or Dresden or any other town in the Soviet zone.

In justification of their stand the British and Americans now claim that the Soviet Union was solely responsible for the failure to achieve German unity as laid down in the Potsdam Agreement. But as late as October 27, 1947 Mr Bevin admitted in the House that it was not fair to put all the responsibility on the Russians, for the French had in the beginning been primarily responsible.

Soviet retaliation for what they regarded as an attempt by the Western Allies, through introducing their new West German currency into their zone in Berlin, to create an accomplished fact and thereby inflict an overwhelming diplomatic defeat on the Russians, was undoubtedly highhanded and tough. Some Soviet acts, such as staging manoeuvres in the air corridor, etc., have been provocative and dangerous. But their object was essentially defensive, an attempt to stop the Western Allies trying to put the U.S.S.R. into the position of being compelled to accept the division of Germany coupled with the continued presence in Berlin of Britain and the U.S.A.

There were two ways out of this deadlock: former Secretary of State Sumner Welles suggested that, since a West German State was more important to the Allies than Berlin, they should do a deal, securing Russian acceptance of their West German policy and further concessions such as a settlement of Austria and a *modus vivendi* between Eastern and Western Germany as the price of withdrawing from Berlin or remaining on a more or less nominal basis.

Mr Lippmann on the other hand contended that the Russian demand that the Allies resume four-power discussions for an all-German settlement was justified, whatever might be thought of the means by which it was pressed, and that the Allies should agree to go back to that basis of negotiation in exchange for the Russians calling off their 'blockade' of Berlin.

(The word 'blockade' is misleading, because the population of Western Berlin have access to the Soviet zone and the Soviet Government has, in fact, repeatedly offered to make itself responsible for feeding them on the same scale as the inhabitants of the rest of Berlin, which is slightly better than Western zone rations).

But the Western Allies refused to attempt either way out of the deadlock and continued to insist on their right to have it both ways. That is, on the one hand to repudiate the Potsdam Agreement and set up a West German State and on the other to remain in Berlin, 120 miles within the Soviet zone. They upheld this right by organising the air lift to supply the population of West Berlin with enough food, coal, etc., to keep alive. This, though a remarkable achievement, merely prolonged a deadlock which inflicted great and growing suffering on the people of Berlin, created more and more complications and bad feeling, deepened the breach and further embittered the relations between East and West.

The reference of the matter to the United Nations Security Council was correct in principle but carried out in the most bellicose and unhelpful manner possible, flinging about charges of aggression, rattling the sabre, indulging in unbridled abuse, etc. The Russians for their part were equally unhelpful and tough. They had a formally good legal case for claiming that the possibilities of reaching agreement between the Allies had not been exhausted and insisting on Article 107 of the Charter to keep the question out of the U.N. But the United Nations is a political instrument designed to help reach agreement. The Soviet Government would have been better advised to take the initiative itself rather than adopt the barren and negative policy of refusing to recognise the jurisdiction of the Security Council.

In short, Britain and the United States attempted to use the Security Council, not for reaching a settlement, but for mobilising the small States to pillory the Soviet Union as an aggressor and glorify themselves as angels of peace. The Russians played straight into their hands by refusing to have anything to do with the Security Council.

Even so the small States revolted against the role assigned to them sufficiently to come within an ace of agreement – so near in fact as to invalidate the Anglo-American attempt to depict their case as white pitted against the Soviet black and to leave the impression on world opinion that both sides were a pattern in varying shades of grey.

The matter was made even worse from the Western point of view when Mr Evatt, the Australian President of the U.N. General Assembly, exhorted both sides to reach agreement, if necessary with his assistance. For the Soviet Government accepted and the British and United States governments rejected this offer. That finally destroyed the illusion, so carefully built up from Whitehall and Washington, that the British and Americans were the good boys of the United Nations and the Soviet Union the enemy of peace and understanding.

As they had already turned down the Soviet all-round one third disarmament proposal and the Soviet offer of a compromise on the control of atomic energy, the intransigence of Anglo-American policy became uncomfortably obvious.

The picture became clearer when Stalin's offer in February, 1949, in an interview with Mr Kingsbury Smith, to drop the 'blockade' of Berlin if the Western Allies would drop their policy of splitting Germany, was met with a contemptuous refusal, followed by a tightening of Anglo-American measures to 'blockade' the whole Soviet Zone of Germany.

The truth is that, whereas the Soviet Government considers it is to its interest to get back to Four-Power discussions on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement, the State Department and its obedient satellites in Whitehall believe they can split Germany and build up a militarily strong and economically stable capitalist anti-Communist Western Europe, with a re-militarised, re-Nazified (more or less) Western Germany as its spear-head. With this as a base the U.S. would then pass to the offensive, wear down, economically weaken and politically demoralise, and finally provoke upheavals in or otherwise win over the Soviet Zone of Germany and large parts of Eastern Europe.

The 'moderates' of the 'be tough with Russia' school look

forward to being in a stronger and the U.S.S.R. in a weaker position than to-day at some stage in these proceedings, whereupon they would negotiate a 'spheres of influence' settlement dividing Europe and leaving them the lion's share and a free hand to 'mop up' the Communists of France and Italy. The 'forward' school looks to the reconquest of all Europe by a series of counter-revolutions backed by intervention. The super-optimists dream of a European working class Marshall-planned, Morgan-Phillipsed and third-forced into the kind of 'social democracy' that accepts the restoration of capitalism, and of a Soviet regime George-Kennaned into collapse.

The super-optimists, 'forward school' and 'spheres of interest moderates' alike think in terms of using war as an instrument of national policy against the U.S.S.R. and are prepared to risk, indeed some of them are eagerly resigned to and optimistically pessimistic about, a third world war. Most of them prefer prolonging the existing deadlock to negotiating a German settlement with the Soviet Union. At the same time they do not like the increasing truculence of their *proteges* and the prospect of West German industrial competition, and are worried by the growing alarm and hostility of the French to the revival of German nationalism and economic Power.

Mr John Foster Dulles, on his return from heading the U.S. delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, revealed the official perplexities and point of view in an 'off-the-record-talk' in New York on January 10, 1949, to the Overseas Writers Association, that was published by the *National Guardian* on January 24th. Mr Dulles made the following statements:

1. There could be a settlement of the Berlin situation at any time on the basis of a Soviet currency for Berlin and our right to bring in food, raw materials and fuel to the Western sectors. The present situation is, however, to U.S. advantage for propaganda purposes. We are getting credit for keeping the people of Berlin from starving: the Russians are getting the blame for their privations.

2. If we settle Berlin then we have to deal with Germany as a whole. We will have to deal immediately with a Russian proposal for withdrawal of all occupation troops and a return of Germany to the Germans. 'Frankly I do not know what we would say to that,' Mr Dulles was quoted. 'We cannot keep up the airlift indefinitely.'

On March 23, 1949, the Tory ex-Minister Mr Harold MacMillan told the House that there was a 'very serious danger' that the Russians would propose the conclusion of 'a Treaty with Germany involving the ending of the joint occupation by

all the Powers'. The proposal would, on the face of it, be 'very attractive', to British, American and German opinion alike. 'Yet it is a fatal snare. It is, in my view, the kiss of death.' Why? Because what had happened in Czechoslovakia might then happen in Germany. And then 'At one single blow the Communist menace, both military and propaganda, would be on the Rhine'. Moscow, wrote Lord Vansittart in the *Sunday Pictorial* of March 27, 1949, 'may embarrass us by advocating a general evacuation of Germany, so that its armed henchmen might take over the whole country'.

The reader need only look back at the history of British policy toward Germany after the first world war (Chapters II and III) to recognise what all this means: Allied occupation, the militarisation and re-Nazification of Western Germany and ultimately a third world war are necessary to prevent Germany going Socialist – not by Russian intervention but by the action of the German people themselves, in particular the German workers. That indeed would be the kiss of death for British Toryism.

The Paris Conference in June 1949 began with 'inspired' press despatches from Washington saying the U.S. would in no circumstances withdraw troops from Western Germany or set a date for their removal. It went on to Anglo-Franco-American proposals (the operative word being 'American') for the acceptance of majority rule by the great powers in Berlin and the extension of the 'Bonn Constitution' to the Soviet Zone. The Russians countered by pressing for the acceptance in the West of the East German Constitution. The end was a lame compromise that left Germany divided. American-sponsored Capitalism is riding for a fall in the West and conditions are far from ideal in the Soviet Zone. But at least the 'blockade' and 'counter-blockade' over Berlin has ended and some trade will be done between East and West Germany.

GREECE

On January 23, 1948, Mr Bevin, in the course of a speech in the House, for the first time threatened war in connection with British policy in Greece. His statement is so important and so revealing of the distorted view of the world on which Mr Bevin acts that it is worth quoting fully:

Events have shown that it is the policy of the Soviet Union to use every means in their power to get Communist control in Eastern Europe, and, as it now appears, in the West as well. It therefore

matters little how we temporise, and maybe appease, or try to make arrangements.

It has been quite clear, I think, that the Communist process goes ruthlessly on in each country. We have seen the game played out in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, more recently in Roumania, and, from information in our possession, other attempts may be made elsewhere. Thus, the issue is not simply the organisation of Poland or any other country, but the control of Eastern Europe by Soviet Russia, whose frontiers have, in effect, been advanced to Stettin, Trieste and the Elbe. One has only to look at the map to see how, since the war, Soviet Russia has expanded and now stretches from the middle of Europe to the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin. Yet all the evidence is that she is not satisfied with this tremendous expansion...*

Then we have the great issue in Greece which is similar to the others I have mentioned. It has been assumed – in fact, said – that the Soviet Union can wait; that the United States of America and Great Britain will get tired; and that the so-called Government of Communist rebels can be recognised later on without danger; and then, in the end, that a Communist Government will be forced upon Greece, and she will be incorporated in the Soviet system of Communism with the rest. Here, let me make His Majesty's Government's position quite clear. We had hoped to be out of Greece. We had hoped that after the first election a Government would be formed; that in time subsequent elections would take place, and the whole process of democratic development would be allowed to function. But that has not been allowed, because a state of virtual civil war has been perpetuated the whole time. So, it is not a question of what sort of elected Government there is in Greece – Liberal, Coalition, or whatever it might be – but it is a ruthless attempt, constantly maintained, to bring that country in the Soviet orbit ...

I know that I have been pursued in this country on this Grecian question as if it were a question between a Royalist and a Socialist Government or Liberal Government. It is nothing of the sort, and never has been. I beg all my friends in this House to face the fact: this is a dangerous situation. It is a case of power politics. We have been trying to leave Greece an independent country and to get out of it; and we also want her northern neighbours, and everybody else to leave her alone and to get out of it. We will do that immediately they lift their fingers and honourably agree.

I would remind the House that the United Nations have been brought in, but they have been flouted by the Balkan neighbours of

* On February 21, 1946 Mr Bevin told the House that 'the Soviet Union has a territory right from the Kuriles into the satellite States' and that 'I cannot conceive any circumstances in which Britain and the Soviet Union should go to war ... I cannot see about what we have to fight. And certainly it never enters my mind and I am certain it does not any of my colleagues in the Government.' Between February 1946 and January 1948 the facts did not change. But Mr Bevin's language went all the way from swearing he meant peace to openly threatening war.

Greece. There is a very real danger that they and their Soviet mentors may make a great blunder over this business. In all solemnity I would advise great care. Provocations like these lead sometimes to serious developments which we, and I hope they, are anxious to avoid. It would be better to settle this matter in accordance with the decisions of the Assembly of the United Nations than in the promotion of civil war, or in giving any kind of recognition to the Marcos junta, or in attempting the methods which have been applied elsewhere. There is the Assembly decision, and if we accept Assembly decisions in other matters, we should accept the decision in the case of Greece. I say no more than this, that it is dangerous in international affairs to play with fire.

What Mr Bevin meant by the Assembly's decision was, presumably, the very watered-down, tentative and dubious assertions of an Assembly committee, discussed in the previous chapter, about the facilities allegedly enjoyed by Greek guerrillas in the North to cross the frontier when hard pressed and seek temporary refuge in Albania, Yugoslavia or Bulgaria.

On September 15, 1948 Mr Bevin developed his peculiar views of what is happening in the world, by ascribing the unrest and conflicts in Burma and Malaya to the machinations of Communist murder gangs acting in pursuance of a Cominform plot throughout South-east Asia. The plan also included 'special assignments' given to Communists in British trade unions.

'His Majesty's Government have known for some time that this policy on the part of the Communists of the world was working, but no one knew exactly in what form or where it was going to break out. Even if we suppress it in Malaya, as we shall, it may break out in Africa or somewhere else tomorrow and the agents - (laughter) - it is all very well for hon. members opposite to laugh.'

Nothing daunted by the fact that even the Tories laughed at the extravagance of his Blimpish belief that social and colonial unrest the world over was due to Moscow plots and agents, Mr Bevin continued:

Not only in Malaya, for if this policy of starting civil war as an instrument of policy goes on - I repeat if it goes on - as it has gone on ever since the war closed, first in one territory and then in another, no one can foresee the end to which it will lead the nations who are promoting it. For ourselves, I think the Commonwealth itself is now seized of the facts of this policy and wherever it rears its ugly head we shall do our best to stamp it out. We shall use our maximum resources to do it. If we do not there will never be a peace settlement and harmony will never be established in the world.

On September 27, 1948, at the United Nations General Assembly, he had reached the point of shouting that 'if the black fury, the incalculable disaster of atomic war should fall upon us' one power alone would be responsible for the evils that might be visited on mankind. That power was the Soviet Union, because of its refusal to accept the American plan for control of atomic energy. This tirade was launched after the Anglo-American rejection of Mr Vyshinsky's compromise proposals for atomic control.

As for Greece, said Mr Bevin, he had been entitled to assume at the time agreements and treaties were signed relating to the Balkans

that Greece's frontiers would be inviolate; that there would be no interference with the internal rights of Greece; that she would be left free by her northern neighbours to develop in her own way; that she would have her elections, develop parliamentary government, and evolve the kind of life she wanted.

I say to this Assembly that, with all the abuse about 'monarcho-Fascist Governments', that the poor people of Greece have never had a chance since the war closed. Greece has not had a moment's respite, either from her neighbours outside or from their accomplices within.

The Greeks have been treated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by their northern neighbours and friends, as if Greece were an enemy country – and, by heaven, if ever a country fought for the allies in this war we have gone through, Greece did her share and ought to be respected. Her people – ordinary people – are now unable to sleep in their beds at night with safety. They have been driven out of the villages. There are thousands of refugees.

The blame for the woes the Greeks have suffered cannot be pinned on the United States and on the United Kingdom. We have merely been trying to assist the Greek people to reconstruct their own lives and defend their own country. We all know of the desire on the part of her northern neighbours for territorial aggrandisement at Greece's expense; that has never been disguised.

We cannot be expected to forget these things. And if the cold war is to stop – and we have not been in it, except to defend ourselves – let those who started this war of nerves lift a finger and order it to be stopped; it will be stopped; and it will be of great benefit to the United Nations and to the world.

In many parts of the world democratic institutions have been attacked, either through the Cominform or by local Communists acting under direction. An onslaught has been made, directly and indirectly, on the rights of peoples and individuals. We are all denounced as warmongers and as everything that is bad. And yet,

when we lift a finger or say a word in return, a resolution must be carried by the United Nations to stop us, because it is offensive. It is we who are the victims of the cold war, waged almost ever since the war closed.'

The reader who has become familiar with the facts recorded in the preceding chapters will feel like Alice when she jumped through the mirror into Looking Glass Land, where everything was reversed and working the wrong way round. For after all the only foreign troops and agents in Greece all along have been American and British, and the interference of these two powers in Greek internal affairs has gone to extraordinary lengths. The appalling thing is that Mr Bevin really believes in the nightmare creatures of his own dream world, and would be quite prepared in a frenzy of fanatical self-righteousness to plunge humanity into a third world war to try to make them come true.

In the summer of 1948, the United States made an all-out effort in Greece, raising the army to over 200,000 men, equipping and arming it lavishly, putting it practically in charge of American officers, who not so much led it into battle as pushed it into battle from behind by dint of heroic exertions. The *New York Herald Tribune*, in a tragi-comic account of the lengths to which American officers had to go to bully the Greek forces into giving battle, recorded the heartfelt remark of one officer that no one had yet found out how to make an army 'get off its fanny and fight if it doesn't want to.'

The simple Greek soldiers not unnaturally tended to think that as the Americans were so all-fired keen on this war they might as well get on with it themselves and leave the poor Greeks alone, who had had enough of slaughtering their fellow countrymen. There were many thousands of deserters, including officers, and the whole offensive, after a tremendous press campaign announcing overwhelming victories, collapsed and left things much as they were before. According to reports from the British Military Mission in Greece the growing unwillingness of the Greek soldiers to fight had become alarming by the end of 1948.

Twenty to twenty-five thousand ragged, half-armed partisans fought a force ten times the size of theirs to a standstill because, unlike their opponents, they knew what they were fighting for and believed in their cause. In their simple way it seemed to them the same cause for which they had taken to the hills during the war against the Nazis, when they found themselves pitted against the same Greek Fascists and Royalists now in the field against

them. The only difference was in their uniforms and foreign backers, who this time, for some puzzling reason, were the very powers that had helped the partisans last time and were supposed to be in favour of democracy and freedom in Greece.

The Greek Government kept many thousands of former resistance fighters in prison for two years, on trumped-up charges or on true charges of having dealt harshly with collaborators and quislings whom they found spying or fighting on the side of the Germans during the war, before it felt it was safe to bring them to trial. The judges were the same judges who had functioned under the pre-war Fascist-Royalist dictatorship of General Metaxas, under the Nazis and under the Greek quisling Rallis Government.

These men had been disposed of inconspicuously and in small batches, but suddenly a decision was taken to kill off a thousand or more. Public opinion, although it had lost interest in the Greek horror, was aroused by the size of the projected murders. It was particularly stirred when ten Greek trade unionists were condemned to death on frivolous charges, including several who were well known for their war services to this country and one who had married a British girl. The Foreign Office played blind and deaf. Mr Bevin said he could not interfere in Greek internal affairs. He ostentatiously ignored a protest in the House on an adjournment – neither he nor his Secretary of State, Mr Hector McNeil, nor his Under Secretary, Mr Christopher Mayhew, was there to reply on behalf of the Foreign Office.

But Mr Evatt of Australia, then President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, made a protest which caused the Greek Government to stay its hand. Mr Evatt then went further and proposed mediation between the two sides so as to bring the whole long and bloody struggle to a close. This aroused the moral indignation of Secretary of State Marshall and Mr Bevin, for it exposed the utter hypocrisy of their bluff that they cared a tinker's cuss about the United Nations, and its decisions or recommendations in Greece or Berlin or Palestine. They unhesitatingly turned down the proposal, just as they had rejected the offer of mediation over Berlin and as they had between them sabotaged the United Nations almost to death over Palestine – Mr Bevin's record on the last issue being on balance a shade worse than his American colleague's.

Reviewing the year's events *The Times* of December 30, 1948 concluded:

The situation is very like stalemate. The Government forces should be able to recover much of the lost ground, but no end can be seen to the struggle, and the political situation in Athens is little more reassuring than the prospect on the battlefield. There is again talk of changes in the Government, with its mere majority of one, and even of extra-parliamentary methods of rule while the emergency lasts, but no one has any real remedy or hope of a remedy for the political difficulties while the war lasts and is menacing. In considering means of ending this disastrous war the western Powers seem to have only two practical courses open to them. Either they must give the loyal forces in Greece more machines and more money, which even then would offer no sure end to the fighting, or they must take up again the project of mediation and endow it with much greater authority than was given to Dr Evatt.

The day this editorial appeared, the *New York Herald Tribune* Paris edition carried a despatch from its Washington correspondent reporting that President Truman was expected to adopt (as he has done since) the recommendation of his advisers to increase American aid to Greece, on the ground that:

The Greek-Turkish programme is the key to American strategy in the Middle East. Politically it is the heart of the Truman Doctrine, and militarily it is the extra strength that strategists feel is needed to keep Greece and Turkey as a bulwark against Communist invasion of the Middle East.

If the British people will stand for it, the gamblers in human flesh are eager to throw British lives into the inferno. Brigadier Maclean, M.P. for Lancaster, spoke the Tory mind in the House on March 23, 1949, when he demanded that the Western Powers should 'send actual armed assistance to Greece.' He would like to see British soldiers having a chance to win medals in Greece.

I interrupted to ask whether it was the gallant Brigadier's 'proposal that we should send conscripts from this country to take part in the civil war in Greece'.

'Mr Maclean: I think it would be preferable to send Regular troops, but if we have not enough Regular troops, we should send conscripts. That would be better than sending no troops at all, and letting events take their course.' (Hansard, March 23, 1949, Col. 407).

On the same occasion Mr Harold Macmillan uttered a cry of alarm: 'I regard the Greek position as very serious indeed, almost desperate.' The Greek Army of 200,000 men was an impossible drain on the country's manpower and resources but 'still is not strong enough to end the war. If it were raised to 300,000 I still do not think it would end the war this summer ...

If the Greek civil war is not ended this summer the Greek morale and the Greek Government may well collapse.'

Mr Macmillan of course wanted us to wade deeper into the bloody mess, organise smashings and killings on a vaster scale, more arms, more money, more explosives, and more cannon-fodder.

The vivisection of Greece is therefore to continue, at any cost to the Greek people, and at increasing jeopardy to world peace, in pursuance of Anglo-American oil and power politics, dressed up when necessary as solicitude for Greek freedom and democracy.

THE MIDDLE EAST

During the year 1948 Mr Bevin's Middle East policy produced a situation that would be Gilbertian if it were not so tragic: the Labour Government, it will be recalled, assumed office on the basis of a longstanding policy, approved by successive Annual Conferences, fought for in Parliament, and strongly defended by Labour's responsible leaders, that was summed up as follows in the Labour Party's report on the International Postwar Settlement that was summarised in *Let Us Face the Future* and set forth the foreign policy on which Labour won the General Election:

PALESTINE

Here we have halted half way, irresolute between conflicting policies. But there is surely neither hope nor meaning in a 'Jewish National Home', unless we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong case for this before the War. There is an irresistible case now, after the unspeakable atrocities of the cold and calculated German Nazi plan to kill all Jews in Europe. Here, too, in Palestine surely is a case, on human grounds and to promote a stable settlement, for transfer of population. Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out, as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and let their settlement elsewhere be carefully organised and generously financed. The Arabs have many wide territories of their own; they must not claim to exclude the Jews from this small area of Palestine, less than the size of Wales. Indeed, we should re-examine also the possibility of extending the present Palestinian boundaries, by agreement with Egypt, Syria or Transjordan. Moreover, we should seek to win the full sympathy and support both of the American and Russian Governments for the execution of this Palestinian policy.

In 1939 Mr Creech Jones, who was as Colonial Secretary to act as unwilling understudy to Mr Bevin's Palestine policy, spoke to a resolution of the Southport Conference, passed with only two dissentients, that condemned the Chamberlain Government's Palestine policy of making Jewish immigration dependent on Arab consent and restricting Jewish land settlement, as violating the principles of the mandate and our solemn pledges. The argument of the Chamberlain Government's White Paper, said Mr Creech Jones,

is set out in terms of a capitulation to violence. The argument runs that it is largely because of the [Arab] rebellion which has been fostered from outside that the Government must reconsider their policy.

'What is really at stake,' said Mr Creech Jones, 'is a conflict between the new order, which the Jews stand for in Palestine, and the old, crumbling, feudal system for which a few rich Arab landlords stand. That difficulty of conflict between the new and the old order has been exploited by Fascist imperialism: it has been exploited by those who hate the very principles for which the Jewish democracy stood; and it has been exploited largely because in that crumbling old order one saw spreading through the Middle East a new democratic faith which would ultimately undermine the foundation of the older system ... The Jews are asked to end their experiment because our own Government is unable to secure good order, is unable to restrain the Fascists, is unable to check the bandits who come in from outside.'

On becoming Foreign Secretary, Mr Bevin, as explained in previous chapters, simply took over without question the Churchill-Eden foreign policy of going back to the Crimean War in the Middle East, with its practical consequences in Greece and Palestine. With regard to the latter it meant that Labour's Palestine policy was simply thrown overboard by Mr Bevin, who is as fond of insisting that he always keeps his word as tricky Mr Baldwin was fond of parading his honesty.

Mr Bevin continued Mr Eden's policy of building up and arming the Arab League, intended to constitute a great Middle East anti-Soviet defence bloc run by feudal sheikhs, whose Moslem faith and social interests would guarantee their opposition to any Soviet or Communist penetration, meaning thereby agrarian revolution or any other form of serious social unrest. The Arabs on which this block was to rest were the very men of whom Brigadier Glubb Pasha, himself one of the evil geniuses of the pro-Arab policy, commander of the Transjordan Arab Legion during the war, and the leading British officer who led

Arab forces in their invasion of Palestine in defiance of the United Nations and nominally in disagreement with British policy, wrote in 1944:

At the time of these operations every Arab was perfectly convinced that Britain was finished for ever and that it could only be a question of weeks before Germany took over Europe. The Iraqis were perfectly sure of this or they would not have declared war on us - in brief, during the six weeks before the fall of Baghdad every Arab was convinced that we were done for. Every Arab force previously organised by us mutinied and refused to fight for us or faded away in desertions.

In Palestine, with a Jewish population only half that of the Arab, twice as many Palestinian Jewish volunteers, to the annoyance of the pro-Arab Palestine Administration, which was already thinking of double-crossing the Jews after the war, served in British and Allied units. Palestine became the one war base in the Middle East about whose loyalty Britain never needed to worry. Thirty thousand volunteers joined the British forces in spite of the plea for a Jewish Army being resisted to the end. There was a higher proportion of voluntary enlistments from among the Jewish Palestine population than from any part of the Empire or Commonwealth. On the other hand pro-Fascist and Nazi sentiments became so strong in the feudal Egyptian regime that British tanks had to be driven into King Farouk's palace yard 'as a show of force to compel the King's consent to the appointment of a pro-British government under Nahas Pasha.'*

This may seem a somewhat odd procedure to employ toward an ally whose sovereignty we were sworn to respect. But the ally and the situation were undoubtedly peculiar and our ruling class was never one to stand on ceremony when vital interests are at stake.

Iraq declared war on us, the Mufti of Jerusalem, who after the war became one of the pampered favourites of Mr Bevin's Middle Eastern policy, was broadcasting from Berlin calling upon the Arabs to revolt, while Fawzi al Kawkji, who afterwards led Arab forces into Palestine in defiance of the United Nations, was also in Germany working for Hitler during the war. Another of the leading Arab commanders unofficially

* From the pamphlet 'Palestine - The Stark Facts and The Way out' by two Labour M.P.'s., W. N. Warbey and Lyall Wilkes (who served in Palestine during part of the war). Much of the above account is taken from the clear and damning marshalling of the facts in this pamphlet.

enjoying Mr Bevin's favours or at least those of his agents on the spot during the period of Arab sabotage of the United Nations and assaults on Palestine, Sheikh Hassan Salameh, was dropped in Palestine by parachute in 1944 for sabotage duties as a German major.

As early as the Bournemouth Conference in 1946 Mr Bevin announced that he could not admit 100,000 Jews to Palestine, as recommended unanimously by the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, because 'it would require two British divisions to keep the Arabs quiet'. After this he concentrated 100,000 troops (more than six divisions on a war footing) in Palestine to hold down the Jews and keep out the immigrants.

There were always desperate elements in the Jewish population in Palestine. With the background of struggle against terrible oppression, cruelty and suffering in the countries from which so many of them had come it was only surprising that the fanatics and terrorists were such a small minority. Mr Bevin's policy was a direct incitement to them while preventing the regular Jewish Army from restraining them. This started a vicious circle of terror and counter-terror, the abolition of *habeas corpus* and all civil liberties, the imposition of a curfew and a harsh, military dictatorship.

Mr Bevin further rejected the unanimous Anglo-American Committee Report in 1946, although before the Committee left he had privately promised some of its members, as both American and British reports afterwards disclosed, that he would implement any recommendations that were unanimous.

He also opposed the idea of a partition of Palestine, thus cleaving faithfully to the traditional Foreign Office line, which was to incorporate Palestine with the Arab States, but guaranteeing the minority rights of the Jews (in practice the Foreign Office was not very fussy about the guarantee part of this proposal. Anything that looked good enough on paper to put it over would satisfy them, for their policy was to appease the Arabs at the expense of the Jews). The Colonial Office, on the other hand, had been in favour of the partition of Palestine ever since the report of the Peel Commission in 1937.

In February 1947 the Government abandoned the attempt to find a solution acceptable to both Jews and Arabs and refused to impose a settlement. It therefore turned over the whole problem to the United Nations as the heirs and successors of the League in the matter of the Palestine mandate. The resulting investigation produced a General Assembly report adopted by 33 votes

to 13 (the latter including the seven Arab States and the former the Dominions and the United States as well as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), recommending the partition of Palestine. Mr Bevin then embarked upon the policy of passive sabotage and turning a blind eye to Arab machinations that was responsible for so much delay, disorder and bloodshed and has so greatly weakened and discredited the United Nations.

The Arab States from the first openly announced their intention to end the partition of Palestine by armed force and went ahead openly with their preparations to fight. The Prime Minister of Lebanon, Riad al Solh, on December 7, 1947 told his Parliament that 'the Lebanese army now on the Palestine borders will play its part with other Arab armies in saving Palestine when the proper time comes.'

The Iraqi Premier on October 23, 1947, announced that 'the Iraqi army will march and enter Palestine if the United Nations adopt partition.'

The Syrian Premier on January 12, 1948, promised support for a Jihad (holy war) in defence of Arab Palestine.

The Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia on December 15, 1947 promised 'to save Palestine by our souls, money and sons.'

The Secretary General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha, said 'This war will be a war of extermination and massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongol massacres and the Crusades,' (October 11, 1947).

Jemal Hussein, spokesman for the Palestine Arab Higher Committee at U.N.O., said 'the partition line proposed shall be nothing but a line of fire and blood.'

The preparations were then put in hand openly, and Arab forces began to enter Palestine under the noses of the British forces that were responsible for maintaining law and order. The Arabs not only poured in from the surrounding States but Mr Bevin continued to supply these Arab States with arms and munitions, while at the same time blockading the Jews to prevent them getting ready to defend their lives, and, incidentally the decision of the United Nations, which the Jews had accepted and the Arabs rejected. Sir Alexander Cadogan's argument to the United Nations was worthy of the Foreign Office at its best in the palmy days of appeasement: Because the frontiers of Palestine had not been recognised there could not be aggression when Arab forces entered and took up their positions in the country. The frontiers had been laid down by the United Nations

but not recognised by Britain, who refused to accept the United Nations solution.

Mr Bevin armed the Arabs, who were defying the U.N., on the ground that we had treaty obligations to them as allies. He denied arms to the Jews, who were defending the territory assigned to them by the U.N., because of the United Nations' decision that neither side should get arms. He allowed Arab forces to enter Palestine on the ground that there were no recognised frontiers, when it was his own decision to refuse to recognise the frontiers laid down by the United Nations and accepted by more than two-thirds of the General Assembly (including the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and the Dominions) that was responsible for this situation. He prevented the Jews getting ready for self-defence or the United Nations Commission from entering Palestine lest we appear 'un-neutral' and offend the Arabs. During these proceedings Mr Bevin, through Sir Alexander Cadogan, stalled and played for time at the United Nations.

Now Article 103 of the United Nations Charter explicitly says that whenever other treaty obligations conflict with its provisions the obligations of the Charter shall prevail for members of the United Nations, so that Mr Bevin's policy of arming the Arabs because of our treaties of alliance was a violation of the Charter. Mr Hector McNeil's reply on February 16 to a question, that 'I have no evidence to suggest that arms supplied to Middle East governments by virtue of these treaties ... are being made available for warfare in Palestine', was a piece of cynicism and hypocrisy worthy of Chamberlain at his worst. It had the authentic Foreign Office smell.

Of course, no one could prove that any particular rifle, cannon or aeroplane brought into action against the Jews and the United Nations by Britain's Arab auxiliaries had been provided by Great Britain during the period that the supply of arms to the Arab States was forbidden by the United Nations. It might well be indeed that the new arms coming in were kept by the Arab States for their regular forces, and that the latter's slightly less modern weapons were then turned over to the irregulars that were being not so much smuggled as openly marched into Palestine.

When heckled at press conferences about the presence of Arab forces in Palestine, the Foreign Office spokesmen blandly replied that it was no longer 'within the bounds of strength' of British forces to stop this traffic. At that time the British forces in Palestine were about ten times as big as the Jewish forces that

stopped all six Arab armies about a month later and were armed and equipped 100 times better than the said Jewish forces. The usual appeaser argument was worked to death that the whole of the Middle East would be in flames and the Arabs would rise in their irresistible wrath if they were not allowed by Britain to do as they pleased – but this supposedly mighty and invincible Arab League was made in Britain and armed by Britain, apart from proving a ramshackle bluff when it came to the point.

The following incidents in a deadly account by Mr Jon Kimche, himself an eye-witness of what he describes, in the *New Statesman and Nation* of January 8, 1949 show the sheer bad faith of the British authorities: while arms were openly and admittedly flowing unchecked across the land frontiers to the Arabs

two British destroyers patrolled the short sea coast of Palestine day and night. There was never a moment in Tel Aviv when one or the other was not visible like a shadow on the horizon that can never be shaken off. They were most effective: no arms reached the Jews. Hence, it was hardly surprising that there was a feeling locally that the British were displaying a certain partiality in the execution of internal security, particularly as the land forces that could not be found to patrol the frontier were busy in Jerusalem and Haifa disarming any Jewish patrol they came across.

That was what might be called the first phase. The second period started with the completion of the arming of the [Arab] Liberation Army. In April, Fawzi el Kaukji descended from the hills with some 2,000 men and attacked the Jewish settlement of Mishmar Naemek. He surrounded it, and for five days shelled it with seven French 75 mm. guns which he had just received. All this took place six weeks before the expiry of the Mandate, four miles from the main R.A.F. airfield in Palestine and 12 miles from Haifa. R.A.F. planes were in the air throughout the fight. A company of Hussars was stationed close by.

I recall an incident typical of this second phase. During the night, at the local H.Q., a conversation between el Kaukji and Haifa was intercepted. Kaukji said that he had exhausted his petroleum supplies. Next morning, driving down the road from Sarid to Haifa – which is also the road from Haifa to Jenin, where Kaukji had the bulk of the Liberation Army – we passed nine motor tanks from the Haifa refineries. They were accompanied by 34 armed vehicles of the Arab Legion, commanded by a jeep containing four British officers. It passed right through the Jewish battle area. It did not reinforce local faith in the scrupulous impartiality of the Mandatory Power.

Mr Bevin's Arab bloc kept coming unstuck. Egypt hung fire for a long time on the ground that it did not wish to enter into

an alliance with Britain which would enable the British Government to commit it to a war anywhere in the Middle East against the Soviet Union. No sooner had the treaty been concluded with the Iraqi Government than it was overthrown by Nationalists, who likewise objected to being incorporated in British imperial combinations in the Middle East.

The British Government refused to carry out the U.N.O. Committee's recommendation that a Jewish militia should be formed in good time to protect the new Jewish State, although Sir Alexander Cadogan, reporting to the United Nations on security conditions in Palestine, had said that 'the international status of the United Nations Commission will mean little or nothing to Arabs in Palestine, to whom the killing of Jews now transcends all other considerations'.

Finally, when the British forces withdrew on May 15, 1948, after allowing the Arabs to get ready for war in Palestine, but forbidding the Jews to make any preparations to defend themselves and refusing the United Nations representatives the right to go into the country until a fortnight before the British withdrawal, the Arabs duly attacked the State of Israel and attempted to make good their threats to drown it in blood.

The Security Council met on May 15 while full-scale Arab land and air attacks were taking place on Jewish towns and territory. But Sir Alexander Cadogan did not speak until the 18th and then only to doubt whether there was a threat to peace justifying the American proposal to invoke Article 39 of the Charter. A further week passed of Arab attacks on Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and in the Negev. Sir Alexander roused himself only on May 22 to oppose the application of strong measures to halt the invasion. He moved a tame resolution asking both sides to stop fighting within 36 hours. The Arabs went on attacking for a further 48 hours and the Syrians then asked for 48 hours more for the Arabs to deliberate. Sir Alexander warmly supported the request for a further delay. On the 28th he again opposed hasty action. The Arabs captured the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem; thirteen days later the Cease Fire came into operation. But it was not until July 13 that Sir Alexander Cadogan thought the time had come for strong measures. Why? Because the day before the Jews had captured Lydda and Ramleh; the tide of war was turning.

The Jews then proceeded to knock the ramshackle Arab League to pieces and to occupy the territory assigned to them by the United Nations but denied to them by Britain. The British

Government had put through a proposal to mediate, which under Foreign Office influence resulted in offering the Arabs a very favourable settlement and the Jews a miserably small territory. But the Arabs in the flush of their initial military successes turned these proposals down and were then in their turn defeated by the battling Israelites.

Mr Bevin thereupon demanded that the Jews should withdraw their forces from the territory (Negev) assigned to them by the United Nations and through which they had driven back the Arab invaders of their country, and should return to the mediation proposals which the now defeated Arabs had previously rejected when they were attempting to defy the United Nations and conquer Israel by force of British arms. Naturally the State of Israel refused.

At the same time as he was trying to make the Jews give up their territory as assigned to them by the U.N., which they had successfully defended against the Arab invaders, Mr Bevin, through Sir Alexander Cadogan, was urging the Security Council to be 'realistic' and recognise that the Dutch could not be asked to withdraw from the Indonesian territory they had seized by force of arms in disregard of the decisions of the United Nations and in the teeth of a Security Council condemnation of them as aggressors.

To the Jews: Give up the territory assigned to you by the United Nations which you have successfully defended. To the Dutch: Keep the territory you have seized in defiance of the United Nations. Why this double standard?

The *News Chronicle* of January 4 carried a Washington despatch saying that

'Britain has warned the U.S. Government of the danger of a complete military and political collapse of the Arab nations, with a power crisis of the first magnitude in its wake. This grave message from Mr Bevin was communicated to the State Department last Thursday:

The British view ... is that whether or not Israel provokes the situation with attacks on Arab countries the wider danger of Arab military defeat on a considerable scale is still present and indeed increasing ... the whole balance of power in the Middle East is judged to have changed, with Egypt and her Arab neighbours being continually and progressively weakened.

The *News Chronicle*, which for some time has been attempting to prove that cocoa is thicker than blood, published a leader on January 13, which was pure Foreign Office phony power politics.

It read like a F.O. Press Bureau hand-out. It argued that the Jews, by being tactless enough to stick up for their rights, sell their lives dearly and beat Mr Bevin's *protégés* the Arabs, had turned 'what was a matter capable of settlement between Arabs and Jews' into 'an affair of strategic importance affecting the vital interests of many world powers, including Britain and America'. If this situation were allowed to drift it might conceivably develop into 'a major conflict'.

The fundamentals of the situation in the Middle East are these. In the first place, the Middle East is the bridge by which a great land Power could make a bid for the control of Africa. Such a bid, if it were successful, could speedily lead to control of the whole land mass of Europe, Asia and Africa. Then the American Continent would be left to contemplate with dismay a clash in which the greater part of the world's resources and population would be arrayed against it. This is a situation which the Western democracies dare not permit.

Secondly, from the Middle East comes the oil which is essential to our Western civilisation. Thirdly, in the Middle East are located many of the bases upon which sea-power depends, and seapower is still the life-line of the democratic countries.

Britain above all must defend these things. There is nothing sordid in this. In doing so we seek no added power, but security and freedom to live as we wish to live. Nor is there anything selfish in our aims. If these interests in the Middle East are vital to Britain, they are also vital to all the democracies and to peace itself.

The reasoning is the same as that of the U.S. State and War Departments, in the policy of global intervention described by the Alsop Brothers in the *Saturday Evening Post* of February 21, 1948, referred to in the last chapter. The article explained that the U.S.A. must stay in Greece and Turkey to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East, not only for the sake of oil, but because 'with the Soviets in the Middle East the fate of Europe and Asia will be sealed, unless we fight to get them out. And we should have to fight to get them out, since our own fate would be sealed if the Soviet sphere ever extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific'.

Oil and anti-Soviet power politics, it will be observed, are the 'unsordid' motives of Anglo-American policy, according to this account. It is assumed that the Russians are anxious to march through the Middle East into Africa, just as Western Union is based on the idea that the Russians wish to march through Europe to the Atlantic, and America's policy in China was

directed to preventing the Russians marching through China into Southern Asia, the Philippines and the East Indies.*

When the Jews had defeated the Arabs, who with British connivance and assistance attempted to wipe them out, King Abdullah of Transjordan was prepared to abandon the Arab League and come to terms with Israel. The Foreign Office told him they viewed any such policy with alarm. Brigadier Glubb Pasha, in charge of King Abdullah's Arab Legion, that is paid and armed by Britain, induced the King to break off negotiations and send for British help, which arrived, men, planes and ships, with a promptness that suggested a put-up job. After that the Egyptians entered into negotiations with the Jews for peace – and British planes, accompanied by Egyptian planes, were sent on a reconnoitring expedition that involved crossing over the battle zone at low level and led to five R.A.F. planes being shot down by the Jews. British troops were held in readiness to go into action if the Egyptian Government yielded to British pressure not to make peace and solicited British military aid. Further British forces were prepared to go to the aid of Iraqi troops who were defending their homeland by shelling a Jewish settlement 250 miles beyond the Iraq frontier.

Mr R. H. Crossman, who was a member of the Anglo-American Palestine Commission and has in his articles and speeches in the House shown an appreciation of the realities in Palestine that puts him in a different class from Mr Bevin's advisers – in 1946 and 1947 he frequently pointed out, for instance, that the Jews were in fact a stronger military force than the Arabs – cabled from Israel on January 15, 1949 a devastating exposure of Mr Bevin's anti-Semitic and anti-Soviet phony power politics:

Starting from the fatal illusion that the Arab armies could easily overwhelm the Jews, our Palestine policy has been based on the foundation of a myth, buttressed by prejudice which now threatens to destroy our whole Middle East position. That position cannot be saved by grandiose military gestures which we are quite unable to follow up, but only by sober reassessment of the realities here, and a policy based on that reassessment.

* Even more extravagant are the beliefs apparently entertained by the blindly faithful at the other end of the political scale. A Sydney despatch on June 20, 1949 reported that Mr L. L. Sharkey, Secretary of the Australian Communist Party, had been found guilty of uttering seditious words because he had said on March 5th that 'If, in pursuit of aggressors, Soviet troops came to Australia, the Australian working class would welcome them in the way they were welcomed by the people of Europe when they were liberated.' One does not know which to admire most – Mr Sharkey's political realism or the liberalism of the Australian authorities.

What are those realities? First is the military and political collapse of the Arab League. The Arab Legion, numbering not more than 12,000, is intact, because Abdullah is wise enough not to commit it in any major action. All other Arab armies have melted into thin air. The Egyptian Army has virtually ceased to exist during the recent fighting ...

In so far as British power depended on Arab military strength (which in terms of modern war was always mythical) we have inflicted gratuitously on ourselves a sensational defeat by compelling the Jews to fight for their lives – and to win.

The second reality is that the collapse of the Arab war of conquest in Palestine produces a social convulsion in every Arab State. On one hand, reactionary groups now in control are more inclined to appeal to Britain for protection ...

On the other hand, anti-British feeling reaches a new fever of intensity ... Arab leaders complain that Britain first encouraged them into this campaign, in which they were spectacularly defeated, then backed down halfway. Arab bitterness against Britain, as I found after talking the whole morning with notables in occupied Nazareth, is even stronger than the Jewish bitterness. This explains the behaviour of Egypt during the last few days. Forced by blundering British policy into an open choice between accepting British help under the deserted 1936 Treaty or entering into armistice negotiations with the Jews, the Egyptians preferred the Jews. Thus, Bevin's power politics have only resulted in a shattering blow to Britain's waning prestige.

In spite of the war, says Mr Crossman, there is more law, order and civil liberty in the State of Israel than the population has enjoyed ever since the Arab revolt in 1936.

With the removal of the Police State, into which the Mandate had degenerated, the nation has emerged, equipped with civil and military administration; sea, road, and rail transport, and full-scale social services – the whole equipment of a Western European Socialist State ...

From this war, forced on them by deliberate British policy, Israel has emerged as the one constructive force in the Middle East, a twentieth-century Socialist State in the midst of the Middle Ages.

Israel could have been our close friend and ally. Her people stood by us in the war and asked nothing better than to work with us in peace. They felt deeply grateful for the Balfour Declaration and the mandate. They resented the Chamberlain Government going back on its pledges in order to appease the Arab chieftains, who turned to Nazi Germany anyway during the war. But they believed the Labour Party really would keep its promises to change all that.

To-day, all chance has disappeared of the State of Israel siding with Britain in international affairs. Mr Bevin has seen to that. The best he can hope for is that Israel will become a sort of Middle East Switzerland, holding aloof from all blocs and entanglements.

Dr Chaim Weizmann, now President of the State of Israel, is one of the most distinguished of post-war statesmen. Before and during the war he proved, in word and deed, a staunch and wise friend of this country. The following passage in his *Autobiography* shows what Mr Bevin's breaking of Labour's word and anti-Semitic feelings* have done to alienate Britain's friends in the Middle East:

If ever a political party had gone unequivocally on record with regard to a problem, it was the British Labour Party with regard to the Jewish National Home. But to-day it is clear from the course of events that the promises and protestations of friendship lacked character and substance; they did not stand up to the pressure of those forces which, behind the scenes, have always worked against us. It was on November 13, 1945 that the Labour Government officially repudiated the promise of the Labour party and offered us, instead of the abrogation of the White Paper, and relief for the Jews in detention camps - a new Commission of Inquiry.

The British government, in other words, refused to accept the view that 6,000,000 Jews had been done to death in Europe by various 'scientific' mass methods, and that European anti-Semitism was as viciously alive as ever. The British government wanted the Jews to stay on and contribute their talents (as I afterward told the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) toward the rebuilding of Germany, so that the Germans might have another chance of destroying the last remnants of the Jewish people.

Instead of the mass movement of Jews into Palestine which the British Labour party had repeatedly promised, there was an offer of a trickle of 1,500 refugees a month. Instead of the generous recognition of the original purposes of the Balfour Declaration, there was a reversion to the old, shifty double emphasis on the obligation toward the Arabs of Palestine as having equal weight with the promise of the Homeland to the Jews. The let-down was complete.

Mr Bevin, who, as the new Foreign Secretary, issued the declaration of policy on behalf of the Labour government, was apparently determined to make it clear that no doubts should be entertained anywhere as to his personal agreement with the worst implications of the declaration. At a press conference following the issue of the

* Mr Attlee in the Palestine debate of January 26, 1949, hotly denied that Mr Bevin was anti-Semitic. He said some of Mr Bevin's best friends were Jews. I should hate to say when and where I heard that one before. K. Z.

declaration, he said, apparently apropos of our demand for the fulfilment of the Balfour Declaration and the promises of the Labour party: 'If the Jews, with all their suffering, want to get too much at the head of the queue, you have the danger of another anti-Semitic reaction through it all.'

I thought the remark gratuitously brutal, even coarse, but I cannot say that it surprised me. My personal contacts with Mr Bevin have been unfortunate where Jewish matters have been concerned. His tone was hectoring. I first went to see him, in his capacity as Foreign Secretary, with regard to immigration certificates for refugees. We had been offered a ludicrously small number, which we could not offer the unhappy, clamouring inmates of the D.P. camps without a feeling of shame. We refused the certificates. Mr Bevin's opening remarks to me were: 'What do you mean by refusing certificates? Are you trying to force my hand? If you want a fight, you can have it.' There was not the slightest effort to understand our point of view; there was only an overbearing, quarrelsome approach.

A fitting epitaph on Mr Bevin's policy in Palestine, where he staked his reputation in November 1945, to achieve a settlement within twelve months, are the following remarks by Mr Harold Laski, a member of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, in *Forward* of May 15, 1948:

This week brings us to the final phase in Ernest Bevin's disastrous Palestine policy. If, in his now notorious phrase, he 'staked his reputation' on his ability to solve the problem, not an atom of that reputation is left except among the colleagues in the British Cabinet whom he drove into joint responsibility with him, and the professional eulogists who always feed the vanity of a Minister in high office.

It is a dreadful failure. He has stained the great name of Britain all over the world by mean acts and utterances. He has been rough and brutal in negotiation. He has sought to club his critics into silence. He has been unable to produce a single argument for his attitude which has not dismayed the friends of the Attlee Government and made the world wonder whether the traditional state-wisdom of Britain is not exhausted.

It is a dismal story. No doubt his position has been made more difficult by many factors. American policy in this field has been futile, irresponsible and devious; no Arabs helped him anywhere in the Middle East, since they contemptuously refused all compromise...

If there is one jot of magnanimity in Mr Bevin's Palestinian activities, I am not aware of it. In a mingling of vanity, self-righteousness and revengeful bad temper, he accepted a Foreign Office policy built by men with different ends in view and little contemporary perspective, so that what he led his colleagues to

support was too seldom based on evidence that would stand examination. Rarely has a British statesman played so sorry a role out of a vain self-complacency which made humility a virtue beyond his reach.

THE FAR EAST

By the end of 1948 the French were no nearer reconquering Indochina than they had been in 1945. In Burma and Indonesia there had been widespread disorders and attempts by Communists and guerrillas and partisans, some of whom had turned into something like bandits, to overthrow the existing regime. Similar disorders arose in Malaya, where, however, abject poverty was aggravated by grievances arising out of what native workers resented as exploitation by white planters.

The result was a British colonial war in Malaya and a sudden and treacherous attack by the Dutch on the Indonesians, in total disregard of their pledges to the United Nations, which for some time had been conducting enquiries and attempting mediation on the spot. This represented the triumph of the colonial die-hard reactionaries and imperialists in Holland. It led to a period of intense guerrilla warfare followed by a shaky settlement under duress.

The time has gone past when Indonesia can be held down indefinitely by force, and if the United Nations, thanks to the ambivalent Anglo-American attitude, could take no strong action it did at any rate pillory and expose the bad faith of the Dutch Government to the world.

In China America's war of intervention bit the dust and the reactionary, semi-Fascist, corrupt, oppressive and incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime was overwhelmingly defeated by the Communists for the reason ultimately that the Chinese people greatly prefer the latter to the former. The defeat of the policy of anti-Communist intervention in a country the size of China may prove a turning point in history hardly less important than the defeat of Mr Churchill's intervention in Russia after the first world war. It will have immense, incalculable and cumulative consequences for all China's neighbours and throughout the Far East.

CONCLUSION

During 1949 statesmen and public opinion in the great Western Democracies became dimly aware of the growing failure of their whole post-war world policy. In essence, and under many

layers of confusion, contradiction, camouflage, humbug and hypocrisy, it is the same old policy of 'preservation of society on existing lines and resistance to Communistic propaganda' that was practised after the first world war and so painfully and unnecessarily lost the peace.

But last time the policy was temporarily successful in arresting the forces of social change and social revolution in Europe, at the cost of acting as midwife to the Capitalist counter-revolutions of Mussolini, Hitler and their minor disciples in Eastern and Southern Europe. By the time the policy of restoring the old order collapsed in the great slump and its aftermath, the backing of Western Toryism for Central, South and East European counter-revolution had raised the Frankenstein monster of the Fascist Axis, which was wound up by appeasement and from which humanity had to be delivered at a bitter price.

This time the events of years have been telescoped into months and the defenders of the old order have been fighting in the outskirts and on the beaches and edges of the Eurasian Continent. Their policy of restoring and propping up Capitalism has begun to collapse before it really got started. For it is too late to restore the old order and too early to drag the peoples into another great war as the last throw of the despairing gamblers of die-hard Toryism.

In China, it proved too late to prop up the rotting old order, represented by Chiang Kai-shek, and too early to drag the American and British people into war for any such insane purpose. The colonial wars in Indo-china, Indonesia and Malaya, against that background, are doomed to failure, after a more or less prolonged and bloody deadlock.

In the Middle East it proved too late to keep Arab feudalism from collapsing, when its rotten social foundations were shaken by defeat, in spite of the imposing façade of the synthetic Arab League made in Britain. It was too early to bluff or trick the British people into a war, and Mr Bevin in attempting to embroil them met his Chanak*.

In Greece all President Truman's money and all his men have failed to put the Humpty Dumpty of Greek Royalist Fascism securely on the throne again. It is too late to make the Greek people return to the hideous past of the Meaxas Fascist dictatorship and the oath-breaking King George, however hard, long,

* When Mr Lloyd George after the first world war indulged in sabre-rattling at Chanak in Asia Minor against the Turks, who had just defeated his *protégés* the Greeks, he was repudiated by public opinion and the Tories in the Coalition.

expensively, bloodily, destructively, self-righteously and hypocritically American and British interventionists may try to make them submit. Nor is the British or American people in a mood to be stampeded into a world war for this vile cause.

The battle of the Western interventionists has been lost long ago in the rest of the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The foundations of Socialism are already impregnably strong in these countries. It is too late to restore Capitalism and too early for the war-weary peoples to be led into a crusade, even by clergymen praying for blood and atom bombs in the name of the religion of brotherly love.

As the reactions of the American and British peoples and the United Nations Assembly have shown, it is too early to seek support for starting a war in the attempt to inflict 'overwhelming diplomatic defeat on the Russians' by compelling them to accept the Anglo-American claim to remain in Berlin in the Soviet Zone, while excluding the Russians from any share in the settlement of Western Germany. On the other hand, it is too late to restore Capitalism in Germany. Socialism is already taking its place in the Soviet Zone on a scale that cannot be undone.

In Western Germany, the Anglo-American restoration of Capitalism and splitting of the country has succeeded merely in reviving the unholy trinity of German big business, militarism and Fascism, and encouraging it to embark on a policy of blackmailing the Allies and working for war. This is setting up acute social tension and resentment within West Germany and providing the German workers with the arguments not only of glaring social injustice but of national unity, national independence and peace. It is causing alarm and dissension in the West and rubbing salt in the wounds of France as the facts become known.

In Western Europe and Italy public opinion is beginning to realise the uncomfortable fact that the Marshall Plan on present lines cannot succeed, and that in 1952 Western Europe may be worse off than it is to-day and still hopelessly insolvent. This prospect is made even gloomier by the burdens of rearmament and conscription imposed by the American strategic plan, the cutting off of Western from Eastern Europe, and the social cleavage and conflict imposed by American intervention.

The longer headed among the Western statesmen must be reflecting that they could have ended American intervention in China a year earlier, on terms that would have led to the formation of a broadly-based Left Wing Kuomintang - Democratic League - Communist coalition government, safeguarding legi-

timinate Western interests in China, if they had been prepared to compromise and co-operate with the Soviet Union in the Far East. Now they have to take their chance at the hands of the victorious Communists, after the defeat and downfall of the near-Fascist regime they backed so stubbornly and bloodily. Similarly, the kind of policy to which Labour was pledged in the Middle East could have been applied on much more favourable terms at any time between 1945 and 1948. Now it is necessary to face the situation resulting from the total defeat and collapse of Mr Bevin's Tory-inspired feudal Arab bloc and the alienation of the State of Israel.

A year hence, these statesmen may well argue, it may be necessary to face an equally unfavourable situation in Greece. In any case, with the collapse of the Crimean War policy buttressed on the Arab bloc in the Middle East, there is no political sense in continuing intervention in Greece. And if Britain and the United States find it necessary to come to terms with the Soviet Union and Communism in China, and with the Soviet Union and social insurrection against Arab feudalism in the Middle East, they have no moral justification, if they ever had any, for the further vivisection of the Greek people.

The deadlock in Germany can be prolonged only on terms that continually strengthen the forces which in a few years, when the U.S.A. slides into depression, and failing a third world war, will overthrow the old order and build a united Germany on new social foundations.

The bargaining position of Western Europe, which needs food and raw materials, is at best not very strong against Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which can feed and house their populations and build up their own industries, although to do so will be a longer and harder job without full trade with the West. But with American economic aid based on war preparations, restoring Capitalism, alienating the workers and cutting off trade with Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and Socialist reconstruction in the East forging ahead with increasing momentum on the other, the bargaining position of the West promises to be even worse in two or three years' time than it is at present, even if U.S. Capitalism does not suffer a 'major recession' in the meantime. Bit by bit, not through the operation of reason or on grounds of mercy and justice, but simply under the pressure of sheer physical necessity, military defeat, social collapse and economic adversity, the policy of Anglo-American anti-Communist intervention and anti-Soviet power politics is being

abandoned in the Far and Middle East and weakening in Europe. But there is little sign that the powers that be are drawing sane political conclusions from the tale of deadlock and break-down.

Anglo-American world policy in fact is not so much a policy as a series of retreats and rearguard actions by die-hard defenders of Capitalism, who can be forced to acknowledge defeat but will go on preparing for war, making trouble and refusing to make peace with blind obstinacy and vindictiveness until their own peoples rise up, sick of the imbecility, hypocrisy and cruelty of their rulers and longing for peace, and call the fear and hate-crazed warmongers to account.

CHAPTER IX

The Failure of Tradition

THE CHANGING WORLD

WE are drifting towards a war that will destroy us because our foreign policy has failed. Our foreign policy is a failure, not because of lack of intelligence, or knowledge of facts by the Government's professional advisers, or of good intentions in our National and Party leaders, but because it is rooted in traditions and assumptions that have become unreal. In the last thirty years the forces of change that began to gather momentum more than half a century ago, and that became turbulent and rapid after the first world war thirty years ago, have transformed the world out of all recognition.

One third of humanity, comprising some 600 million people, living in the vast territory that extends from the middle of Europe to the Pacific, and from the Arctic to the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Middle East, Central Asia and the coast of China, has passed or is passing through a social revolution. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China, the foundations of a new social order are rising, based on public ownership and control of the means of production and distribution. The process has gone so far, covers such a vast area and is backed with so much intelligence, determination and toughness that no power on earth can put the clock back. There is much that is harsh and ugly, still more that is primitive and unfinished in the new societies. They are in a state of change and evolution. But the forces of change are native and work from within. Change can be influenced, but not imposed, from outside; force will be victoriously resisted and the threat of force only aggravates the evils it invokes as a pretext.

In the rest of the world, the spreading sense of man's increasing command over the powers of nature has wrought a mental revolution. The workers, in the broad sense of the many who are poor and have to work hard for little reward, have acquired a different status and power, a new social militancy and political consciousness.

Apathy, resignation and fatalism about evils such as unem-

ployment, ignorance and poverty, have almost vanished. There is something like a politically effective demand for a decent standard of living. Democracy as a system of government is being summoned to deliver the social goods demanded as minimum satisfactions by the people, and particularly by the workers, on pain of seeing democracy as a way of life jeopardised by the intensity of the struggle between those who believe fundamental social change is necessary to provide the required goods and the all-in defenders of those who enjoy power, wealth and privilege under the old order and are determined to resist change, even at the price of destroying democracy and gambling on a third world war.

The great new ideas of planning and world government have come to stay. They sum up and symbolise the revolt against economic and international anarchy, the shaking off of selfishness and helplessness in ordering our affairs as a community, and the assertion of man's duty to his neighbour and right and capacity to be master of his fate.

These great forces or trends or currents of opinion and emotion, call them what you will, are sweeping through mankind and transforming the world before our eyes. The rate of change and the method of change are different in every separate community and vary from year to year. But the process is universal. There are no water-tight barriers or differences of principle between East and West Europe, nor even Europe and Asia, or ultimately America, Africa, Europe and Asia. Among the subject coloured races, social emancipation, what Dr Sun Yat Sen, the pioneer of the Chinese Revolution and the founder of the Kuomintang, called the principle of the people's livelihood, is mixed up with the struggle for national liberation and racial equality. The day of colonial rule and exploitation by alien rulers of subject populations is passing in Asia, if it has not already passed. It is only a question of time when Africa's hour will strike.

BRITAIN'S CHANGED POSITION IN THE WORLD

Within these wider changes, our own position in the world has changed: Britain is no longer the greatest and richest world power, ruling one quarter of humanity. The Empire and Commonwealth are growing up or falling apart – it is sometimes hard to tell the difference. From being a creditor, we have become a debtor nation, struggling to make ends meet and still a long way from our goal. The development of modern weapons, particularly the air arm, has made this thickly populated, industrial island

highly vulnerable, relatively weak and militarily almost a part of the Continent.

The British people, like other peoples, have not yet come of age in world affairs. But they are less docile and infantile than they were thirty or even twenty years ago. Too little has been learnt by the experience of two world wars and all the upheavals and betrayals, disappointment and distress between. But nevertheless something has been learnt. They are beginning to ask questions and to take an interest in the drift to war.

The people believe in defending our country against attack. They can be won for a policy of organising peace, through establishing a system of world government that will uphold the rule of law and promote the common interests of the peoples in social justice and economic welfare. They will take the risks and make the sacrifices necessary for self-defence or for making a reality of the great and beneficent idea of world government.

But they cannot be convinced that it is necessary to kill and be killed on the satanic scale of fury and destruction of modern warfare for such abstractions as the balance of power, or for such iniquities as colonial exploitation, or such sheer insanity as the attempt to undo the social revolution in one third of humanity and put back the old order.

Attempts to take advantage of their innocence, ignorance and loyalty to their rulers to 'sell' them policies pursuing such aims, by representing them as identical with self-defence or half-way houses to world government, may succeed temporarily. But they will break down sooner or later under the impact of reality and those who have sown the wind will find they have reaped the whirlwind and that the hour of reckoning is upon them.

BRITAIN'S UNCHANGING FOREIGN POLICY

Through all these psychological, social, national, imperial and international changes, British foreign policy has remained unchanged in its main lines and fundamental assumptions. That fact emerges with sufficient clarity from the record of the preceding chapters of this book. In particular, the grand aim of maintaining the balance of power, as the sum total of British policies and purposes in world affairs, has never been abandoned, although all history shows that this policy invariably ends in war and reason demonstrates irrefutably that it makes war inevitable.

THE BALANCE OF POWER AND SPLENDID ISOLATION

The nineteenth century was the hey-day of British power and wealth. We had a navy greater than that of the next two greatest navies in the world combined. We had a long head start in the industrial revolution and a world-wide Empire.

In those days democracy was practically non-existent in foreign affairs. The objectives of foreign policy were relatively limited and precise. They could be expressed in terms of strategic points, colonial possessions and foreign markets. And so the great game of power politics could be played almost bloodlessly, like a vast chess game, where you could bluff or seriously threaten war and the other fellow could estimate coolly whether it was worth taking the risk or better to yield with what grace he could muster.

The French Commander-in-Chief in the early part of the first world war, General Joffre, relates how, at the height of one of the crises between France and Germany over Morocco in the opening years of this century, he was asked by the then Prime Minister Viviani, whether he, as Chief of the General Staff, could guarantee that there was a seventy per cent chance for the French Army to beat the Germans in case of war. 'No', said Joffre. 'Very well, then, we will negotiate', said Viviani.

That was power politics, that was. The past master in the art was Bismarck, who managed to gain a lot with only two small wars, in which he had it all his own way, as the price.

As far as Britain was concerned, our way of playing that game in the spacious days of the nineteenth century was to keep our hands free (splendid isolation) and throw our weight on whatever side in any European controversy we thought our advantage lay. Because there was no democracy in foreign affairs and the professionals of power politics had no use for moral indignation, except as one of the weapons in their diplomatic arsenal, alliances and alignments could be changed with bewildering rapidity and total cynicism, and the great game was played in secret.

THE BALANCE OF POWER AND THE ENTENTE

The Boer war nearly brought about a Franco-German coalition against us. This frightened the government of the time badly, because our power-politics had been based, ever since the Franco-Prussian war, on the Franco-German feud, which swelled into the Franco-Russian versus the Austro-German alliances.

It was realised that Britain was no longer strong enough to play the game of power-politics single-handed and that there was danger of a German combination dominating the Continent and pressing its claims for colonies and access to the Middle East at our expense.

Hence Britain found it necessary to attach herself to the Franco-Russian camp. But she did so as loosely and ambiguously as possible and preserved the valiant pretence of retaining freedom of action in case of a crisis. One reason for this was that we did not wholly trust our allies and disliked the idea of being committed to war by them. Another was that the Liberal Government, which had taken over this policy in 1906 from the Tories, knew that it was unacceptable to many of their own followers in the House and to the semi-Pacifist, semi-isolationist, anti-Imperialist opinion of the Liberal and Radical voters, mostly working class and lower middle class, who had given the Liberal Government its huge majority. Nor would public opinion agree to pay the price for building up these arrangements and understandings in the shape of the unsavoury bargainings and deals that ended with the French conquest of Morocco, the Anglo-Russian partition of Persia, the Italian war on Turkey, etc. Power politics and Imperialism were so outrageous morally, so shocking to common sense, and so remote from their interests that the people could not safely be let into the secret.

The people were easily fooled and forgave and forgot everything when the war duly broke out. So did most of the members of the Cabinet and the back benchers who had been kept in the dark. But the double-dealing of their leaders did much to split and wreck the Liberal Party for good.

In their day, however, there was no alternative to power politics; their choice was between isolationist power politics, which would no longer work, because we were not strong enough, and Entente power politics.* They likewise failed to keep the peace, but did at least mean that we entered the war with powerful allies and as adequately prepared as anyone else for the kind of war everyone expected – which was not, of course, the kind of war we actually got. The first world war turned out to be quite different from what the General Staff of any of the belligerents had prepared for. It was a war of peoples that changed the world.

* A third alternative would have been to let the Russian Revolution of 1905-6 succeed, instead of lending money to the Tsar to strangle it. The liberalisation of Russia would have made it impossible to retain semi-autocracy in Imperial Germany, and we should probably have avoided the first world war. But that alternative was literally unthinkable to the British and French ruling class.

THE BALANCE OF POWER AND THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS

By the end of the war public opinion had been aroused to the point where the establishment of a system of world government had to be officially substituted for the maintenance of the balance of power as the grand objective of British foreign policy. The idea had been badly watered down by the time it reached the Covenant of the League of Nations, and was treated as mere sentimental humbug to placate public opinion by the Foreign Office and the seasoned power politicians of the Liberal and Tory Parties.

The previous chapters have shown to what inextricable confusion the Tories were reduced by the contradictions between their lip service to the League in order to fool public opinion on the one hand, and their devotion to old-fashioned power politics on the other, and how further their attempts to build up a new balance of power failed disastrously because of the clash between their pro-Fascist class interests and their anti-Axis Imperial interests.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the extraordinary tenacity and persistence of the Foreign Office tradition in the teeth of all the realities of the modern world, apart from such airy nothings as public opinion (which in the view of the Foreign Office exists only to be circumvented, humbugged, and trotted out as a bargaining counter in negotiations with other countries), honour, mercy, justice and treaty obligations.

In the case of the Sino-Japanese conflict, for instance, they went back to the old Anglo-Japanese alliance and before that to the partnership between Britain and Japan in the nineteenth century for the exploitation of China.

The Italo-Abyssinian conflict was handled throughout by the Foreign Office on the basis of the 1906 Treaty between Italy, France and Britain, contemplating a division of Abyssinia at some suitable moment under cover of solicitude for her sovereignty and integrity, on the lines of the old Morocco deal with France. The 1906 treaty, in turn, summed up and codified innumerable Imperialist bargains, deals and understandings between the great powers, jointly or separately, in and around Abyssinia, going far back into the nineteenth century. As Mr Churchill told the House on December 1, 1948: It is necessary to put these matters 'in their proper settings and perspectives, because events happen from day to day, but they all happen as

the result of long chains of causation which one must bear in mind if one is to see where the next link comes in or closes.'

The Tories got into a fearful snarl in trying to build up a balance of power against Germany. In the first place, Russia, the only country powerful enough to serve for the purpose, was excluded because she had gone red.

In the second place, as Mussolini's Fascist regime depended for its survival on the preservation of Fascism in Germany, the attempt to separate the two and bring Mussolini into the Democratic camp was ludicrous.

In the third place, Fascism, being Capitalist counter-revolution, was driven by the nature and internal necessities of the regime to ever further aggression and violence, and would not and could not become a 'satisfied power' by the rape of Abyssinia, any more than Japan could be satisfied by being allowed to take Manchuria (these were the 'realistic' theories on which the Foreign Office pundits proceeded).

In the fourth place, the Tories did not want to hurt the Fascist regimes at any price, because they looked on them as a bulwark against Communism.

In the fifth place, public opinion could be kidded to the point where the Tories snatched a quick electoral victory in 1935 by pretending that they wanted to uphold the Covenant against Mussolini. But it was a hopeless enterprise to justify appeasement of the Fascist regimes by claiming that we could live at peace with them and denouncing as bloodthirsty warmongers those who, like the Labour Party and the League of Nations' Union, asked for leadership in collective action to restrain Fascist aggressions – and at the same time to expect public opinion to support a rearmament campaign. If the government had been honest and explained that we must rearm against the Fascists because they meant mischief, the immediate and deadly retort would have been, why did they not nip Nazi rearmament in the bud by collective action at Geneva, as proposed by the French and the Poles, or alternatively, why did they not threaten to cut off oil for Mussolini and close the Suez Canal before he started his war, as Mr Attlee asked them to do in the House on June 7, 1935, in order to forestall his aggression against Abyssinia and force him to call it off.

The attempt to combine pseudo-Pacifism and pretended devotion to the Disarmament Conference with a race for arms against the very powers which we were allowing to commit aggressions and refusing to take the risk of coercing when we had

most of the civilised world on our side, failed, as it was bound to fail. Moreover, the Tories held the view, expressed for instance by Sir Thomas Inskip, the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence (afterwards kicked upstairs to the House of Lords, where he had a distinguished career, suited to his talents, in selecting Biblical texts for the *Daily Sketch*) on May 21, 1936, that rearmament must not 'impede the course of normal trade'. This meant, as he confessed on the same occasion, that the new arms factories then being built, did not have priority over private firms in securing delivery of the necessary machine tools, although the latter were the bottleneck. It was a case of profits before defence. Indeed, the F.B.I. and Tory politicians conducted rearmament as part of the normal activities of private profit-making enterprise, and so turned it into a vast racket, by which businessmen could more than recover the losses incurred during the slump.

The conflict between class and Imperial interests, the humbugging of public opinion and conducting rearmament on the basis of putting private profits before the needs of defence, resulted in the balance of power policy never even taking shape. The Fascist powers were encouraged and indeed helped to combine, rearm, commit successive and swelling aggressions with impunity, to overrun or weaken our potential friends and allies, and finally to land us in a second world war, almost alone and only half armed.

Mr Churchill's own opinion of the responsibility for the second world war of the Party which he now leads and hopes the electors will return to power so that they can start a third world war of intervention, was fittingly expressed by him in the House on October 3, 1938:

So far as this country is concerned the responsibility must rest with those who have the undisputed control of our political affairs. They neither prevented Germany from rearming, nor did they rearm ourselves in time. They quarrelled with Italy without saving Ethiopia. They exploited and discredited the vast institution of the League of Nations, and they neglected to make alliances and combinations which might have repaired previous errors, and thus they left us in the hour of trial without adequate defence or effective international security.

THE BALANCE OF POWER AND THE UNITED NATIONS

After the second world war we pledged ourselves once more to the endeavour to establish a system of world government, that had been so shamefully betrayed with such awful consequences after the first world war. But the Labour Government

has continued the foreign policy of the Tories, which has resulted, as it was bound to result, in throwing overboard the Charter of the United Nations and falling back on the balance of power and a race for arms. For a long time the Government tried to cover up this fact and to humbug public opinion, perhaps even to assure themselves that this was not happening.

Previous chapters have quoted Mr Bevin's statement in the House on February 21, 1946, and Mr Attlee's assertions on November 18 of that year, as well as his replies to questions about Anglo-American arms standardisation, etc., that showed how strenuously the Government were denying then what they now admit to have been true all along. As late as March 6, 1947 the Prime Minister replied with an emphatic affirmative to my question whether 'he will re-affirm the declaration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to this House, on February 21, 1946, to the effect that war between this country and the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. is equally inconceivable, that no such possibility ever enters the minds of the Government or any other party, and that, in considering all organisations or States, there can be no policy or anything else which would lead to a conflict with either of these great Allies'.

In the defence debate of March 20, I returned to the charge, and concluded, after exposing and analysing the contrast between the Government's words and deeds:

The plain truth is, if the Government mean what they say, if their policy is based on the United Nations Organisation and its Charter, and within the U.N.O. on equal friendship, co-operation and confidence with regard to both the Soviet Union and the United States, that there is no sense whatever in our present military establishments, and our defence arrangements are out of all proportion to our necessity, as well as being out of all proportion to our means. The only thing that makes plain and sinister sense of the Government's Defence White Paper is the assumption that the Labour Government to-day have got into the same position as the Liberal Government between 1906 and 1914, and are saying one thing in public and to the back benchers and doing another. I accuse the Government of not genuinely basing their policy on the United Nations Organisation, and still less on friendly and equally close co-operation with both the Soviet Union and the United States of America within the United Nations organisation. I accuse them of basing their policy on an Anglo-American *entente* and an Anglo-American arms tie-up against the Soviet Union ...

I accuse the Labour Government of conducting a foreign policy to-day that is based on systematically deceiving and misleading the

people of this country and flouting the pledges on which this Government was returned to power. I accuse the Government of becoming the make-weight in an Anglo-American balance of power run from Wall Street and Washington and designed to use the threat of war as an instrument of national policy against the U.S.S.R., against Socialist reconstruction in Europe and against the movements of social and national emancipation in the Middle and Far East.

Balance of power politics are not only a crime because the balance of power always ends in war. An Anglo-American balance of power is a mug's game for the Labour Government, because America will supply most of the power, while we shall have to provide the conscript cannon fodder for policies determined in Washington, as we are doing in Greece to-day. Big business and reactionary America wants things in the world that are not in the interests of a Labour Britain, and if we make ourselves wholly dependent on the United States, for defence or anything else, the end is going to be that they will crack down on the Labour Government's home policies.

In the debate of March 31, 1947 I spoke and voted against the Bill introducing permanent peace-time conscription, pointing out that I did so not as a pacifist:

I fought in the first world war, I was a Home Guard in the last war and I accept the principle of conscription ...

The real root of my objection is stated this morning in the *Daily Herald*. It says:

Only one thing, indeed would justify Parliament in refusing to grant to a British Government to-day the powers now sought: and that would be the failure of such a Government to base its foreign policy on support for U.N.O ...

We are in fact basing our policy on an Anglo-American *entente* and arms tie-up ...

There is a case, of course, for an Anglo-American balance of power and arms tie-up against the Soviet Union and it was powerfully argued by the Leader of the Opposition at Fulton. I understand that case. It is a logical case. I feel about it rather as Ernest Renan felt about the theology of a great Church with which he disagreed - he said its doctrine was a logical system that went wrong only in its foundations. The foundation of the Fulton foreign policy is belief in the immaculate conception of the foreign policy of the capitalist United States and in the original sin of the foreign policy of the Communist Soviet Union. That dogma is based on the perfectly consistent and logical belief of the Conservative Party that the world's journey to Socialism is not really necessary. One can say with only a little exaggeration that the Tories of Britain and America are the *Irgun Zwei Leumis* of civilisation's march to Socialism. They would cheerfully blow up civilisation with atom bombs rather than allow it to move in that direction.

I can understand this argument. But I cannot understand why a Labour Government, basing its belief in world peace on the advance of Socialism, must tie itself up with this crypto-Fulton, Winston and water foreign policy, while paying lip service to the United Nations.

PRACTISING TO DECEIVE

As late as the Margate Conference of the Labour Party at Whitsun, 1947, Mr Bevin accused me of being an 'expert in deception', because I had moved a resolution which urged the Government to give a lead in applying the fundamental principle of the Charter that 'the permanent Security Council members, and particularly Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., must co-operate as equal partners' and 'must trust each other to keep the peace' by 'instructing the Service Departments to frame their estimates and make their strategic dispositions on the assumption that Britain need not prepare for self-defence against either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R.'

'If that is accepted', cried Mr Bevin, with a splendid show of moral indignation, 'what is the assumption? The assumption is that that is what we have been doing. That is the clear deduction, that we have had some sort of machinery for this purpose, employed somewhere, according to a certain strategy. We are doing nothing of the kind and I cannot accept what is implied in the resolution.'

The whole burden of my speech had been that 'the main issue, and the one to which this Conference will have to give an answer, is the question of whether we believe that it is possible to conduct our relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the Charter, or whether we think that we have got to conduct those relations on the basis of Fulton, as suggested by *Cards on the Table*. The answer should be that the Charter is the only possible basis on which we can win the peace. If we abandon the Charter, if we give ourselves over to the idea that it is impossible to reach agreement by the peaceful means provided in the Charter, and that only the threat of war can suffice to come to terms with the Soviet Union, then we are heading for a very serious situation'.

In the light of subsequent events, it should be fairly obvious who was the expert deceiver at the Margate Conference.

WHAT THE BALANCE OF POWER MEANS TO-DAY

On June 9, 1948 *The Times* reported from Washington that the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, had 'declared flatly that Britain was definitely on the side of the United States in the

present "cold war" against Russia, and was a partisan rather than a mediator. "After the failure of the Big Four meeting in London last December we came to the conclusion, if we had not already done so before, that we are with you on that issue," he said ... "On minor points there will be differences. But on the big issue we are with you".

This was the first open official admission that Britain had lined up with the U.S.A. against the U.S.S.R., although this had then been an accomplished fact for more than two years. Just to see how truthful the Government now felt it was safe to be, I asked the Prime Minister on June 29, 1948:

(1) Whether he will give an assurance that, in spite of the existence of joint Anglo-American defence arrangements, the West European military alliance and the recent declaration of His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington to the effect that this country had taken sides with the U.S.A. against the U.S.S.R., his announcement on March 6, 1947, to the effect that war between this country and either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. could be equally disregarded in considering the policy of this country, still holds good, and

(2) whether he will assure the House that the emergency plan for joint action in case of hostilities with the Soviet Union, in Berlin or elsewhere, agreed upon during the visit to Washington in April of Lieut.-General Sir Leslie Hollis, Deputy Military Secretary of the Cabinet, does not impose any obligation on the country to go to war if the United States enters into military conflict with the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister: The policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to security continues to be based upon their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. I cannot undertake to say in advance how these obligations would operate if an act of aggression occurred. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government naturally reserve their right to conclude arrangements for regional defence based on Article 51 of the Charter. Regional arrangements for defence already exist, as my hon. Friend is aware, in Eastern Europe. There is no defence agreement between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government, though relations between the services and staffs are, of course, close and cordial.

Mr Zilliacus: Is the Prime Minister aware that the arrangements referred to in these two questions are regarded in the United States as automatically committing this country to go to war if the United States were to go to war with the Soviet Union in any part of the world. Is that impression correct, or is it a wrong impression?

The Prime Minister: I am not aware that that impression is prevalent in the United States of America, and I really cannot correct every impression which gets in the minds of another country or of hon. Members of this House, (Hansard, June 29, 1948, Cols. 2007-8).

Evidently Mr Attlee did not think that what the Spaniards call the 'hour of truth' had yet arrived. The 'hour of truth' is the moment when the bewildered bull, after being goaded to a frenzy by lance-thrusts and barbed darts, and having run himself tired after red rags, wielded by beings nimbler and more cunning than he, is despatched by the matador. The poor old British public is the bull.

But by the end of 1948 humbug had been pretty well abandoned and there was no longer any serious attempt to deny what had been true for nearly three years, namely that we were back in the balance of power and engaged in a new race for arms. The plea now was that we had no choice, that we had tried and failed to come to terms with the Russians by the methods prescribed in the Charter and that there was nothing for it, therefore, but to resign ourselves to the inevitable. At the same time growing efforts were made in Press and Parliament to fill the people of this country with such fear and hatred of some vast vague bogey called 'Communism' that they would be conditioned to bleed and burn in another war.

Resignation is made easier by encouraging public opinion to chase the will-o'-the-wisp of a Western Union that shall be both solvent and anti-Soviet, democratic and anti-Communist, independent and allied to the United States, and which somehow, sometime is to achieve stability and finality that will in some unspecified way change the international situation for the better to such a degree that we can resume negotiations with the Soviet Union and make peace. This is mere international Micawberism, elevated to the dignity of a world peace policy. It is the kind of feckless optimism of the lunatic who fell off a skyscraper and shouted cheerily 'All right so far' as he whizzed past a pal on the 21st floor.

The grim fact is, and it must be pounded home into people's skulls lest we perish, that the balance of power and a race for arms make another war certain. The time and occasion are in doubt. We probably have another five years at least to blunder into and out of a number of major crises before rearmament and the working up of public hysteria have reached the pitch of war. But the end is as sure as death. And the end will be death on a vast and frightful scale unless British foreign policy is radically changed.

Moreover, the Government have filed their petition in bankruptcy in world affairs and are more or less belliciously drifting to war, for that is what throwing overboard the Charter and

falling back on the balance of power and a race for arms mean when stripped of verbiage, in circumstances where, for the first time in our history, Britain is the weaker partner in the alliance on her side of the balance, and therefore forfeits her national independence as part of the price of her policy; the issues, being matters of social organisation and political ideology, are so vast and vague that they are inherently incapable of settlement by the methods of power politics, that is by diplomatic bargaining backed by the threat of war; and where war itself has become something so all-inclusive that preparation for war will break the Labour Government and bankrupt the country and to fight the war that is coming would close the long and not inglorious chapter of British history.

THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER AND THE THIRD ARMS RACE

The North Atlantic Treaty or Pact, as it is officially called in the United States, marks the all but avowed abandonment of the attempt to base our relations with the Soviet Union on the principles, purposes and obligations of the United Nations and the all but open return to the balance of power, with its inevitable concomitant of a race for arms and the growing prospect of war.

In view of the preponderant political, economic and military influence of the United States in the grand alliance based on this Pact, the American interpretation of its character and purpose will in practice be decisive. In any case, the British official view appears, as usual, to have taken its cue from Washington.

Let us therefore examine the official case for the North Atlantic Treaty as set forth in the U.S. Department of State White Paper, published on March 19, 1949:

This document calls the North Atlantic Pact 'a treaty for collective defence' and says it has become necessary because 'the expectation that the co-operation among the Great Powers pledged during the war and reflected in the Charter would be continued has not been realised. The most important of the peace settlements have not been agreed upon, and, largely because of Soviet obstruction and abuse of the veto, the United Nations has not yet become so fully effective in achieving collective security as had been hoped.

'Since the signing of the Charter it has become progressively clearer that serious misconceptions prevail in the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union concerning Western civilisation and concerning what is possible and what is impossible in the relations between the Soviet Union and the world at large. A major contri-

bution which United States foreign policy can make is to dispel these misconceptions by means consistent with the Charter.

'In the field of international relations the efforts of the Western Powers to reach agreements providing genuine solutions for many of the most important post-war problems have thus far proved fruitless because of Soviet intransigence. Nonetheless, the Parties to the North Atlantic Pact solemnly and specifically reaffirm their obligation under the Charter to settle any international dispute by peaceful means and in such a manner that peace, security, and justice are not endangered. In the Pact they pledge themselves anew to strive toward that end.

'The North Atlantic Pact speaks in clearly understandable language. It defines the security of the North Atlantic area and the consequences of infringement upon that security. It should thereby enhance the likelihood of reaching peaceful solutions to pending problems by making clear the consequences of resort to force.'

To make the point even clearer, the State Department further explains that: 'The purpose of the Pact is to strengthen the peace by making clear that the Parties are prepared to do their utmost individually or together to maintain it and to act together if any one of them is attacked ...

'The clear intention of the Parties to the Pact to take united action, coupled with the preparation of the means to do so, should remove the danger of miscalculation by any potential aggressor that he could succeed in overcoming them one by one. If a similar clear indication of the firm intention of the free nations had been given early enough in the course of Nazi aggressions, the Axis Powers might well have stopped before they precipitated a war in 1939. Faced with sufficient firmness, potential aggressors have always paused. Firmness does not in itself provide solutions of the underlying problems, but it does increase the readiness of ambitious nations to seek solutions by negotiations rather than by force.'

The State Department then addresses itself to the task of proving that the Atlantic Pact is consistent with the principles, purposes and obligations of the United Nations Charter: It endeavours to do so in a section entitled 'The Pact and the United Nations Charter' as follows:

The Atlantic Pact is a self-defence arrangement among countries of the North Atlantic area who, while banding together to resist armed attack against any one of them, specifically reaffirm their obligations under the Charter to settle their disputes with any nation

solely by peaceful means. It is aimed at co-ordinating the exercise of the right of self-defence specifically recognised in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is designed, therefore, to fit precisely into the framework of the United Nations and to secure practical efforts for maintaining peace and security in harmony with the Charter ...

The primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the Security Council. The obligations undertaken by the Parties to the Atlantic Pact do not affect their obligations under the Charter and are subject to present and future obligations with respect to actions taken by the United Nations 'to maintain or restore international peace and security'. Article 7 of the Pact explicitly states: 'This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.' In other words, everything done by the Parties under the Treaty must be done in accordance with their obligations under the Charter, the provisions of which, wherever applicable, are paramount.

The words 'wherever applicable' could be used to justify disregarding the obligations of the Charter on the plea that they are no longer applicable. That, in effect, is what the North Atlantic Treaty does, as is shown below.

Finally the State Department's explanation asserts, quoting the words of Mr Warren R. Austin, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, that 'conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact would reduce the likelihood of war. It would increase the prospects of peace. It would help us turn to a major task of the United Nations - the substitution of pacific settlements for armed conflict'.

If these assertions and arguments were correct, the Secretary General and leading officials of the United Nations might be expected to be delighted at this epoch-making contribution to the strengthening of the world peace organisation. It is therefore a fact as significant as it is disturbing that the opposite is the case. The *Manchester Guardian* of March 21st published a despatch from its New York correspondent, saying that Mr Trygve Lie, the United Nations Secretary General, 'has refused all comment on the Treaty and most pointedly would say nothing about President Truman's opinion that the United Nations had been strengthened. He is positively known to feel quite the contrary'.

The Secretary General's pessimism is shared by the leading

officials of the Secretariat and by permanent delegates of governments accredited to the headquarters of the United Nations. The *Manchester Guardian* of March 23, 1949, published a further despatch from its New York correspondent, Mr Alistair Cook, on the doubts and apprehensions entertained by such bodies as the American United Nations' Association and Foreign Policy Association, and added:

There are not least the delegations and staff of the United Nations, some senior members of which feel for the first time that the Russians have little to gain by staying inside the organisation and may at the coming Assembly prepare their exit with a long farewell from Mr Gromyko. At the unhappy centre of this group is Mr Trygve Lie, who is in these days an extremely unhappy man.

Field-Marshal Smuts, on the other hand, has fervently welcomed the North Atlantic Pact and pointed out that for all practical purposes it supersedes and sets aside the Security Council of the United Nations. That too has been the tone of a good deal of British and American Press comment – the argument of many supporters of the North Atlantic Pact is that as the Security Council could not keep the peace or settle disputes because of Soviet intransigence and abuse of the veto, the new organisation had to be set up to take over the job without and against the Soviet Union.

There is small doubt that Field-Marshal Smuts's appraisal of the effect and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty is correct, whereas that of the State Department is, to put it mildly, disingenuous.

That explains the unhappiness of the Secretary General of U.N.O. and his colleagues. It explains why the Soviet Union has denounced the Pact as a war alliance directed against the U.S.S.R. and a breach of the Charter and of the Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet alliances. It accounts for the fact that the conclusion of the Pact has caused a rapid, grave and alarming deterioration of relations between East and West and increased the fear of war.

Neither the political assumption on which the North Atlantic Pact is based, nor its view of the action permissible in the exercise of the rights of self-defence are consistent with the principles, purposes and obligations of the United Nations Charter.

The Charter was founded upon the basic assumption, wrote Mr Trygve Lie in his first Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations 'that there would be agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council upon

major issues. The fact that the Charter gave the right of veto to each of these permanent members imposes upon them an obligation to seek agreement amongst themselves. I should be failing in my duty in presenting this report if I did not emphasize the absolute necessity that the powers should seek agreement amongst themselves in a spirit of mutual understanding and a will to compromise, and not abandon their efforts until such agreement has been reached.'

The prime purpose of the United Nations is to preserve the peace. By Article 24 of the Charter, the members of the United Nations confer 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' on the Security Council and 'agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf'.

The Security Council can discharge this primary responsibility only if its permanent members, that is the great powers who were allies in the war, base their mutual relations on the fundamental principle of the Charter, contained in Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, that members of the United Nations must settle all their differences by peaceful means and never resort to force or the threat of force as a means of settlement.

This does not mean that there will not be disagreements or even deadlocks between the permanent members of the Security Council. That, alas, would be a counsel of perfection. But it does rule out the use of force in order to break deadlocks and iron out differences. It commits the members of the United Nations to keep on trying and never to stop trying to reach agreement by peaceful means.

This obligation in the Charter is absolute, unlimited and fundamental in the relations between the permanent Security Council members. If they wish to remain loyal to the United Nations and observe the obligations of the Charter, they must trust each other's will to peace to the point where they do not fear aggression from nor prepare for or contemplate war against each other. Even when they disagree and have reached a deadlock in their mutual relations, they must keep on trying to reach agreement by peaceful means, and only by peaceful means. They must never, in any circumstances, on the plea of self-defence or the abuse by the other fellow of the veto power, or for any other reason, prepare for or contemplate the necessity of war against each other, or resort to force or the threat of force in order to break deadlocks or end disagreements.

The provisions of the Charter are worked out so as to agree

with this basic assumption. Thus Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements, Articles 52, 53 and 54) allows regional arrangements or agencies to be set up, but says that their activities must be 'consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations' (Art. 52). Except in the case of ex-enemy states, i.e. states who fought on the side of Germany during the last war, when freedom of action is granted the Allied Governments by Article 107 of the Charter, Article 53 provides that 'no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council'. 'Enforcement action' means, as defined in Chapter VII of the Charter, 'action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression'.

That is, the Charter expressly rules out action under regional arrangements to deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, except when ordered by the Security Council, which, it is provided, 'shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority'.

The Soviet Union, it may be observed at this point, has a number of bilateral treaties with her European neighbours committing her to go to their assistance and *vice versa*, in case of an attack by Germany or a State fighting in association with Germany.* These treaties are genuinely regional and limited to the contingency of 'armed attack' by an ex-enemy State or its associate. They are, therefore, formally consistent with Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter, whatever view one may hold of their political necessity or desirability. They are radically different in scope and character from the North Atlantic Pact.

Article 51 of the Charter lays it down that nothing in the Charter 'shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations'. But the Article also limits the exercise of the right of self-defence in such a way as to subordinate it to the authority and efficacy of the Security Council, as the body charged with preserving peace and dealing with acts of aggression.

For Article 51 goes on to say, after the words just quoted, that measures taken by members in the exercise of the right of self-defence shall last only 'until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security' and that they shall further be 'immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority

* They are mentioned in the State Department document.

and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security'.

This means that what it is lawful to do in the exercise of the right of self-defence is severely limited, for it must not go to such lengths as to affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to safeguard or restore peace. That authority it can wield only so long as its permanent members trust one another's will to peace.

The North Atlantic Treaty or Pact on the other hand, as we have seen, starts with the political assumption that the Contracting Parties are threatened by aggression from the Soviet Union and must prepare for a war of self-defence against that country. The whole justification for the Pact indeed rests on the assertion that the Western Powers have done everything humanly possible to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. on outstanding issues, that the responsibility for their failure rests solely on the Soviet Union, and that they can no longer trust that country's will to peace. They have a chance of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union only if they can back their diplomatic bargaining with that country by the threat of force. This is the antithesis, the direct negation of the political assumption on which the Charter is based.

The impossibility of reconciling the North Atlantic Treaty with the Charter of the United Nations becomes crystal clear by comparing the crucial obligation in Article 5 of the former with the obligations of Article 51, 52 and 53 of the latter.

By Article 5 of the Pact, all the Contracting Parties, if in their view 'an armed attack occurs against any of them', will take 'forthwith individually and in concert with the other Parties' such action as they deem necessary 'including the use of armed force' in order to 'restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area'.

Now the fundamental obligation of the Charter is one of self-restraint, of holding your hand, of not going to war until you have exhausted the methods of peaceful settlement through the Security Council. This obligation applies to alleged acts of aggression against a member of the United Nations just as much as to the settlement of disputes.

But Article 5 proposes that, whenever any signatory of the Atlantic Pact considers that an armed attack has occurred against itself, all the signatories are forthwith to go to war. But the moment Britain, France and the United States go to war against

the Soviet Union, the third world war would have broken out. In those circumstances, the final paragraph of Article 5 is a dead letter. It reads as follows:

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

What this means in practice is that, when a world war has broken out in which some of the permanent Security Council members are fighting other permanent Security Council members (e.g. Britain, France and the U.S.A. against the Soviet Union and Communist China), they are to meet in the disintegrated Security Council and unanimously agree to tell themselves and each other to stop fighting and 'take the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security'.

The last paragraph of Article 5 of the Pact reproduces some of the language of Article 51 of the Charter and says that the action taken under it is 'in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter'. That is also the claim boldly made by the authors and defenders of the Pact.

But it is no accident that Article 5 of the Pact, while reproducing parts of Article 51 of the Charter, leaves out the essential provision that measures taken in 'the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence ... *shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security*'.

It is obvious that measures in the exercise of the right of collective self-defence that mean some of the permanent members of the Security Council going to war with other permanent members will not only 'affect' the authority and responsibility of the Security Council, but will disintegrate that body, shatter the United Nations, divide the world and plunge mankind into the horrors of another great war.

It was no accident of course that the framers of the Atlantic Pact, who are evidently very well acquainted with the provisions of the Charter, left out the crucial sentence from Article 51, quoted above, when framing Article 5 of the Pact. Some clever gentleman in the State Department must have had his tongue firmly in his cheek when he penned the official explanation of the relation of the Atlantic Pact to the United Nations' Charter.

For the first four paragraphs of the explanation give an account of the relation of Article 5 of the Pact to Article 51 of the Charter that is a masterpiece of hypocritical special pleading. It claims that all the Atlantic Pact does is to co-ordinate 'the exercise of the right of self-defence, specifically recognised in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter' and that it is designed 'to fit precisely in the framework of the United Nations and to assure practical efforts for maintaining peace and security in harmony with the Charter ...'

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognises that the Member Governments have 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security'. Such measures, however, are to be reported immediately to the Security Council, and do not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council 'to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security'.

The last sentence is a gem, for it comes very close to reproducing the crucial sentence in Article 51 of the Charter. In fact, it reproduces it word for word – except for the key word 'shall'. The State Department confidence-trickster did not dare to quote the sentence verbatim. Because if he had done so it would have been plain that the Charter imposes the obligation, by saying that measures in the exercise of the right of self-defence 'shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council' to take no action in the name of self-defence that would result in affecting the Security Council's authority and responsibility. So, instead of quoting the sentence, he put the thing almost in the words of the Charter, but substituting 'do' for 'shall', thereby turning the crucial sentence into a misstatement of fact that supports the misleading view he is trying to put over, instead of an imperative injunction that reveals the impossibility of reconciling the Atlantic Pact with the Charter.

Article 51 of the Charter does NOT say that measures in the exercise of the right of self-defence 'DO not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council', for they obviously do if not severely limited and localised. What it says is that they 'SHALL NOT' affect the Security Council's authority and responsibility, i.e. that they must not be of such a character as to make it more difficult for the Security Council to act as the guardian of peace.

The intent to deceive in the State Department's explanation

of the Atlantic Pact is only too painfully obvious. Anyone who believes that these omissions and distortions are accidental, may be congratulated on his charitable disposition but not on his political perspicacity.

Such measures are not 'self-defence'. A Treaty that provides for such action is not in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The *Wall Street Journal* of April 5, 1949, was painfully right when it said the Atlantic Pact (which it welcomed) 'nullifies the principle of the Charter', celebrates 'the triumph of jungle law over international cooperation on a world scale ... makes military might the determining factor in international relations' and substitutes 'brute force for the human quality of reason'. One Senator, who voted for it, called the Pact 'knuckle duster diplomacy'.

The British Foreign Office commentary published with the text of the Charter by H.M. Stationery Office (Cmd. 6666) in 1945, says: 'It is clear that no enforcement action by the U.N. Organisation can be taken against a Great Power itself without a major war. If such a situation arises the United Nations will have failed in its purpose and all members will have to act as seems best in the circumstances'. The authors of the North Atlantic Treaty assume that situation already exists and they must abandon the Charter and forge (in both senses of the word) a grand alliance so as to be sure of winning a third world war. Some still hope for peace. Others are not far from the view of the *New York Daily News*, commenting on the Atlantic Pact:

The only thing left for us to do is to be sure that we win when we do get into World War III, as we will ...

Optimists and those unversed in the wiles of diplomacy may argue that the definition of aggression in the Atlantic Pact is so precise and limited that it cannot be abused, even although the signatory parties do their own interpreting of what it means, i.e. are judges in their own cause.

Those who add moral self-righteousness to political simple-mindedness may be impressed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson's assertion in his radio address of March 18, explaining the Atlantic Pact, that 'anyone with the most elementary knowledge of the processes of democratic government knows that democracies do not and cannot plan aggressive wars'.

The short answer to that is that democracies can and do plan and get into wars of self-judged self-defence that sometimes are

hard to distinguish from aggression. No great power has a record that will bear examination in that respect.

One thing that the experience of the League of Nations in the years between the wars made clear beyond doubt was the difficulty of working out a watertight definition of aggression. Committees and conferences wrangled over this problem for years in Geneva, without achieving any generally accepted result. The nearest they came to agreement was an elaborate definition, adopted by a Committee of the Disarmament Conference, that was worked out by a Greek jurist, M. Nicolas Politis, on the basis of a draft submitted by Maxim Litvinov for the Soviet Union. According to that definition the United States have been an aggressor for years in China and Greece.

The definition of aggression in the Atlantic Pact is sweeping and vague, for it speaks of 'armed attack', not only against the territories of the Contracting Parties, but against their Occupation Forces in Europe, or against their aircraft anywhere, or their vessels on the high seas. This definition covers the outbreak of hostilities on land, sea or air, for any cause and in any circumstances, over a large part of the globe.

As the Parties are to apply this definition of aggression for themselves, there is practically nothing that they cannot call 'self-defence'.

Previous chapters have shown how, if the Tories or General Clay had had their way, we should have been at war already because of an attempt to crash through by armed force to Berlin, or through armed intervention in Greece, or even through an attempt to invade China, all in self-defence. The Chinese incident would have to spread to Europe or we should have to wait for a Peace Pact in the Pacific before it could instantly precipitate a world war. But all the other near-misses described in the previous pages would become full hits in virtue of the Atlantic Pact. So would Mr Churchill's policy of 'bringing matters to a head' with the Soviet Union before they had the atom bomb.

What American policy is capable of in the name of self-defence has been made quite clear also in the analysis of Mr George F. Kennan's authoritative exposition of the American policy of intervention. Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty gives statutory authority for this policy.

Brigadier Maclean, Tory M.P. for Lancaster, has already been quoted as invoking this article as the pretext for sending British conscripts to die for Fascism in Greece.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, at a Press Conference, an-

nounced that 'revolutionary activity in a member country inspired and assisted from outside as in Greece would be considered as an armed attack', justifying intervention under Article 4 of the Atlantic Pact.

As has been made clear in previous chapters, the United States consider all Communist Parties as manifestations of aggression by the Soviet Government, and therefore holds that diplomatic, economic and, if necessary, military intervention is justified anywhere in the world to stop a Communist Party coming into power or sharing power, even by constitutional and democratic means. How far the U.S.A. are prepared to act on this doctrine at any moment depends on what the effective rulers of that vast and at present dangerously hysterical country think they can get away with at the time. The one thing certain is that article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty is expressly designed to enable them to get away literally with murder on an impressive scale and to drag in Britain and other signatories when and if necessary for the success of their projects.

Article 3 of the North Atlantic Pact is virtually an international obligation to engage in an arms race. It reads as follows:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

The third race for arms is already in full swing. The U.S. Defence Budget of £4,800,000,000 is the biggest peace-time arms budget in history and fifteen times what the United States was spending before the war. Strenuous efforts are being made by the Army and Navy Departments and the arms manufacturers to bump it up to £6,000,000,000 and to step up the Air Force programme from 48 new groups to the vast figure of 70, which practically doubles the existing force.

Half-bankrupt Britain is spending three times what she did before the war, allowing for the rise in prices. The burden is far too heavy and far too high a proportion of the total budget of the country. The increase of £107,000,000 from last year is disquieting.

The Soviet Government has replied by raising its arms budget for 1949 to £3,700,000,000. That is 19% of the total Soviet budget as compared with 30% of the British budget for defence and over 40% of the U.S. budget. On the other hand, the Soviet budget is a far higher proportion of the total national income, so that a percentage comparison is misleading. The one

thing certain is that the great nations, who four years ago staggered out of the war where they fought shoulder to shoulder as allies, are now bleeding themselves white in order to get ready to fight one another.

To this the foolish or the dishonest argue that the more we arm the better the position we shall be in for reopening negotiations with the Soviet Union. But the danger we are rearming against grows greater the more we sacrifice economic strength, social justice and political sanity to war preparations, war hysteria and anti-Communist witch-hunting.

If what the Western Governments fear is violent social upheaval in the form either of social revolution or Capitalist counter-revolution with the accompanying evils of the police state, and if what they want to defend is democracy, their method of dealing with that danger and defending democracy is about as sensible as trying to put out a fire by spraying it with petrol.

A race for arms and the mounting tension, fear, hatred and fanaticism engendered by an arms race and deliberately fostered in order to justify the burdens that it imposes on the people, create a temper the very opposite of that required for peaceful settlement of disputes with what the race for arms assumes is our potential enemy. Sir Edward Grey, in the quotation given in Chapter I, drew the obvious lesson of history when he said that 'the increase of armaments that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts ... The moral is obvious. It is that great armaments lead inevitably to war.'

Sir Edward Grey in a speech in 1912, also quoted in the same chapter, pointed out that the alternative to the race for arms ending in war was that the peoples would revolt against the intolerable burden it inflicted upon them. But unless they revolted, the arms race was bound to end in war.

They did not revolt and the first great race for arms duly ended in the first world war.

Mr Churchill, commenting on the second race for arms, in the House of Commons on April 23, 1936, indicated the second alternative to war:

I cannot believe that, after armaments in all countries have reached a towering height, they will settle down and continue at a hideous level far above the present level, which is already crushing, and that that will be for many years a normal feature of the world's routine.

Whatever happens, I do not believe that will. Europe is approaching a climax. I believe that that climax will be reached in the lifetime of the present [next] Parliament. Either there will be a melting of hearts and a joining of hands between great nations, which will set out upon realising the glorious age of prosperity and freedom which is now within the grasp of the millions of toiling people, or there will be an explosion and a catastrophe the course of which no imagination can measure, and beyond which no human eye can see.

There will not in fact be a melting of hearts and joining of hands in high places until the people clear their heads and stiffen their wills to the point where they revolt against not only the material burdens inflicted by the third race for arms but its moral wickedness and political insanity

LOSS OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Our loss of independence if British policy after the war were based on an alliance with the United States in a new balance of power, instead of on an equal partnership with both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. through the United Nations, was evident to far-sighted observers the moment the United States came into the war. Thus Mr Virgil Jordan, the President of the National Industrial Conference Board of the United States, pointed out in December 1940, that 'whatever the outcome of the war America has embarked upon a career of Imperialism, both in world affairs and in every aspect of her life. Even though by our aid England should emerge from this struggle without defeat, she will be so impoverished economically and crippled in prestige that it is improbable that she will be able to resume or maintain the dominating position in world affairs which she has occupied for so long.

'At best England will become a junior partner in a new Anglo-Saxon Imperialism, in which the economic resources and the military and naval strength of the U.S.A. will be the centre of gravity.

'Southwards in our hemisphere and westward in the Pacific the path of Empire takes its way and in economic terms as well as political prestige the sceptre passes to the U.S.A.'

The path of American Imperialism has gone not only southward to South America and westward across the Pacific to Japan, China, and even tentatively Indonesia and Indo-china (which after all are not far from the American-dominated, although nominally independent Philippines) but also eastward to Western Europe, the Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East.

In a speech in October 1943, to a meeting of members of both

Houses of Parliament, held by the United Kingdom Branch of the British Empire Association, Field-Marshal Smuts warned against the danger of Britain casting in her lot with the United States in the post-war world:

Many people look to a union, or closer union, between the U.S.A. and Great Britain, with her Commonwealth and Empire, as the new path to be followed in the future. I myself am doubtful about that. I attach the greatest importance to Anglo-American collaboration for the future. To my mind it is, beyond all doubt, one of the great hopes of mankind ...

But I do not think that, as what I might call a political axis, it will do. It would be a one-sided affair. If you were to pit the British Commonwealth plus the United States against the rest of the world, it would be a very lopsided world. You would stir up opposition and arouse other lions in the path. You would stir up international strife and enmity which might lead to a still more colossal struggle for world power than we have seen in our day. I do not see human welfare, peace, security along those lines.

Since then U.S. domination and the inequality of the present Anglo-West European Association with the U.S.A. have proved far greater than Marshal Smuts' gloomiest forebodings. Our dependence in foreign policy approaches the absolute; the military Lend-Lease Plan by which the U.S. supplies equipment for British forces that we cannot afford to keep unaided means that our defence will be determined in Washington. In the not very long run it will prove impossible to maintain independence in the field of economic and social policy after it has been surrendered in defence and foreign affairs.

FAILURE OF POWER POLITICS

In a speech in Chicago on November 18, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall emphasized that 'it is the divergence of purpose concerning the future of Europe which is the cause of many of the present differences between the United States and Soviet Russia. The divergence is not due to any direct clash between the national interests of these powers'.

The preceding chapters show that this statement is a misleading half-truth. The difference of purpose in China, for instance, was not between the Soviet Union and the United States, but between General Chiang Kai Shek's corrupt and oppressive regime, backed by the United States, on the one hand, and the common people of China, who preferred the Communists, on the other. The Soviet Union did not come into the picture at all, except insofar as its example and presence in the

background encouraged those who fought in the cause of the Chinese Revolution against reaction and counter-revolution, backed by foreign intervention.

The story of Greece is the same. The quarrel in Italy and Western Europe is not between the United States and the Soviet Union, but between Fascist-minded propertied classes, backed by the United States, and the working class and its political and class allies, who are fighting without any Soviet aid or support, although undoubtedly encouraged by the mere knowledge that the Soviet Union exists.

Further examination of the record makes it clear that the issues raised by this 'difference of purpose' between the United States and the forces of social change and social revolution in most of the rest of the world cannot be settled by economic and military intervention, still less by delivering ultimatums to Moscow or attempting to bring about the overthrow of the Soviet regime by a policy of pinpricks and half-measures, as suggested by the egregious Mr Kennan.

Three years of this policy of 'cold war', applied with ever greater resources and to the accompaniment of ever more menacing language, has produced nothing but failure. It has not settled any differences between the West and the East, but, on the contrary, has turned all the disagreements into issues of prestige and so made them insoluble. Abuse and threats have not resulted in the countries against which they were directed becoming more reasonable, but have, on the contrary, made them tougher and more intransigent. It has not helped the cause of democracy and freedom, but, on the contrary, has aggravated the evils of the police state where they already exist and has caused these evils to spread where they did not exist before. It has not brought us nearer peace, but, on the contrary, within sight of a third world war.

Where Hitler, Mussolini, Hirohito and the hordes of lesser Fascists and quislings failed, can President Truman and Mr Bevin succeed? The most savage repression by the Fascist regimes ended with Communism emerging stronger, more militant and more widespread in Europe and Asia than before they started the policy of force. The Western democracies cannot hope to succeed in wiping out Communist parties that have been tempered and steeled in that long struggle, by a policy of pinpricks and half-measures, witch hunts, purges, economic discrimination, intrigues with and furtive assistance to the ragged remnants of the beaten counter-revolution, and the rest of the bag of unsavoury tricks that have been exposed in the preceding chapters of this book.

Nor would another world war help. The first world war ended with the Russian Revolution and upheavals from one end of Europe to the other. The policy of anti-Communist intervention after the first world war, both directly and in its later form of appeasement, produced the Fascist regimes and landed us in a second world war. The second world war has spread the social revolution over half Europe and large parts of Asia, and is making the earth quake under the feet of the propertied classes in Western Europe. The policy of intervention that has been practised again, on the lines made sickeningly familiar from last time, is quite visibly pushing us towards a third world war, which would spread the evils of the police state and violent social revolution far and wide and destroy most of what is left of Western civilisation, democracy and freedom.

BANKRUPTCY ON THE ROAD TO WAR

The Transport House pamphlet *Feet on the Ground* admits that 'all the planning for European recovery to date has been based on the assumption that European military expenditure will not increase' and that the E.R.P. countries could not 'produce and equip' larger forces without 'wrecking their present plans for economic recovery'.

Sir Stafford Cripps, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Minister of Economic Affairs, in an interview in Washington in the summer of 1948, admitted that large-scale rearmament would wreck Britain's four-year recovery programme. Yet the 1949 Defence White Paper budgeted for an arms budget of £760,000,000, an increase of £107,000,000 over the previous year. It provided for a total of 1,000,000 men and women serving in or working for the armed forces.

Unless foreign policy is radically changed this huge arms budget and drain on our manpower will increase year by year. The burden is already too great, and the indirect effect on the cost of living and the manpower available for producing export goods, houses, etc., is too drastic to be borne for more than a short time without jeopardising British economic recovery and standards of life.

The lease-lending of American arms and munitions hardly affects that situation. In the first place, it is bound to mean the diversion of some of the limited supplies of key American raw materials like steel from civilian to military purposes, thereby reducing the already inadequate amount of Marshall Plan Aid.

In the second place, every man in the forces means his with-

drawal from the industrial, mining or agricultural front, with the resultant loss in civilian production, estimated at an average of £500 a year per soldier. This makes £500,000,000 a year for 1,000,000 men. For this it would be physically impossible for America to provide compensation. The same applies to the diversion of materials and manpower for building barracks, transport and a thousand and one activities, where military needs can be met only at the expense of the civilian population and our production drive. Mr Cyril Osborne, the Conservative M.P. for Louth, was right when he said (October 3, 1948): 'England is faced with Hitler's choice of guns or butter, for rearmament demands personal sacrifice as well as a lower standard of living'.

The Lend-Leasing of arms and equipment will relieve us of only a fraction of the staggering military burdens being heaped on us. The sum Congress is prepared to vote for military lease-lend for Britain, Western Europe, Greece and Turkey combined will not exceed £360,000,000 and may be half that amount.

The 1949 defence estimates and Sir Stafford Cripps's socially Conservative and economically oppressive 1949 budget are the first instalment of the price we must pay for providing and training cannon-fodder to fight on the orders of Washington under the Atlantic Pact, the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. Under these instruments we serve an American foreign policy that is bound to lose the peace, and will end as victims of an American strategic plan that cannot win the war and regards Britain and Western Europe as expendable.

The situation on the Continent is even worse. The greatest obstacle to French recovery, as many American and British commentators have pointed out, is the universal dread of another war. It is paralysing the reconstruction effort. When the burden of rearmament is thrust on the French people to prepare them for slaughter when the U.S.A. invokes the Atlantic Pact, the country's economic plight will grow worse and the cleavage in the French nation will deepen.

To this must be added the effects of growing American insistence, as the cold war warms up, on cutting down trade with Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. The whole situation bears out Sir William (now Lord) Beveridge's warning in his famous report on social security, that the first condition for attaining the post-war aim of freedom from want was that 'the world after the war is a world in which the nations set themselves to co-operate for production in peace, rather than to plotting for mutual destruction by war, whether open or concealed'.

DESTRUCTION IN THE NEXT WAR

Such gigantic strides have been made since the war ended in perfecting the devilish ingenuity of man in planning his own destruction, that another war would unleash horrors on humanity that almost baffle imagination. Whoever else won the next war, this highly-populated and industrialised little island would be the loser. The 'realistic' American strategic planners, who do not believe in the Maginot Line on the Rhine and have written off France, look upon England as an aeroplane carrier rather than an ally. They write off the South of England, including London, as bound to be turned into radio-active rubble heaps and smoking ruins by super V1's and V2's in vast quantities. But they believe they can hold the middle and north as a base for the American air force. That was why Mr John Dugdale, Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, told the House of Commons on March 8, 1949, that 'in a future war the Atlantic might become like the Mediterranean was in the last war, with England taking the place of Malta'. He forgot to add that, unlike Malta, this thickly populated and highly industrialised island has no caves in which the population can take refuge.

On this view, the V.I.P.'s who had started the war would flee to Washington and become an *émigré* National Tory-Lib. Lab. government, much like the Dutch, Norwegian, Belgian, Polish, Czech etc. *émigré* governments in London during the last war. Some millions of our people would starve or otherwise be done to death in more or less sensationally horrible ways. But if all went well, the V.I.P.'s could return after a few years, from across the Atlantic. They would no doubt be accompanied by American troops to make sure that the welcome of the survivors in the desert that had been England's green and pleasant land would not be unpleasantly warm.

HISTORY HALF-REPEATING ITSELF

The record of the first eight chapters reveals how closely the past is linked with the present and how strenuously our rulers to-day are trying to make the history of the years after the first world war repeat itself. To-day the United States has taken over the role of Britain after the first world war and Britain is playing a part similar to that of France in those days. The slogans of Anglo-American counter-revolutionary intervention, the propaganda the interventionists use to justify themselves, their policies bear a strong family resemblance to the evils of the past.

Then intervention was in Russia and Europe. To-day it is

world wide and stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific, along the Southern coast of Asia and through the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The defeat of intervention is already an accomplished fact in the Far and Middle East and in Greece, although the struggle may drag on for years. In Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the battle has been finally lost.

Whereas last time intervention succeeded in restoring and consolidating European Capitalism so that it could function out of its own resources and, through Locarno, brought the whole of Germany, at least for a time and more or less, into the Western camp, to-day Germany has been split. The Western half presents an extraordinary mixture of the Weimar Republic in 1930 and Hitler's blackmailing of the Allies into giving him a free hand in the East by playing on their fear and hatred of Communism and the Soviet Union, and presenting himself as their defender against both. West European Capitalism has been not so much restored as shored up by the pumping of the liquid concrete of American economic aid into its cracked and crumbling foundations. There is not even a reasonable chance that Western Europe will recover on the basis of Capitalism and within the framework of the American-run balance of power, and every prospect that when U.S. aid is withdrawn, if not sooner, it will founder in more or less violent fashion. For American intervention has made a peaceful transition from Capitalism to Socialism far more difficult and uncertain than it would have been if the U.S.A. had not intervened politically but had contented itself with aiding economic reconstruction.

What we are seeing is a vast and despairing rearguard action by morally, politically and intellectually bankrupt ruling classes, whose failure to understand what is happening in the world is equalled only by the violence and arrogance with which they cling to the belief that they can and must hang on to or win back power and prop up or restore the old order, by hook or by crook, if necessary, by going all the way to Fascism and a third world war. It is as true to-day as it was in 1915 when Bertrand Russell penned the words (in his pamphlet *The Policy of the Entente*, 1904-1914) that: 'the guiding principles of European [and American] policy, in Asia, as in Africa, are such as must bring horror and dismay to every man with a spark of humanity in his nature ...

'How are we to prevent a repetition of this long history of deceit, cruelty, and preparation for war? The English people is, I believe, the most humane, generous, and peace-loving in the

world (except, perhaps, the people of America); consciously and of set purpose, it would never tolerate such a policy as its chosen rulers have carried on for the last eleven [four] years. But public attention was engrossed by the struggle in home politics ... The first and most indispensable requisite, if this nation and others are not again to be led blindfold into crime and disaster, is that everywhere men should learn to be interested in foreign affairs, to follow them closely, and to bring the pressure of public opinion to bear upon diplomacy. The war, we may hope, will have taught the democracies this lesson, that they cannot safely permit themselves to ignore dealings with foreign countries, or blindly follow the lead of men who say they deserve their trust.

"The next thing to be achieved is to destroy the evil tradition of "continuity" in foreign policy ... In the days of Gladstone and Disraeli, Palmerston and Lord Derby, Fox and Pitt, Chatham and Lord North, and right back to the times of the Stuarts, the parties were hotly divided on foreign policy. "Continuity" represents no real need of national safety, but merely a closing up of the ranks among the governing classes against their common enemy, the people.

'Ever since 1832 the upper classes in England have been faced with the problem of retaining as much as possible of the substance of power while abandoning forms to the clamour of democrats. They have gradually lost control over legislation, while retaining in the main their hold of the administrative and judicial sides of government. In foreign affairs their ascendancy, threatened by the Manchester School and Gladstone [Labour], was completely recovered twenty years ago, and survived, as we have seen, even the collapse of 1906 [1945]. Only by reintroducing foreign affairs into the arena of party politics can this ascendancy be destroyed ... The interests of the British democracy do not conflict at any point with the interests of mankind. The interests of the British governing classes conflict at many points with the interests of mankind'.

THE AWAKENING OF PUBLIC OPINION

But, although the peoples have learnt disappointingly little since 1915, they have learnt something. Enough, at any rate, to make what is, as yet, not so much their awakening as the stirrings of the giant asleep the greatest barrier to war and the most solid bulwark of peace.

In France and Italy a large part of the working class is aroused, militant and so determined in its opposition to war that the war-mongers feel that democracy must be destroyed and some kind

of dictatorship of the Right established before the enterprise of war would be 'safe'. And as the war is supposed to be in defence of democracy and liberty, they do not quite see how this consummation is to be achieved without gravely indisposing American and British public opinion.

AFTER THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

The U.S. presidential election in 1948 showed that the American people, like the peoples of Europe, want social justice and peace, and have been less affected by the floods of propaganda and misrepresentation to which they have been subjected than there was reason to fear. President Truman's address to Congress in January 1949 followed up his election campaign and voiced the aspirations of the people. Civil liberties and democratic rights for Negroes; expanded social security; a National Health Insurance Scheme; the building of houses and slum clearance; progressive instead of reactionary laws concerning the status and rights of Trade Unions; the building of publicly owned steel mills and plants where supplies are critically short, private enterprise fails to do the job and government funds are necessary; an improved farm programme; power, irrigation, navigation, flood control and soil conservation schemes; the planned use of oil reserves etc., are the main heads of the home programme, regarded as the continuation of Roosevelt's New Deal.

'Our domestic programmes', said President Truman, 'are the foundations of our foreign policy. We are following a foreign policy which is the outward expression of the democratic faith we profess ...

'The heart of our foreign policy is peace. We are supporting a world organisation to keep peace and a world economic policy to create prosperity for mankind. Our guiding star is the principle of international co-operation ...

'In the European Recovery Programme, in our good neighbour policy and in the United Nations we have begun to batter down those national walls which block the economic growth and the social advancement of the peoples of the world.'

There is no need to labour the point, which stands out from the record of the preceding chapters, that this description of the nature, purposes and consequences of American foreign policy is almost the exact inverse of the truth. The important fact is that the millions who voted President Truman back to the White House really believe that his account of what America is doing in world affairs is reasonably accurate. It does not fit

the facts, but it does faithfully reflect and represent the intentions of the great mass of the American people.

But the cleavage between the interests of the American people and the interests of the men representing powerful privileged minorities who pull wires through their lobbies in Congress, dominate the National Security Council and are well represented among the President's advisers, is thrusting itself into the foreground of public attention. In home affairs, the fight is open since the President's message to Congress and is likely to be waged with increasing bitterness by American reaction and big business. In 2½ months the 81st Congress made a shambles of the whole programme for civil rights and social reform. That was only the beginning. Unemployment has crept up to the 5,000,000 mark and there is growing fear of a depression.

In foreign affairs the 'bi-partisan' Democratic-Republican agreed foreign policy masks significant and growing differences of emphasis and purpose that can hardly fail to lead to an ultimate divergence of policy. The resignation of Mr Marshall and Mr Lovett, both known for being prominent advocates of the 'Be tough with Russia' policy, and the terms of Dean Acheson's letter thanking the President for his appointment and promising faithfully to execute his policies, means that the State Department will no longer be quite so much a law unto itself, but will conform more closely in its practice to its constitutional position of being a Department run by a Secretary of State who is himself an appointee of and responsible to the President as the Chief Executive elected directly by the people.

During the election President Truman tried to open up direct conversations with Stalin, by his proposal to send Judge Vinson to Moscow. He was frustrated by Secretary of State Marshall. Commentators expressed the belief after the election that this abortive initiative, which at the time was severely condemned as cutting across the 'bi-partisan' foreign policy, had not a little to do with securing President Truman's re-election. The move was violently denounced by Dewey and stoutly defended by President Truman during the campaign.

How very far commonsense, decent liberal-minded opinion in the States is from being satisfied with the present trend of world events was expressed amusingly by Mr I. F. Stone in the *New York Star* of November 15, commenting upon Secretary of State Marshall's indignant denunciation of what he called the 'Soviet Peace Offensive':

Secretary of State Marshall accuses the Soviet Union of waging

a propaganda campaign for peace. This is a curious accusation. Don't we want peace?

Until now the U.S.S.R. has been accused of plotting aggression. Now it is accused of plotting peace. The shift in accusation is necessary because the Soviet desire for talks to end the cold war has become too plain.

It could hardly be plainer unless a little man in grey with a moustache were to show up one morning before the White House with a ticket sign saying 'Tovarich Truman. Let's Talk Peace'.

What is the plot behind the peace offensive? The plot, says Secretary Marshall, is to make the U.S. look like a warmonger. Then what is the duty of Secretary Marshall? To make sure that the plot does not succeed.

Why is there a danger that the United States may be made to look like a warmonger? Because every Soviet effort at peace has been rejected. Twice this year Stalin tried for direct peace talks with Truman. Once Truman tried for a direct peace talk with Stalin. On each occasion the military diplomats and bankers-in-uniform moulding American foreign policy prevented a meeting.

We have the atom bomb. The Russians seem to have a secret weapon more terrifying: the peace feeler. The peace feeler appears to create more panic in the Pentagon* than the atom bomb did at Bikini. Is the mere possibility of peace so dreadful?

A lot of poor G.I.'s got shell shock. Our brass hats seem susceptible to peace shock. They can discuss poison gas, rocket planes, bacteriological warfare, and atom bombs without blenching. Mention peace and the Pentagon becomes as hysterical as a girl's dormitory invaded by a mouse. I guess generals are just naturally high-strung.

Let us assume the worst. Let us assume that the Russians are not acting in good faith. Is it not, then, the task of American diplomacy to expose that bad faith? How expose it without discussion?

In recent weeks at Paris our representatives have rejected out of hand two Russian offers of compromise: on disarmament and on atomic inspection. These offers may be inadequate; they may be phony. But it made a bad impression on the smaller nations at Paris - the nations which must bear the brunt of a new war - that both offers were dismissed so quickly and so noisily, almost as if we were afraid discussion might lead to acceptable solutions.

Unless a new war can be won by push-button and blitz bombing (and only idiots think so), it will last a long time. Morale will become an important factor. People must be convinced that war was necessary to endure its terrors without crumpling. How prove it necessary except to let pass no possible chance of preventing conflict?

You can jump off the Brooklyn Bridge any hour of the day or night, but once you jump it's too late for discussion. What harm in making

* The U.S. War Department, which inhabits a five-sided house.

sure first? Why are people like Marshall and Forrestal and Lovett so afraid that unexpectedly, suddenly, peace might break out?

Let us put it in the most hard-boiled terms. Let us assume the Russians don't want war because they think communism will win anyway, without their having to fight for it. Has this handful of brass hats and bankers so little faith in democratic Capitalism that they believe it will lose under peaceful conditions?

Surely they don't think another war, even a victorious war (get out pencil and paper and make a rough estimate of the cost of restoring Capitalism in Russia), will provide a basis on which a healthy business economy can be operated?

Will Western Europe revive better if it must divert scarce materials and manpower to war preparations, or if it can keep them on the tasks of peace? Under which set of conditions is social stability more likely in Western Europe?

Sometimes I think it isn't only their hats which are brass.

A small, outspoken, courageous and clear-headed minority is unsparingly denouncing the hypocrisies and iniquities of American foreign policy and mercilessly exposing the horrid facts. A most remarkable and revealing instance of this process of debunking and its fate was the book entitled *Bases and Empire* by a veteran foreign correspondent, George Marion. No established publisher would touch the book, on the ground that it was too controversial. Mr Marion, not to be balked, formed a firm of his own and brought out the book himself early in 1948. There was a general refusal by newspapers to accept advertisements for it and it was all but universally boycotted in the review columns. This, says Mr Marion in a preface, was because 'the book challenges the official theory of world affairs lying behind United States foreign and domestic policy to-day. On the basis of facts coming chiefly from anti-Russian sources it refutes the view that Russia is responsible for the present state of no-peace. Instead, it seeks to show that the United States is forcibly spreading its military power over the entire globe, provoking a dozen civil wars and general world unrest by aggressive expansion. The book places the blame for this policy on the former Wall Street bankers who are now running Washington.'

As for the contents of the book, 'The most important truth of our place and time is that the United States is expanding at a rate and to an extent never before witnessed in history. While we cry 'Stop Thief' at the Soviet Union, we are ourselves engaged in extending what is already the broadest area of military strategic domination ever controlled by one nation ...

'The following are the minimum limits of American strategic empire to-day:

'1. We have acquired total strategic domination over the American hemisphere, beyond early effective challenge by any other Great Power.

'2. We have taken over control of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

'3. We seek the necessary positions in Europe and Asia and Africa and Australasia to maintain that control. In practice, we have those positions as a result of occupation during the war.'

Mr Marion provides full details, and sums up that

in the course of World War II the United States acquired or consolidated *de facto* dominion over 96,495,000 square miles of ocean, and put in claims to domination and control of 13,825,000 square miles of land with 645,815,000 inhabitants ...

To-day you can stick a pin anywhere on the map and prick an American general or admiral. Yet, by some miracle of smugness, this complete break with American tradition, and assumption of military prerogatives beyond those ever claimed by any power in recorded history is presented to the domestic audience as further proof of American generosity, disinterestedness, eagerness to serve others. Bosh! ...

The vast resources of the multi-billion-dollar news industry are employed to maintain a constant flow of stories purporting to show tireless Soviet activity abroad. Correspondents in Seoul, Vienna, or the Antarctic know that any item about Russia is welcome ... If the same resources were employed to describe the most important trend in world affairs to-day, stories of American pressures would pour in from fifty capitals each day, fighting one another for the headlines ...

The American people are constantly flattered that they are the best-informed people on earth. It is categorically untrue. We are merely the most-informed. More meaningless words are hurled at us daily ... than any other people has to put up with ... Such an insane profusion of words can misinform or confuse; it cannot inform ...

As an example, he remarks that the acquisition of bases by the United States 6,000 miles from home becomes a harmless idiosyncrasy when it is not a positive virtue. A security base obtained or sought by the Soviet Union on her very borders is 'Red Imperialism' ... This double standard has been the stock-in-trade of almost all our opinion machinery and officials since the death of Mr Roosevelt ... Every Soviet act is multimagnified and warped beyond recognition. Every American act is softened in outline and reduced in extent.

The truth is that Capitalism in the United States, through the ownership of the Press and radio stations and time on the air by

big private interests, can distort the workings of democracy and humbug public opinion by soaking and tainting the minds of readers of newspapers and listeners to the wireless with floods of sensationalism, tendentious stories, trivialities, gossip and downright misinformation.

GREAT BRITAIN AFTER 1945

In Britain an equally vague and horrific image, calculated to inspire terror, has been built up in the public mind about the Socialist third of humanity and the working class of France and Italy, partly by similar means but also by official discretion and guidance. Public opinion is doped by the selection of news, the choice of items to be emphasized, angles from which news should be written up, etc. There are off the record talks with lobby correspondents. The services of P.R.O.'s; the uses of the hand-out; the way in which the B.B.C. uses material supplied by the Foreign Office Press Bureau for the reports of its diplomatic correspondent and all but completely excludes news items running contrary to this line, critical of the United States or friendly to the Soviet Union; these are among the ways in which British opinion has been consistently and increasingly confused and humbugged on world affairs, until those who know any of the relevant facts and can see straight on the fundamental issues have become a tiny minority. A miasma of fear has been spread between our hardworking and war-weary people and our recent allies, toiling in heartbreaking conditions to rebuild their war-torn countries and to lay the foundations of a better society. It is only one degree less ridiculous and odious than the panic that darkens the lives of so many millions of good folk thousands of miles away in mighty and remote America.

In Britain, too, there is a cleavage at home and a 'bi-partisan' policy in foreign affairs. But the cleavage at home is much wider and deeper in Britain than in the U.S.A., and the 'bi-partisan' foreign policy is a matter of some Labour leaders, who believe that to do so is really necessary, practising a foreign policy agreeable to the Tories, and not an officially acknowledged policy of 'national unity' in foreign affairs as in the United States.

That is because the Democratic Party in the United States, even after the semi-defection of the Dixiecrats (the ultra-Conservative Southern Democrats) and after the Wallace-PCA break-away had compelled President Truman to resurrect the New Deal, is the American equivalent of the British Liberal Party in 1906 rather than of the Labour Party in 1945. The Right wing of the Demo-

crats passes over into big business and the die-hards of the Republican Party without a break. Its centre is large, amorphous and vaguely progressive. Its Radical Left wing has strong support in and a large part of its votes come from the world of labour, where the Trade Unions are mostly under what in this country used to be called 'Lib-Lab' and Catholic leadership.

In Britain, both the Labour and Conservative Parties are nationwide and include members of and receive votes from all classes in the community. There is a measure of continuity and agreement as regards both means and ends. There is even overlapping in home affairs between the Left wing of the Conservative Party and the Right wing of the Labour Party. Common sense and decency, wisdom and patriotism are not the monopoly of either, nor even of both combined, but are, in greater or less degree, the political heritage of the British people of all parties or none.

But taking all these factors into account – and they are all-important, for without them there could be no democracy – the two great parties are sharply divided on fundamental issues in home affairs, and the division is deep because it is rooted in the conflicting interests of economic classes. Highly industrialised British society is more stable, more stratified and more nearly divided into Capitalists and workers than American society with its huge farming population. British political parties are organised on lines that reflect the real divisions in economic interest and political outlook in society much more clearly than is the case in the United States.

Whereas the clash is real and deep in home affairs, the war-time Labour-Tory coalition never really ended in foreign affairs, although the fact was at first strenuously denied and to this day is only half admitted by the leaders and 'loyally' ignored by the rank and file. But this 'national unity' on the surface papers over a real and growing cleavage between the defenders of Capitalism and the believers in the need for advancing towards Socialism, on the issue of whether we must go to war against or can make peace with the Socialist third of humanity and the working class of France and Italy.

The development of this rift in national unity has been delayed by the sheer ignorance of the people, who have no opportunity of learning the facts and are deceived and doped by appeals to prejudice and fear through all the channels of mass publicity. Last but not least, the recognition that the people's interests are being betrayed in foreign affairs is impeded by the wrong kind of loyalty in the Labour Party (a point further discussed in the

next chapter). But the rift is there and it is growing, for it remains true, as Mr Attlee points out in *The Labour Party in Perspective*, that 'there is a deep difference of opinion between the Labour Party and the Capitalist parties on foreign as well as on home policy, because the two cannot be separated'.

THE TORIES WANT WAR

On the common law principle that a man must be held to intend the natural consequences of his acts, the Conservative Party want a third world war. For they do not believe in the possibility or desirability of living at peace with the Socialist third of humanity, and denounce as a crypto-Communist and practically a traitor anyone who believes we can and should try to discover common ground between our purposes and interests and those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and revolutionary China, and concludes that we can and should live in friendship and co-operation with these 600 million human beings. The Tories insist that the only possible basis for conducting our relations with the Socialist quarter of humanity is a balance of power and a race for arms.

Not only would this policy make war inevitable sooner or later. At every crisis responsible Tory leaders have raised an irresponsible clamour for courses that would without any reasonable doubt have landed us in war.

Thus at the height of the hysteria and sabre-rattling over Berlin, when General Clay was summoning the British and French governments to promise they would stand by him if he felt it necessary to 'call the Russian bluff' and crash through the 120 miles of the Soviet zone separating Berlin from the Western zone with an armed force, Mr Harold MacMillan, M.P. told a Conservative rally at Liverpool that the struggle would soon reach its crisis and there must be no wavering and no weakness. For a retreat or even a diplomatic defeat might result in a Russo-German combination, and that would be the greatest danger of all. Therefore 'we shall have to insist on and enforce our right of access - by canal, road and railway. Nor must we wait too long. There is a point at which patience becomes weakness and prudence shades into appeasement.'

In the House on March 23, 1949, Mr Macmillan called the air-lift 'essentially an act of political appeasement' and asked 'I often wonder what history will say of that decision in June last year. Were we right or wrong? Would we have done better to face the issue squarely then? [An Hon. Member: 'War'.] I do

not think there would have been war, I think there would have been a Russian retirement.'

General Clay had backed his representations to the British and French governments by assuring them that the Russians were in no condition to fight and it was therefore safe to assume that they would give way if threatened. But neither the French nor the British Government was prepared to back him in this criminal gamble and an outcry arose in the United States at the danger of leaving policy decisions in the hands of fire-eating generals. These protests were made not only by Progressives but by such men as Hanson W. Baldwin, the military critic of the *New York Times*, former Secretary of State Sumner Welles and – the Republican Presidential candidate, Mr Thomas Dewey.

'Few people fully realise how near to an explosion we came,' writes Mr David Raymond, the Foreign Editor of *Reynolds News*, on January 30, 1949, on the basis of information obtained while he was in the U.S.A. and corroborated from reliable Washington sources, 'General Lucius Clay actually ordered an armed convoy that was to force its way, if necessary, through the Russian blockade of Berlin. One train was despatched, under American guard, that had orders to resist any Russian interference.

'The U.S. officer in charge hesitated, when the Red Army stopped the train and, in doing so, gave time for second thoughts. 'Washington, backed by London and Paris, abandoned General Clay's policy in favour of the air-lift.'

If the Tories had been in office, they would have told General Clay to go ahead and we should to-day be agonising in the third world war.

Brigadier Maclean's demand in the House on March 23, 1948 that we send conscripted British boys to Greece to lose their lives fighting for the noble cause of Fascism, has been quoted above (p. 254), as well as Mr Harold Macmillan's clamour for more massive and bloodier intervention in that country and starting the third world war by marching on Berlin. Mr Macmillan concluded a speech that was one long itemised demand for sabre-rattling and carnage in Germany, Greece and points East, as follows: 'To sum up. The cold war must be fought with as much energy and single-mindedness as the shooting war.' In Mr MacMillan's mind the former naturally and inevitably leads to the latter.

Again, in the Foreign Affairs Debate of December 9 and 10, 1948, when the subject of the collapse of American intervention

in China and the overwhelming victory of the Communists was discussed, Mr Walter Fletcher, the Tory Parliamentary Party's Far Eastern expert, fell on the Labour Government tooth and nail for not intervening at once and demanded the despatch of troops to establish bridgeheads against Communism in China by creating 'new Treaty Ports' (that is, by invading Chinese territory and seizing and occupying Chinese towns on the coast).

The bellicose Mr Fletcher presumably knew that the Communist government had issued a public warning that any American or other troops invading Chinese territory would be regarded as enemies and dealt with accordingly. But when asked by a Labour M.P., Mr Skeffington-Lodge, whether he meant that we should go to war in China, he attempted to combine the roles of artful dodger and war criminal. Hansard tells the tale:

Mr Fletcher I am not suggesting that we should go to war in China I am saying that we should establish and defend certain treaty ports, which will be ports of refuge and strong centres there. Yes, go to war to that extent, but it would be a war of defence and not a war of attack.

Mr Skeffington-Lodge: War might be involved then?

Mr Fletcher: The Hon. Member for Bedford (Mr Skeffington-Lodge) can put it any way he likes – the facts of the case will establish themselves. The very fact that they might be attacked might show how much they were feared, how great was their use against the Communist regime in North China.

It is difficult to imagine that any sane person, or even a Member of Parliament (and we're an odd lot), should be seriously advocating war against China in 1948. These sentiments of responsible members of the Conservative Parliamentary Party show how almost past belief is the folly and fanaticism of the Tories and their unfitness to govern in the post-war world, where they have lost their mental and moral bearings.

CHURCHILL THE WARMONGER

The worst and most irresponsible warmonger in the whole Tory Party is their leader, Mr Winston Churchill. He sums up, personifies and lends coherence to all the dark forces driving humanity towards the abyss. He has become the incarnation of the collective death-wish of a ruling class that sees its world crumbling, the blind Samson eager to pull down the temple of civilisation on our heads.

If Mr Churchill had had his way we should be struggling today to hold down Egypt, India and Burma. For he passionately

protested against the withdrawal of British troops from those countries and the only alternative would have been to engage in the kind of enterprise on which the Tories embarked with the Black and Tans in Ireland – but in countries which together are bigger and more populous than a dozen Britains.

In his speech in the House of January 23, 1948 Mr Churchill claimed with justice that the bi-partisan policy of an Anglo-American alliance for building up a balance of power against the Soviet Union, in order to use the threat of war as the final argument in dealing with the Socialist third of humanity, had first been advocated by him at Fulton. He also congratulated Messrs. Attlee, Bevin and Morrison on having caught up with and outstripped him in the violence and menace of their language towards the U.S.S.R. :

I am often asked, 'Will there be war?' and this is a question I have often asked myself. Can you wonder, Sir, that this question obtrudes itself upon us when the Lord President of the Council [Mr Morrison] speaks, as he did 10 days ago, of the 'risk of war' with Russia – twice, I think, he used that phrase – and speaks of:

'The availability and, if necessary, the readiness of armed force to prevent the outbreak of violence ...' and when the Prime Minister says – and I agree with him when he says – 'Soviet Communism pursues a policy of Imperialism in a new form – ideological, economic, and strategic – which threatens the welfare and way of life of the other nations of Europe ...'

Can you doubt that times are grave when the word 'sabotage' is used in accusation of one of the greatest Powers of the world, both by Mr Marshall in the United States and by the Foreign Secretary in this House? Such language in any previous period would have been incompatible with the maintenance of any form of diplomatic relations between the countries affected. I think it quite right to say the things said, but when they are said it is certainly not odd that we should have to ask ourselves this grim and hateful question. 'Will there be war?'

In particular, he congratulated Mr Bevin on having subdued and triumphed over the at times strenuous opposition within his own party to his policy of following in Mr Churchill's footsteps, particularly in Greece. He then resumed with gusto his self-appointed mission as pathfinder on the road to war, and pointed the way to the next steps in that direction.

It was, he said, 'idle to reason or argue with the Communists', but 'possible to deal with them on a fair and realistic basis'. This meant 'bringing matters to a head with the Soviet Government' before the Russians also had the atom bomb, and 'by

formal diplomatic processes with all their privacy and gravity to arrive at a lasting settlement'. This afforded the best chance of avoiding war. But 'even this method, I must say, however, would not guarantee that war would not come. But I believe it would give the best chance of preventing it and that if it came we should have the best chance of coming out of it alive.'

What this means, stripped of verbiage, is that Britain and the U.S.A. and their West European clients should attempt to impose their views on all outstanding issues on the Soviet Government, in negotiations backed by the threat of using the atom bomb, to break any deadlocks and arrive at a 'settlement'. They should take full advantage of the fact that the Russians have not yet got the bomb.

Mr Churchill admitted, of course, that the Russians might resist and that the result would be a third world war. But he evidently assumed that war was inevitable sooner or later, as indeed it is on his premises, and that therefore we should face the Russians with the choice between surrender or war while they were relatively weak and the Anglo-American side was relatively strong. But he was in a hurry, for he reckoned, as he explained to the House, that the Russians would probably have the bomb within a year or two (some high American authorities believe that they already possess it).

At a Conservative Women's Conference a few weeks later Mr Churchill went a step further and said flatly that peace was impossible in the long run if the present regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union continued to exist.

LOVE THY NEIGHBOUR WITH ATOM BOMBS

The same view was expressed by the Dean of Chichester, Dr A. S. Duncan Jones, at the Church of England Assembly, which approved the use of atom bombs as a 'defensive necessity against an aggressor', the said aggressor being any state against which Britain went to war. Dr Duncan Jones observed that 'If you love your neighbour, then you must try to save him from the aggressor. We shall have no peace while there are a hundred million people in Eastern Europe living under an appalling tyranny.'

The logic of that statement is that Dr Duncan Jones carries his Christian love of his neighbour to the point where he wishes to use atom bombs in a war of intervention to 'liberate' the peoples of Eastern Europe from the 'appalling tyranny' under

which they are living, and the existence of which is intolerable to a peace-loving man.

The New Testament has some uncharitable remarks about the Pharisee who merely thanks God that he is not as others are. But the Pharisee at least did not advocate a war of extermination against those who were not as he was. And he never thought of dragging in 'love thy neighbour' as the moral justification for butchering his fellowmen.

If the prelates who preach 'Love thy neighbour with atom bombs' are Christians, a witch doctor is a Harley Street specialist and a baboon is a bathing beauty. Dignitaries of the Church who talk like this are simply Tories in dog collars, the clerical arm of Capitalism fighting dirty because it has lost hope of holding its own by fair means. But they are no doubt as morally self-righteous as they are mentally dishonest and politically illiterate.

THE DAY-DREAM OF A WARMONGER

To clear up all possible doubt as to the fate in store for us if he were in power and the real meaning and implications of his speech in the House on January 23rd and his address to the Conservative Women's Conference in February, Mr Churchill dotted his 'i's' and crossed his 't's' at the Llandudno Conference of the Tory Party on October 9, 1948:

'There should be no delusion about the foundations of peace. The only sure foundation of peace and of the prevention of actual war rests upon strength. If it were not for the stocks of atomic bombs now in the trusteeship of the U.S.A., there would be no means of stopping the subjugation of Europe by Communist machinations backed by Russian armies and enforced by political police. We have the example of Czechoslovakia before our eyes, where Stalin has perpetrated exactly the same act of aggression, in 1948 as Hitler did when he marched into Prague in 1939'.

The reader who compares Mr Churchill's statement about Czechoslovakia with what really happened in that country, described in the preceding chapter, will realise just how strange is the dream world of Mr Churchill's delirious fantasies. Equally strange was Mr Churchill's assertion that 'The fourteen men in the Kremlin who rule over 300 million human beings with an arbitrary authority never possessed by any Tsar since Ivan the Terrible, and who are now holding down nearly half Europe by Communist methods, dread the friendship of the free civilised world as much as they would its hostility'. Free commercial and

cultural intercourse would soon 'undermine the power of this wicked oligarchy in Moscow' and 'break the spell of their Communist doctrines ... Therefore, for the sake of their own interests and skins, they cannot allow any intercourse or intermingling. Above all, they fear and hate the genial influences of free and easy democratic life, such as we have gradually evolved for ourselves in the Western world. These they know would be fatal, not only to their ideological theories and imperialistic appetites, but even more to their own dictatorial power.'

The Poles, the Czechs, the Yugoslavs, the Hungarians, the Rumanians and the Bulgarians are all desperately anxious to encourage British and American trade and tourist traffic and grieved that the Labour Government, while allowing tourists to go to Franco Spain, make it financially impossible for residents of the United Kingdom to go as tourists to any of these countries – they cannot use any British currency for the purpose. The Russians are making preparations to restore tourist traffic as soon as the rebuilding of shattered towns and transport and hotel facilities make it feasible.

If Mr Churchill believed in his own theory, he should be the strongest advocate of the fullest, most friendly relations between the West and the East, as the best way to 'undermine the power of this wicked oligarchy in Moscow', and 'break the spell of their Communist doctrines'. But the doctor has no faith in his own remedy – in fact, anybody who wishes to use it is promptly denounced as a crypto-Communist. 'Treat 'em rough' is his policy. Blood and iron is the stuff to use, if possible scattered by atomic energy, in Mr Churchill's view.

'Nothing stands between Europe to-day and complete subjugation to Communist tyranny but the atom bomb in American possession', he told the hysterically cheering Tories at Llandudno. All would be lost when the Russians also possessed the atom bomb and therefore 'we ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement'.

The Russians should be threatened with the atom bomb unless they 'released their grip on the satellite states in Europe'. In Mr Churchill's mind this is apparently linked with his view, repeated in this speech, that all Communist parties are mere tools and agents of Moscow, acting on the instructions of the Kremlin.

The Russians should therefore be summoned to order all Communist parties everywhere in the world, literally from China to Peru, passing through the Middle East and Europe, instantly to cease their activities, disband and for ever after hold their

peace. The Russians were also to bring to an end all serious social unrest in any part of the world, for which they were of course responsible, so that everything in the Capitalist garden would be lovely for Mr Churchill and his buddy Franco.

The penalty for not doing these things with sufficient alacrity and thoroughness to please Mr Churchill and his friends would be the dropping of the atom bomb on Moscow.

This is an unsympathetic but not inaccurate summing up of the policy of the leader of the Conservative Party, as expounded in a great oration on a solemn occasion. No wonder *The Times* rebuked Mr Churchill, as it had previously rebuked Mr Byrnes for making the same proposal in his book, for suggesting in effect that we should start a war. The price of peace with the Soviet Union, in Mr Churchill's view, is unconditional surrender by Russia on being threatened with the atom bomb. We must hurry to get a final settlement by these methods before the Russians have the atom bomb. After they get it the 'final' settlement would presumably cease to be final.

From this it is a small step to believing war is inevitable and then making the belief come true. Mr Churchill showed he was ready to take that step in his speech at Boston early in April. He began by telling his astonished audience that 'if it were not for the atomic bomb London would already have been bombed by those fourteen wicked men in the Kremlin'. He ended by bringing his campaign for waging peace with atom bombs to its logical conclusion: He bade us be ready to start a 'preventive war'. 'In Mr Churchill's opinion', say Joseph and Stewart Alsop, writing with warm approval of his Boston speech in the *New York Herald Tribune* (Paris edition) of April 9, 'it is apparent that we have only two ways to survival. Either Russia will change radically and soon [through the death of Stalin and collapse of the regime], or, when the "not unlimited period of our safety" begins to run out, we must force a preventive crisis, leading, if need be, to preventive war, in order to secure a settlement with the Kremlin. When this will be necessary is suggested by his emphasis on the temporary American monopoly on atomic energy. In short, there must be a show-down before the Kremlin possesses a people's democratic atomic bomb.'

CLASS WAR, INTERNATIONAL WAR AND PARTY POLITICS

The Bedlamite quality of the proposition makes it difficult to take it seriously. But it is meant in blood earnest and should

be taken with deadly seriousness. It is no doubt something new in our history that a great Party in the State should be anxious to start a third world war that would smash up civilisation as well as this country, in their mad desire to fight the Socialist third of humanity that were our allies only four years ago. But it was also a novelty in the history of Britain when the Tory Party landed us in the second world war because they put the success and power of the Fascist regimes before the honour and safety of their own country.

Their extreme and insane conduct in both cases springs from the same source, namely the fear and hatred felt by a ruling class faced by a fundamental challenge to its privilege and power. A ruling class in that situation does not distinguish its own class interest from the interests of the State and so becomes ready to court national suicide and bring down civilisation in a despairing attempt to stave off social defeat.

It is characteristic of those who work themselves up into that mental condition that they cease to be able to connect cause with effect. Thus Mr Churchill, in the intervals of using his formidable powers with baneful success to commit and keep us to a policy that would inevitably produce a third world war, told the House (on December 1, 1948) in all seriousness that:

It does not depend on us whether war comes; less than ever in our history does it depend on us. It depends on events largely beyond our control and on decisions and factors which are inscrutable.

In delivering himself of this *dictum* Mr Churchill showed that he was as incapable of understanding that, by practising the class war power politics to which he is addicted, he would become responsible for starting another world war, as a male Trobriand islander is unable to understand that by indulging in sexual intercourse he becomes a father.

The failure to grasp the facts of public life in Mr Churchill's case and the facts of life *tout court* in the case of the Trobriand islander is due to fundamentally the same cause. It is not a question of lack of intelligence or knowledge, still less of moral turpitude. It is a matter of social faith. If the Trobriand islander recognised the existence of paternity, he would become disloyal to the institutions and ideology of the matriarchal society in which he is born and bred. If Mr Churchill recognized that there might be enough good in the Socialist third of humanity to make friendship and co-operation with them possible and war against them a crime, and if he could see that they were strong enough

to make such a war a suicidal blunder as well as a crime, he would be an apostate from the faith of the Capitalist ruling class in which he is born and bred. The idea is literally unthinkable to him.

Similarly the Tory National Government of the 'thirties also felt that the war their policy had made inevitable was an act of God, a visitation of nature, a calamity descending upon them from outside like a storm or an earthquake, for which they felt no trace of responsibility. They could not and would not see the plainest and most obvious relations of cause and effect. For to do so would have been to question the validity of their assumptions about the value and permanence of Capitalist society and the non-existence of a tolerable alternative.

But, although Conservative politicians may be genuinely unaware of the relation between their class war politics and losing the peace, they are perfectly conscious of the uses of war preparations, war hysteria and of an orgy of fear and hatred, half-truths and hard lying about Communism and the Soviet Union, for winning the next election. It is nearly two hundred years since Dr Johnson observed that patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel, and over a century since John Stewart Mill remarked that when a cause became too bad to defend on rational grounds, its defenders fell back on religion.

To-day there is no longer a convincing rational case for Capitalism and its defenders have to appeal to primitive emotions of fear and hatred that will inhibit the working of reason, and to the kind of patriotism defined so cogently by Thomas Hill Green ninety years ago: 'Patriotism in that special military sense in which it is distinguished from public spirit, is not the temper of the citizen dealing with fellow citizens or with men who are themselves citizens of their several states, but that of the follower of the feudal chief or of the member of a privileged class, conscious of a power resting ultimately on force over an inferior population or of a nation holding empire over other nations'. (From the Lecture on *The Rights of the State over the Individual in War*, in the collection of lectures on the *Principles of Political Obligation*.)

Playing on the emotions appropriate to that kind of patriotism is now the political stock-in-trade of the Tories, just as war preparations have become the economic stand-by of latter-day Capitalism. If peace were to break out between now and the General Election, or if the Labour leadership would stop following Mr Churchill on the road to war and tread the path to peace

that they said in 1945 they would take, Labour would be triumphantly returned to power at the next General Election.

The Tories know it and fear it. But they believe they can demoralise and split the Labour Party, stampede the voters and ride home on 'national unity' for recruiting, conscripting, re-arming and witch-hunting against the great Red Bogey and the Soviet Union.

The more people believe that that sort of thing is really necessary – and some Labour Ministers, with the gleeful assistance of the Tories, are straining every nerve to make them believe it – the more they will think in terms of national unity and become coalition-minded and the less they will be likely to vote Labour.

On social and economic issues and on their domestic record the Labour Party are not only unbeatable but unchallengeable so far as the Tories are concerned. The only chance for the defenders of Capitalism is to try a diversion, a gigantic anti-red herring, by frightening the electors to the point where they cease to think about their bread and butter, their jobs and homes and believe they must get ready for war to save their lives.

As peacemakers, Labour can beat the Tories just as decisively as they can on the domestic front, provided they dare to part company with the Tories and to be Socialists abroad as well as at home. But if the Labour Government, which was elected to make peace with the Soviet Union, now summons our people to prepare for war against the U.S.S.R., the voters will find Mr Churchill more convincing as a war-leader than Mr Attlee, and the Tory plea for national unity and a coalition because 'the country is in danger' more attractive than 'party politics' under Labour rule.

The Labour Government's Tory foreign policy is sawing off the limb on which the Labour Party is sitting. Once Labour's leaders, with the willing assistance of the Tories, have started the stampede from sanity to fear, it is not much use entering Labour's little pink porker for the Gadarene stakes. It may squeal and grunt and scamper right gallantly, but it will be trampled to death in the rush of the True Blue swine, even before the whole lot disappear over the edge.

How Tory politicians hope to use the anti-Soviet war scare and anti-Communist witch-hunt to 'dish' the Labour Party on the road to war may be illustrated by an amusingly crude display of the Tory tactics at a political rally, reported in the *Dumfries Standard* of March 24, 1948:

The first speaker was Sir Thomas Thank-God-and-the-Tories-for-Mosley Moore, M.P. for Ayr Burghs:

To-day Russia by her rape of Czechoslovakia and Finland* has finally divided Europe into two parts. We have done our best, but we have to meet that challenge. Thank God Mr Bevin met it a month ago, when finally and for all time he discarded that woolly slogan 'Collective Security' – because I have never found out what it means – and came back to the age-long traditional foreign policy of Britain, the balance of power ...

The logical conclusion of that is for Mr Bevin and Mr Churchill, and Mr Attlee if he likes to accompany them and have a bit of a treat, to go to Stalin in Moscow, or meet him in Berlin, and say, Mr Stalin, do you want peace or do you want war. If you want peace every British man, woman and child will support you to the last minute of their lives and the last ounce of their effort. But if you want war we will ourselves, with our good American friends in co-operation with ourselves, deliver five atomic bombs next Tuesday, and deliver them by air. (Applause.)

Sir Thomas Moore, it will be seen, was reducing Mr Churchill's peace programme to words of one syllable, for the bloodthirsty Tory morons who applauded him.

The next speaker was Mr J. Henderson Stewart, M.P. for East Fyfe:

Two years ago Mr Churchill, out of his incomparable wisdom and experience, went over to Fulton in America and urged the freedom-loving democracies, and particularly the English-speaking democracies, to come together and make an alliance for the defence of freedom against the attacks of Communism. What happened after that? Who was it who denounced that policy, and by their denunciation delayed action for twenty-four vital months, so that now we had the calamity of Czechoslovakia and the threatened calamity in Italy? It was 120 Labour Members of the House of Commons who were responsible for the denunciation. He would tell the audience what these Members did. On the 12th of March last year they tabled a resolution – no doubt with the support of a great many of the leaders of their party – to the effect that the House considered that proposals for a military alliance between the British Commonwealth and the United States for the purpose of combating Communism, such as were put forward in the speech at Fulton by the Rt. Hon. Member for Woodford (Mr Churchill), were calculated to do injury to the good relations between Great

*The Czechoslovak lie has already been commented upon. The reference to Finland is a mystery, for that country held a perfectly free election in 1948 in which the Communist-front coalition was beaten and a Centre-Right strongly anti-Communist 'Third Force' Social Democratic Government, supported by capitalist parties, came into office. The Russians continued their policy of non-interference in Finnish internal affairs.

Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R., and were inimical to the cause of world peace. Yet that is what Mr Bevin is trying to get now.

Socialism was a halfway house to Communism and Socialist Parties were full of crypto-Communists. The Labour Party shared the guilt for the advance of Communism and Socialism in Europe, and had for a long time been criminally complaisant about what was happening.

Now, after two years, the Labour Government have wakened up and they have started a witch hunt for Communists in the Civil Service. I do not know what my audience think about it, but what I think is that the Labour Party should start a witch hunt among their own rank and file.

The tactics are plain: embrace and defend the right-wing Labour Ministers who are going Mr Churchill's way, and make violent attacks on leaders, such as Mr Shinwell and Mr Aneurin Bevan, who publicly disagree with Mr Churchill. Hope that the Labour leaders may butcher the Labour Party to make a Tory holiday by conducting an 'anti-Communist' witch-hunt among the rank and file and Members of Parliament.

The *Sunday Times* of April 3, 1949 said the agenda of the impending Annual Conference were proof positive that the rank and file of the Party were 'Red' and would sooner or later take the bit in their teeth and run away with their moderate and statesmanlike leaders, of whom Mr Morrison in particular came in for high praise.* However hard our leaders try, they can never compete successfully with the Tories in anti-Communism and bellicosity. There is no end to a competition of that sort except a coalition and going, through the coalition, all the way to Fascism and a third world war.

The Tory dream is that Mr Bevin should weed out of the Labour Party everyone who does not agree with Mr Churchill's war policy. Mr Bevin has been so consistently obliging to Mr Churchill in everything else that the Tories do not see why he should not do them this favour too.

WILL THE TORIES GO FASCIST?

The Conservative Party do not possess and will not have a policy for the General Election, because it is no longer possible to produce a policy within the framework of the Capitalist system that will meet the crying needs of our people and face the real

*Mr Bevin, of course, being *hors concours*. The Tories do not regard him as a party politician. To them he is a national leader.

issues in the post-war world. No doubt they will fudge a make-believe programme of sorts. But what they really are relying on to do the trick are (1) Social demagoguery – promise all things to all men; play on every grievance; be at once evasive and fulsome, slippery and hearty.

(2) A violent smear campaign – call every Socialist who quarrels with the Tories and opposes the drift to war a Communist or crypto-Communist, enemy of his country, Moscow agent, etc. The open anti-Communist smear propaganda is increasingly being supplemented with furtive sidelines in political pornography, such as anti-Semitism and a whispering campaign about the alleged corruption of Labour leaders. The Tories will in fact try to convey the impression that the Labour Party is divided into Stalinists (at the bottom and on the left) and Stanleyites (on top and on the right).

(3) Trumpeting the glories of Mr Churchill as the inspired leader, God's gift to the British people in this time of trouble. It is rather like trying to sell a man who wants to rent a prefab or Council house with modern conveniences, a historic, magnificent, picturesque but impossibly dilapidated, expensive and insanitary old ruin as the ideal home for himself and his family. But the Tories hope that the discrepancy won't be noticed in the atmosphere of fear, hatred, war hysteria and more and more frenzied appeals to patriotism and national unity lest we perish, which they hope to work up by 1950. They count on the able assistance of the Right-Wing Labour leaders, whose views on Communism and the Soviet Union have become indistinguishable from those of Mr Churchill (or, for that matter, of Hitler and Goebbels), and who are obsessed by the fear lest the Tories call the Labour Party 'the Russian Party'.

It is many years since the Tory Party dared to fight an election under their own name. Ever since the first world war they have fought under a variety of *aliases* and monikers. Nor have they ventured to make a straightforward political appeal as one party in the State. Increasingly, they have appealed to the electorate to vote for their party on the ground that there was a crisis or emergency, the urgency and gravity of which transcended party politics and called for national unity. The nation and the Union Jack are election accessories of the camouflaged Tory Party.

The 1945 election was fought by the Tories as a one-man show. The Conservative Party's election address was couched as a personal appeal by Mr Churchill. The name of the Conservative Party was never mentioned from start to finish. It was all an

appeal by the Great White Chief to give him the tools so that he could finish the job. His face was on every Tory poster.

Quite clearly, this is the kind of appeal the Conservative Party wish to make again with a vengeance. Mr Churchill has already announced that he will ask for a 'doctor's mandate' (like Ramsay MacDonald), i.e. a free hand and power to do what he likes. The result would probably call for an undertaker's mandate.

Mr Churchill did as great a job winning the second world war as Mr Lloyd George did in winning the first. But hero worship of Mr Lloyd George in the Capitalist press and on Conservative platforms stopped abruptly when the Tories parted company with him in 1923. The adulation of Mr Churchill to-day is simply part of the Tory technique for humbugging the electors and putting themselves back into power. By that time Mr Churchill would be 76 and could be used as a mascot or dropped the moment he ceased to be useful.

Meanwhile Mr Churchill, towering as is his stature as a man, sums up in his own person as a politician the cross-currents and paradoxes in which Conservatism is caught and buffeted in the post-war world. His party are trying to cash in on his fading glory as the leader of the nation and the Grand Old Man of the United Nations. But in attempting his apotheosis they have achieved only his decline to the lowly status of the Old Man of the Sea, clamped on the neck of the defeated Tory Party, the mascot of the City and the F.B.I., the toast of European reaction and counter-revolution, the friend of Franco and the enemy of peace.

Mr Churchill and his Party are tireless in war-whooping and war-dances in the alleged defence of Democracy and freedom, of which they claim to be the only true champions. But the only result is to suggest that their allegiance to democracy and freedom in the situation opening up before us is becoming more and more doubtful.

One's blood runs cold to think of what would happen if the ship of State were captured by this atom bomb-happy Ahab and his chaotic crew of battered and bewildered big business bruisers, arrested undergraduates, middle-aged public school boys, ex-officer types, crypto-Fascists, kindly old buffers and lost liberals.

He would batten the passengers down under hatches, hoist all sail, and set off across the phantom seas of his anti-Soviet fanaticism in pursuit of the red Moby Dick of his anti-Communist delirium, until the good ship Britain foundered with all hands.

Mr. Churchill gave himself away in the House on December

1st, 1948. Mr. Ellis Smith reminded him that he had spent a lot of the taxpayer's money and killed many people in his squalid and bloody war of intervention in Russia. Mr. Churchill replied:

'I am hoping - I am believing - that the day will come when the efforts I made in those far-gone years will be considered to have been wise and right.' I interrupted to remind him that 'on 16th July, 1918, the War Cabinet adopted a memorandum by Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, pointing out that if Tsarism were restored in Russia the result would be a deadly danger to the British Empire, because a Tsarist Russia would join autocracy in Germany to defeat us in a world war,' and that Mr Churchill 'did his best to produce that result.' Mr Churchill audaciously countered this with 'The ignorance of the Hon. Gentleman does not even let him know that it was the Social Revolutionary Party for which we were endeavouring to secure victory.'

The obvious answer to that whopper, the full flavour of which the reader of Chapter I of this book can appreciate, was to remind Mr Churchill that on November 5th, 1919, he had himself admitted in the House that his purpose was to restore Tsarism in Russia.

But the immense significance of Mr Churchill's remark was that it revealed that (a) in all the intervening thirty years the fact has never sunk into his mind that if his class-war had succeeded in assassinating the Russian Revolution, he would have encompassed the defeat and downfall of his own country, (b) he is back in 1919 in his mind now, playing cops and robbers against world Communism, obsessed by the 14 wicked men in the Kremlin who would murder us all in our beds if they weren't scared of the atom bomb, and dreaming of himself as the happy warrior, leading not only the British Commonwealth and Empire but also Western Europe and the Western hemisphere in a bigger and bloodier war of intervention against the Socialist third of humanity, (c) give him power, and he would strive with might and main to bring matters to a head by summoning the Soviet Union to choose between unconditional surrender to Anglo-American demands and war.

Mr Churchill is like an elderly Prima Donna, whose engagement has unaccountably not been renewed, but who gamely refuses to give up hope and tries to stage a come-back by touring the provinces (Fulton, Edinburgh, Zürich, The Hague, Llandudno, Brussels, Boston) putting on the Russian intervention act that wooed his public back in 1919 and plugging his theme song:

'Fourteen men on the Red Man's chest,
Yo ho ho and the atomic bomb.'

On the one hand, Mr. Churchill is the greatest living Parliamentarian and the leader of us all in the last great war. On the other he is still the Mr Churchill who went to monstrous lengths of double-dealing, maniacal fanaticism for the sake of anti-Communist intervention in Russia; who excluded the working class from the comity of the nation when he fought the General Strike in 1926; who praised Mussolini in 1927 for showing hard-pressed Western statesmen how to deal with democracy by, when necessary, holding the line against the advance of Socialism, and lauded Franco in 1936 for bearing arms against the Spanish Republic he had sworn to serve; and who, in 1938, said that this country in case of defeat in war needed a Hitler to put it right again.

The last sentiment is particularly interesting, because in a speech at Luton Hoo in June, 1948 Mr Churchill said that Labour rule was inflicting on Britain 'evils and humiliations almost as bad as those suffered by defeated nations'. In August Mr Churchill proclaimed that we were facing a 'measureless prospect of misery and tribulation' as a consequence of Socialism.

As for the Conservative Party, they have scarcely changed, except possibly for the worse as the situation gets more critical for their class, since Mr Churchill said of them, with reference to the gun-running, subornation of army officers and organisation of an armed revolt in Ulster by Tory politicians against the Liberal Home Rule for Ireland Bill:

There are those who say, 'We are Tories. No laws apply to us. Laws are made for the working people, to keep them in their proper places. We are the dominant class. We are the ruling forces of the State. When laws suit us, we will obey them. If they do not suit us, so much the worse for the laws. We will not bow down to the rules appropriate to the common herd of British subjects. It will be time enough for us to talk of law and order when we have got into office.' (House of Commons, April 28th, 1914).

A popular Tory argument to-day was compressed by Mr Henderson Stewart in the speech already quoted into the following sentences:

Socialism taken to its logical conclusion destroys democracy because the two are exact opposites ... The history of the last two years proves beyond doubt that Socialism and Democracy are irreconcilable.

Continental Socialists, he continued, had sacrificed Democracy to Socialism. British Socialists could not be trusted to respect and preserve Democracy, because 'the conflict between Socialism and Democracy is still unsolved in the British Labour Movement'. The only trustworthy defenders of Democracy were therefore – the Tories. (Presumably because of their fine record of appeasing Fascism yesterday and whoring after Franco and world war to-day).

From these views and attitudes it is a small step to defend Democracy against the menace of Socialism, meaning thereby the 'preservation of society on existing lines and resistance to Communistic propaganda', in Lord D'Abernon's phrase of a quarter of a century ago, by resorting to sabotage and unconstitutional action against the Labour Government, or, if the Tories are in office, by introducing some form of boiled shirt Fascism to hold down the workers and bulldoze the people. Anti-Communist witch hunting, anti-Soviet hysteria, anti-Semitism, warmongering and war preparations are the line of least resistance the Tories feel bound to take in the circumstances of to-day, and would continue to take with a vengeance if they got into office to-morrow, in order to keep their hold on power after failing to keep their demagogic promises.

It is not surprising that the party which exists to defend Capitalism in this country should be evolving in the direction of a kind of British compromise with Fascism, a semi-Parliamentary and semi-Constitutional semi-Fascism. For the defeat and overthrow of the Fascist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, Italy and most of the Balkans has meant the advance of the Social revolution to the middle of Europe and has weakened and exposed Capitalism in the West. Fascism is essentially Capitalism at bay. The champions of Capitalism in this country are beginning to feel that they are fighting with their backs to the wall. That is why the Conservative Party is tending increasingly to justify Sir Thomas Moore's remark that the instincts of the Tories and the Fascists are the same, that the latter have sprung from the former and that the two are blood brothers.

It would be wrong to exaggerate these tendencies. The Conservative Party so far has behaved far less viciously than they talk. They still look on the State as their State because they cannot bring themselves to believe that the Labour Government will last. It is an article of the Tory faith that the choice of the electorate in 1945 was an aberration, an unfortunate accident, and that Labour rule is a kind of interregnum, almost

an act of usurpation, from which the swing of the pendulum will rescue the country. Their behaviour is likely to change for the worse when the next election belies their hopes.

But many Conservatives really are good democrats. Most will remain such if Labour stays resolute, united and realistic in its Socialism, shows itself competent and confident, plays the game according to the rules of democracy itself, and stands no non-sense against democracy from anyone else.

On the other hand, it would be dangerous to overlook the fact that there is a hard core of hard-faced men in the Tory Party and the vested interests behind them, who would not hesitate to go all the way to Fascism and world war rather than let Britain and the world go Socialist in peace. Harold Laski was quite right and his grave warning should be heeded when he wrote:

When all allowance is made for national character, the strength of tradition, the impact of historic experience, and so on, there is no reason to believe that when their fundamental power is challenged British capitalists will act very differently from those of France or Germany or the United States. The Labour Party may insist upon its constitutional right, should it win an electoral majority, to use political power, the power given to it by the masses, to satisfy what it deems their legitimate expectations; to our capitalists, the threat of that political power to their security, thereby to the privileges that security maintains, will tend to obscure the validity of constitutional right.

That is the lesson of Italian Fascism; it is the lesson of Nazism in Germany; it is the lesson of the Civil War in Spain; less dramatically, but none the less truly, it is the lesson of 1931 in Britain, and of the New Deal in the United States. Capitalist democracy does not get automatically transformed into socialist democracy as victories are won for economic justice, by the mere flux of time. When democratic institutions threaten the capitalist foundations of society, capitalists, if they can, embrace counter-revolution in order to overthrow democratic institutions. That is the real meaning of this war; that is why Vichy France preferred slavery under Hitler to the risks attendant upon evoking the dynamic of democracy. The British Labour Party has got to digest – and its leaders, at any rate, have not yet sought to digest – the significance of this experience. For it might well happen, unless we adapt the productive relations of our society in time, that not even victory could save our people from a similar experience. (In *Marx and To-day*, a Fabian pamphlet published in 1943.)

THE FAILURE OF THOSE WHO KNOW THE FACTS

In short, in the world in which we are living, the old order is crumbling and its defenders are at their wits' end. The pro-

fessional advice of those whose job it is to know the facts is generally worse than useless. For the overwhelming majority of the brass hats and diplomats on whom the Government relies to supply it with information are born and bred in the upper reaches of the Capitalist class and admirably illustrate the truth of Marx's famous saying that 'Consciousness does not determine social position. Social position determines consciousness.'

Their political consciousness is incapable of encompassing and fathoming the realities of our swiftly changing and largely revolutionary world. They are pagans, suckled in the creed outworn of power politics in defence and extension of the benefits of private enterprise, and they understand nothing of the fundamental issue of Socialism versus Capitalism that dominates world politics.

The old China hands and the old Russia hands proved the worst possible advisers of His Majesty's Government on what should be our policy towards the Chinese and Russian revolutions. They knew a lot about the life of the propertied administrative and ruling classes of the old China and the old Russia, but they had nothing but fear and hatred and blank incomprehension for the new revolutionary order and its ideas and men.

Similarly the old Foreign and War Office hands are almost inconceivably bad advisers on what to do about the Soviet Union and the social revolution in Europe and the Middle and Far East. For they regard this vast phenomenon in huge sections of humanity with a cold maniacal obsession of fear and hate that warps their vision and distorts their judgment. The failure of the wisdom of the ruling classes and of the knowledge of the experts nurtured in the old order, as well as of the power political tradition in which they believe, is part and parcel of the wider failure of the old social order. The official experts and advisers and the capitalist politicians and their Labour fellow-travellers cannot be trusted, for there is no health in them.

SALVATION IS IN THE COMMON PEOPLE

Salvation can come only from the common people. The people, said the French historian Michelet, writing of the French Revolution, are nothing and must be everything. In world affairs that is still true. Up to now, the people have been and are nothing in foreign policy but pawns, dupes, dolts, expected to put up with anything and endure everything, even unto losing their lives,

without holding their rulers to account. Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die.

As long as the mass of the people accept that servile and degrading role there will be no democracy in foreign affairs and the drift to disaster will continue. But if they rouse and assert themselves, they can turn power politics into human affairs and generate a politically effective demand for peace.

In France and Italy the workers are awake to their peril, for the lesson is being driven home by acute economic distress. In the U.S.A. the Presidential election showed the people stirring in their sleep. In Britain the foreign policy of the Labour Government, if it had been openly carried out by the Tories instead of only being inspired and supported by them, would long ago have aroused a furious popular revolt, led by the Labour Party and demanding in a voice of thunder that it be abandoned and repudiated before we are utterly undone.

As it is, the Tories are right in taunting the Labour Party on their lack of unity and enthusiasm about the Government's foreign policy. Foreign Affairs debates present the depressing spectacle of Labour backbenchers listening to the Foreign Secretary in glum silence while he is cheered to the skies and warmly praised by the Opposition (at any rate, he was – even the Tories are now beginning to find his performance unsatisfactory).

There is bewilderment and dismay in the rank and file, who more and more feel themselves in the agony of perplexity, described in the poet's words:

'His honour rooted in dishonour stood
And faith unfaithful kept him falsely true.'

There are all but open divisions among the leaders, as revealed by the wide differences in their public statements, that are gleefully seized upon by the Tories. National unity with war-mongering Tories against the Soviet Union violates the deepest instincts of the workers and outrages the common sense of those who voted for Labour because we said we could succeed and make peace where the Tories had failed and landed us in war.

The majority of the Labour leadership are afraid above all things of being charged with lack of anti-Communist conviction and anti-Soviet resolution. And so they are trying to prove there is nothing in that line Mr Churchill can do that MM Attlee, Bevin and Morrison cannot do at least as well if not better. But for this purpose they want a purge of the Left in the Party.

The difficulty is where to stop. The Tories are never satisfied. They can always go one better, so that to lop off the left begins to look like the old joke about the man who wanted to cut the wobble out of his chair by sawing off a bit of one leg and then the other, and so on, until he found there was no chair left and he was on the floor.

Amid much that is evil, the one good thing is the proof afforded again and again of the power of democracy, not least in the Labour Party. The revolt on foreign policy organised by the Keep Left group in November, 1946, half-hearted and muddle-headed though it was, and the protest organised by a number of backbenchers against Mr Churchill's Fulton speech did, as Mr Henderson Stewart said so angrily, at least constrain the Government to go slow and be cautious for two years in following in Mr Churchill's footsteps. The weak revolt against the original proposal to impose conscription nevertheless led to eighteen months service being reduced to twelve for a year, before the Government capitulated to the Tories and the brass hats and the Foreign Office.

Partial negative revolts are not likely to bring about a radical change. Nor will such a change come merely because the recruiting campaign is a flop and eighteen months conscription is bitterly unpopular. But there are signs that public opinion is ready for and would support, in the end overwhelmingly, a movement of radical revolt against what is wrong that was linked with a realistic and positive policy for getting us out of this mess and blazing the trail to peace.

There is no need whatever for the present drift to war. It is perfectly possible to make an honourable peace that will last with the Soviet Union and her neighbours and associates. They want it and need it as much as we, and they have no ambition to overthrow our institutions, still less to invade our country. They are afraid we and the Americans are preparing to do that to them.* That fear appears just as absurd to us as ours does to them.

*Mr Philips Price, M.P., in the House on February 20, 1946, after a two months visit to the U.S.S.R. (where his knowledge of Russian enabled him to gauge the temper of public opinion):

'What struck me most was that the Russians are just as fearful of us as we are of them. All the time they were asking: "What are you up to, are you preparing a Western bloc against us, you and the Americans?" I could see they were determined to prevent their country ever again being a scene of war and devastation, to which they have been subjected for the third time in thirty years. They have a nervous suspicion of us. They cannot forget the wars of intervention. While talking to them, I was all the time trying to tell them that 1945 was not 1918 again.'

The Labour Party and only the Labour Party can make peace, because we stand for Socialism. But in order to tackle this biggest job in the world and the newest, for which there are no precedents, and where all the established experts and leaders have utterly failed, the Labour Party must learn how to apply its Socialism abroad as well as at home. We must not let Labour's leaders ignore international affairs at the general election, nor allow them to get away with joining the Tories in trying to convert the issue of how to make peace into a campaign for getting resigned to and ready for war. We must be forthright and resolute about refusing to be dragged into war and hard-headed and tough about insisting on the election of a government that will make peace.

The concluding chapters of this book will show how this can be done. The first discusses Labour in world affairs. The next sets down certain elementary facts about the ideas, forces and countries with which we must find out how to live at peace; after that comes the Price of Peace; first steps to peace; and the strength of our position.

If we are not afraid to lay bare our faults and discuss our weaknesses with ruthless candour, if we know what we want and have the courage of our convictions, if we dare to be 'no' men as well as 'yes' men, the job can be done and peace can be saved by the Labour Party.

CHAPTER X

Labour in World Affairs

1914-1949

BACKGROUND

THE Labour Party is flesh of the flesh and bone of the bone of the British working class. It is organically and inseparably joined with the workers through the politically affiliated Trade Unions which constitute the great bulk of its membership. At the same time, it is a true cross section of the nation, almost every class and walk of life being represented in its ranks in numerical proportions similar to their occurrence in the people.

Britain is the only country in the world where the industrial workers (including agricultural labourers) are the great majority of the nation. At the same time the workers, rising from unskilled to skilled and starting at their lower level in the slums and the cottages, shade off at their upper economic level into the lower middle class, the salaried and the professional classes.

Because Britain was a pioneer in the industrial revolution before she became a democracy and arrived at 'Votes for all' by gradual stages, the workers developed their trade unions and co-operatives long before they found it necessary to part company politically with the Liberal Party and to set up a party of their own.

For a long time the Trade Unions were content to seek concessions from the two Capitalist parties. As they generally found the Liberal Party more forthcoming, they gravitated into a position of semi-autonomous support for the Liberals. This was the era of Lib-Lab Trade Union leadership. At the same time, Socialist societies, such as the Social Democratic Federation, the Fabian Society and the Independent Labour Party, sprang up, trying to convert the workers to Socialism and in the case of the first- and last-named to the need for forming an independent party of their own.

For years Keir Hardie, rightly regarded as the founder of the Labour Party, pleaded at Trade Union Congresses for independent political action. In 1899 a motion was carried at the T.U.C. for calling a conference of Trade Unions, Socialist

Societies and the Co-operative Movement. It set up a Labour Representation Committee in 1900, with Mr Ramsay MacDonald as secretary, that returned Keir Hardie, Arthur Henderson and two other M.P.s to the House. In the great Liberal victory of 1906 it returned 29 Independent Labour members and changed its name to the Labour Party. In 1910 the almost equally numerous Trade Union group in the House, mainly miners, who were returned as members of the Liberal Party, joined forces with the Labour Party.

This early Labour Party was a loose federation of politically affiliated Trade Unions and Socialist societies. It had been formed to fight for the wage packets and bread-and-butter interests of the workers, including particularly the rights of the trade unions. Experience, particularly the famous Taff Vale case, when a judgment in the House of Lords deprived the unions of their long-standing legal status, had shown they could not be entrusted to the care of any capitalist party.

The outlook of the Labour Party at that date was summed up in the address in 1911 of its then President, Mr Wardle:

From the very first, the ties which bound the Party together were of the loosest possible kind. It has steadily and, in my opinion, wisely always refused to be bound by any programme, to subscribe to any dogma, or to lay down any creed. Its strength has been its catholicity, its tolerance, its welcoming of all shades of political and even revolutionary thought, provided that its chief object, the unifying of the workers' political power, was not damaged or hindered thereby.

This party was concerned with practical aims: power in local government and the promotion of municipal enterprise (so-called 'gas and water socialism'); social legislation, health insurance, old age and widows' pensions, accident insurance; legislation regulating the hours and conditions of labour; Trade Union rights. At the same time, the Socialist Societies and particularly the I.L.P. (the Social Democratic Federation had gone off on sectarian grounds at the start, and the Fabian Society was then as now largely a research and discussion group, believing in permeation of the elite rather than propaganda among the many) were making converts to Socialism within the party and the trade unions, and preaching the necessity for building up the independence and power of the party. They put an apostolic fervour into the work of education and agitation, on street corners and at the factory gate, in broad-sheets, pamphlets and small journals, discussion groups, study circles -

the rousing to political consciousness and fitting with intellectual weapons of the workers by the workers and for the workers.

LABOUR AND WORLD AFFAIRS, 1906-14

In world affairs, says Mr Attlee in *The Labour Party in Perspective*, there was in the years before the First World War 'little to distinguish the foreign policy of the Labour Party from that of the radical wing of the Liberals. The Party, although comprising within its ranks Socialists, and forming itself part of the Second International, had no real constructive foreign policy, but shared the views which were traditional in radical circles. These were not very coherent.

'They were based first of all on an individualist conception of the world. A number of sovereign States, following their own conceptions of self-interest, existed in a state of anarchy mitigated by a number of rather vague understandings and rules which were known collectively as international law. The citizens of these States were considered as competing freely with each other in accordance with the best principles of the Manchester school. The ideal aimed at was complete freedom of trade, which was considered to be a satisfactory basis for world peace.

'The radical tradition was strongly isolationist. It suspected all entanglements with foreign powers. It was anti-imperialist and anti-militarist. It held that armed forces should be kept at a minimum as potentially dangerous to popular liberties.

'There was, however, another radical tradition, which looked upon Britain as the champion of liberty against tyranny, and the supporter of all peoples rightly struggling to be free from domestic or foreign oppression. The Palmerstonian tradition of support for Liberal movements abroad was reinforced by the humanitarian impulse which lay behind Gladstone's denunciation of Armenian and Bulgarian atrocities. Thus it was found possible then, as it is to-day, for people to hold strong pacifist views, while claiming the right to denounce oppression all over the world, and to call upon Britain to use her strong arm to protect the weak. The explanation of the paradox lay in the strategic position of Britain. Long immunity from invasion tended to give the pacifists an exaggerated sense of security.'

Keir Hardie unconsciously defined the nature and limitations of the Labour Party's view on international relations, when reporting on the Parliamentary Labour Party's activities to a Party Conference in 1907:

Questions of foreign affairs, education, the welfare of subject races, militarism (that sinister foe of progress) have been dealt with by members of the Party speaking for their colleagues ... these things however have been merely incidental to the *real* work of the Party.

There spoke the heart and mind of the Labour Party in 1907, seven years before the outbreak of the First World War. The '*real*' work of the Party was the range of subjects already mentioned, to wit local government, social legislation, trade union rights. Colonial affairs, defence and foreign policy were regarded as matters that were not the direct concern of the working man. Therefore, in practice, they were left to the capitalist classes and their political representatives.

The outbreak of the First World War, which came as a stunning surprise to public opinion, was the price the people paid for leaving these matters to the ruling class. The Labour Party was affiliated to the Second or Labour and Socialist International and was a party to its resolutions, further discussed in the next chapter, pledging its constituent parties to joint action, including a general strike, to prevent war between Capitalist governments breaking out, and if it did break out, to oppose it and utilise the war situation to overthrow the governments.

But only a tiny revolutionary minority ever dreamed of taking these resolutions seriously. A rather larger pacifist minority had, together with some Radicals in the Liberal Party, drawn the logical conclusion from the individualistic Liberal philosophy that the problem of war should be dealt with on the moral basis of a conscientious objection to kill one's fellow men for any reason and in any circumstances. Those who held this belief usually did so on religious grounds.

LABOUR IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The bulk of the Party felt about the war much as did the great majority of the nation - it was a hideous thing, it came like a bolt from the blue, but it had been forced upon us and we must fight to save little Belgium and prevent German militarism from snuffing out British democracy and freedom. The Labour Party held an anti-war meeting in Trafalgar Square on August 2, 1914, at which a resolution was adopted protesting against 'any step being taken by the Government of this country to support Russia, either directly or in consequence of any understanding with France'.

The Conservative Party on the other hand urged the Govern-

ment to support France and Russia against Germany at any cost and quite apart from the question of Belgium. That is, the Labour Party drew belated and futile conclusions from its semi-pacifist radical anti-imperialism and isolationism, whereas the Conservative Party took the straight balance of power view which they had held all along.

The war turned out to be something utterly different from the wars of the past for which the various admiralities and war offices had been preparing so assiduously. For the first time all the resources of the nation had to be mobilised. There was industrial as well as military conscription. Man power and production became key problems. The opposing forces were so vast, ponderous and evenly matched that the issue hung in the balance for year after year of heart-breaking toil and sacrifice.

In this situation, the all-important problem that the belligerent governments had to solve was to secure and keep the loyalty of organised labour. The war, said Lenin, would be won or lost in the workshops and not at the front. There was an advantage, wrote Mr Lloyd George in his War Memoirs, in having a Liberal rather than a Tory government in power when war was declared, because it had the support of Labour. 'This secured the adhesion of the great Labour organisations whose action and sympathetic aid were essential to its vigorous prosecution. Had Labour been hostile the war could not have been carried on effectively. Had Labour been lukewarm victory would have been secured with increased and increasing difficulty. The most prominent and influential leaders of trade unionism worked for victory throughout the war. Without their help it could not have been achieved.'

One of the first things Mr Lloyd George did was to meet the National Executive of the Labour Party and urge them to be represented in the War Cabinet, because 'it is obvious that no government can be carried on in this country, whether during war or peace, without, I won't say the support of Labour, but the co-operation of Labour. Upon its determination to help in winning this war, everything depends'.

In the subsequent discussion, Mr Lloyd George was pressed by the Executive to admit Labour's claim to take part in negotiating and drafting the peace settlement. He replied that 'it seems inconceivable that any minister should make terms of peace without consulting representatives of Labour.'

Labour was modestly represented in the Coalition Government. But the business of settling peace terms went on with scant regard for Labour's views. Again and again, Mr Lloyd George

makes it clear in his War Memoirs, he had to ask organised Labour to make sacrifices by accepting more and more drastic measures of industrial and military conscription, surrendering Trade Union safeguards, accepting 'dilution' and submitting to comb-outs that drained men off to the forces. He understood and sympathised with the workers' point of view on the necessity for getting undertakings from the Government in return, about peace terms and the policy that would be adopted at home after the war. But he considered it a higher duty to coerce or fool the workers into doing the Government's bidding without changing its policy. He describes how and why he made his choice of method:

I had to weigh carefully the alternatives of taking drastic action or trying conciliation. Had stern action proved successful without arousing wide antagonism, it would greatly have expedited the process of dilution. If it had failed against a massed opposition on the part of the skilled workers – for it would obviously have been impossible to punish them all – the campaign for dilution might have been permanently lost.

LABOUR AFTER THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The Russian Revolution greatly increased the militancy and political consciousness of the workers. The Labour Party under Mr Arthur Henderson's influence swung over to the view that there should be a negotiated peace without victors or vanquished, instead of prolonging the war to seek a military victory and a dictated peace. This view was influenced by the monster strikes in January, 1918, in Germany and Austro-Hungary, the great labour unrest in France and the mutiny of no less than 17 French Army corps, about half the total French forces in the field, who refused to fight and were out of action for nearly a year. Mr Henderson resigned from the War Cabinet late in 1917 and the feeling grew stronger that the Capitalist governments were incapable of making peace and that Labour must act independently.

The Labour Party and the T.U.C. held a Congress on December 28th, 1917, at which they drew up an outline of Labour's proposals for the peace settlement. The idea of reaching agreement on something like this basis with Continental Socialist Parties, allied, enemy and neutral alike, in a great conference in Stockholm, fell through, partly because of right wing Labour opposition, which gave the government the courage to put its foot down, but mainly because the majority of the German Social Democratic Party refused to accept the basis proposed

and clung to the war-making Imperial Government. Only the Independent Social Democratic Party in Germany was prepared to work for an international Socialist peace along the lines suggested. In the meantime, industrial unrest and anti-war feeling were growing in the Labour Movement.

'Official Trade Unionism was unable to oppose the Government's industrial policy,' says Temperley's semi-official *History of the Peace Conference*, 'but discontent was growing and the unofficial Shop Stewards' Committees, particularly in the engineering trade, became the exponents of the policy of "peace by negotiation". The difficulty was made still greater when it became necessary for the Government to seek for more men for the army in the early months of 1918. The "man-power controversy", as it was then called, brought out opposition in the industrial sphere'.

An official ballot of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers gave a majority of 121,017 against and only 27,570 for the Government's proposals.

... at various conferences of Shop Stewards ... the discussion turned upon the possibility of trade-union action to secure an early peace. Some district committees of trade unions proposed that the Government should adopt the war aims of the Labour Party ... before making any further call upon the man-power of the nation. Thus opposition, suspicion of the aims of the Government and an alternative policy were being developed. Labour and trade union organisations became more and more eager to press upon public attention the statement of generous war-aims and the adoption of steps towards negotiation. It was now appreciated by the whole of organised Labour that even domestic and industrial grievances, which were more easily understood by the rank and file, could not be redressed so long as the war continued ...

... despair of any conclusion to the war was driving the people to look about for some new method of approach to a settlement. By the autumn of 1917 in all belligerent countries organised labour was inclined to feel that the Governments could do nothing and that labour itself must make the first move towards peace.

Wilson's famous 14 points were issued as an attempt to placate and re-assure Labour and Liberal opinion, in response to an S.O.S. from the British Government (although Wilson had been thinking on parallel lines for some time). On January 5, 1918 Foreign Secretary Balfour cabled to Colonel House that 'Negotiations have been going on for some time between the Prime Minister and the Trade Unions. The main point was the desire of the Government to be released from the pledges which were

made to the labour leaders earlier in the war. This release is absolutely indispensable from the military point of view for the development of manpower on the Western Front. Finally the negotiations arrived at a point at which their successful issue depended mainly on the publication by the British Government of a statement setting forth their war aims.'

This Mr Lloyd George had done. It would be very helpful if President Wilson did the same.

What had happened was that Mr Lloyd George had studied the peace terms published by the Labour Party and hastened to assure them that they were the same as the Government's. He also gave reassuring replies when asked about the conscription of wealth, the ending of war-profiteering and the nationalisation of the arms industry after the war, just as later he promised the nationalisation of the coal industry.

But at the same time the Government were committed to an annexionist and Imperialist peace in the secret treaties with its allies, and refused to commit itself to Wilson's Fourteen Points until just before the armistice, and then only under extreme pressure and the threat of a public showing-up by the President and his unofficial agent, Col. House.*

LABOUR AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

Wilson's Fourteen Points and Mr Lloyd George's promises, assurances and harangues did the trick. Labour stayed in line. With victory, Labour pressed for representation at the Peace Conference and, not getting it, took up the idea of running an international working class peace conference. The T.U.C. had summoned an inter-allied Labour and Socialist Congress in London in February, 1918, which approved the memorandum on peace terms already mentioned, that was adopted at the joint conference of the Labour Party and the T.U.C. in December, 1917. It also decided upon the abortive Stockholm Conference.

After that came a further inter-Allied conference of Labour and Socialist groups in London, including the American Federation of Labour, in September, 1918, which repeated the call for a joint statement of allied war aims.

In short, so far as the great Western Powers were concerned, 'the British Labour Movement took the lead in promoting the expression of an inter-allied labour policy for the conclusion

*The full story of how Labour was bamboozled, is told in my book *Mirror of the Past*, published in 1944 by Victor Gollancz Ltd., and in 1946 by Current Books Inc. A. A. Wynn, New York.

of the war; and, although the inevitable entanglements of war-time foreign negotiations were perhaps hardly appreciated by the majority of organised labour, suspicion was widespread that the European governments were not working towards the aims which labour had welcomed when President Wilson had given them expression. The terms of the Armistice, however, satisfied British Labour and opposition to the Government died down' (Temperley, *op. cit.*).

The Armistice terms in fact pledged the Allies to base the peace on Wilson's Fourteen Points – a pledge that was interpreted out of existence when it came to drafting the peace terms.

But between the November 11, 1918 Armistice and the opening of the Peace Conference at Paris on January 18, 1919, Labour did not carry the matter much further. The truth was that, as will be shown in the next chapter, the end of the war showed the Continental working class movement divided into three parts, with Labour leading the right wing and trying to recapture the centre, which was inclining towards the Left. Moreover, 'the attention paid by the workers to the problems of demobilisation, unemployment and the securing of their industrial position almost entirely absorbed the thought of organised Labour, thus leaving Labour organisations without direct power in international politics while the Peace Conference was being held' (Temperley, *op. cit.*).

But during the concluding stages of the war the Labour Party had contributed a good deal to the intellectual spade-work that resulted in the establishment of the League of Nations. The part played by such bodies as the Union for the Democratic Control of Foreign Policy and the League of Nations Society, whose leading members (E. D. Morel, H. N. Brailsford, Seymour Cocks, Norman Angell, G. Lowes Dickinson, C. R. and Noel Buxton, Bertrand Russell, etc.) were already or shortly became members of the Labour Party, has been mentioned above. Leonard Woolf's Fabian Research Report on 'International Government' was an important document.

Sidney Webb was the intellectual progenitor of the large and constructive idea that the economic controls set up by the allies in order to ration and allocate war materials, shipping, etc., should be internationalised, put under the Council of the League of Nations and used for the purposes of reconstruction after the war. This policy was adopted by the Labour Party and the T.U.C., and then by the Allied Socialist Labour Party and

Trade Union Conference of February 19, 1918, already mentioned. So strong was the mass support in the Western working-class world for this idea that it was adopted by the British Government, and a plan was prepared by the Foreign Office and presented to the Peace Conference. It was turned down by the United States, which had by that time abolished controls and relapsed into the blessings of 'free' private enterprise.

Many other of the most advanced proposals for a League of Nations, such as colonial trusteeship and an inter-Parliamentary Assembly, a court with compulsory jurisdiction, etc., originated with Socialists and left wing radicals, with the Labour Party and Trades' Unions providing a political sounding-board and mass support. Most of the ideas about international government aired in those early days are even yet ahead of anything so far attempted or discussed ever since, even after mankind set out again in the search for world government through the United Nations.

The part – a not altogether fortunate one – taken by the Labour Party in reconstructing the Second International is discussed in the next chapter.

The Labour Party put up a gallant but ineffective fight for a reasonable peace settlement and against the extravagances and absurdities of the dictated peace of Versailles.

LABOUR AND INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA

The biggest battle with the greatest consequences in the post-war world fought by the Labour Party was its opposition to intervention in Russia. It took a long time and a tough determined fight by the Left within the Party against the leadership before the Labour Party was gingered up to the point of really objecting to intervention. For a long time the Labour Party was deluded by the plea that intervention was connected with the business of defeating Germany, and later that it was for the purpose of restoring democracy in Russia and enabling the Russian people freely to settle their future through a Constituent Assembly. The rank and file of the Party and even its leaders were bluffed by the argument that the Government alone possessed the information necessary to judge and their policy therefore could not properly be questioned.

In December 1918 the Labour Party National Executive asked the Government to define their intentions with regard to Russia. There was no reply. In the spring of 1919 the Miners' Federation

took advantage of a special joint Labour Party and T.U.C. Conference to discuss the draft Covenant, to table a resolution demanding the end of intervention and the summoning of a special conference to organise resistance to intervention.

At the Labour Party Conference at Whitsun 1919 there was further discussion of the need for direct action to stop the war on Russia. Right-wing leaders expressed their moral indignation at this audacious idea. Mr William Brace, who shortly afterwards got a good government job, described the idea as 'the slippery slope'; Mr Clynes said the Conference was threatening a 'blow at democracy' and Sir James Sexton said he did not believe in 'letting mad dogs loose'.

Bob Smillie retorted:

It is rather strange that the Executive Committee of the Labour Party should take up exactly the position of every exploiter and capitalist and politician in this country at the present time. They fear more than anything else what has come to be called direct action. But I want to put it that direct action may be constitutional action ... We are told our action is unconstitutional. I should like to follow Mr Williams' statement as to whether the action of the Government of this country is constitutional. Have they not deceived the people?

Mr Herbert Morrison said the Labour Party had got to realise that the war being waged by Britain, France and other Imperialist powers against revolutionary Russia was not war against 'Bolshevism or against Lenin, but against international Socialism and the Trade Union movement itself', and 'as such should be resisted with the full political and industrial power of the whole Trade Union Movement'.

The Conference passed a resolution by 1,893,000 votes to 935,000 demanding an immediate end to intervention and prescribing Labour Party and T.U.C co-operation 'with the view to effective action being taken to enforce these demands by unreserved use of their political and industrial power'.

It had taken six months after the end of the war (when intervention had already been waged for nearly a year) before the Labour Party got this far. Three months later, in the autumn of 1919, the Glasgow Trades' Council proposed a twenty-four hours' General Strike as a protest against intervention and there were big street demonstrations in London. Another six months went by and the war of intervention continued.

After the Russian Whites were beaten at Archangel, in South Russia and in Siberia, the Allies supported Yudenich and his

Baltic Allies, who were likewise defeated. Then came the turn of the Poles under Marshal Pilsudski.

On May 10, 1920, at the height of the Polish offensive, the dockers engaged in loading the London freighter *Jolly George* with munitions for Poland struck work with the support of their Union. The coal trimmers refused to stoke the vessel and the owners were compelled to unload the munitions again. A week later the Dockers' Union decided to put a general ban on the loading of munitions for use against Russia.

At Whitsun 1920, when intervention had been going on for almost exactly three years, at first only furtively and hypocritically, when the Allies backed General Kornilov to overthrow the Kerensky government and establish a military dictatorship, and then, after the October Revolution, more and more openly against the Bolsheviks, the Labour Party Annual Conference met at Scarborough, where a resolution was passed, requesting an immediate summoning of the National Labour Party and T.U.C. Conference, 'having for its object the organisation of a General Strike that shall put an end once and for all to the open and covert participation of the British Government in attacks on the Soviet Republic', and further recommending 'that Unions should support their members in refusing to do work which directly or indirectly assists hostilities against Russia'.

The Executive, while professing sympathy for the principles of this resolution, rejected it on the ground that the time was not ripe for drastic action.

Then came the defeat of the Polish Army and the advance of the Red Army on Warsaw. In the House of Commons on July 21 Mr Lloyd George hinted plainly at war, and orders to stand-by were given to the British fleet in the Baltic. British troops broke a strike of dockers at Danzig against the landing of munitions for the Poles. On August 7 Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, sent a note threatening the Soviet Government with war if the advance of the Red Army were not stayed.

The next day Labour Party headquarters telegraphed all districts and trades' councils urging demonstrations against war on Russia. The result was nation-wide demonstrations on an impressive scale.

The following day, August 9, the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, the Labour Party Executive, and the Parliamentary party met in the House of Commons and unanimously passed the following resolution: 'That this Joint Conference, representing the Trades Union Congress, the Labour

Party, and the Parliamentary Labour Party, feel certain that war is being engineered between the Allied Powers and Soviet Russia on the issue of Poland, and declares that such a war would be an intolerable crime against humanity. We therefore warn the Government that the whole industrial power of the organised workers will be used to defeat this war'.

The Conference notified the executives of all affiliated organisations 'to hold themselves ready to proceed immediately to London for a National Conference', advised them 'to instruct their members to down tools on instructions from that National Conference', and constituted a representative Council of Action with full powers to implement these decisions.

The National Conference met in the Central Hall, Westminster, four days later, and fully endorsed these decisions. It 'pledged itself to resist any and every form of military and naval intervention against the Soviet Government of Russia', mandated the Council of Action to remain in being until it had secured recognition of the Soviet Government and the establishment of normal trading relations, and authorised the Council 'to call for any and every form of withdrawal of labour which circumstances may require to give effect to the foregoing policy'.

Mr Ernest Bevin told the delegates at the conference that 'this question you are called upon to decide to-day - the willingness to take any action to win world peace - transcends any claim in connection with wages or hours of labour ...

'We believe that hidden forces, reactionary forces, have been endeavouring to manœuvre the diplomatic situation so as to make Russia appear in the wrong, so as to find the excuse to declare war with all the forces of the allies against her ...

'Tsars have murdered thousands and 'we have not interfered - but if a people's revolution takes place, we appear to be called upon, according to the policy of the last three years, to "stamp out a terrible menace". This is a principle that Labour can no longer stand idly by and see develop.

'In conclusion, we have no hesitation in putting our cards on the table. We are satisfied of this, that if war with Russia is carried on, anyone who is responsible will be setting a match to material so explosive in its nature that the result none of us can foresee.'

Mr J. R. Clynes said that 'no Parliamentary or political measures, we felt, could be effective in themselves to save the country from being committed to war against its will'.

'No Parliamentary effort could do what we are asking you to do,' urged Mr J. H. Thomas, adding bluntly, 'When you vote for this resolution do not do so on the assumption that you are merely

voting for a simple down-tools policy. It is nothing of the kind. If this resolution is to be given effect to, it means a challenge to the whole Constitution of the country' (Cheers). Mr Thomas was that year's president of the Trade Union Congress.

Mr A. G. Cameron of the Woodworkers, chairman of the Labour Party Executive, was even more outspoken. Declaring that 'Constitutionalism can exist only so long as it does not outrage the conscience of the community', Mr Cameron said that power was needed 'for a united Council to declare action at a given moment. If the day should come when we do take this action,' he concluded, 'and if the powers that be endeavour to interfere too much, we may be compelled to do things that will cause them to abdicate, and to tell them that if they cannot run the country in a peaceful and humane manner without interfering with the lives of other nations, we will be compelled, even against all Constitutions, to chance whether we cannot do something to take the country into our own hands for our own people.'

This was language that the Tory fanatics of intervention could understand. In fact, it was about the only language that they did understand – they had gone murdering on in the face of all the remonstrances, questions and speeches in the House, protests, talks, newspaper and review articles and moral indignation of many good people in and out of the Labour Party for three years. But when Labour really got tough at home and the Red Army had beaten all the White hopes, they realised that the time had come to call it a day, and did.

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR, 1920-31

At the same time as it threw itself into the war effort and into these great social and international battles in the concluding stages of the war and the opening phase of the peace, the Labour Party reformed its constitution.

In addition to affiliated membership through Trade Unions and Socialist Societies, the status of directly recruited individual members was created, and a network of constituency Labour Parties sprang up in which the active element rapidly became the individual members.

The Labour Party fought Lloyd George's khaki election at the end of the war on a bold Socialist and international programme, the famous pamphlet *Labour and the Nation*. It doubled its numbers in Parliament, outstripped the sadly diminished and hopelessly split Liberal Party and became the biggest party next to the Conservatives, and therefore His Majesty's Opposition.

The war had compressed developments that would normally have taken a quarter of a century into four years. It had vastly speeded up the evolution of our Capitalist society from the stage of small-scale freely competing merchants and businessmen to the domination of economic life by vast concentrations of economic and financial power through giant banks, trusts, corporations, holding companies, trade associations, cartels, combines and monopolies. The Liberal Party, which had drawn its mass support from the lower middle class and the trade unions had for long been more and more dominated by leaders that belonged to the new ruling class, arising out of the social and economic fusion of big business with the old landed aristocracy. The tendency of Radicals to join the Labour Party and for Right-wing Liberals to attach themselves to the Conservatives, therefore, arose out of the changes in the class structure of our society. The splitting and melting away of the Liberal Party was merely the British variant of similar developments in other countries.

The quarrel between the followers of Lloyd George and Mr Asquith and between the near-Pacifists and the power politicians who had played false with the people aggravated and exacerbated these social tendencies under the pressure of the crowding events of the war.

The post-war Labour Party now had to begin to think of national and more remotely of international issues in terms of power and responsibility for the destinies of the country.

The first Labour Government ruled as a minority dependent on Liberal support. It came in just as the country and the world were recovering from the short but sharp post-war slump, and was able to carry on without challenging the assumption on which post-war reconstruction was based, namely that its object was to return to the pre-war economic system based on private enterprise. It was also able to continue the ten years' rule adopted at the end of the war, by which our defence preparations were based on the assumption that there was no appreciable danger of Britain being involved in a major war within the next ten years. In short, there was no fundamental international or social challenge to be met.

The Geneva Protocol and the recognition of Soviet Russia were the two outstanding achievements in international affairs of the first Labour Government. But the former was opposed by MacDonald, Snowden and other members of the Government and found little understanding in the Party. It was clear that many of the leaders and most of the rank and file of the Labour

Party in 1924 had not yet grasped the meaning of the obligations of the Covenant, still less what was meant by the attempt to establish a 'real, practical and effective system of world government'. Their emotional reactions were still based on the isolationist and pacifist assumptions of radicalism.

As for the recognition of Soviet Russia, as already mentioned it took a hard fight by back benchers and the Left in the Labour Party to prevent Prime and Foreign Minister Ramsay MacDonald wrecking the negotiations by his slavish adherence to the Foreign Office line of insisting on the recognition of Tsarist debts.

The first Labour Government fell and lost the election on the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet hysteria of Mr Ramsay MacDonald and his closest associates, which made them a prey to the intrigues of certain Foreign Office officials with the Tory Press over the faked Zinoviev letter.

The Labour Party took a good League of Nations radical line through its delegates in the Second International in the social lull between the first post-war slump and the great slump. It fought the 1929 General Election on a foreign policy programme of preparing and summoning the Disarmament Conference, elaborating machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes and recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the permanent Court of International Justice.

The second Labour Government put through this programme in the teeth of strenuous opposition from the Foreign Office and the Admiralty. Throughout its period of office, the ten years' rule still held good. It was never faced with a challenge to the fundamental assumptions of British Foreign policy. But in home affairs, the assumption that it was possible to restore the economic system of 1913 cracked under the hammer blows of the great slump.

The crisis revealed the fact that the chief Labour leaders of that day, who had come of age politically in the pre-war era, had been Socialist propagandists in their fiery youth and understood social reforms, but were not Socialists in the sense that they believed in or knew anything about how to deal with the problems of employment, finance, balance of payments, and other practical measures by Socialist policies. When faced by Capitalism in crisis, Snowden as Chancellor of the Exchequer swallowed the views of the Treasury officials and the Bank of England. He acted as a Gladstonian Liberal of the most strait-laced orthodoxy, a devout believer in the gold standard and the immaculate conception of bankers.

Mr Ramsay MacDonald, on the loftiest patriotic grounds, conceived a great contempt for his colleagues and decided that it was the course of duty and statesmanship to fool them and his back benchers, by doing a deal with the Tories and the Liberals behind their backs. He set up a coalition government that would represent national unity for saving the country (i.e. Capitalism). On taking this historic decision, he made his famous remark: 'Every duchess in the land will want to kiss me after this!'

When the betrayal burst upon the Labour Party, two things happened. First, Mr Macdonald's assumption that he had the party in his pocket and could count on the blind and stubborn loyalty of the workers as his personal property was proved false. Whereas he thought he could take half the Labour Party with him into the coalition, only thirteen out of some 280 odd Labour M.P.'s, including himself and his son Malcolm, his principal collaborators Philip Snowden, J. H. Thomas, Jowitt, and the P.P.S.'s and personal followers of this little group, crossed over. In the country not a single trade union branch or local Labour Party broke the ranks. All stood firm.

The second consequence was the staggering shock to the Labour Party's belief in its leaders and in the very principle of leadership. Ramsay MacDonald was a romantic figure. He went back to the great days of the pioneers and Keir Hardie. He had been in prison for his pacifist beliefs during the first world war. He had risen from humble beginnings. He was handsome and the possessor of a golden voice. He had fervour, pathos, eloquence. He had everything it took, in fact, to make him the symbol of Labour's onward march and high aspirations. He received adulation and devotion in full measure. It should have made him humble but it ended by turning his head.

Labour's representation in the House fell to sixty in the 1931 election. The triumphant Tories thought that the Labour Party had been smashed for good and all, or at least for many, many years.

LABOUR AND THE DRIFT TO WAR, 1931-9

Meanwhile the great slump had produced social conditions in Japan and elsewhere where the defenders of Capitalism had been driven to war preparations and foreign adventures in order to relieve the pressure. That was the ultimate driving force behind Japanese aggression in Manchuria and Tory appeasement of the Japanese. It was also ultimately responsible for Hitler coming

into power against a background of 7 million unemployed and a ruined and desperate middle class in Germany.

By the autumn of 1933 it became clear that a new race for arms had begun. Japan and Germany were out of the League and preparing for war. Imperialism and aggression had raised their heads and the collective system was falling to pieces. Up to then the Liberal assumptions that were the bed-rock of the Covenant had not been seriously questioned by Labour. The great majority of the Party followed its leaders in a foreign policy directed to trying to make a reality of the ideas of collective security and world government by purely political means, centreing on the cult of the practically defunct Disarmament Conference.

But at the 1933 Hastings Conference the pacifist and revolutionary-opposition-to-a-Capitalist war minorities in the party, which had never ceased to exist, proved strong enough to secure the passing of a resolution by the bewildered and unhappy rank and file against the National Executive. It drew attention to the threatening international situation and went on: 'Conference instructs the National Executive to pledge itself to take no part in war and to resist it with the whole force of the Labour Movement, and to seek consultation forthwith with the Trade Union and Co-operative Movements with a view to deciding and announcing to the country what steps, including a general strike, are to be taken to organise the opposition of the organised working-class movement in the event of war or threat of war'.

The National Executive, on the other hand, secured the passing of a resolution declaring that 'this Conference favours the total disarmament of all nations throughout the world and the creation of an international police force'.

The rest of the resolution put forward a programme for the Disarmament Conference intended to be the first steps in the implementing of this policy and to reaffirm the devotion of Labour to collective security. This resolution, with its technical allusions and jargon; its condemnation of the Government's 'retrograde attitude on the question of air bombing'; its call for the 'general abolition of all weapons forbidden to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles'; and its control provisions, was caviar to the general. Politically, it was almost frighteningly unreal.

The next year, at Southport, the National Executive submitted a memorandum on 'War and Peace' which had been worked out jointly with the T.U.C. General Council through the National Council of Labour and was adopted by overwhelming majorities by the Annual Conference of the Labour Party and by the T.U.C.

This memorandum repudiated the maintenance of the balance of power as the aim of British foreign policy and put forward the establishment of world government as the end to which Britain's endeavour should be directed in international affairs. It proposed as a first step the formation of a regional collective security group under Art. 21 of the Covenant, including the U.S.S.R. and working in as close association as possible with the U.S.A., perhaps on the basis of a non-aggression and consultation pact providing for the use of League machinery.

The memorandum recognised that making a reality of the collective peace system by advancing in the direction of world government implied 'profound changes in our views on the rights of the state over the individual in wartime, the duties of citizenship and the nature of patriotism.

'Specifically, it means that loyalty to the World Community on the issue of Peace overrides any national duty, and notably, our duty to the Government in war. We are World citizens because of our country's membership of a World community bound by common treaty obligations – the rudimentary Constitution of a nascent World Commonwealth.

'Our World citizenship is still strictly limited in nature, owing to the limited character of the treaty obligations that bind us to the rest of the World community. Therefore, our World Peace loyalty comprises only three duties of citizenship. But these duties rank first of all the duties of good citizens. They are:

(a) **ARBITRATION-INSISTENCE** – the duty to insist that our Government settle all its disputes by peaceful means and eschew force.

(b) **SANCTIONS-ASSISTANCE** – the duty unflinchingly to support our Government in all the risks and consequences of fulfilling its duty to take part in collective action against a peace-breaker.

(c) **WAR-RESISTANCE** – the refusal to accept our Government's unsupported claim to be using force in self-defence; insistence on submitting this claim to the test of international judgment, or of willingness to arbitrate; refusal to serve or support our Government if it were ever condemned as an aggressor by the League or designated itself as an aggressor by becoming involved in War after refusing arbitration.

Under the heading 'General Strike' the memorandum said: 'Labour is fully cognisant of the various implications of a General Strike against War. The present Standing Order 8(h) of the Trades Union Congress, which states that a special Congress should be called in the event of there being a danger of an outbreak of

War, covers the position ... The responsibility for stopping War ought not to be placed upon the Trade Union Movement alone. Every citizen who wants Peace and every other section of the Labour Movement must share the responsibility of any organised action that might be taken to prevent war.'

In *The Labour Party in Perspective and Twelve Years Later*, Mr Attlee, giving a personal but authoritative exposition of Labour's policies and principles, has this to say of the 'War and Peace' memorandum:

In 1934, at the Southport Conference, the Party adopted a comprehensive statement, under the heading WAR AND PEACE, which set out in full the principles for which the Party stands and the policy which it would pursue when given power. It stands to-day as the official policy of the Party. Its principal points were these: it based Labour's foreign policy on the collective peace system through the League of Nations, but, so far from regarding the League as only an adjunct to foreign policy and the collective system as a collateral security to national armaments, it regarded the League as a first step towards a co-operative world commonwealth. It rejected the theory of the balance of power and demanded the subordination of national sovereignty to world obligations. It stressed the need for basing the new world order on social justice and demanded far-reaching measures of economic co-operation and world control in economic and financial matters, such as raw materials, transport, travel and communications, hours and conditions of labour, etc. It linked disarmament with collective security, and accepted the obligation to use armed force if necessary in restraining an aggressor State. It declared for an international police force. It stressed the need for world loyalty as against national loyalty. It regarded war resistance as the duty of every citizen, and not merely of organised Labour.

He further explains what is meant by 'war resistance' in his chapter on 'Labour Party Method':

While, as I have stated, the Labour Party has steadily opposed the tactics of revolutionary action and violence, and has always pinned its faith to constitutional action, it has never ignored the possibility that occasions may arise when extra-parliamentary action may become necessary. Its faith in constitutional action inevitably depends on its opponents also adhering to it. As long as the workers have it in their power to achieve their ends by the use of the ballot-box, they have no right to seek to obtain them by other means. If Labour cannot obtain a majority, it must as a minority accept the will of the majority. It may seek to influence that majority, and those to whom it has entrusted power by every lawful means, but to try to enforce its will on a majority by violence

is contrary to its democratic faith. Stated thus, the proposition seems simple. But in fact there are borderline cases which require more examination.

It may be that the Government which has received a mandate from the electors deliberately goes against or beyond the wishes of those from whom it has derived its power. It may be that it behaves so tyrannically that it drives a minority to revolt. The question then arises as to whether a position may not occur in which it is right for a minority to bring pressure to bear on a Government by direct action of some kind or other.

Thus a Government might, in defiance of its election pledges, take action which amounted to aggression leading to a war. It might deliberately disregard public opinion in the matter. It might ignore its manifestations and continue on a course which was bound to involve the whole nation in great loss and suffering, if not ruin. It may be, then, right and necessary for a minority to take action, but it must be recognised that at that stage the method of constitutional action has been abandoned. A revolutionary situation may result.

During the years from the great slump to the great war the Labour Party pressed its demand for an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance, in friendly relations with the U.S.A., to organise collective defence on the basis of the Covenant against further aggression and expansion by the Fascist powers. It opposed the policies of pro-Fascist appeasement and for a time backed its opposition to the Government's foreign policy by voting against the defence appropriations, on the ground that defence was inseparable from foreign policy.

But, as already explained, opposition to the Tories' foreign policy was half-hearted and not always clear-headed. The way in which Labour's leaders became committed to traditional Tory assumptions in foreign policy during the war-time coalition, and how, almost without knowing it, they abandoned the Party's election pledges and foreign policy statements and carried on with the Churchill-Eden policy after 1945 has been described in previous chapters. There was a parallel evolution in the attitude of the Labour Party to working-class parties abroad.

LABOUR AND THE WORKERS OF EUROPE

In 1942 Mr Laski, on behalf of the National Executive, told the Annual Conference of the Party that the N.E.C. proposed to ask 'the authorities in the Soviet Union to receive a delegation from the British Labour Party at the earliest possible moment,

for the purpose of discussing all outstanding problems between 'them and ourselves and of finding, if we can find, a common basis that will enable their purposes and our purposes to march jointly together in an unbreakable union and for all time'.

At this time and during the year 1943 there was a growing number of voices raised, not only in the Labour Party but among French (e.g. Felix Gouin, Louis Lévy), Belgian (Louis de Brouckère) and other Continental Socialist leaders, for complete working class unity after the war. Mr Laski, who was active in this cause, wrote an article in the *Left News* of February 1943 concluding that if the fratricidal strife between Socialists and Communists 'which did so much to wreck the Labour movements of Germany and Italy, continues when the war ends, the result of the war for freedom may well be the achievement only of a more bitter slavery'.

At the 1943 Annual Conference of the Labour Party I moved a resolution on behalf of the Gateshead Labour Party and Trades' Council which called upon the National Executive Committee 'to send a delegation to the U.S.S.R. at the earliest possible moment in order to seek agreement with our Soviet comrades on all outstanding problems between them and ourselves; and in order to put in hand preparations for the holding of a congress at the end of the war whose object would be to found a new and united Workers' International'.

I pointed out that 'this resolution deals with one of the most important subjects before the Conference, no less an issue than the question of establishing unity throughout the working classes of the world.

'The resolution proposes to give effect to the National Executive's pledge that a Labour delegation to the U.S.S.R. will seek to find a common basis that will enable the purposes of British workers and the purposes of Soviet workers to march together in an unbreakable union for all time ...

'If we are indeed to march together for all time we must work together permanently, and for that we must set up some permanent machinery. We must become members of some common organisation. Both the Soviet workers and the British workers believe in internationalism. We do not want an exclusive British-Soviet arrangement; we want to co-operate with the workers of all countries. That means that the common organisation for which we strive can only take the shape of a new Workers' International. The resolution asks us to seek agreement with our Soviet comrades on putting in hand preparations to hold a congress of

working-class parties at the end of the War whose purpose will be to found a new and united International.

'The breach in the working classes after the last war was the main reason why we lost the peace – the breach between Communists and Socialists – and only a partisan would declare that in that breach during the last 25 years the faults were wholly on one side. Through that breach, Fascism came to power in Italy and Nazism in Germany; through that breach the French Popular Front Government was so weakened that it was first bullied and then broken by French reaction, ably assisted by reaction on this side of the channel. To-day the Pink International has faded into invisibility; it was the first casualty of the war. The Red International has just been put under. But the Black International will still be doing business at the old stand at the end of this war – the Black International of reaction, clericalism, big business and militarism, co-operating across frontiers against the workers for the sake of class in the name of nationalism. To-day the historic reasons that divided Communists and Socialists have disappeared. Both Communists and Socialists over a great part of Europe are co-operating in the underground resistance movements. They are agreed, not only on fighting the common enemy but on the necessity for overthrowing the Fascist and quisling States and the big business and land-owning classes who literally sold out to the enemy. They are also agreed that the liberated peoples shall settle their differences by democratic means, through constituent assemblies.

'Both these branches of the working class movement, fighting underground in Europe, are looking to the British Labour Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as their great allies in this struggle for freedom, and are hoping for a lead from us.'

Mr Laski replied on behalf of the Executive that they were not prepared to be mandated by the Conference to seek agreement on forming a new International, but that 'it would be for me, it would be for my colleagues, a tragedy of the first order if the twenty-five years after this war were followed by the same kind of internecine conflict as distinguished the twenty-five years between the two wars.'

The resolution was, of course, lost. What had happened was that the right-wing in the Executive attached more importance to disunity with a handful of Communists in this country than to unity with the workers of Europe and the Soviet Union.

Even on that level of argument the Labour Party was perfectly

entitled to take the position that, whereas it was prepared to co-operate and be friends with the parties in Europe that represented the majority of the workers in their own countries and stood for Socialism, it insisted in return on those parties recognising Labour's claim to represent the workers of this country and its right to do as it pleased about minority parties, such as the British Communists or Commonwealth or the I.L.P. But passion rather than reason carried the day and what might have been a great opportunity for Labour Party international leadership was lost.

Next year, in 1944, the National Executive, both in its report on the international post-war settlement and in its resolution welcoming the resistance movements, not to mention its messages to the Italian partisans and resisters and the Italian Socialist Party, went a long way to satisfy those who dreaded the renewal after the war of the splits and feuds in the working class that helped so materially to open the door to Fascism and war.

In pursuance of their report of the previous year promising they would 'take the initiative in creating an international Labour and Socialist Preparatory Committee', the Executive had held a series of meetings with delegates from Continental Socialist Parties. I drew attention to the dangers of this policy at the 1944 Conference, in the following terms:

I should like to know whether the proposal is still maintained of sending a delegation at the earliest possible opportunity to Moscow to discuss the future of international Socialist and Communist Party relations. I wish to hear that we are not committed, directly or indirectly, to trying to rebuild the Second International. I hope that we shall build a new and all-inclusive International, including both Socialists and Communists. That is all-important, especially in view of what has been happening in France lately, where the Socialists and Communists have a clear majority over all other parties. There can be no co-operation between the workers of Britain and the workers of the Soviet Union unless we have an International in which there is room for the Communist party of the Soviet Union as well as for the Labour Party here.

To this Dr Dalton replied for the Executive that 'the Labour Party is determined to do all it can to make Anglo Soviet friendship and co-operation a reality in every form, both between the respective governments, between the Trade Union organisations and between the broad masses of our people'.

Mr J. S. P. Davey, on behalf of the Watford D.L.P., moved a resolution instructing the N.E.C. 'to call at the earliest opportunity in 1945 a world Conference to which all parties with Socialist

objectives in all countries should be invited in order to devise machinery to secure a lasting peace based on a progressive social policy'.

The resolution also congratulated the conveners of the World Trade Union Conference on their success in establishing the World Federation of Trade Unions (including both Communist and non-Communist Trade Unions). The mover said it was 'high time' that the political sections of our movement co-operated all over the world in an endeavour to secure the future peace of the world, because peace could be brought about 'only by the determined effort of the workers'.

The seconder of the resolution, Mr G. D. N. Worswick, said:

We do need to form a new International. It is quite obvious that a revival of the Second International, which would exclude the Communist Parties of the world, including the Communist Party of Russia, could hardly be representative of the workers of the world; equally the Third International would exclude another great section. We therefore call on the National Executive to take the initiative in this respect as soon as possible, calling all parties with progressive and socialist objectives to come to a conference this year in order to devise machinery to carry out a common policy for peace.

Dr Dalton, replying for the Executive, said they could not accept the wording of the resolution, because 'all parties with progressive and Socialist objectives' might, for instance, include Sir William Beveridge and the Liberal Party. He did not mention Communists but pointed out that the N.E.C. were already in touch with the representatives of a number of Socialist groups on the Continent, who were 'resolved to give new life to the Socialist International'. He asked the Conference to leave the matter in the hands of the N.E.C., on the understanding that they pressed forward vigorously on this question and because it was their desire 'not merely to reconstitute a body so relatively feeble as in the last pre-war years the old Labour and Socialist International was, but to seek a wider and stronger organisation within the bounds of the declarations approved by this Conference from time to time'.

The attitude of the Blackpool Conference in 1945 and Labour's election statements on international working-class unity and support for Socialism have already been described.

By the middle of 1946 the 'crypto-Fulton' foreign policy pursued by the Government of an unavowed Anglo-American alliance, building up a balance of power against the Soviet Union

and her associates, and its repercussions in the States against which it was directed, had deeply influenced the policy of the Labour Party towards the workers of Europe.

The *New York Herald Tribune* of May 29, 1946, published an article by its London correspondent, saying that he had been told by a 'well-informed Labour Party source' that the Labour Party leadership were 'planning to unite the Social Democrats in Germany and Western Europe for an ideological battle against the Communists of Eastern Europe'.

This, observed the correspondent, 'would be a new Socialist International, but it would only be one wing – the left wing – of a greater predominantly non-Socialist International which is now in the making, an odd alliance which includes groups ranging from the old-line Socialists to the *Falange**, cutting across national boundaries in a tangled confusion of fears and loyalties'.

That the Labour Party were being steered in this direction became plain at the 1947 Margate Conference, and was all but admitted in the report of the Executive to the 1948 Scarborough Conference, where I begged the rank and file to realise that we had embarked 'on a policy which isolates and cuts us off from the greater part of the European working class. We are now on officially good terms only with the Social Democratic Parties of Scandinavia and Benelux and with the MacDonaldite Socialists of France and Italy, who are working as minor partners in Capitalist Coalitions and have practically no working-class support, plus Dr Schumacher's little lot in Western Germany. All the rest of the European working class, beginning with the overwhelming majority of the French and Italian workers and Trade Unionists, are to-day under the leadership either of Communists or of Left-Wing Socialists, the two working together or fusing into new working-class parties.'

There had been a Socialist revolution in Europe by much tougher means than anything we knew in England. The only rational policy for the Labour Party was one of 'live-and-let-live' towards the working-class parties of Europe, on the basis of their 'recognising us as the only representatives of the British workers, with the right to do what we like with the insignificant Communist Party here' and the Labour Party in return recognising 'the right of the working classes of Europe to choose whatever leadership is best suited to their conditions. If we do not do that, then where are we going? Are we going to remain on bad terms

[with most of the workers of Europe] indefinitely, or are we going to begin talking with them again? Why are we on bad terms with them to-day, when it is impossible to achieve Socialism in Europe, democracy in Europe or peace in Europe without the co-operation of the workers in Europe as they are to-day, and not perhaps as what Transport House wants them to be?

Dr Dalton replied at some length for the Executive, without even attempting to meet the real issue, which is that the existing working-class leadership of Europe is a fact that Labour presumably does not wish to follow Mr Churchill in trying to wipe out by war, and certainly cannot abolish by abuse. What then is the alternative to attempting to work out a correct and business-like relationship with these parties, based on mutual tolerance and respect, and a common interest between our respective countries in trade and friendship, in Socialism and peace?

The further implications and consequences of the policy to which the Labour leadership has committed itself on this all-important issue are referred to in the next chapter. It is plain that the attitude of the N.E.C. to European working-class parties is closely connected with the Government's foreign policy, and that the one can hardly be expected to change without the other.

Early in 1949 Mr Arthur Deakin joined with the American C.I.O., now under right-wing, mostly Catholic, leadership, with the pro-Capitalist and anti-Socialist American Federation of Labour in the background, to split and secede from the World Federation of Trade Unions. There is no doubt that Communist parties and Communist-dominated Trade Unions may be tough and tricky customers to deal with, and that the divergence in the foreign policies of the countries concerned has made the situation difficult for their Trade Unions. But it is equally certain that the Labour Party leadership never attempted, either during or after the war, to work out terms of tolerable relationship with Communist parties in Europe, even where they represented the great majority of the workers of their own countries and were co-operating with Socialist parties. It was quite plain in the case of Mr Arthur Deakin and those he represented in the Trade Union leadership, and indecently clear in the case of Mr James Carey of the C.I.O., that they desired to break up the W.F.T.U. and made not the slightest attempt to reach a compromise with the Communist-dominated Trade Unions. Neither the T.U.C. nor the C.I.O. leaders had seen fit to consult their rank and file on these issues.

WHERE LABOUR STANDS TO-DAY

The resulting situation and the alternatives with which we are faced are further discussed in the next chapter. Looking back on the growth and record of the Labour Party over the last half century certain phases in its development stand out clearly.

The Labour Party cut its milk-teeth on the questions of local government, social legislation and trade union rights. Lord Woolton, at the Conservative Party Conference at Llandudno in October 1948, paid an unexpected tribute to the superiority of the Labour Party over the Tories in local government, and urged Conservative councillors and candidates for municipal honours to take a lesson from their Labour colleagues. At bottom, Labour's advantage over the Conservatives in local government rests on the fact that the troubles and ills of the humble and disinherited and what they suffer from bumbledom are better understood and more zealously remedied by those who have issued from the ranks of the humble and know where the shoe pinches out of their own lives and those of their families and friends.

That too is the source of Labour's superiority in social legislation. To begin with, the Labour Party believes that social legislation is really necessary, which is more than can be said of many Tories. In every debate in the House the Parliamentary Labour Party produces speakers with intimate and profound knowledge of the wrongs to be redressed, of how any given piece of legislation is actually working in practice, and of what should be done to make things better.

It is hardly necessary to press the point that the Labour Party stands for the rights of the Trade Unions, whereas the Tories and latter-day Liberals are for all practical purposes the enemies of the trade unions. The infliction of the vindictive 'Trades Disputes' Act and the attitude of the Tories and Liberals in the debate that preceded its repeal by the Labour Government is sufficient evidence on that head.

But the building of houses, schools, hospitals and roads, better lighting and other amenities, for which local government is responsible, the benefits of social legislation and the effective enjoyment by Trade Unions of their rights, all depend upon success in making the country solvent, providing full employment and raising production.

The Labour Government cut its wisdom teeth painfully on

these questions of finance, economics and social reorganisation, as a result of the drastic experience of 1931. The shock was severe but salutary. It taught the Labour Party two great lessons, one technical, the other political.

The leaders who stood firm in 1931 set themselves to find the answers to the questions of finance, employment, trade and production that had baffled them at that time. They were helped by the great advance in economic knowledge, brought by Maynard Keynes' epoch-making book *The General Theory of Employment, Production and Trade*. They worked out practical Socialist policies to deal with the real issues.

The important part Labour Ministers played in the National Government during the war yielded much valuable experience and increased the competence and confidence of the Party. This time Labour came into the war-time coalition as well-nigh equal partners, and the Trade Unions played a tremendous part in the war effort. It was Labour that insisted, against the majority of the Tory Parliamentary Party, on dismissing Mr Chamberlain and putting Mr Churchill at the head of affairs. It was Labour pressure and ideas that accounted for the Government's White Papers on Full Employment, Social Security and a National Health Service after the war.

These are the reasons why the third Labour Government, the first with a solid majority of its own, has a record of remarkable achievement in home affairs and why this country has gone further along the road to recovery than any other West European country. Labour's leaders can govern and have shown courage, drive and a high order of ability and technical competence in tackling the intricate and stubborn problems of reconstruction amidst heartbreakingly difficult conditions, because they have learned how to do the job and are backed by the right kind of loyalty in the party.

The second or political lesson that the Labour Party learned in home affairs from the crisis and betrayal of 1931 was even more important. It was summed up as follows by Dr Dalton in his book *Practical Socialism for Britain*, in a discussion on the melancholy fate of the Second Labour Government:

Looking back, it is easy to put most of the blame for what was done or not done on the three men who occupied key positions in the Cabinet .. and who crossed over when the crisis came ... Certainly they exercised individually and collectively an undue influence in the Cabinet and in the Party. But all of us, I feel, must take some share of the responsibility, all members of the Parliamentary Party,

all junior Ministers outside the Cabinet and other members of the Cabinet itself. We should have kicked up more row, been less loyal to leaders and more loyal to principles ...

The Parliamentary Labour Party of 1929-31 was a magnificent army which was never led into battle. Had it been properly led it would have followed anywhere and gallantly. It was led, instead, through bogs and mists, by slow circuitous routes, to the very edge of a precipice. Here some of its leaders saved themselves by a most singular manoeuvre, in which the Party, with negligible exceptions, refused to join. Peering over that edge, the Party was in mortal danger of losing its soul. But at the last it put principles before persons. It chose to take the plunge.

Democracy is now much more of a reality in the Labour Party in home affairs than it was before 1931. That means that Labour Party loyalty in home affairs is a two-way loyalty: the rank and file will support their leaders through thick and thin in carrying out party policy; but they expect, nay, insist that the leaders should stick to and not run away from the Party's policies and principles.

The Government's decision to nationalise the steel industry is a case in point. The Labour Party's election programme *Let Us Face the Future* was perfectly clear about it that Labour was asking for a mandate to nationalise the steel industry. But as time went on, there was growing pressure, not only from the Tory Party, but from the powerful steel interests themselves and their allies in the City and F.B.I., as well as from the more faint-hearted and politically reactionary of the Government's official advisers, and last but not least from Mr Hoffman, the Marshall Plan administrator, and his minions, eagerly seconded by the Tory Party and Press, to leave well enough alone.

The case for this view – and there is a case – was powerfully argued by Mr Alfred Edwards, who was excluded from the Party for his pains, and by Mr Ivor Thomas, who felt so strongly about it that he discovered, as he put it, that it was better to be a Conservative in the Conservative party than in the Labour party. Certain 'moderate' members of the Cabinet quite sincerely inclined to the view that in the circumstances it might be a lesser evil to yield to the arguments and pressure from the Right, than to go ahead with the nationalisation of steel.

But the moment rumours reached the back benches of these tendencies in the leadership, there were marked and vivid reactions. The Trade and Industry Group of the Parliamentary Labour party and the party itself made it very clear that they expected the election programme to be carried out and were prepared to

make a fuss if it wasn't. The rank and file in the Annual Conference and the T.U. Congress went on record as pressing for the fulfillment of the promise to nationalise the steel industry. Strong in the knowledge of this great volume of support, left-wing members of the Government fought hard for taking in hand the promised legislation on steel and won.

This was democracy in action and heartening proof of the maturity of the Labour Party, which thought in terms of loyalty to policies and principles and did not burke free, vigorous discussion. No one dreamt of suggesting that by pressing for the honouring of Labour's election pledges the left or the rank and file were 'rocking the boat' or 'causing dissension' and 'splitting the party' - although, of course, the Tory Press and Party did their best to make public opinion believe that these signs of health and vigour and belief in democracy in the Labour Party portended a serious split.

In the decisive debate, it was not the Minister of Supply, Mr George Strauss, submitting the Steel Bill, that was applauded by the Tory party, but Mr Ivor Thomas, who left the party because he decided that national unity with the Tories on this issue was necessary in the international crisis. Whereas in foreign affairs, the Tories cheer Labour ministers and join with them in attacking Labour back-bench critics who stick to their election pledges.

The political maturity of the Labour party in home affairs reflects the psychological advance of the workers towards the attitude of a ruling class or, at any rate, of a class whose birth-right it is to take a share in the power to rule commensurate with their numbers and economic importance. In a revolution, this change in the mental outlook of the under-dog is dramatically rapid and sudden - overnight bent backs are straightened, sealed eyes are opened, and crushed wills spring defiantly to attention.

In a democracy, where change takes place by peaceful and constitutional means, the stiffening of wills and clearing of minds is a slow, gradual process.

The Labour party have long ago come to the conclusion that they can run local affairs better than the Tories and this claim was virtually conceded by Lord Woolton at Llandudno. On social legislation and trade union rights, the Labour party regards the Tories as enemies and not as friends, because they stand for the interests of the rich against the poor.

Before 1931 there was still a widespread inferiority complex in the Labour party about economic and financial affairs and many who held that, if the country was in a jam, it was safer to

leave its destinies in the hands of the upper class, whose knowledge, wealth and experience qualified them for leadership, or, at any rate, that it was unwise to reject offers of national unity with our betters to save the country in the crisis. Prolonged and severe unemployment and suffering under the Tory National Government, and the fact that Mr Chamberlain and his yes-men landed us in war and would have led us into defeat if their hands had not been forced by the Labour party into forming the coalition and putting Mr Churchill at its head, finally cured Labour of its inferiority complex on the major issues of finance, production, employment, planning and socialisation. The great part Labour played in the second world war in governing the country, raising, arming and equipping the forces and in organising the production drive, completed Labour's political education and social emancipation in the field of home affairs.

Insofar as there is discontent in the Labour party and the Trade Unions at faults in the government's home policy, it springs from the feeling that too much is being conceded to the Tories and that what is wanted is a more resolutely Socialist policy, placing greater reliance on the workers. All the pressure is from the Left in home affairs. There is little or no sign of any general demand among those who voted Labour into power, and none in the Labour party, for a return to national unity with the Tories because of our domestic difficulties.

But Labour has not yet come of age in world affairs. This is not surprising, for democracy itself is still young and timid in this field. The old contradictory Radical tradition of semi-Isolationism and semi-Pacifism on the one hand, and on the other an ardent desire to pass moral judgments on and lecture other countries while knowing little or nothing about them and sublimely disregarding moles or beams in our own eyes, is still strong in the Labour Movement. Keir Hardie's attitude, that the 'real' work of the Party is local government, social legislation and trade union rights, is still very much alive. The cry of Mr Jack Jones, the late M.P. for Silvertown, at a conference just before the war 'Let's drop all this talk about foreign affairs and get back to Socialism' would arouse a sympathetic echo even to-day. At one of the post-war conferences a delegate complained bitterly that we had wasted time talking about foreign affairs and not devoted sufficient attention to the question of the rates.

When we Labour candidates were being instructed by Transport House in June 1945 on the line to be taken in the coming election campaign, we were told that the Party's strategy was to

concentrate on home affairs, since we had virtually attained national unity in foreign affairs. It was, of course, impossible to reconcile this 'line' either with the terms of Labour's foreign policy statements and pledges, or with the fact that we were at the end of six years of the second world war in a lifetime, with all the problems of peace-making in front of us and with Britain entirely dependent upon the restoration of peace and international trade for her prospects of recovery at home.

Apart from this traditional insularity and the mental hangover from the days when Labour was too far from national power and responsibility to feel strongly or think realistically about international questions, the issues in world affairs are often concerned with matters not directly and immediately related to our daily lives. There are plenty of people in every constituency who can tell councillors and M.P.'s just what children's allowances, old age or widow's pensions, housing, the health act, the cost of living, etc. etc. mean to them. But the impact of foreign affairs on our daily lives is less direct and obvious, although even more far-reaching.

The responsibilities involved in foreign affairs are frighteningly great, for they may involve the issue of war or peace.

Whereas at home the responsibility of the Government is undivided, our own country has only a share of the responsibility for what happens abroad and there is always some truth in the charge that it is the other fellow's fault. It takes a slight intellectual effort to perceive that we must be concerned primarily with our own country's foreign policy, just because it is our responsibility and we can change it, whereas our main job in relation to other countries is to understand what they are up to and why, so that we can take account of all the relevant factors in deciding upon our own policy. It is much easier and more emotionally satisfying to appeal to nationalism by accusing critics of the government's foreign policy of being 'friends of every country but their own'.

These are some of the reasons why the Labour Party still suffers from a pre-1931 inferiority complex in foreign affairs. There are relatively few in the party who grasp the literally vital life-and-death importance of foreign affairs and their inseparable connection with our struggle to make ends meet, hold down the cost of living and raise the standards of life of our people. There is no widespread belief in the need to stand up to and fight the Tories in defence and foreign affairs just as strenuously as in home affairs.

For these reasons, whereas the Party is fairly hard-headed and thinks in terms of policies and principles in home affairs, one

touch of foreign affairs makes it go soft in the head and regard any attempt to insist on policies and principles as disloyalty to our leaders. 'Loyalty' in foreign affairs, in fact, is apt to mean the duty of the rank and file to be loyal to Mr Bevin's suicide pact with Mr Churchill.

Thus critics of the Government's foreign policy are met, not with any serious attempt to disprove what they are saying, but with the assertion that since the Annual Conferences have overwhelmingly endorsed the policies of the Government, the voice of criticism should be silenced. That is a point of view that it would be unconstitutional for a member of parliament and improper for any democrat worth his salt to accept without qualification. But it represents a view so widely and strongly held that it is worth examining the foreign policy resolutions for which the Annual Conferences have voted by overwhelming majorities, because Mr Bevin said that he would accept them.

In 1946, the Conference on Mr Bevin's say-so approved a resolution moved by Mr H. Bullock, of the National Union of Municipal and General Workers, which read as follows:

This Conference places on record its appreciation of the United Nations Organisation Congress held in London, and particularly of the part played by the Foreign Secretary, the Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.

It regards the development of international authority as the only alternative policy to the old diplomacy of national sovereignty and isolation, and the groupings of nations which lead inevitably to international conflict.

The Conference supports the Government in its policy of open diplomacy and of referring disputes between nations to international arbitration and decision. It believes that the creation of an International Force to restrain aggression is a necessary instrument of international policy, and will render unnecessary the maintenance of huge armies and armament development in times of peace, which tend to aggravate tension which arises between Governments over matters which can be dealt with more fittingly by international decision.

Notwithstanding all that the Government may do, the Conference regards it as imperative that independent voluntary organisations such as the United Nations Association should be supported in creating a public opinion in support of Governments pursuant to a policy of peace by negotiation.

A harmless and laudable resolution, it will be observed, that could have been passed by any branch of the United Nations Association or, for that matter, by any old ladies' sewing circle

or Browning Society. If 'League of Nations' were substituted for 'United Nations' it might just as well have been passed at any time between the wars. In fact, it resembles the resolution submitted by the National Executive to the Hastings Conference in 1933 that has been mentioned above. But it had nothing whatever to do with any of the real issues in world affairs since the last war.

In 1947 the Conference passed a resolution moved by that horny-handed son of toil and great Trade Union leader, Professor George Catlin, with Mr Arthur Deakin, Lord Dukes, Sir William Lawther and the other heavyweights of British Trade Union leadership rising to support him, that asked the Government to support the co-operative and social democratic forces in Europe. The only thing the resolution and the Trades Union leaders forgot to mention were the Trade Unionists of Europe. The omission was, no doubt, deliberate on the part of Professor Catlin, who knew that most of the Trade Unions in most of Europe were Communist.

In addition, there were some general phrases and another resolution about supporting economic reconstruction, the unification of Europe etc. etc. – all admirable sentiments but divorced from any consideration of working-class realities and ways and means in the world after the war.

In 1948, at Scarborough, the Conference, on the motion of the National Union of Mineworkers, declared 'its loyal support for the Labour Government and endorses the policy which is being carried out both at home and in the field of foreign affairs.

'It welcomes the acceptance of the Marshall offer and the recent Trade Agreements with Russia and other European countries, believing that these measures ensure the means whereby the economic rehabilitation of Europe can be effected.

'It recognises that the economic rehabilitation of Europe will lead to increased standards of living, strengthen the cause of democracy and improve the possibilities of international co-operation through the United Nations Organisation.'

Here again no one could quarrel with the admirable generalities of the resolution. Its only defect was that it did not even look at what was actually going on in the world or attempt to face the real issues of our foreign policy.

An approach to those issues was made in the resolution moved by Mr Fenner Brockway, expressing alarm at the tendency to divide Europe into Eastern and Western blocks and affirming that 'the Conservative conception of Western Europe on a

Capitalist basis and in military alliance with the U.S.A. against the U.S.S.R. cannot solve Europe's economic problems and will only lead to a third world war'.

But even this resolution soared into a rose-pink cloud-cuckoo land, inhabited by the ghost of the I.L.P., when it called for the achievement of the 'United Socialist states of Europe ... based on public ownership, economic planning and individual liberty ... in complete military and political independence of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.' to be achieved in co-operation with the 'United Socialist parties' of Western Europe.

The reader familiar with the realities set forth in the preceding chapters and further discussed in the next chapter does not need to be told that these proposals childishly failed to relate means to ends. Dr Dalton made confusion worse confounded by accepting the resolution on behalf of the National Executive, while making it perfectly clear that the N.E.C. proposed to pursue the very policy of a Western Union in which Capitalism is being restored, and in military alliance with the United States, that the resolution condemned.

This cursory review of the record of successive Annual Conferences on foreign affairs shows how unfair it is to blame Labour's leaders for practising to deceive, when the great majority of the rank and file care so little about what happens to their fellow workers in other countries and understand so badly that our own lives and fortunes are bound up with theirs, that they will vote for anything endorsed by Mr Bevin and are quite content to be told to their faces that what they are voting for is the opposite of the policy the Government are pursuing and intend to pursue.

Mr Bevin crystallised the position at the Margate Conference, when he said that it was not a matter of criticising policy, but of having confidence in him. Either he was right or he was wrong.

This was a demand for a blank cheque and a free hand, by the very man whose policy had been up till then, as it has been ever since, an unrelieved and increasingly dangerous failure, who had thrown overboard Labour's election pledges and who was rapturously acclaimed by the Tories as their ally and partner.

Mr Bevin got his vote of confidence by a crashing majority - only about a dozen hands were raised against him. That was a disgrace to the Labour Movement and gave the full measure of the political immaturity of the party in world affairs.

Mr Bevin is one of the biggest men in the Labour Movement and has a splendid record. But, however big any of Labour's

leaders may be, he has no right to make the rank and file as small as Mr Bevin made them at Margate; and the delegates, in accepting the position of blind stooges, were abdicating their duty to those who have made the Labour Movement great by their courage, their faith, their sufferings and their sacrifice.

To-day the Labour Party can be divided roughly into those who are loyal to the Government's foreign policy because they do not know what it is and those who are disloyal, because they are beginning to see the chickens coming home to roost. There is a famous story in the United States, dating from the time when President Grover Cleveland invoked the Monroe Doctrine and threatened Britain with war, because of a British boundary dispute with Venezuela, about two Americans engaged in an argument about the Monroe Doctrine. One of them says: 'What, did I understand you to say that you don't believe in the Monroe Doctrine? And you call yourself an American!' to which the other replies: 'Of course I believe in the Monroe Doctrine. I would die for the Monroe Doctrine. What I said was, that I don't know what it is'.

That hits off the attitude of a large part of the rank and file to Mr Bevin's foreign policy.

It isn't good enough. If we are in earnest about wanting to win the next election, we must show we can win the peace. We cannot win the peace unless and until the Labour Party grows up and comes of age in world affairs.

That means thinking in terms of loyalty to principles and policies, not to persons, however exalted or forceful, and however distinguished their past services. It also means not being afraid of frank and vigorous discussion.

Above all, it means understanding the full measure of the failure of tradition and the old order and the deadly danger of listening to their purblind and passionate defenders. The Tories, presuming to tell the Labour Party what it ought to do in foreign affairs, are in the position of undischarged bankrupts, and fraudulent bankrupts at that, pressing their advice on an inexperienced but honest and able businessman who has made a success of things so far and is anxious to start an export trade. National unity with the Tories, in either home or foreign affairs, is the kiss of death for the Labour party.

Once these truths sink home, the tremendous responsibility and great opportunity of the Labour party in world affairs become clear. The concluding chapters show how Labour can rise to its responsibility and grasp its opportunities.

CHAPTER XI

Communism and the Soviet Union

THE slave owners of the Southern United States, in the course of defending their position, worked out an elaborate complex of political, economic, social and religious doctrines, proving that slavery was the ideal state for the Negroes, a patriotic and philanthropic duty assumed by the whites, the only alternative to economic ruin and social chaos and agreeable to the will of God. Southerners were mentally soaked in these doctrines and dogmas until they coloured and distorted their vision of the real world, focussed their fears and hates on the non-slave owning society of the North and made them ripe for civil war.

Some such process has been at work in the almost wholly Capitalist press, pulpit and radio of Britain and the U.S.A., filling the vast void of the ignorance of our people about their fellow men in the Socialist third of humanity with hate-filled rationalisations of the murderous panic of the defenders of Capitalism. There is nothing queerer in the strange world in which we are living than the body of beliefs and assumptions with which the public mind is being warped and poisoned, and the decent, peace-loving, hard-working common people are being crazed and conditioned into getting ready for the maddest and most suicidal of all wars, or, failing war, and in any case pending war, to accept the evils of the police state at home in the name of abhorring the police state abroad.

The intellectual and moral foundations of the creed of the warmongers are nothing more substantial than political illiteracy, social superstition and ideological fanaticism. But on these foundations has been reared a lofty and elaborate structure of false assertions and phony assumptions. This chapter turns the light of reason on the chief dogmas of the warmongers and directs a cooling spray of facts on their fevered fantasies.

COMMUNISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

How Socialism arose in Britain has already been described. On the Continent Socialist parties generally preceded the formation of trade unions and Co-operatives and were offshoots and breakaways from the middle-class revolt against the remains of

feudalism. Karl Marx and his disciple Engels gave political coherence, a social analysis and a philosophy to the Socialist movement on the Continent. He foresaw that in Capitalism competition would give way to combination and that the increasing scale of private economic and financial enterprise would produce a new ruling class, capturing and controlling the State from within. He also realised the prime importance of economic motivation in society.

Marx was a pioneer in applied sociology. His discoveries of the springs and modes of social action rank with Darwin's discoveries about biological evolution and the origin of species, and Freud's in the realm of psychology. Marx pointed out that the main driving force in society was the desire of economic classes to develop their powers of production fully. That is, men wished to be free to earn their living and enjoy the fruits of their labour.

The class that owned the means of production – in a slave-owning society the slave-owners, in feudal society the landowners – arranged the laws to suit themselves and exploited the rest of the community. As developments and inventions changed the forms of production so as to make an economic class powerful and important in the processes of production, that class would challenge the restrictions on its activities imposed by the ruling class. The latter would make concessions up to a point, but would not willingly yield its power and privileges. Hence the likelihood of revolution, ending in the rise to power of a new ruling class that would re-shape the laws to suit itself.

Marx showed how this view of social dynamics threw light on the rise of Capitalism through the defeat of the landed aristocracy by the middle class and the peasants, made a close study of Capitalist society as it existed in his day and forecast the coming of social revolution, which he believed was imminent. He argued that, because the laws were devised to protect property and the army and police commands, the judges, higher civil servants, teachers, etc. were recruited mostly from the propertied classes, the State was in the hands of the ruling class and its servants would turn to them rather than obey the orders of a workers' government with a mandate to legislate against the interests of property, even if such a government were voted into power by a majority of the people. Hence the need for revolutionary action, the smashing of the framework of the Capitalist state and the establishment during the transitional period of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', which Marx defined as 'government of the great majority, by the great majority and for the great majority'.

During this period a new State would be established with an administration, armed forces, police and judiciary loyal to the new order.

After the transitional period, during which an equalitarian, classless society would be established based on public ownership of the means of production, distribution and transport, the State would begin to 'wither away'. Since the State represented the coercion of the rest of the community by a ruling class that owned the means of production, the new society would be able to do without the kind of State which the world had known hitherto, and could rely on forms of voluntary co-operation, building a new society in which the welfare of all depended on the freedom of each to develop and use all his faculties, without let or hindrance.

Marx owed much to the Philosophical Radicals. But whereas they reasoned from their unconscious middle-class premises, Marx consciously took his stand with the workers. In Marx's day Communism and Socialism were used as interchangeable terms and his and Engels' famous Manifesto, greeting the revolutions of 1848, was known as 'The Communist Manifesto'.

Marx wrote when Liberal revolutions against the remnants of feudalism and autocracy were still apt to break out and the traditions of the great French Revolution and its aftermath in Europe were still very much alive. But in the latter half of the 19th Century Capitalist democracy showed a degree of elasticity and power to satisfy the demands of the workers and to raise their standards of living that Marx had never suspected. The Socialist Parties, in spite of Marx's repeated warnings, had turned his social analysis into a dogma. At the same time, while they continued to pay lip service to the coming world revolution, they, in fact, became parties concerned with social reforms and trade union rights.

The revolutionary hangover in ideological outlook and the class basis and feeling of the Socialist parties, who dropped the name 'Communist' and called themselves 'Social Democratic' to signify their turning away in practice from revolutionary ways, forbade them entering into coalitions with radical and liberal middle-class parties. At the same time there was no chance of their obtaining a majority to rule alone. Hence they developed a 'permanent opposition' mentality and began to act as pressure groups or political lobbies, concerned to extort concessions for the workers from the governments of the ruling class rather than to win power themselves.

Only in Russia, the more backward parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Balkans, where the middle-class revolution had never penetrated, did the revolutionary tradition live on. In Austria-Hungary and the Balkans it was mixed up with the liberation of subject nationalities and had a very small and primitive working-class foundation.

But in the semi-feudal Empire of the Tsars, the transition from the middle-class revolutionary movement through the Narodniki and the Social Revolutionaries to the Marxist Social Democrats was easy and natural.

In the Russian Social Democratic Party a man of outstanding gifts and character – Lenin – applied the Marxist analysis of society to Russia's conditions and worked out a form of party organisation, strategy and tactics adapted to those conditions.

The Social Democratic party split into the minority or Menshevik fraction, which believed in building up a mass party on the Western model, and the Bolshevik or majority section, which believed in building up an organisation more like Cromwell's Ironsides or the Order of Jesuits in their great days than the Western conception of a political party.

In the Bolshevik party only those who put its discipline and loyalties before everything else in life and took an active and direct part in its work and risks could become Party members. It was a Bolshevik order and a secret conspiracy rather than a political party.

The British Labour Party and the Continental Social Democratic Parties were affiliated to the Labour and Socialist (2nd) International. The First International had been founded on the Continent by Marx and Engels in 1864 under the name of the International Association of Workers. It broke up ten years later because of dissensions arising out of the Franco-Prussian War, symbolised in the quarrel between Marx and Bakunin.

The Second International was formed in 1889 and used to hold conferences every two or three years. As the danger of a European war increased the International concerned itself more and more with the idea of international working class direct action to preserve peace in an emergency. This policy was discussed and adopted unanimously at the International Socialist Conferences of Stuttgart (1907), Copenhagen (1910) and Basle (1912). The Stuttgart resolution, which was reaffirmed on the later occasions, pledged the parties in the International 'to use every effort to prevent war by all the means which seem to them most appropriate, having regard to the sharpness of the class war and to the

general political situation. Should war nonetheless break out their duty is to intervene to bring it promptly to an end and with all their energies to use the political and economic crisis created by the war to arouse the populace from its slumbers and to hasten the fall of Capitalist domination.'

THE WORKING-CLASS PARTIES AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

But when the 1914 diplomatic crisis became so acute as to suggest that it would end in war the International Socialist Bureau merely recommended the German and French workers to bring pressure to bear on their governments 'in order that Germany may secure in Austria a moderating action and in order that France may obtain from Russia an undertaking that she will not engage in the conflict'.

That was on July 28, when Austria declared war on Serbia. The French Socialist leader Jean Jaurès was murdered by a patriotic assassin. A German Socialist visited Paris on August 1, and the Labour Party held the anti-war meeting in Trafalgar Square on August 2, mentioned in the previous chapter. That was the sum total of the war resistance of the British, French and German Socialist parties of the Second International.

The Labour party thought the war was being fought to save gallant little Belgium. The British, French and Belgians alike held that it would be worse for the world if the Western democracies were defeated by semi-autocratic Germany. The German Socialist Party supported the war because they considered that Germany was defending Western civilisation against the 'Asiatic barbarism' of Tsarist Russia.

A minority of the German Socialist party, the Independent Socialists, stood all the way through for a stalemate and a negotiated peace, as did most of the I.L.P. in Britain under Ramsay MacDonald, the Austro-Hungarian Social Democrats, the Italian Socialists (except for a small pro-Ally Right Wing, of which the leader, before he broke away from the party, was Benito Mussolini) and a section of the French Socialist party. These parties and groups took a pacifist rather than a revolutionary attitude toward the war. But small Left-Wing fractions, such as the Spartacists in Germany, clung to the revolutionary doctrine of the Second International.

The only Social Democratic party that remained loyal to the decision of the Second International was the Bolshevik party under Lenin. In its November 1, 1914, manifesto on 'The War

and Social Democracy', the Central Committee of the Bolshevik fraction of the Russian Social Democratic party said it was the duty of Socialists in every country to work for the defeat of their own government and for the right of all nations to self-determination. It emphasised that:

In the present situation it was impossible to determine from the point of view of the international proletariat the defeat of which of the two warring groups of nations would be the lesser evil for Socialism. But for us Russian Social Democrats there can be no doubt that from the point of view of the working class and the toiling masses of all the nationalities of Russia, the lesser evil would be the defeat of the Tsarist monarchy, which is the most reactionary and barbaric government oppressing the greatest number of nationalities and the greatest population in Europe and Asia.

Lenin, who was the author of this manifesto, compressed its teaching into the slogan 'Turn the Imperialist War into a Civil War', and advocated the formation of a Republican United States of Europe after the revolutionary overthrow of the German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian monarchies.

The revolution that overthrew the Tsardom was due to the breakdown of the Russian State rather than the work of the Bolsheviks or any other party. It started as one of a growing number of strikes and demonstrations in the capital (Petrograd, now Leningrad), this time in support of a demonstration of working-class wives outside the City Hall clamouring that they wanted bread. Next day half the workers of Petrograd were out with red banners and slogans. The crowds were sympathetic, the Cossacks and soldiers did not shoot, and the police were routed by the people, who began to fraternise with the soldiers. This went on on an increasing scale for three days, with the workers conducting a prolonged moral assault on the soldiers which at last broke down their obedience to their officers. On the fourth day the soldiers were given the order to shoot, and then – regiment after regiment mutinied as they were called up for duty, and went over to the workers. Behind them came the overwhelming majority of the population of all classes. The rest of Russia and the Army followed the capital.

The Bolshevik Revolution was the counterstroke to the attempts of the Allies to keep Russia in the war without revising their imperialist war aims, and to the efforts of the displaced ruling class, working through the only surviving Capitalist party, the Cadets, to use the war in order to 'contain' and ultimately undo the revolution. The aims of the Allies and the

Cadets converged in the common desire to establish a military dictatorship in order to 'restore order', 'save the country' and 'win the war'.

The Bolsheviks' call for peace and appeal to the workers of Europe to rise rocked the old order to its foundations from one end of Europe to the other. The measures employed by the Allies to break the social revolution have already been described.

THE 2ND, 3RD AND 2½ INTERNATIONALS

With the end of the war came the struggle between the Social Democrats and the Communists for the leadership of the European working class. The Armistice found the workers of Europe divided into three groups: the Labour party, the Right Wing of the French Socialist Party and German Majority Socialists who had backed the war all through and were described by their fellow Socialists on the Continent as 'Social Patriots'. The Italians, the Austrians, the German Independents, the Norwegians and a number of others constituted a middle group that had been more or less pacifist during the war. They called themselves the Internationalists.

A small Left Wing third group was headed in Germany by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht and by Lenin in Russia. They took the stand that the war should have been used for a social revolution. But Rosa Luxemburg disagreed with the type of organisation Lenin had worked out for the Russian Communist Party and therefore opposed his idea of forming a Third or Communist International, although she agreed that the Second International was dead. She suggested delaying the establishment of the new international until large parts of the European working class had abandoned their social patriotic leaders. This discussion took place before the Russian Revolution. But Rosa Luxemburg stuck to her view even after that event. The Communist International was created against her advice. Her second objection was that the principles of organisation adopted by Lenin would end by putting a small group of leaders in bureaucratic control of the Communist parties in each country and of the Communist International.

The victory of the October Revolution, its successful resistance to intervention and counter-revolution, the great strike wave in Central Europe in January 1918, the mutiny in the French Black Sea Navy, the upheaval in Hungary and the unrest in the Western working class bore eloquent witness to the impression the Russian Revolution had made upon the war-weary workers of Europe.

The Russian Communists refused to take part in international gatherings together with the 'Social Patriotic Traitors', who were no more anxious than they to reconstitute an all-inclusive International. Several parties refused to attend the International Socialist meeting in Berne in February, 1919, mentioned in the last chapter. At this meeting Right-Wing leaders proposed a resolution which by implication criticised the Russian Revolution. The question of the German Majority Socialists' share of war guilt, on the other hand, was shelved.

In reply to these proceedings the Leftist majority of the French Socialists, the German Independents, the Austrians, the Spaniards and Norwegians declared that the 'Social Patriots' were in no moral position to criticise the Bolsheviks and that although there might be reason for criticism they preferred to postpone judgment since they wanted to 'reserve free entry into the International for the Socialist and revolutionary parties of all countries conscious of their class interests'.

Further attempts to reconstitute the Second International ended in the same deadlock. Finally, at a congress in Geneva in July 1920 a group of Right-Wing dominated parties decided to carry on alone as a continuation of the Second International. They were the British Labour Party, the German Majority Socialists, the Belgian, Dutch, Swedish and Danish Social Democrats and a small Right-Wing French splinter group which had seceded from the majority of the French Socialist party when the latter at its congress at Tours had decided to join the Third International. The secretariat of this rump Right-Wing Second International was transferred to London and Ramsay MacDonald became its Secretary.

Meantime most of the parties who had taken the Leftist line at the Berne Conference formed their own group, the so-called 'Viennese Union', also known as the '2½ International'. The question now was whether the Centre groups would move right and rejoin the Second International or move left and go into the Third.

When the Third International was constituted in March, 1919 Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht had been assassinated by German nationalists. But the future looked bright for social revolution in Europe. The Hungarian and Bavarian Soviet Republics had been born. Austria appeared to be on the verge of social revolution. The Balkans were in an uproar.

When the Congress met again in July 1920 the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviets had been defeated, the political middle-

class revolution in the Austrian republic had been stabilised and the revolutionary tide in the Balkans was ebbing. On the other hand the Italian, Bulgarian and Norwegian Socialists as well as the German Spartacists had joined the Comintern. So did the Youth League of the Swedish Social Democrats, 50,000 strong. The majority of the French Socialists were seeking admission; the German Independent Socialists were making enquiries to this end and there was a powerful movement among the Czechoslovak workers. A considerable part, perhaps a majority of the Socialist workers on the Continent, appeared ready to accept the leadership of the Third International.

THE DEFEAT OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION

The social revolution in Europe was defeated, partly by Allied intervention as already described; partly by the attitude of Right-Wing Social Democrats, who believed in establishing political democracy with the help of the middle class and then resisting social revolution, if necessary, by force; and partly because the Bolsheviks and their allies were 'giddy with success' and not sufficiently aware of the difference between Russian conditions and those of the European working class.

In his book *The Tragedy of European Labour*, 1918-39, Dr Adolf Sturmthal, an Austrian Socialist who was one of the Secretaries of the Second International, makes an extremely interesting analysis of the reasons for the failure of the European working class and the success of the Fascist counter-revolutions.

'In 1914,' he points out, 'the Socialist parties were minority groups with little influence upon the real major decisions. In 1918 labour was on the threshold of power. An evolution which might have taken a quarter of a century had been telescoped into a few years by the war. But the mental growth of the movement had not kept pace with its rise in influence. German labour was still primarily a pressure group when the breakdown of the Hohenzollern empire forced political control upon the Socialists. British Labour had little understanding of the basic economic and international issues when, a few years after the war, a labour leader became prime minister of Great Britain.'

The Socialist parties had become tremendous vote-getting machines, closely tied up with the trade unions. But they were weak in their economic and political general staffs and had not thought out the problems of transition and power. The gulf between the pressure group mentality of the movement and its final Socialist objectives, in other words the lack of a political

and economic policy as distinct from mere trade union demands, persisted after the war. Only very slowly and bit by bit, after the catastrophic defeats inflicted during the great slump, did the Socialist parties begin to develop an economic programme for the period of transition. But it was a case of too late and too little. 'The rise of Fascism was determined primarily by the failure of Europe's strongest democratic force to fulfil its constructive task'.

Only the Bolsheviks, thanks to Lenin, had worked out a technique that involved transcending the pressure group stage of development. But his was a revolutionary technique adapted to the particular conditions of Tsarist Russia. He secured the supremacy of political over trade union thinking by concentrating power and leadership in a small group of well-trained professional revolutionary leaders. By imposing the famous 'Twenty-one Conditions' for admission into the Communist International, the Bolsheviks endeavoured to transmit to all other Communist parties this peculiar type of revolutionary organisation, which left party leadership in the hands of a secret committee unknown to the ordinary members of the Party and able to control the party, and through it all working-class organisations, trade unions, etc., in which party members obtained a determining influence.

An organizational device was thus supposed to remedy the lack of political maturity of the labour movement. This scheme was successful in Russia, but it proved a complete failure in Western and Central Europe. Leninism, outside Russia, was twice defeated; the first time when, after 1923, the great majority of the workers in Western and Central Europe rejected the revolutionary and dictatorial methods of Bolshevism in favour of the evolutionary and democratic tactics of the Socialists; and again when, in spite of the Leninist scheme of organization, the Communist parties, after 1923, developed into pressure groups, differing from the Socialists merely in the size or extravagance of their demands. The first defeat was due to the progressive stabilization of the middle-class forces and the economic reconstruction of Europe. But the second, even more decisive, failure was intimately tied up with the futile efforts of Communism to disregard the basic differences between the labour movements in Russia and the rest of Europe and to press both into the same Russian pattern.

In Russia the Leninist scheme of organization, with its highly-trained political leadership and a relatively small number of well-selected and controlled members, was very well adapted to the

conditions and the state of mind of the working class. A small minority was alive to the political problems of Russian labour, and another small, though more numerous, group understood the need for trade-unionist action. It was not too difficult, under the circumstances, for the political leadership to control the not very large trade-unionist group. The permanent and ruthless Tsarist oppression made every trade unionist realize that the success of his own struggle depended on a democratization of the political system. The trade unions themselves were thus ready to admit the supremacy of political action.

'Outside Russia, however, under the conditions of Europe in the early twenties, Leninism came into contact with labour organizations of tremendous size and well-established traditions, which enjoyed the advantages of political democracy. The millions of organized trade unionists and their well-established leaders rejected control by a political party, however close it might be to the industrial working class. The trade unions did not admit that the success of their own efforts to improve the living conditions of their members depended on the achievement of political successes by the Communist party. Whatever modest political wishes the trade unions might have, the Socialist party was willing to fulfil. In resisting what was called Communist control of the unions, the labour leaders fought for their right to continue as pressure groups; and the fact that political control would have meant control by a revolutionary, dictatorial party with a leadership independent of its members, facilitated trade union resistance and delayed the progress of labour's political maturity.

'The lesson of the Leninist failure in Central and Western Europe should have been plain to any Marxist. It was that no device of organisation could defeat the powerful economic and social forces which had turned the labour organisations into pressure groups. Political maturity depended on the recognition by labour that its interests required institutional changes in society. Not before the facts had demonstrated to the large working masses themselves the extent to which their immediate interests required basic reform, could labour develop into a genuine political movement'.

It is not necessary to accept the validity of this 'Austro-Marxist' analysis in every particular to recognise that it indicates an important source of the Communist failure to win the adherence of the European working class after the first world war. The Social Democrats got their chance – and muffed it. They did so

because of their 'pressure group' mentality, their shrinking from the responsibilities of power and preference for opposition or minor partnership in Capitalist coalitions. These attitudes were often rationalised as concern for principles and for defending democracy or Social Democracy against Communist dictatorship.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISM AFTER THE GREAT SLUMP

The consequences were Capitalist counter-revolution in one country after another and finally war. As the situation grew more critical there was an evolution in both the Communist and Social Democratic Parties. At the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935, largely under the influence of Dimitrov, then Secretary of the Comintern, it was decided to relax the tight control hitherto exercised over the constituent Communist parties and to allow them greater liberty of action. Wilhelm Pieck, a leading German Communist, deplored the mistakes that had been made and notably the tendency of the German Communists to see Fascism where there was none (this was a reference to the German Social Democrats) and to underestimate the real danger of Fascism (this alluded to the theory of the German Communist party during Hitler's march to power that the Nazis would get in for six months and then there would be a revolution and the turn of the Communists would come). The policy of co-operating with all democratic and anti-Fascist forces, particularly with the Social Democrats, in Popular Fronts was proclaimed.

This decision was based partly on the recent experience of France, where a strong rank and file movement among both Socialist and Communist workers had compelled their at first reluctant leaders to drop their recriminations and join in the Popular Front with one another and the Radical Socialists, in defence of the Republic against the Fascist danger that had become apparent in the assault of February 1934 on the French Chamber. But partly too it was based on the new insight of the Soviet Communist Party: the latter had started off in 1919 with the view that they were the outpost of the world revolution. Either the social revolution would spread to other countries or Capitalist counter-revolution would destroy them.

The first massive fact to which the Bolsheviks had to adjust themselves was that their view proved to be a half truth; there was intervention, but it was half-hearted and they beat it off because of the growing opposition of the workers in the West and

the war-weariness of the peoples. On the other hand the social revolution was defeated in Europe and world capitalism had recovered from the war and appeared set for an indefinite time. Hence the necessity for the Soviet Government, which now felt primarily responsible for the peoples of the Soviet Union who had fought so stubbornly to defend their revolution against a hostile world, to win recognition, promote trade and conclude non-aggression treaties with the rest of the world. During this period a great deal of Russian *kvass* (a popular national soft drink) was poured into the revolutionary wine of the Comintern and Stalin beat Trotsky on the issue of 'Socialism in One Country' versus 'Permanent Revolution'.

The great slump split the Capitalist world into the aggressive Fascist powers and the pacific democracies. The Soviet Government desired to ally itself with the peace-loving States against the Fascist Axis that was preparing for and threatening war. Kirov's and Maxim Gorky's conclusion has already been mentioned, that in this situation not only internal considerations (summed up in the slogan 'the revolution has won') but the Soviet Union's international interests demanded that the regime should be broadened and softened into a democracy. At the same time the conclusion was drawn that the Soviet Communist party and the Communist parties of other countries should seek contacts with the whole of the working class and the Left instead of treating everyone who was not a Communist as an enemy.

There had been an earlier phase when this policy was practised on Trojan horse principles, and there is no doubt that in the minds of a good many Communists the Popular Front tactic looked like a continuation of the earlier attempts at infiltration and capture of the leadership of Social Democratic parties and trade unions from within. But the underlying motive this time was different and was based on compelling realities.

Meanwhile, during the years between the wars there had been a double development within the Communist parties: on the one hand the death of Lenin, the consequent struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, the refusal of the minorities to acquiesce in majority decisions and the tremendous tasks of reconstruction and laying the foundations of a new society in Russia, complicated by Allied intervention, the repercussions of the great Capitalist slump, the rise of Fascism, Nazi fifth column activities, etc. had successively turned the Soviet regime from a coalition between Left Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks (after the Mensheviks and Right-

Social Revolutionaries had refused Lenin's repeated requests to form a Soviet Government when they had the majority in the Soviets) into a purely Communist regime; had concentrated power in the Central Committee; then in the Politburo and then in the Secretary of the Party; and had produced waves of purges and heresy hunts. These developments all had their natural causes in the historic background, internal developments and international circumstances of the Soviet Union.

But they were gratuitously reflected in all the parties affiliated to the Comintern. Whereas Lenin had worked out a peculiar form of organisation adapted to the special conditions of Tsarist Russia, the other Communist parties had simply taken over Russian organisation, strategy and tactics and, through accepting the right of the Comintern Executive by majority decisions to give them orders and interfere in their internal affairs, had in fact accepted the right of the Soviet Communist party to direct them. For although the Communist party of the Soviet Union had less than 40 per cent of the votes in the Comintern it was by far the largest unit, its prestige was incomparable, the seat of the Comintern was in Moscow and most of its funds were Russian, so that what it did or did not do was pretty closely modelled on the policies of the Soviet party.

On the other hand, the Communist parties learned by their own defeats, failures and mistakes and accumulated a fund of experience that stood them in good stead when Capitalist counter-revolution outlawed them and drove them underground. If it is true that the European Communist parties copied the Russian model too faithfully to adapt themselves to political life in democratic countries, the converse is equally true: when Capitalist counter-revolution snuffed out democracy and established dictatorships the Communist parties came into their own. The issues of democratic versus revolutionary and of trade union versus political action ceased to be relevant in the long, underground revolutionary struggle. Communist leadership gave the workers what they needed to carry on the fight.

The Social Democratic parties on the other hand fell more and more under the influence of their Right-Wing leaders, who carried capitulation and abdication in face of the advance of reaction and counter-revolution to almost incredible lengths. They fled abroad or died more or less courageously when Fascism overtook them. But among the rank and file Socialists and left-wing minorities in the leadership there was a revival of revolutionary traditions.

DISSOLUTION OF THE COMINTERN

During the war the Comintern was dissolved, on the ground that the conditions of the workers in different countries now varied so much that it was impossible to co-ordinate them from a common centre and that they should be left full freedom to conduct their struggle according to their own judgment in each country. This referred to the fact that in the Allied countries Socialists and Communists were supporting the war, whereas in occupied and enemy countries they were conducting underground activities and fighting in resistance movements against their own collaborators and quislings and the Fascists and Nazis, turning the Fascist war into a civil war.

THE WORKERS AFTER THE LAST WAR

In the Europe that emerged from the last war there was a queer resemblance to the working-class pattern after the first world war but with significant differences: this time the Communist parties were mature and powerful, tempered by their long struggle and longer experience and not only ready but anxious to co-operate with all the other elements in the resistance movements and in particular with the Social Democrats. The problem of the relations between the Communists and the trade unions had solved itself, because the workers had acquired a new political consciousness and self-confidence through the part they played in resistance and in reconstruction after the war, and the trades unions themselves took a leading part in the re-building on Socialist lines of the countries they had helped to liberate.

This time the middle groups in the working-class parties, that is the Left-Wing Socialists, unhesitatingly threw in their lot with the Communists, first through alliances and afterwards by forming united parties. That is why the rump, shadow International, known as *Comisco*, with Mr Morgan Phillips as its Chairman, Mr Denis Healey as Secretary of its International Bureau, and Transport House as its headquarters, consists of a handful of Right-Wing parties of whom two, the French S.F.I.O. and the Italian Unity Socialists, are MacDonalddites, the Germans are Pan-German Nationalists, irredentists and haters of the Soviet Union before they are Socialists or even democrats (with some honourable exceptions); and the Belgians, Danes, most of the Swedes and many of the Norwegians, so right-wing that they prefer co-operating with Capitalist parties or being out of power altogether to ruling with the help of Communists.

COMMUNISM, MARXISM AND THE POLICE STATE

What, it may be said, of democracy in relation to these developments? Do not the Communists stand for the police state?

This is what, in the United States, is called the 64 dollar question. To answer it honestly is not simple, for the evils of the police state, like the poor, have been with us a long time and assume many guises.

Indeed, the 'police State', that is some form of authoritarian and dictatorial government, is the rule rather than the exception in the world and has been throughout history. It is democracy that is the new thing in the world. It exists more or less imperfectly in only a few countries and since little more than a century. In the British Commonwealth and Empire, for instance, only the small white minority knows democratic government (with the exception of the Union of South Africa, where 20 per cent of the population are white and rule autocratically and brutally over the coloured 80 per cent. The blacks and browns in South Africa have been reduced to sub-human conditions and the situation is getting steadily worse). Colonial populations have been allowed to taste the sweets of democracy only very slowly and grudgingly, and in minute doses.

Most of the coloured ten million in the United States are deprived of their rights of citizenship and many of them live under something like a reign of terror. Ulster has been a police state for a quarter of a century.

The countries now governed by Communists or Communist-dominated coalitions were police states before the war, with the exception of Czechoslovakia. The most that can be said against them is that they have not ceased to be police states since passing through a social revolution. But against this it may be objected that, whereas before the police were used by a privileged minority to hold down the majority, to-day they serve regimes that are close to the people and are carrying out programmes of social reconstruction and renovation that correspond to what the great majority of the people want.

In any case, history knows no instance of revolutions and civil wars, particularly when complicated by the fact and threat of foreign intervention, that were not followed by a period of more or less dictatorial government. Cromwell's Ironsides were not exactly tender toward the defenders of the old order. During and after the American revolution the 'Tories' who clung to the British connection were treated so harshly that most of them emigrated to Canada. The French Revolution took a long time to achieve

political freedom and democracy. After the Civil War in the U.S.A. the whole of the white population of the South was disfranchised and governed autocratically from Washington for twenty years (after which the black population were deprived of their votes and have not yet got them back).

Karl Marx, whose social analysis is accepted as valid by Social Democratic as well as by Communist parties, believed, for the reasons mentioned above, that at some point the propertied classes would resist and sabotage the working of democracy rather than allow themselves to be voted out of their power and privileges. They would be able to win over enough of the army and police officers, higher civil servants, etc., to set the will of a legally elected workers' government at naught. The previous chapter of this book quoted Mr Laski pointing out how Marx's predictions in this respect had been proved true by the experience of Europe between the wars, and warning that the propertied class in Britain differed in degree rather than in kind from its brethren on the Continent.

But Marx thought that in some of the most highly developed democracies, such as Britain, the U.S.A., Holland and Scandinavia, it might be possible to effect the transition from Capitalism to Socialism by peaceful, democratic and constitutional means. Lenin doubted whether this was possible, on the ground that militarism, bureaucracy and imperialism had developed so greatly in the countries mentioned since Marx's day as to make it well nigh impossible to expect a peaceful transition. Lenin, however, was influenced in his view by an exaggerated opinion of pre-first-war Germany. The German Social Democratic party enjoyed great prestige before the first world war because of its long traditions, its size and its mass trade union basis. its stiff fight against Bismarck's policy of repression and the quantity of social legislation passed as a result of its pressure group activities by the paternal semi-autocracy of Imperial Germany. Accordingly Lenin quoted Germany in his pamphlet on 'The State and Revolution' (1917) to justify his scepticism about the reality of Capitalist democracy. He proves his contention by the case of Germany, he says, because 'in this State constitutional legality lasted and remained stable for a remarkably long time – for nearly half a century (1871–1914) – and because social democracy in Germany during that time was able to achieve far more than in other countries in "utilising legality" and was able to organise into a political party a larger proportion of the working class than anywhere else in the world'.

It hardly needs arguing at this date that Great Britain was much more thoroughly a democracy, with a form of government more elastic and capable of transforming society by peaceful means than the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm, and that the British working class and Labour party possessed and still possess more political maturity, public spirit and capacity to govern than the German Social Democrats of inglorious memory or their fanatical successors to the leadership of the West German working class.

But it is not true to say that Communists any more than any other brand of Marxist Socialists want revolution for its own sake. They are sceptical about the reality of democracy under Capitalism. But it is no part of their policy to destroy democracy where it exists. On the contrary, they believe in using democratic institutions to the utmost while having a pessimistic opinion of what can be accomplished by these means.

The Bolsheviks made their revolution to head off the swelling counter-revolution and to put an end to the fearful slaughter of the world war. During the Kerensky period they did their best to induce the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries to join them in making the transition from the political to the social revolution bloodless and peaceful. It was not their fault that the pusillanimity of the Mensheviks and S.R.'s, the intransigence of the propertied classes defending the old order and the fanaticism of Allied interventionists made the peoples of the former Russian Empire pay a fearful price for their revolution.

At every step in the history of the Soviet Union there is a close connection between the degree of toughness of the Government on the one hand and on the other the backwardness of Russia and the amount of pressure and danger from outside. The backwardness of Russia is being overcome by the great strides made in education and material development since the Revolution. The greatest obstacle to-day to the regime broadening and softening into a democracy is the Anglo-American policy of anti-Communist intervention and anti-Soviet power politics, that is the cold war.

It is too readily forgotten that the opposite approach to that of the Communists and Left-Wing Socialists – that is, a political revolution to establish democracy and civil liberty, followed by insistence that social change must come only by constitutional means – was extensively tried out in Europe after the first world war. Germany was the outstanding case. Here this policy had two complementary aspects: the first was the early tie-up between

Social Democratic President Ebert and the German General Staff to defend democracy against Communism by shooting down the workers who wanted to introduce measures of land reform and socialisation by rough and ready methods. The theory was that the political revolution had endowed the country with a democratic constitution and it had consequently become a crime to attempt to deprive the Junkers of their land or the big business men of their financial and economic power by any method but the ballot box. It was regarded as equally 'undemocratic' to clear the agents and executors of the old regime out of the civil service, the police and General Staff, the judiciary and the corps of teachers.

The complementary aspect of this outlook was the surrender of the Social Democrats Braun and Severing, the heads of the Prussian Government, when Chancellor von Papen sent a corporal's guard to arrest them on the most dubious legal grounds. They explained that they surrendered in order to avoid bloodshed. The German Social Democratic party, because of its all-in anti-Communism, went on to the bitter end collaborating with Capitalist parties moving to the Right and finally surrendered to Hitler, on the pleas that they were 'constitutional democrats, not revolutionaries', 'the lesser evil', and 'avoiding bloodshed'. The world mourning its dead and contemplating the revival of Nazism in Western Germany will hardly applaud the humanitarian sentiments of these gentlemen.

Experience has proved that Marx was right when he pointed to the immense difficulty of using even long-established democracy to carry out a fundamental change that really challenges the power and privileges of the ruling class. The same idea was in the mind of Lord Balfour when he wrote that 'democracy can exist only in a community where everyone is agreed on fundamentals'.

It is, therefore, politically unreal to the pitch of insanity to imagine that in a country where the ruling class has just had democracy imposed on it by revolution it will be prepared to play the game according to the rules of this democracy by submitting tamely to the loss of its class power, privileges and property at the hands of the newly-enfranchised workers and peasants exercising their right to vote. The bitter price paid by the workers of Europe for the failure of this crazy experiment after the first world war is the main reason why most of the European working class unhesitatingly followed the Communists in the countries under enemy occupation, particularly where

it had been preceded by some form of Capitalist counter-revolution in the years between the wars, or as in France during the war. The Communist 'line' in post-war Europe was, in the countries where there was neither democracy nor Socialism, 'social revolution first, then democracy', not, as after the first world war, 'political democracy but no social revolution'.

But, although determined to lay the foundations of Socialism and not to let go the reins of power until the job was done, the Communist parties that emerged after liberation as the driving force in the resistance movements were very different from the raw, infant Communist parties of 1919-20. At that time Lenin had violently disagreed with the German 'Centre' Social Democrat Kautsky's theories. One of them was that when the opposing class forces were evenly balanced the transition from Capitalism to Socialism could take place either through an exacting and destructive civil war, which most European peoples would be less able to endure than the Russians, or else by compromise and piecemeal, through coalitions.

After the second world war the coalition governments that had issued from the resistance movements and took charge of the liberated countries bore a superficial resemblance to Kautsky's idea, although the social context was decisively different. The resistance movements, as the *Manchester Guardian* once remarked during the war, were in a sense a prolongation of the Russian Revolution. That is, they stood for a measure of social revolution. But they did so not on theoretical grounds but because they were up against native Fascist or quisling dictatorships that had been incorporated by Hitler in the economic system that his counter-revolution had fastened on Europe. Victory and liberation automatically meant the collapse of that system, leaving a void that had to be filled. It could not be filled by private enterprise in these ruined and war-shattered countries, even if the believers in private enterprise had not been politically compromised by association with the enemy. Therefore a measure of socialisation became unavoidable.

In 1945 and 1946 the post-liberation regimes framed advanced democratic constitutions that combined the political and individual rights of the French Revolution with the social and economic securities and guarantees of the Russian Revolution. The view was widespread that it would be possible to effect the transition from Capitalism to Socialism by peaceful and gradual means. In part this theory was derived from applying the Marxist analysis to the facts of the situation: the army and police command, the

judges, teachers and higher civil servants, the great landowners and big business men and bankers had all been so mixed up with the Fascist and Nazi era that with the defeat and collapse of the old regimes they disintegrated and disappeared, leaving a clear field. In the circumstances there was no reason why democracy should not work.

At that time Mr Hilary Minc, the Minister of Industry in Poland and one of the ablest Communist leaders, explained to me in a long talk I had with him in Warsaw, that although historical analogies were dangerous and misleading he would take the risk: the French people paid a terrible price in civil war, intervention and terror for being the first to carry out a middle-class revolution. But after they had broken the ice it was easier in the 19th century for other countries to get rid of the remnants of feudalism and change over to modern Capitalist democracy.

Similarly the peoples of the Soviet Union had been the first to make a social revolution and had paid a hideous price. But as a result it would now be possible for the rest of Europe to go from Capitalism to Socialism by gentler methods. In Poland in particular he saw no reason for passing through a period of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. For a long time ahead Polish economy would be mixed, with a considerable private enterprise sector, including the peasantry. The existence for a long time of different economic classes made it necessary to have several political parties representing these different interests. At the moment there was urgent need for all to pull together to put Poland on her feet again. But, once the acute phase of reconstruction was over and the Social foundations were solidly laid, he fully expected the governing coalition to revert to the normal parliamentary practice of Government and Opposition. J. Berman, another Polish Communist leader, made a public statement emphasising that the future Poland would have several political parties and would be governed by the usual methods of parliamentary democracy, that is by a Government and Opposition functioning in conditions of political freedom.

At the other end of Europe the French Communist view was summed up after the November 1946 election, when the Communists emerged as the biggest party in France, by M. Thorez in interviews given to *The Times* and various news agencies, in which he emphatically asserted that the French Communist party would find its own way in accordance with France's traditions and would not have to follow the path trodden by the Communists of Russia.

The progress of democracy in the world, with the few exceptions that confirm the rule, makes it possible to advance toward Socialism by other paths than those trodden by the Russian Communists. In any case each country must choose its own way. We have always thought and said that the people of France with her glorious tradition will find their own way toward more democracy, progress and social justice. (*Times*, November 18, 1946.)

M. Leon Blum, writing in the *Populaire*, November 22, 1946, accurately summed up the gist of M. Thorez' remarks as follows:

In his interviews to the representatives of the British and American Press, Maurice Thorez not only affirmed the independence of the French Communist Party with regard to the Soviet Government. He added that the example of the Soviet Union was not something that the other Communist Parties in the world felt bound to follow; that in other countries the processes of transforming the system of property relations and of production could be accomplished by other means and assume other forms; that this transformation was wholly compatible with maintaining and developing democracy; and that it was even possible in countries with a mature political civilisation like France that this transformation would take place solely through the working of democratic institutions.

M. Blum's comment was that it was a pity the Communists had not taken this line twenty-five years earlier and that it was not possible to abolish the past!

At that time I was at pains to find out in personal talks with MM. Thorez, Duclos and Benoît Frachon what was the position of the French Communist party with regard to democracy. I checked what I heard from them by comparing the opinions of French non-Communist political leaders, foreign journalists and diplomats in Paris, leading French Socialists and former French colleagues from the Secretariat of the League of Nations. The composite picture that emerged of the attitude of the French Communist party at that time to the problem of democracy in relation to the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, as seen by themselves and confirmed by others with some claim to realism and knowledge, was as follows:

The position after the second world war is very different from what it was after the first. The Communist Party is now so great and powerful and has such support in the working class and trade unions and a growing section of the peasantry that its co-operation has become indispensable in reconstruction. It cannot think and act as a small sect without power and responsibility for it has eight Ministers in the Government, one million members and six million votes. Moreover, the workers who fought in the resistance

movement and have played a leading part in reconstruction since liberation now feel it is they who are the saviours of the nation and the architects of the Fourth Republic, whereas the taint of treason clings to the propertied classes for their collaboration with Pétain and Hitler. In those circumstances there is no reason at all why the Communists should not win power and wield power by the ordinary democratic process of party propaganda, free speech and association, elections, etc. It is not they but the defenders of the old order who now fear and hate democracy and may attempt to overturn it by force and fraud. If so the French Communist Party and the workers will defend democracy and uphold law and order against reaction and Fascism in support of whatever Government is assaulted from the Right.

The *Economist* of August 17, 1946, Paris correspondent, in the course of an article on the French internal situation, concluded that 'the facts suggest that the French trade unions are Communist to-day because the working man has learned by hard experience to identify Communist leadership with his own betterment. This development is vital to understanding what is now happening in France.'

On November 23, 1946 the *Economist* published a further article drawing attention to the steady growth of the French Communist party, which was now getting the votes of trade unionists in industry and agriculture; workers in light and heavy industry; a growing minority of the peasantry; and an unknown number of middle class intellectuals, some of them of outstanding capacity.

But first and foremost the Communist party in France is the great meeting place of the industrial and agricultural working class. The notion propagated by Mr Churchill that the French Communist party is an obscure fifth column of Russian origin is, of course, grotesque. The Communists in France must be judged on their merits, if their appeal and attraction are to be understood. Whatever their links with Moscow may be – and there is no reliable information either way – the six million men and women who voted for Communist or near-Communist candidates, the productive third of the French electorate, were presumably voting for people whom they believed would represent them sincerely and effectively. There are some things which money cannot buy; and the backing of six million people is probably one of them. If it had been otherwise, the Right and Centre parties, never lacking for funds, might have done better than to gain only the moneyed middle-class.

The working class would not vote for the Right nor for the middle-class leadership and submission to Vatican influence of the M.R.P., nor for the old Liberals, nor for the sterile and timid

Socialist party with no positive programme but anti-Communism and secondarily anti-clericalism. They voted for the Communists because they believed they offered a new approach to life and a doctrine of human values and belief in human organisation.

The French Communists grew out of their revolutionary sectarianism during the trials of the occupation, when they found themselves called on – in the absence of rivals – to lead many groups of French society. Their doctrines have evolved and grown in the process. Their programme to-day is as far removed from Bolshevism as Paris from Moscow; what they want, they argue – and what they believe they can get – is Socialism by Parliamentary means. They declare themselves the only party in France to offer a serious hope of progressive social change and adaptation. In many ways, it is true, the Socialists pay lip-service to the same ends, and even the same means. The telling difference lies precisely in the nature of the two parties' backing and in the quality of devotion, sincerity, and hard work that each can bring to bear.

Where the Socialists, under M. Blum's world-weary influence, withdraw farther into the niceties of humanist phrase-making, letting I-dare-not wait so long upon I-would that faith in their efficiency withers at the source, the Communists throw the nets of their conviction and enthusiasm ever wider and more boldly across French society. As they grow in size and strength, realists first and last, their leaders adapt and modify their doctrine and tactics to changing circumstances. Often they seem to contradict themselves; yet the appearance is misleading, for under this tactical contradiction lies the profound belief in the rightness of their inspiration. Where that inspiration will lead them and France, time alone will show. At least it can be said that if Socialism – Fabian, Marxian or merely French – has any future in France, it is with the Communists, and with them only.

The Left-Wing Social Democrats co-operating with the Communists in the resistance movements emerged as strong and active partners in the post-war coalition governments building up Socialism in their countries. The Polish Socialist Party, for instance, did well in the election prematurely forced upon the country by Anglo-American intervention. In spite of the excesses of the Fascist underground the first act of the new Polish coalition government, in which the Prime Minister was a Socialist and there were an equal number of Socialists and Communists in the Parliament and in the Government, was to declare a sweeping amnesty for political offenders and underground fighters and to undertake to reduce the security police as rapidly as possible. The Polish Parliament pledged itself to give the people 'a great charter of freedom' guaranteeing the rights of

citizens, to serve as a guide to the Government until they could be written into the new Constitution.

A prominent Polish Socialist, Dr Julian Hochfeld, wrote a moving open letter to a 'Labour Party Comrade' that appeared in the Warsaw *Political Review* of April 1, 1946. It pointed out that Polish Socialists shared the British Labour Party's belief in democratic socialism, but that the ways of attaining this end must differ in the two countries, although both were advancing toward the same goal, because

in Poland we have not yet outgrown the stage in which the battle of ideas is fanatical; our history does not allow us as yet to free ourselves completely from what in your history was the pioneering of the Elizabethan adventurers, the fanaticism of Cromwell's republicans and sternness and sometimes cruelty towards opponents and criminals. We must pass through this stage at lightning speed and catch up with history, which has not always been kind to us ...

But you know that if the next elections would give a majority to your Tories they would not be able to undo what you had accomplished while you were in power; they would not oppose your ultimate return to power by armed force; and they would probably not introduce Fascism. Whereas with us it is different. We *know* that if we once surrender power we should have to reconquer it by wresting it from the grip not of Conservatives but of Fascists; and not with voting cards but by force, drawing inspiration for our struggle from the sacrifices of those who perished in prisons, concentration camps and on the scaffold ...

Would you, in such circumstances, venture to advise us to get rid of our Security Police, even if they need to be improved and to work more efficiently? Do you really believe that we Socialists adopted the position that we have adopted because of 'Communist blackmail'? Does not our Socialism, which is both democratic and revolutionary at one and the same time, account for our attitude? And do you not think that in our circumstances you would have to do the same out of your own profound inner conviction and not through external compulsion? Don't worry. We shall not renounce our Socialist democracy and humanism. But neither do we propose to cease being revolutionary.

That was how matters stood in Eastern Europe as late as the end of 1946. There seemed every prospect that the social revolution would be an altogether more humane and civilised affair than in the desperate conditions of Soviet Russia, bringing Social revolution to 17th-century and primitive peoples and battling for its life against Allied intervention, and that democracy and political freedom would soon spread to countries where they had never been known before, in a new and more hopeful social context.

But by 1948 Anglo-American intervention had changed all that. Under the impact of the growing hostility and menace from the West the more intransigent elements in the Communist and Socialist parties got the upper hand and were provided with all too plausible reasons for relying on the Secret Police and getting tough with political opponents. The threatened regimes drew together and mounted guard against the enemy without the gates and his real or suspected allies and agents within. The formation of the Cominform, the speeding up of the social revolution and sharpening of the class struggle, the conditions in which fusion between Socialists and Communists took place (after purges of 'moderates' in *both* parties!), the reasons why the Cominform parties felt constrained to follow the Soviet line whatever happened and to be intolerant and tough with Yugoslav non-conformity, have already been described.

Communism is revolutionary Marxist Socialism. There is no difference of aim nor any difference of principle about methods between Communist and Continental Social Democratic parties, because both are Marxist. There are often deep and real differences, of course, as regards ways and means, strategy and tactics, but they arise from differences in social analysis and sizing up the situation rather than from issues of principle. Whereas Communist leaders are apt to be too tough and Machiavellian, Social Democratic leaders tend to sell out to the other side in the name of defending democracy against Communism.

Like all revolutionary movements, the social revolution has worked itself out in the politically backward countries of Eastern Europe in the conditions of war, civil war, Fascist occupation and quisling treason, and last but not least, Allied intervention, in harsh, ugly, fanatical and violent ways. But under all the excesses, Machiavellianism and fierceness, it is not difficult to see a great hope, a wild and primitive passion for justice, love of the people and the shining ideal of a world delivered from want and war, where all men are brothers and all men are free.

There is too much in Communism both as a fact and an idea for it ever to be exterminated by force. A policy of pin-pricks, hatred and abuse of Communism merely goads it to retaliate and counter-attack in self-defence, aggravates the evil and chokes back the good in Communism.

But in the international context of a world securely at peace, where there is trade and friendship between East and West, and as Socialist reconstruction and development yield the benefits of social security, full employment, rising standards of living,

education and equal opportunities for all, the regimes in which Communist parties are in power, either alone or as the dynamo of Left-Centre coalitions, will in time relax and soften into democratic Socialism. At a conservative estimate the process may take a generation (20-30 years) in the Soviet Union; 10-15 years in Eastern Europe and the Balkans; 15 years in Germany. In favourable circumstances the evolution to full democracy and freedom might be much swifter. That it had started would become evident within a year or two of the international situation changing from cold war to a warm peace.

COMMUNISM AND FASCISM

The acid test of political illiteracy should be the inability to distinguish between Communism and Fascism. For the former is the extreme form of social revolution and the latter the extreme form of Capitalist counter-revolution.

Both types of regime are, of course, disfigured by the evils of the police state, that is the use of force and fraud in the relations between rulers and ruled. But as has already been pointed out they share that characteristic in varying degree with the government of most of mankind throughout recorded history. Even the handful of advanced democracies are in a bad position to throw stones if one calls to mind their recent past or their dealings even to-day with colonial and coloured populations, not to mention the scandal of Greece, the Union of South Africa, Ulster and the Southern States of the U.S.A.

To confuse Fascism with Communism because 'both are police states' is like being unable to distinguish cats from dogs because both have four legs – a characteristic they share with a great many other animals and that should not obscure their marked and typical differences to anyone gifted with normal eyesight.

Conservatives, to do them justice, who have a keener sense of what side their class bread is buttered than many Labour folk, have never made the mistake of confusing Communism and Fascism. That was why they intervened with such fanatical determination against the Russian Revolution and appeased Fascism until they landed us in the second world war. That is why they passionately support anti-Communist intervention and anti-Soviet power politics to-day even at the risk of a third world war – and at the same time display an indecent desire to clasp the Fascist Franco to their bosoms.

Nor did anyone have any difficulty in distinguishing between Communism and Fascism during the years 1939-45. The Soviet

Union and the Communist parties in the resistance movements were fighting heroically on our side, while Hitler and Mussolini and the Fascists of Europe were responsible for an amount of unpleasantness that should not yet have passed wholly out of people's minds.

Another interesting point is that those who call Communists 'Red Fascists', and profess to see no difference between the two almost invariably end up by coming down on the side of Fascism, either by deliberate choice or without admitting it, or through sheer inability to make up their minds in a situation where events end by imposing a decision on the irresolute and panic-stricken.

The Third Force Socialists are a typical example of how this sort of thing works out; they are the last of a long and dishonourable line. Their prototypes were the Russian Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries who ended up as *émigrés* or stooges of the Allied interventionists and the Japanese invaders. The German Social Democrats began by calling in the General Staff to shoot down the workers and ended by capitulating to Hitler. The same pattern, with local variations of detail, was repeated in Italy and the East European countries between the wars and is being reproduced with sickening fidelity by the Saragat Unity Socialists, the French Socialist Party, Dr Schumacher's Pan-German anti-Communist and anti-Soviet Social Democrats, and a section of the Labour party.

The political colour blindness that fails to distinguish Communism from Fascism is indeed the first symptom of the mortal disease of Social Democracy. At a more advanced stage the political eyesight of the sufferer goes back on him altogether, so that he no longer notices the existence of Capitalism or the threat of Fascism, and claims that 'the struggle is no longer between Capitalism and Socialism but between Social Democracy [in the Weimar Republic it used to be 'democracy' but to-day 'Social Democracy' or 'Democratic Socialism' is the phrase more commonly used] and Communism'.

This expression in the mouth of a Social Democrat is a form of 'famous last words' rather than a political argument. For the Social Democrat who uses it, as all Continental experience shows, shortly finds himself by the logic of his own failure to distinguish between Fascism and Communism or even to perceive the existence of Capitalism and the danger of counter-revolution, the prisoner of a Capitalist coalition heading for Fascism in order to fight Communism.

That was the way the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries

went in the Russian Revolution. That was the path trodden by the German Social Democrats, always in the name of 'the lesser evil'. That is what is happening to-day to the French Socialists and the Italian Unity Socialists, and in a different form to the West German Social Democrats. A Third Force Social Democrat may properly be defined as a man who does not believe in a Socialist policy and whose allegiance to democracy becomes doubtful when his co-operation with Capitalists drives the workers to vote for the Communists.

The first difference between Communism and Fascism is that the workers do not turn to Communism, that is to revolutionary Socialism, unless there is no democracy or when democracy has been sabotaged to a standstill by the propertied classes, with or without the assistance of foreign intervention. That is why the countries at present under Communist rule have actually conferred more of the realities of citizenship and democracy on their populations than they ever knew before. Czechoslovakia is a more apparent than real exception to this rule, for although the middle class is worse off the workers and poorer peasants, who between them are the great majority, are generally better off than they were before the February semi-revolution in terms of political status and power and hope for the future as well as in relative material conditions.

The Times of March 19, 1946, in a remarkable analysis of the mood of post-war Russia, pointed out that the Soviet Union was granting its war-weary people 'widening freedom and responsibility. It is giving the rank and file members of society the feeling that they have not merely a nominal duty but the actual power to mould their own future.'

Mr Alexander Werth in the *Manchester Guardian* of June 30, 1948, says that a Soviet way of life is indoubtedly developing and the "classless society" is not an entirely empty phrase. Certain groups have economic privileges that others have not, but the differences in accumulated wealth are much smaller now as a result of the monetary reform than they were last year. People who "live well" now are those who have served the State particularly well. And this is more or less willingly accepted by all ...

'When Russians speak of their way of life as more "democratic" than in Capitalist countries, what they mean is that there is an almost complete disappearance of "class conventions" and "class distinctions", that the level of education, the standard of dress, and, above all, the manner in which people talk to each

other, tend to become increasingly uniform. Little outward signs of class differences like "Yes, sirs" and "No, sirs" do not exist in Russia to-day.'

Fascism, on the other hand, is resorted to by the ruling and propertied classes when they fear that the poor, who are in the majority, may use their democratic rights to vote themselves drastic social reforms and changes. That is why Fascism strikes down a democracy that already exists, as it did in Italy and Germany, and turns the clock back by imposing an authoritarian ideology and leader worship that goes back to the middle ages and even to the social outlook of the slave states and theocracies of antiquity.

Under Communist regimes, even in backward countries, women enjoy full equality and citizenship, racial barriers are abolished, trade unions assume a leading function in economic life, standards of living rise, education is enormously improved, etc.

Fascism deprives women of their rights as citizens and pushes them back into the kitchen. It deliberately fosters the most degrading and ignoble race hatreds and cruelties, lowers standards of living, restricts the people's access to education, breaks up the trade unions and Co-operatives and shackles the workers to their employers, through some form of corporations or guilds and in national labour fronts that are a kind of government-sponsored, nation-wide company unions.

The final and all-important difference is that Communist regimes want and need peace, whereas Fascist regimes live by preparing for war, by expansion, aggression, war and conquest. Because Communism carries out a social revolution and establishes a Socialist economy capable of employing the whole resources and manpower of the country in raising standards of living and improving the conditions of life, it desires and needs peace to realise the promise of the revolution.

The *Times* article of March 19, 1946, already referred to, says that the Russians are desperately anxious to be left alone, to be free to concentrate on their terrific internal problems and to mobilise all the national energies in the service of reconstruction. 'Martial virtues are being superseded by civic virtues with a decisiveness that leaves no doubt of the profound anti-military mood of the Russian people. A reconstruction programme has been launched that convinces the public that it is to an age of plenty, not of adventure, that the Government aspires'.

Hitler and Mussolini, on the other hand, could not keep their

lemagogic social promises to the people, as they were not prepared to carve up the big estates among the peasants or to nationalise factories, mines and banks. Hitler 'cured' German unemployment after the great slump by concentrating on a vast rearmament programme and kept the boys in line by blood and circuses in the form of persecution of the Jews, hatred of foreigners and promises of the prosperity Germany would enjoy when she had enlarged her frontiers and overrun her neighbours. His programme of expansion was the familiar phenomenon of finance and monopoly capital in search of foreign markets, of which Africa and Asia had been the victims in the 19th century, carried out in Europe in the 20th century by brutal and violent means and mixed up with 'anti-Communist' ideology that was, in fact, propaganda for Capitalist counter-revolution.

The great slump mercilessly exposed the hollowness of Italian Fascism's claim to bring benefits to the people and drove the regime into rearmament and foreign adventures. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, although its trade relations with the West and consequently its reconstruction suffered in the slump, went on building up its Socialist economy in a way that deeply impressed the Capitalist world in the throes of the great slump.

'Information Bulletin', Volume 1, No. 17 of August 19, 1945, issued by the United States Armed Forces Institute in order to 'assist Instructional and Educational Personnel in their mission', has an interesting article on the difference between Fascism and Communism of which the following is an extract:

The U.S.S.R., like the U.S., is opposed to the fundamental Fascist ideas on which Germany has operated: (1) The master race; (2) the State is all important; (3) Lebensraum; and (4) desire to dominate the world.

Master Race: If the U.S. is a 'melting pot', then the Soviet Union is an electric mixer. Scientists have counted 189 'races' in U.S.S.R. Under the Tsars, many of the racial minorities were persecuted; to-day in the Soviet Union there is no such thing as racial discrimination in practice or in theory. The people of each 'race' have been encouraged to retain their own language, customs and individuality and to educate themselves and develop the economic wealth of the area in which they live.

All-Important State: Some people profess to see strong likeness between the Soviet and Nazi forms of government; each permits but one legal political party, each uses propaganda and secret police. However, the goals of the two Governments are poles apart. The monopoly of the Communist Party is imposed to

protect the interest of the common people against those who had formerly taken advantage of them. Its purpose is the welfare of the people, not the welfare of the State. In Germany, dictatorship sacrificed the people's welfare to the goal of preparing Germans for aggressive war.

To illustrate this fundamental difference, the Soviets have encouraged trade unions; Hitler destroyed unions. Russia adopted the eight-hour day and later reduced it to seven (until the danger of war was imminent); the Nazis lengthened the working day long before the outbreak of war. The Soviets granted equality to women – they work as farmers, engineers, heads of industries; the Fascists compelled women to give up jobs on the theory that woman's primary job was to produce children.

The number of Soviet men and women in high schools and colleges increased greatly from 1914 to 1937; in Germany, college enrolments alone decreased by more than 50 per cent from 1932 to 1937. Before World War 1, only a small minority of the people of Russia could read or write. To-day, the great majority has been taught to do so.

Living Space: In area, the U.S.S.R. is as large as all of the U.S., Canada and Alaska; it covers one-sixth of the land surface of the earth. Like the United States, it has nearly everything and lots of it – space, iron, coal, electric power, oil and grain.

Many people cannot reconcile Soviet occupation of Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Rumania, and Poland with U.S.S.R. statements that they want no foreign territory. W.D. Pamphlet 20-3 says:

'The ultimate military consequences are the best evidence of whether the U.S.S.R.'s 1939 attack on Finland and subsequent overrunning of the Baltic Provinces were barehanded aggressions, motivated by greed for territory, or were done to strengthen U.S.S.R.'s western frontiers against attack by Germany. The possession of this buffer territory did greatly facilitate the U.S.S.R.'s defence when the attack duly fell. Without attempting any moral judgments on the matter, it is enough to state the military fact that had the U.S.S.R. not acted so, the Allied cause would be weaker to-day.'

How did these territories serve the U.S.S.R. militarily?

Finland: The Russo-Finish border was only 20 miles from Leningrad, second largest Soviet city. After negotiations with Finland for a buffer territory had failed, war resulted. The territory gained enabled the U.S.S.R. to hold out 30 days after the Nazi attack in 1939. Although besieged, Leningrad never fell.

Baltic States: Occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania helped delay the Wehrmacht 59 days and gave naval and air bases to hamper German shipping in the Baltic Sea.

Rumania: Bessarabian territory delayed the German advance for over a month.

Poland: By occupying Eastern Poland, the Soviets acquired 77,705 square miles to cushion to some extent the German attack when it came.

In addition, the territories were part of the Russian Empire before 1917, and, with the exception of Poland and Rumania, had been closely associated with Germany.

World Domination: Early leaders of Communism in Russia advocated world revolution. Communist policy was modified in 1927 by Stalin, who believed Russia's most important contribution to Socialism lay not in revolution but in building Socialism successfully at home. The Soviet Union became one of the strongest supporters of co-operative action to preserve peace; Trotsky, leader of the 'world revolutionists', was exiled in 1927. ... Russia accepted the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war in 1928 ... they joined the League of Nations in 1934 and supported all attempts at disarmament; they abolished the Comintern (the Communist International) in May, 1943. The willingness of the Soviet Union, like other Powers, to make concessions in order to fashion a durable international peace organisation was demonstrated at the San Francisco Conference. In Stalin's words:

'We have no ideas of imposing our regime on other peoples ... Our aim is to help liberate them from Nazi tyranny and then to leave them free to live their own lives as they wish.'

In so far as the Soviet Government have departed from this admirable principle – and they have done so less than the United States have done in Greece, China, Italy and France – they have acted not on revolutionary or doctrinaire grounds, but out of concern for their national security. Sometimes their fears have been exaggerated. But all too often they have been justified by American intervention and power politics.

COMMUNISM AND RELIGION

I have already quoted Mr Churchill's vehement declaration that the 'conflict between Communism, on the one hand, and Christian ethics, on the other, is the most deadly, far-reaching and rending that the human race has known,' and have pointed out that his view of Communism as anti-Christ was the counterpart of his belief that Fascism was the last refuge of the defenders of capitalism in distress. It scarcely needs to be argued that this outlook has no connection with reason or common sense. Let us now attempt a rational survey of the subject.

Webster's Standard Dictionary defines Communism as 'a system of social organisation in which goods are held in common; the opposite of the system of private property; any theory or system of social organisation involving common ownership of

the agents of production and some approach to equal distribution of the products of industry.'

On the face of it it is difficult to imagine why this Socialist concept of society should be less Christian than the selfish anarchy of capitalism. And indeed many distinguished Christians, including not only the Dean of Canterbury but Bishop Barnes, have roundly declared that the early Christians were Communists and that there is much in Communism for which Christians must feel admiration and sympathy. On January 22, 1949, Dr Barnes, Bishop of Birmingham, published a statement in which he referred to Lenin as 'one of the greatest men of the twentieth century,' and said 'Communism is a political social movement for the welfare of the common man. The spiritual basis of the movement is lofty humanism. Its leaders have steadily pursued a social policy which has carried it successfully over half the world as it has lessened the hardships of the poor and spread the advantages of education.

'Christianity ought to be a religious movement with a similar object. Unfortunately, in many lands the salt has lost its flavour.'

Communism was seeking land reform in countries where Catholic nobles had possessed or still possess vast estates. The sympathies of the Catholic nobility and clergy were with the old order.

'But this should not be a reason why Churchmen in England, Anglican or Free Church, should violently condemn Communism and write or speak in such a way as to foment war between the Western democracies and Communist States.'

Dr Barnes pointed out that he was not a Communist 'for I believe that our way of quiet development leads effectively without revolution to the welfare of the common man. But I desire from us friendly recognition of the greatness of Lenin's achievement, lest misrepresentation and suspicion should lead to the culminating disaster of a third world war.'

The truth is that there are millions of members of the East European and Soviet Communist Parties who belong to some religious community. The Greek Orthodox Church long ago made its peace with the Soviet regime and with the Yugoslav Bulgarian and Rumanian regimes. The Baptist community in the Soviet Union is large, flourishing and growing rapidly. The Moslems and Jews in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are on the happiest terms with the State and with each other and their Orthodox and Catholic colleagues. The Calvinists in Hungary are at peace with the new regime.

The position of the Catholic Church is more complex. This, the greatest and oldest of the Christian churches, holds the view, which was universal in the Middle Ages, that a man's religion should govern his conduct in every walk of life and that it is not possible effectively to separate the secular from the spiritual. At the same time the Vatican State is a political institution living in the world of States and responsible for safeguarding the interests as best it can of the Catholic communities in all lands.

On this plane the Catholic Church, as a political institution, must pay heed to the principle of 'rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's' and driving the best bargains it can with the governments of the States in which there are Catholics whose religious interests in education, the right to worship, properties of the Church, etc., the Vatican is charged with safeguarding as best it may. On this plane too there are ancient feuds between the Catholic and other Churches, for instance the rivalry between the Orthodox Church and the Uniate Catholics who belong to the Roman Church but observe the rites of the Orthodox Church. This particular quarrel appears to have flared up again in certain parts of Eastern Europe, the Orthodox Church taking advantage of its own good standing with the people's democracies as contrasted with the strained relations between them and the Vatican.

As a political institution the Vatican has traditionally believed in keeping a foot in both camps and in not committing itself wholly to either. This was so in both world wars. It was so with regard to Fascism, the claims of which to the exclusive loyalty of youth were contested by the Vatican while, at the same time, the latter had safeguarded the interests of the Catholic community through a concordat with Mussolini.

On balance, however, the Catholic Church, which suffered heavily in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, of which the Reformation was largely the religious expression, because as a political institution it was tied up through its vast landed interests with the feudal nobility, is equally deeply embedded to-day in the capitalist social order and correspondingly hostile to Socialists and Communists. In Spain, for instance, the Church is one of the biggest landowners and bankers, and the hierarchy was on the side of Franco's rebellion, although some of the village priests and the Basque clergy were for the Republic.

During the war Archbishop Stepinac in Yugoslavia came out openly for the Pavelic quisling State, exhorted the faithful to rejoice in its advent, blessed its arms, received a medal for his

services—and after the war began to intrigue with various underground movements and factions against the Tito regime, as well as opposing the land reform which deprived the Church of a good deal of property.

During the war, too, Father Tiso became the head of the quisling Slovak Government under Hitler and was one of the leading lights of Slovak Fascism.

Chapter VIII gave an account of how Cardinal Schuster in Italy excommunicated all Catholics who voted for the Communist-Socialist Democratic Front in the General Election.

Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary had demanded the extermination of Communists and Socialists during the White dictatorship and terror of Admiral Horthy, of which he was a strong supporter. Later he proposed that 'all Jews and half-breeds' should be dismissed from the Civil Service and said it was Hungary's 'good fortune' that Nazi Germany had reduced the 'millions of Jews in the Ghetto [i.e. Eastern Europe] to 500,000 only'.

He preached and agitated against the land reform of the new regime in Hungary and forbade priests and nuns to continue their religious teaching in the schools taken over by the State. That is, the Hungarian State makes Catholic religious teaching compulsory in State schools and allows monks and nuns to give it. But Cardinal Mindszenty objected so vigorously to the State taking over the schools that previously belonged to the Church that he refused to cooperate, and used his authority to prevent those among the Hungarian Catholic bishops and clergy who wished to make their peace with the new regime from accepting its conciliatory proposals. He also became the virtual leader of the Royalists of Hungary, fired and financed by Cardinal Spellman and others. The plotters assumed that a third world war would break out in the summer of 1947 over Berlin (which, thanks to General Clay, it very nearly did). The Cardinal was in touch with the American Military Authorities in Germany. The U.S. would then 'liberate' Hungary, and make Cardinal Mindszenty Regent (like His Beatitude Archbishop Damaskinos in Greece and Admiral Horthy after the first world war in Hungary), until Archduke Otto of Hapsburg was restored to the throne of a revived Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to which Bavaria would be subsequently joined. Intrigues with the American Embassy in Budapest and the State Department and Cardinal Spellman, black market transactions in dollars, and espionage were included in Cardinal Mindszenty's and his agents' activities.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, as in Hungary and Yugo-

slavia, there has been complete toleration for the Church as such and the State has agreed to preserve religious teaching in the schools. In Poland not even the Church's vast lands have been diminished by land reform. Communist Party members, particularly in the country, are often practising Catholics in all four countries. But as Anglo-American intervention developed relations between some of the most prominent Catholic dignitaries and the new regimes have worsened. The conflict between the Czech Archbishop Beran, refusing to come to terms with the State, in many ways resembles the struggle between Church and State that was fought out 45 years ago in France.

In July 1949 the Vatican ex-communicated all Catholics who were convinced Communists or Left-wing Socialists, to the consternation of thousands of good village priests and millions of humble Christians.

Father Plojhar, the Czechoslovak Catholic priest who is the leader of the Christian Democratic Party and a member of the Government told me that he had been suspended from his duties as a priest for taking part in politics. He pointed out to me that no such penalties were inflicted on Father Tiso or Archbishop Stepinac or Cardinal Schuster. He was, he said, a faithful son of the Church in all matters of dogma and doctrine and bowed to his ecclesiastical superiors. But outside questions of faith he claimed his rights as a Czechoslovak citizen and judged political, social and economic issues for himself. He was born of a poor family and knew how hard was the life of the people and how much injustice they had to suffer. That was why he wholeheartedly supported the new regime.

The Catholic Church was a political as well as a religious institution and in its political capacity the Vatican was not infallible. He believed that Cardinal Spellman and the U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican, Mr Myron Taylor, had exerted a powerful and sinister influence on the policy of the Vatican since the proclamation of the Truman doctrine. Their opinion carried weight because the American Catholic community was one of the biggest and far and away the richest in the world [three-quarters of the Vatican's revenues come from the U.S.A.]. The Americans were frightened lest Catholicism and Communism should come to terms and settle down peacefully in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. They reasoned that it was bad enough when the Greek Orthodox Church made its peace with Communist regimes, but after all the Greek Orthodox communities were confined to the Eastern fringe of Europe. But if

Communism and Catholicism reached agreement there was nothing to stop Communism spreading to Italy, France and Belgium.

This was an interesting and well-informed view that may well explain the increasing hostility displayed by the Catholic Church to Communist Parties and regimes that in general have done all in their power to show themselves accommodating and conciliatory toward the legitimate interests of the Catholic and all other religious communities in their territories.

The lengths to which the 'tough' or 'world war III' political school in the Catholic hierarchy is prepared to go came out dramatically over the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty. The fact that the charges – of Royalist conspiracy, espionage and changing dollars on the black market – had nothing to do with religion was ignored. The damning evidence, confirmed by his own admissions and those of his associates, was simply disregarded. It was widely, and wholly falsely, alleged that he had been drugged and tortured.

The *Tablet* excelled itself by producing a circumstantial and wildly absurd story about his having been made to drink 'actedron', with the result that his will power was destroyed and he was made to tell lies. 'Actedron' is the Hungarian trade name for what in Britain and the U.S.A. is known as 'benzedrine' or 'dexedrine'. It is a stimulant to the central nervous system and is widely used by Hungarian students to pep themselves up during examinations – a modern substitute for the old-fashioned cups of strong black coffee.

'Actedron' would therefore produce pretty well the opposite effect to that suggested by the *Tablet*. Psychiatrists and chemists scout the idea that any drug or preparation exists capable of making a man tell lies at the bidding of others. The American and British correspondents covering the trial dismissed as absurd the idea that Cardinal Mindszenty was drugged or tortured or terrorised in any way; he showed every sign of health, vigour and mental alertness. His appearance and manner confirmed his own statement that he had been well treated.

The Vatican organ, *Osservatore Romano*, February 7, 1949, admitted that Cardinal Mindszenty had spoken the truth in court, and praised him for so doing. As the evidence was corroborated by Prince Esterhazy, Andrei Zahar, the Cardinal's Secretary, and others, as well as by numerous documents in the handwriting of the Cardinal and his accomplices, the authenticity of which none has ventured to challenge, the accused Cardinal could hardly help admitting patent facts.

This did not prevent Cardinal Spellman preaching a sermon in St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York, on February 6 under the title 'Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God', in which he (a) asserted that Cardinal Mindszenty had been 'persecuted, tortured, victimised'.

(b) Bitterly denounced 'atheistic Communism', described the leaders of the Soviet Union as 'the world's most fiendish, ghoulisn men of slaughter' and said the United States would face certain Red conquest and annihilation if it failed to heed the lesson taught by the 'martyrdom' of his fellow-Cardinal.

(c) Declared that when Cardinal Mindszenty confessed to treason against the Communist Government in Hungary, 'he but professed loyalty to his country. If this be treason - to deny allegiance to an atheistic Communist Government - then thank God that Cardinal Mindszenty confessed to treason, as would I if this free land of America were ever conquered by the demoniac people now using every foul means to overthrow our Republic'.

But there is also a moderate school of thought in high places in the Vatican that believes in Christian morality and peace. The moderate point of view was strikingly expressed in four remarkable articles in June 1947, in the official organ of the Vatican, the *Osservatore Romano*, by its editor-in-chief, the veteran Count Giuseppe della Torre. Analysing the world situation he concluded that, just as 150 years ago there was a counter-revolutionary coalition led by Britain against revolutionary France, so to-day there is a counter-revolutionary coalition led by the United States against revolutionary Russia. Such a conflict was in no true sense a clash of conflicting principles of ideology or civilisation. It was a struggle between great powers using ideologies to mask their national interests.

In such a conflict right and wrong were mixed and distributed equally on both sides and there was no issue which could not and should not be settled by negotiation and compromise. With war everything would be lost and there was not much left to lose after two world wars. With peace everything could be regained.

Communism had originated in Western Europe 100 years ago and would go on whatever happened to Russia. It was impossible to kill an idea by force, even the idea of Communism. 'Whatever may be the positions or opinions we held about Communism, as an idea and in action, as a philosophy and morality, as economics and politics, to-day and to-morrow, we cannot and

we must not, if we wish to remain civilised and Christian, imagine that we can overcome or modify Communism by force, with the blood, anguish, violence, misery and barbarism of war.' (June 26, 1947.)*

In the same article Count della Torre, referring to the impression created by his earlier articles, wrote: 'The question has been asked, with reference to the comparison we have made between the political situation of the world facing the French revolution and the France of those days, and of the world to-day facing Communism and the Soviet Union, whether all this means that since it is impossible now as then to end this state of affairs it will be necessary eventually to arrive at some social and political compromise in Europe, with the resulting necessity for us too to seek new alignments around the idea and system of Communism'.

More should not be read into what he had said than his argument implied, which was simply the necessity to avoid war as a means of dealing with these issues and the necessity for peaceful solutions, was Count della Torre's conclusion.

COMMUNIST PARTIES AND MOSCOW

A favourite charge is the one that Communist Parties are nothing but the fifth columns, stooges and agents of Moscow. From this the conclusion is often drawn that Stalin has merely to lift his finger and say 'one little word' in order to bring Communist Parties everywhere to heel. As previous chapters have shown, Mr Churchill has gone even further and suggested that we should threaten the U.S.S.R. with the atom bomb in order to make her order all Communist Parties everywhere to disband and disappear.

The short answer to this nonsense is - Tito. Whatever may be thought of the merits of the quarrel between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Cominform, the fact stands out a mile that here is a case of not only the Soviet but all the other big Communist Parties in Europe trying to make the Yugoslav Communist Party do certain things that they hold are for its own good and for the good of Yugoslavia. And although Yugoslavia is a small country on the doorstep of the Soviet Union, with a strong Pan-slav tradition, the Yugoslav Communist Party has defied the U.S.S.R. and all the other Communist Parties, including those of her neighbours, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, not to mention the Czechs and the Poles.

* On April 17, 1949, he repeated these views.

Those who habitually talk of the Communist Parties of Europe as though they had been founded and were run by emissaries from Moscow forget that the Allied Governments at the time of the Russian Revolution were immovably convinced that the Russian Bolshevik leaders were merely German agents and that the Russian Revolution was run on German gold and for German purposes.

The view of latter-day Tories and their intellectual bondsmen and fellow-travellers in the Labour Party that Communist Parties are Soviet fifth columns is equally nonsensical. The Communist Parties were originally Left Wing revolutionary breakaways from their respective Social Democratic Parties and are as native to the soil of their countries as the parties from which they sprang.

It is true, of course, that through the Comintern the Communist Parties pledged themselves to accept majority decisions that were in fact determined by the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is also true that since the dissolution of the Comintern there is still what might be called a Moscow hangover in the European Communist Parties. But it is voluntary. If they choose to stick to the Soviet Union and accept the leadership of the Soviet Communists they do so because in their judgment, rightly or wrongly, that is the best course to pursue.

The more Anglo-American intervention and cold war create the atmosphere of a state of siege the stronger will be the attachment of Communist Parties to their Soviet comrades, and the greater will be the insistence of the C.P.S.U. on the necessity for a common front against the common foe under its unquestioned leadership. There is a direct and visible connection between the greater intransigence and fanaticism of the Communist Parties to-day and the way they have drawn together on the one hand, and on the other the course of Anglo-American policy in Europe and Asia since 1945.

COMMUNIST PARTIES, WESTERN CIVILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

A further popular charge is that the Communist Parties are, on the orders of Moscow, bent on wrecking Europe's reconstruction effort. This charge is doubly absurd: in the first place it ignores the fact that throughout Eastern Europe the Communist Parties have played a leading and energetic part in reconstruction and the framing and carrying out of the various

Two, Three, Five and Six Year Plans. Second, that in the West the Communist Parties played an equally leading and energetic part in reconstruction until they were driven out of the governing coalitions and forced into opposition by American intervention.

In this connection the flood of propaganda with which Western public opinion is being bemused and poisoned has succeeded in obscuring and causing to be forgotten facts that were familiar enough a couple of years ago. A good example is the case of Mr Joseph Alsop. The reader will recollect the handsome tributes he paid in 1946 to the great work done by the French Communists in the framing and execution of the Monnet Plan and in the whole reconstruction drive, as the representatives of the working class and the trades unions in the coalition. Various quotations from his enthusiastic descriptions of what the Communists were doing at that time are given in Chapter VI.*

But Mr Joseph Alsop visited Paris again at the beginning of 1949, as what might be called a convinced 'cold warrior'. And this is what he wrote in the Paris edition of the *New York Herald Tribune* on January 15, 1949: 'Memories are short. Few now remember the time when the directive of the Western European Communists was to retain footholds in the governments; when they were promoting chaos while pretending cooperation and when an actual Communist seizure of power on the Czech pattern seemed far from impossible in France and Italy'.

There are only two possible explanations for Mr Joseph Alsop's flat contradiction of himself. Either his own memory is so short that not only had he forgotten what he wrote in 1946, but the facts of the situation at that time had passed out of his mind or become hopelessly distorted; or – the less charitable explanation – he has changed the spelling of his name to Ananias.

When the Marshall Plan came out, Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communists, said Italy needed American help and should accept it. The French Communists too had no objection to the principle of American economic aid. That indeed was the attitude of the Cominform at its first meeting in Warsaw, when even Zhdanov's speech stressed that American help to Europe was welcome provided it was given without any hostile political axe to grind.

But the Communist Parties were not long in deciding that American economic aid under the Marshall Plan was so in-

*E.g., in the *New York Herald Tribune* of July 12, 1946: 'The key to the success of the Monnet plan to date, which has been considerable, is the enthusiastic collaboration of the Communist Party ... Reconstruction comes first is the party line.'

extricably mingled with anti-Communist intervention and anti-Soviet power politics that it was impossible to separate the one from the other. They have, therefore, fought it as part and parcel of their leadership of the working class of France and Italy in the struggle for a tolerable standard of living and a minimum of social justice, as well as for the right to be free from American interference in the internal affairs of their countries. The attitude of the strongly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet leadership of the West German working class is not very different from that of the French and Italian Communists, because they too are being forced by events to defend the interests of the workers against the conditions created by the American-sponsored and supported restoration of capitalism in Western Germany.*

As for the alleged incompatibility of Western civilisation and Communism, the sane view taken by *The Times* on March 6, 1946, is still a truer guide than the ravings of the fanatics. The *Times* leader condemned Mr Churchill for his assertion at Fulton that Communism and Western democracy were 'irreconcilable opposites dividing or attempting to divide the world between them to-day'. This, said *The Times*, was an assumption of despair that failed to recognise two important points:

The first is that there are many forms of government intermediate between western democracy and Communism, and some of them may be better adapted at the present stage of development to the requirements of Eastern Europe or of the Middle or Far East. The second is that, while Western democracy and Communism are in many respects opposed, they have much to learn from one another - Communism in the working of political institutions and in the establishment of individual rights, Western democracy in the development of economic and social planning.

The ideological warfare between Western democracy and Communism cannot result in an out-and-out victory for either side. The issue will be determined neither by clashes of eloquence nor by clashes of arms, but by the success of the great nations in dealing with the problems of social organisation in the broadest sense which the war has left behind it.

*The Communist Parties discussed in this chapter are those that represent all or the great majority of the working class of their countries. The Scandinavian and Benelux Communists are often simply leftist Social Democrats driven into the Communist Party because of the rigid and narrow view of discipline and Party loyalty in the Right-Wing-dominated Social Democratic Parties. The British Communist Party is so far a marginal minor phenomenon and likely to remain so, in spite of the best the Tories and Right wing Labour can do for it - and are doing with such hearty good will.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND WORLD REVOLUTION

The fears felt by the defenders of Capitalism in Britain and the U.S.A. for the future of the old social order are generally rationalised into the charge that the Soviet Government is working for a world revolution and does not believe in peace with the Capitalist States except as a temporary, tactical expedient. The short answer is first that the Soviet Union has not been a revolutionary power for a quarter of a century, ever since Stalin defeated Trotsky on the issue of 'Socialism in One Country' versus 'Permanent Revolution'. In the second place, the Soviet Government has declared its belief that the Soviet Union could and should live at peace and trade with Capitalist States to their mutual advantage, regardless of the differences in their economic and social systems, on innumerable occasions ever since Foreign Commissar Chicherin appeared at the Genoa Conference in 1922.

That policy was proclaimed then and again in 1924 when the first Labour Government recognised and concluded a trade treaty with the Soviet Union; at the Geneva Economic Conference in 1927; at the Disarmament Conference in 1932; on the Soviet Union concluding an alliance with France in 1934 and on her entering the League of Nations in 1935; and at intervals by Stalin, Molotov and other Soviet leaders during this period and ever since up to the present day. Stalin made the point in his interviews with distinguished foreigners like Mr Harold Stassen, Roy Howard of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain, the Labour official goodwill delegation in April 1947 and the eight Labour M.P.s in October 1947; at the time of the enquiries made by Ambassador Bedell Smith hinting at direct discussions with the United States, and again in reply to Mr Henry Wallace's letter.

At a Lenin memorial meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the death of Lenin, Mr P. N. Pospelov, editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, the principal speaker, in the course of a panegyric on the Soviet Union's fight for peace, included the following:

In his reply to the open letter of Henry Wallace, Joseph Stalin, great leader of the Soviet Union, wrote: that despite the differences in economic systems and ideologies the co-existence of these systems and the peaceful settlement of differences between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. are not only possible but absolutely necessary in the interests of universal peace.

But the question is so important and so much nonsense has been talked, or written by the evilly disposed with phony claims to superior knowledge, in order to frighten the foolish and ignorant, that it is worth dealing with the issue more fully.

The Bolsheviks are Marxist Socialists. That means they believe that the main agent of change in society is the struggle of economic classes. Before and during the first world war they believed that Capitalism was evolving along lines that would bring this struggle to a head and that social revolution in one country would be speedily followed by revolutions in others, the workers inspiring and helping each other in their common struggle.

But like other first rank Marxists – including Marx himself, who once remarked that he thanked God he was not a Marxist – Lenin had nothing but contempt for those who used the Marxist social analysis, not as a guide to interpret reality but as a rigid dogma, a Procrustean bed on which reality must be stretched and mutilated to fit. Stalin is even more pragmatic and empiric than Lenin. His whole fight for ‘Socialism in One Country’ was waged on the ground that it was necessary to recognise the facts and to change policy accordingly.

As recently as February 1947, writing in the monthly review *Bolshevik*, Stalin, replying to some questions put to him by Colonel E. Razin, a prominent Communist military writer, about Clausewitz, supported his contention that modern developments had made that military authority out of date with the following remarks:

It is impossible to make progress and to advance science without subjecting out of date assumptions and assertions by established authorities to critical examination. This is true not only of military authorities but also of the Marxist classics . . .

In criticising we should use as a guide not this or that assumption or statement in the classics but the famous general rule that Lenin gave us in his day:

‘We do not at all regard Marx’s theory as something finished and infallible; on the contrary we are convinced that he merely laid the foundation stones of the science on which Socialists must build further in all directions unless they want to be left behind by life. We think it is particularly necessary for Russian Socialists to work out the application of Marx’s theory independently, for this theory merely gives certain broad general indications which will be worked out in Britain differently from France, in France differently from Germany and in Germany differently from Russia.’

As this quotation, used by Stalin in 1947, was taken from

something Lenin wrote in 1899, it must be regarded as something pretty fundamental in the Bolshevik way of applying the Marxist social analysis to changing and developing realities.

And yet Mr George Morgan, a U.S. State Department Foreign Service officer and First Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow, says nothing about this vitally important article and quotation in his own article in the *Foreign Affairs Quarterly* (signed 'Historicus') of January 1949, entitled 'Stalin on Revolution'. He claims to have read everything Stalin has written since the early days of the Revolution. He points out that Stalin said that the publication of an article in the review *Bolshevik*, which Stalin called 'our fighting magazine', meant that it was to be taken 'as directive or at least deeply informative for our Party workers.' But he says nothing about the article I have just quoted, because to do so would have knocked the bottom out of the case he attempts to make that Stalin is a man of rigid theory and doctrine dedicated to the cause of world revolution.

In establishing this phony case he not only leaves out what contradicts it, but tells the direct untruth that the Soviet Government has only on two occasions, and then only for foreign consumption, declared its belief in the peaceful co-existence of the Soviet Union and Capitalist States. The list given above of the occasions on which this statement was made is by no means exhaustive, and every time it was made it was published throughout the Soviet press and reported on the Soviet radio.

Previous chapters have shown how radically the thinking of the Soviet Communist Party was re-adjusted to the two unexpected, massive and fundamental shifts in the world situation with which they were confronted: the first was their survival in a Capitalist world. Arthur Ransome records how he visited Lenin at the Smolny Institute in what was still Petrograd and found him rejoicing because the Soviet Government had lived one day longer than the Paris Commune. The Bolsheviks were firmly persuaded in those early days that they were the outpost of the world revolution and if it delayed they would suffer the fate of the Paris Commune.

Mr George Morgan makes great play with passages from Lenin in those early days quoted by Stalin back in the twenties. But he is silent about Stalin's explanation, when discussing the question of the victory of Socialism in one country, that Lenin's original belief had turned out to be insufficient and was out-of-date: Lenin had argued that, whereas it was possible in one country to overthrow the power of the Capitalists and set up a

Socialist Government, it was necessary, particularly in the case of a backward, largely peasant country like Russia, for the workers in a few advanced countries also to have a social revolution before it was possible successfully to organise a Socialist economy.

The truth was, Stalin claimed, that it was perfectly possible to build up Socialism in one country, to wit Russia. Its human and natural resources were adequate for the purpose. But this Socialist State and society would not be safe from attempts at intervention and restoring the old order from outside until some other countries also had gone Socialist. In order to prove this point he quoted the further statement of Lenin, dating from the time when fourteen Capitalist countries had invaded Soviet Russia and the infant revolution was fighting for its life in a narrowing ring of blood and fire around Moscow, that in the end either the social revolution would triumph in the imperialist States or they would defeat the Soviet Republic. The existence of the latter side by side with the former for a long period was unthinkable, and before the final showdown a series of fearful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States was inevitable. This, said Stalin, simply meant, as Lenin had said elsewhere, that the Soviet peoples must always remember that 'We are surrounded by peoples, classes, governments, openly expressing the greatest hatred for us. One must remember that we are separated from all kinds of incursions by a hair's breadth.'

The practical conclusion Stalin drew was that the Soviet Union must be militarily strong as well as economically and socially successful in order to hold its own in the capitalist world. Mr Morgan points out that Stalin's 'line' is that 'capitalists whenever they can and dare will seek to intervene in the Socialist country and restore capitalism', that there is a constant danger of 'capitalist encirclement' and that 'Socialism cannot be considered finally achieved as long as this danger of intervention and restoration persists.'

After all, is that not true? The U.S.A. is intervening all round the frontiers of the Soviet Union and her associates, and is doing her best to interfere in their internal affairs. The U.S. Strategic Plan and rearmament programme is openly preparing to burn, kill and destroy Soviet men, women and children, Soviet towns and industrial centres. The U.S.S.R. has no bases or arms for attacking the territory of the United States and is not even attempting to acquire them.

The George F. Kennan policy underlying the Truman doctrine and Mr Churchill's declarations, with Mr Bevin not far behind, openly aim at the overthrow of the Soviet regime. If they do not mean that they mean nothing. If these are measures of defence, what would an aggressive American policy look like? The authors of these policy declarations quite obviously neither believe in the possibility of peace nor desire peace with the Soviet Union and the Socialist third of humanity.

Mr George Morgan is good enough to point out that: 'The emphasis given to economic crises after 1929 ... suggests that the lesson of 1929 produced an important change in Stalin's thinking about the capitalist world'. But he says nothing about the profound effect on the thinking not only of Stalin but of the whole Bolshevik leadership, produced first by their survival in a capitalist world and second when the capitalist world split into the aggressive Fascist Axis pitted against the peace-loving democracies.

Nor does he appear to realise that the mere passage of time insensibly but inevitably altered the outlook of the Soviet leaders: so long as they regarded themselves as merely the outpost of the world revolution, bound to go down if it did not spread, they were primarily international revolutionaries. But as they found themselves responsible for an indefinite time ahead for the destinies of their own people and for the tremendous job of building up Socialism in their own country, they became absorbed in their gigantic task, filled with pride in the achievement and spirit of the Soviet peoples and in course of time acquired a robust and full-blooded Soviet patriotism. In fact, the criticism of Trotskyists, I.L.P.ers and other Left Wing anti-Communists has been that the C.P.S.U. have become Russian Nationalists, and that, as Trotsky put it, whereas Lenin regarded himself and his comrades as the advance guard of the world revolution, Stalin wanted to reduce the world proletariat to the role of frontier guards for the Soviet Union.

This criticism in its way is as exaggerated and unfair as that of Mr George Morgan in the opposite direction. The Soviet regime is no longer revolutionary: it does not consider that its job is to incite or assist others to make revolutions in their countries. As Molotov put it in 1938, the different rates and modes of social change in the countries of the world meant that the world revolution was a continuous process that began in 1917 and was still going on. It would flare up first in one country and then in another, advancing and retreating, failing and succeeding.

The Russians do not believe it is their mission to hang capitalism. They shrewdly suspect that the capitalists are making a pretty good job of hanging themselves.

The Times took a realistic and well-informed view in an article on the 'Principles and Practice of Soviet Diplomacy Since the Revolution' in its issue of December 17, 1947:

In the early days of the Soviet regime its leaders saw in the October revolution the model for Communist upheaval all over the world. They believed in the imminence of that upheaval with an optimism that strikes the reader of Lenin's writings to-day as extremely naive. There can be little doubt that Stalin and his entourage, on the other hand, have long accepted the view that the October revolution was a unique, non-recurring event. This view can never be openly avowed in Moscow. Such a confession would go against the grain of Leninist orthodoxy and Stalinism has been committed to the formal observance of that orthodoxy in much the same way as the churches are committed to holy writ. But in practical politics it is not the inspired orthodoxy but the appraisal of what are believed to be the facts of the international situation that dictates the policies of the Soviet leaders.

The view that capitalism is predestined to be superseded by Socialism or Communism is now entertained by the Soviet leaders in much the same way as it has been entertained by most leaders of 'reformist' Socialism.

The process is seen as history's long trend, which, though it may indeed be much shortened by the determined action of men, is similar to the slow and painful process by which the feudal order was superseded, over the lifetime of many generations, by modern industrial society. It is precisely this deferring of hope that has accounted for Stalin's categorical insistence on the thesis that the full edifice of a Communist society can be built within the limits of a single State.

The same article points out that Soviet leaders are far from enthusiastic at the prospect of another great capitalist slump. 'The expectation of an early and worldwide slump is axiomatic.' Even this statement is probably no longer true, for the eminent Soviet economist, Professor Varga, was treated as a heretic but tolerated, for pointing out that, thanks to the advance in capitalist theory through Keynesian economics and the experience of the two world wars and the great slump, capitalist governments had learned a good deal about how to 'manage' a capitalist economy so as to keep work and production going for a long time without collapsing in a major slump.

But there is no doubt that *The Times* was right when it went on to say that however much the Bolsheviks might expect another world slump 'it is doubtful whether Moscow can now be sure

that Communism will be the beneficiary of the slump. There was a time when it was tacitly assumed in the Comintern that widespread economic depression must lead almost automatically to Communist revolution. This was the illusion entertained by the sixth Congress of the Comintern, which met in Moscow in 1928. It was exploded in the great depression, which resulted in the rise of Nazism and similar movements akin to it all over Europe.

'The lesson is still too fresh to have been forgotten in Moscow.'

Apart from the last slump giving birth to Fascism in many countries and aggravating it in others, it also complicated the Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union to a serious degree, causing the prices of Soviet exports (raw materials, timber, cereals, etc.) to fall so much in relation to the industrial and capital goods which the U.S.S.R. wanted to buy that they had to export twice as much as they had calculated. This and the necessity for re-arming because of the growing Fascist danger threw the plan out of gear and inflicted severe suffering on the Soviet peoples.

Mr George Morgan is silent about these major realities, for to mention them would spoil his case. But he claims that in Stalin's view it is the duty of the Soviet Union to further the cause of world revolution by giving direct or indirect support to the proletariat in other countries. He admits that Stalin does not say this anywhere, but argues that 'it is a clear implication' from his particular brand of Marxist analysis and his exposition of Lenin's theory while lecturing to university students in Sverdlovsk a quarter of a century ago. The nearest he gets to evidence is his triumphant claim that 'Thus for the past quarter century, according to the overwhelming testimony of his writing, Stalin has expected the next crop of revolutions to come during or in the immediate aftermath of the second world war.'

The short answer is that anyone but a fool would have shared that expectation. President Roosevelt took that view when he begged Hitler to reflect that a war would overthrow the social order in a large part of the world. Sir Edward Grey was convinced on the outbreak of the first world war that it would end with Labour and Socialist governments everywhere.

And, of course, the revolutions during or in the immediate aftermath of the second world war are already an accomplished fact in China, Eastern Europe and Czechoslovakia. But so what?

Mr George Morgan even endeavours to make our flesh creep by pointing out that 'in 1938 the Party history appeared with the revolutionary motto on its title page "Workers of all countries unite".' That is nothing - *Pravda* and *Izvestia* to this day

carry that motto on their title pages in half a dozen languages. It is still the slogan of not a few Social Democrats as well as of Communists all over Europe.

It is a bit of an anti-climax, after all these laboured and specious arguments, suppressing vital facts, insisting on gratuitous fancies, and darkly hinting that 'It must remain a question to what extent Stalin's published views on Communist strategy and tactics are supplemented or modified by doctrine reserved for the Communist High Command', when Mr Morgan concludes that Stalin expects the next crisis in relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world to arise in fifteen to twenty years time! In the meantime, the State Department and the Foreign Office find him embarrassingly importunate in his desire for peace.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, WORLD CONQUEST AND INDIRECT AGGRESSION

The charge that the Soviet Government is out for world conquest is equally absurd. The territory of the Soviet Union to-day is smaller than that of the Russian Empire before the revolution. If the steps the Soviet Government took to recover some of the territories torn from it in the hour of defeat and weakness by Allied interventionists after the first world war are aggression, then the French must be held aggressors for insisting on the return in 1918 of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which had been German for half a century and were inhabited by mostly German-speaking people. The remarks of the American Army Bulletin on this subject have already been quoted, and it needs no further comment, except to point out once more that the United States with its record of world wide expansion and intervention is in the position of Satan rebuking Sin when it accuses the Soviet Union or any other country of expansion.

The charge of indirect aggression rests on the theory, which we have just exploded, that the Communist Parties in all countries are the fifth columns of Moscow and not a native and legitimate part of European working class leadership. The part played by the Soviet Government in the countries which the Red Army liberated is in conformity with the June 1944 Agreement between the great powers and the terms of the Yalta Conference Agreement. The Russian record has its full share of human failing and error, but it compares favourably with what the Western Allies have accomplished in Greece.

The main lines of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe have not

varied much from the description given by the Diplomatic Correspondent of *The Times* on his return from Moscow in a series of three articles published in April 1945. The middle article, April 11, concludes that the Russians believe that Europe is going Socialist, although they insist on Lenin's later teaching that the different countries will find their own paths to that common destination. They believe that security and democracy both require that all individuals and politicians associated with Hitler's regime or Fascist counter-revolution should be removed from public life, that the land should be divided among the tillers of the soil and that banks, railways and key industries should come under the State. Democracy to them meant Leftist Democracy and they carried their views to the point of insistence in the countries bordering on the Soviet Union. As for the rest of Europe, they believe that Britain's old genius for reform and evolution has not gone, but that on the Continent the industrial and banking classes have been compromised by their association with Fascism and there will be an advance toward Socialism unless there is a Fascist reaction.

'Is it not, they ask, in the interests of both Britain and the Soviet Union to help in establishing what one or two of them called "the new democracy?"' That would mean a regime somewhere between the Soviet and the capitalist - individualist systems; a regime in each country with firm social security; state control of primary industries; land reform; and a government which would exclude the parties of the Right and be based on forces from the Centre to the Left, including Communists.'

Party members were very insistent that they did not want to spread the Soviet system to Europe.

The record of the Soviet Union in world affairs is that of a peace-loving State. It did not seek isolation but had it thrust upon it by the capitalist world and had a long struggle to secure recognition and trade treaties and to enter the League of Nations. It did its best to strengthen the League as a bulwark against Fascist aggressions and war. It followed a ruthlessly self-regarding line during the war and has played its own hand ever since pretty toughly and by no means always wisely but always as a State that wants peace and loathes war.

It would have been better if the U.S.S.R. had put forward its claims and needs in the Middle East in terms 'understood of the people.' It has frequently conducted its case, even where it was good, in the United Nations and the conferences of Foreign Ministers in ways that argue a profound lack of understanding

of how to deal with the Western democracies and that neglected their public opinion. The refusal to release the Russian brides of British soldiers has done an immense amount of damage to the Soviet Union in the eyes of the people. The Soviet Union would have shown wisdom and realism if it had not let itself be discouraged so readily at the Paris conference, at the launching of the Marshall Plan, and had instead fought stubbornly for using the European Economic Commission of the United Nations as the executive organ of the scheme and for the principle that ex-Allies should have priority over Germany in receiving American help.

The very fact that the supply of news and views in the press and radio is officially controlled in the Soviet Union means that the self-correcting powers of free democracy are absent. The Soviet Government operates without the checks and influences that help to keep the Western governments from blundering badly. (This statement is mitigated but not invalidated by 'self-criticism' within Trades Unions, Co-operatives, Collective farms, factories, and in the Communist Party). Democracy as we know it, with all its imperfections, is not only superior as a way of life and a system of government to any other type of human society, but is also superior as a medium of international intercourse.

But let it not be forgotten that capitalism gravely distorts and impedes the working of democracy. The way in which public opinion is doped and maddened by propaganda and suppression of facts has already been touched upon. The Soviet Government might have done more to appeal to public opinion over the heads of governments. But it had to reckon primarily with the governments and Foreign Offices and could not overlook the fact that the sources from which public opinion derived its information and impressions were tainted. Not only does capitalism stultify democracy in international affairs. It also sets up formidable pressures making for war, in its pursuit of profits through rearmament and the acquisition of foreign markets, and because of its terror of social change.

The Soviet Union on the other hand is based on a Socialist economy that desperately needs peace in order to be free to concentrate all available resources and brains, labour and materials on raising the standard of living and producing a greater and greater volume of goods and services that the people want to enjoy. Unlike capitalism, a Socialist economy does not require rearmament nor does it need to dominate foreign markets in order to prosper. Armaments are an economic dead loss and the kind

of foreign trade it wants is the coordination of planning with other Socialist governments to the mutual advantage of all concerned.

APPEASEMENT, POWER POLITICS AND THE U.N. CHARTER

The practical conclusion drawn by the warmongers from their rotten intellectual and non-existent moral premises is that we can deal with the Soviet Union only on the basis of the mailed fist and threats of war and that to attempt to conduct our relations with the Socialist third of humanity on the basis of the United Nations Charter constitutes the crime of 'appeasement'.

The Tories prostituted the perfectly respectable term 'appeasement' to cover treating the Covenant as a scrap of paper in order to do deals with aggressors at the expense of their victims.

To-day they wish to abuse the word 'defence' to cover the scrapping of the Charter and the return to the balance of power and the use of war and the threat of war as an instrument of Anglo-American policy. Previous chapters have shown why this policy would make war inevitable. The true meaning of appeasement as defined in the dictionary is 'bringing to peace, allaying or composing strife or conflict or those at strife or in conflict.' In that sense appeasement is a fundamental and necessary part of civilised intercourse between States. It was provided for in the Covenant and a whole chapter is devoted to it in the Charter, where the procedures involved are called 'negotiation, conciliation, mediation or other peaceful means'.

The power politicians who invoke 'anti-appeasement' say that unless we arm to the teeth and ally ourselves to the United States the Red Army will march in and put Harry Pollitt into power. The idea that it is only the threat of world war that prevents the Red Army marching into the Middle East, China, Indo-china, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, India, Greece, Italy, Britain and Western Europe, not to mention the U.S.A. and Australia, is half-witted. Finland, a tiny country on the borders of the Soviet Union, which fought on the other side in the war, has become steadily more anti-Communist and Right Wing in its government and is getting tougher and tougher with its own Communist Party without the Russians doing a thing. The Yugoslavs in the midst of the Cominform group have defied Moscow, and although economic pressure has been applied there is no prospect of the Red Army marching into the country. Whatever may be thought of the merits of the February semi-revolution in Czechoslovakia, no informed person ventures to assert that the Russians interfered in any way. The Red Army

was in occupation of Hungary when the elections were held in that country and even hostile observers had to admit there was no Russian interference.

Sweden and Switzerland, small countries living cheek by jowl with Russia and her neighbours, do not consider it necessary to arm to the teeth and ally themselves with the United States. In fact the United States has been working overtime to bribe and bully the Swedes into entering the Western bloc and have so far failed. One of the main reasons why the Swedes refuse to enter it is that by so doing they would sacrifice Finland. The Russians want Scandinavia and Finland to be a neutral or 'buffer' area. But if the U.S. establish themselves in the Scandinavian peninsula the Russians may feel driven in self-defence to occupy or at least establish their defences in and politically control Finland. This is an admirable example of how American intervention is destroying democracy, national independence and international security in Europe.

Turkey and the feudal Arab regimes have been blackmailing the United States, and to a lesser extent Britain, by threatening to come to terms with the Russians unless they get plenty of subsidies and arms. The whole view that the world is panting for American protection from Russia is grotesque.

It is excelled in absurdity only by the spectacle of the mighty United States across several thousand miles of ocean in a state of panic about attack from the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. simply has not the arms or the bases to make an attack on American territory physically possible. But the U.S.A. has extended its defence system half across the world East and West in order to surround the territories of the Soviet Union and her neighbours. Uncle Sam comes across thousands of miles of sea and land to squat on Uncle Joe's doorstep and calamity-howl about Soviet expansion. The whole thing would be comic if it were not so tragic.

THE REAL DANGER AND THE REMEDY

The real danger is not that the Soviet Union will invade this country or Western Europe unless we arm and become American protectorates. The danger is that we may make such a mess of things at home, not least because of our fears and war preparations, that our democratic system of government fails to produce the minimum of social satisfactions that the people demand. Unless democracy as a system of government can deliver the goods, democracy as a way of life may be in danger.

That means specifically that the Labour Party may not be able to keep up its fine record of successes on the home front unless it manages to adjust Britain's relations to the rest of the world correctly. It is physically impossible for us to conscript our youth to the tune of 18 months compulsory service and to do any serious rearming even with the help of American lend-lease without having to choose guns instead of butter, that is, submitting to a drop in our standard of living. Already such things as a slowing up of the housing programme, high indirect taxation with its effects on the cost of living, together with the prospect of endless austerity with nothing but uncertainty at the end is causing widespread doubt and dismay.

Economic strength, social justice and political sanity are our defences against the evils and dangers that encompass us. But in this country the threat from the Right is far greater than any danger from the Left. It is the Tory Party and not the two Communist M.P.'s, voting with Labour nine-tenths of the time, nor the handful that the Communists may put into the field at the next election, that threaten Labour rule. If Labour fails in its tremendous task of laying the foundations of a Socialist society by democratic and peaceful means, while providing full employment and a tolerable standard of living, it is not Communism but boiled-shirt Fascism at the hands of the Tory Party that we have to fear. The greatest threat to democracy and freedom in Britain is not Communism but anti-Communist and anti-Soviet hysteria and war preparations sapping our economic strength, creating social injustice and undermining our political sanity.

That is why Labour alone can make peace, for only the Labour Party can understand and act on the need for Socialism as the underpinning of democracy and as the foundation for European reconstruction. Only Labour can understand the need for the workers of Britain to stand shoulder to shoulder with the workers of Europe.

And that understanding and that solidarity are the intellectual and moral foundations on which alone we can build world peace. They are foundations consonant with Labour's Socialist faith and pledges to the people.

But if the foundations are to hold, Labour folk must put to themselves and give straight answers to the questions: Do you believe that an alliance with the United States and rearmament and conscription are necessary to keep Communism out of this country or Western Europe? Has the United States or Britain the right to interfere by economic pressure or armed force in the

internal affairs of France or Italy to stop them going Communist? Do you believe that the French workers have a right to vote for Communists if they so choose, and that it is wrong to treat the French or Italian Communist Party as though they had no right to exist and must be kept out of any share of power by foreign intervention? Are you on the side of the workers against the capitalists in France and Italy, or do you believe that anti-Communism is a valid reason for taking the side of the capitalists against the trade unionists and workers in those countries? Do you trust the social revolution, even where it assumes Communist forms, to evolve into a democratic, humanist, equalitarian society in which the individual can develop freely, given peace, trade and friendly intercourse between East and West, or do you believe we must get ready to fight it even at the ultimate cost of supporting capitalist counter-revolution in a third world war? Do you realise that this in the end is the choice you must make, for however hard, risky and disagreeable these alternatives may appear, there are no others in real life?

If we shirk these questions we cannot pay the price of peace nor take the first steps to peace. If we answer them clearly and soberly as Socialists we can no longer be frightened or fooled into supporting the drift to national bankruptcy and servitude to Wall Street on the road to war.

CHAPTER XII

The Price of Peace

INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE

THERE is an old Chinese saying that it is harder to know what you want than to get what you want. There is profound wisdom concealed under this apparent paradox.

To know what one wants in this sense, means to be all of a piece inside about one's purpose – the mind the servant of the will, the means willed as well as the end; and all aware of and not flinching from the real difficulties and complications that lie in wait on the way. It means not being enfeebled by a sense of helplessness or baffled by wanting and believing things that clash with each other. It means scorning to let I dare not wait upon I would and being as clear-headed and tough about rejecting what we do not want as we are determined about choosing and sticking to what we do want.

It is not enough, for instance, to say 'I want peace'. It is necessary to be clear that what we want to live at peace with is the Communist-governed Socialist third of humanity and the Communist-led working class of France and Italy. That, in turn, means we must have some rough idea of what this large part of the human race are doing, what they stand for in the world and the lines on which we could and should settle outstanding issues with them. Finally, it means rejecting the policy of war and all its works, root and branch, emphatically and finally.

How do we set about knowing that we want peace and seeking and ensuing peace with the workers of the world and the Socialist third of humanity?

To begin with, we must clear our minds of cant, make a clean sweep of the warmongers' stock-in-trade of lies, clichés and misleading half- and quarter-truths, with which the press and the radio are filled. The record set forth in the preceding chapters and the analysis of Communism and the Soviet Union in the last chapter, will help the reader to see reality steadily and see it whole, to arrive at rational views about Communism, Communist parties, the Soviet Union, power politics and appeasement.

Those who try seriously to look facts in the face will perceive that the horrific image conjured out of their fears and fantasies by the defenders of Capitalism is but painting the devil on the wall, and that the complex reality of the struggle of 600 million human beings to build a juster society holds no terrors for Socialists, however appalling it may appear to Tories and Liberals. That view in no way seeks to minimise the harsh and ugly features of the revolutionary regimes in primitive countries, or the dangers resulting from the fanaticism and Machiavellianism of many Communists and the rigid forms of discipline and organisation prevalent in Communist parties. But these are not evils and dangers that can be met by force. They threaten us only insofar as we fail to make a success of democracy as a system of government and a way of life in this country. In Labour's view that success can be achieved only by using our democracy to advance towards Socialism by peaceful and constitutional means.

Those are the intellectual foundations of a realistic peace policy. The moral foundation is President Roosevelt's great saying, almost his last, that the only thing we need to fear after the war is fear.

There are powerful rational and political objections to Communism in countries where, as in Britain, democracy works and the workers have fashioned a political instrument in the image of the British people that is capable of effecting the transition from Capitalism to Socialism by peaceful and constitutional means, while jealously preserving free institutions and traditions of tolerance and respect for the rights of minorities. But the 'ignoble paranoia' of the anti-Communists is a more deadly and insidious foe to democracy, tolerance and freedom than Communism itself, and should be shunned by the Labour party. The fate of all too many Continental Social Democratic parties shows what happens to the kind of Social Democrat who is an anti-Communist before he is a Socialist.

THE CHOICE WE MUST MAKE

Having laid these intellectual and moral foundations, the next thing we must do is to make up our minds, choose, and stick to our choice, between the two clear-cut political alternatives with which this country is faced in world affairs.

Do we wish to take the risks of the balance of power and race for arms, or the risks of the United Nations' Charter, in our relations with the Soviet Union and the Socialist third of humanity?

Up to now, our policy has consisted in reverting to the balance of power and engaging in a race for arms, while paying lip service to the United Nations' Charter. The reader of the record in this book, at any rate, should have no difficulty in seeing through this swindle and in agreeing that this humbug is intolerable.

He or she should have little more difficulty in making the clear and irrevocable decision to reject the old fatal risks of the balance of power and a race for arms, even when dressed up as the defence of democracy against Communism, because history shows that taking these risks leads not to democracy and peace, but to Fascism and war. Having rejected that alternative, we must choose the new risks, which we are pledged to take, of standing with the workers and for Socialism in Europe, and on the Charter in our relations with the Soviet Union. The next chapter will particularise what is meant by that policy.

The immediate problem, however, is how to impose on the Government the choice we make. That is, how to compel the Government to abandon the risk of the balance of power and a race for arms as being a bad risk. This would leave it with no alternative but to try the effect of acting on Labour's election pledges and Socialist principles in foreign policy.

How set about the job of generating a politically effective demand for peace? How bring democracy to bear in foreign policy?

GOVERNMENT IN A DEMOCRACY

Before answering that question, it is necessary to say a word about how government in a democracy works. It is too often assumed that if our rulers are doing the wrong thing, they must be crooks and incompetents, and as they are obviously neither, what they are doing must be right. Unfortunately, it is not as simple as that.

In politics, as a famous statesman once remarked, it is generally not a matter of choosing between first and second best, but between third and fourth best. Those who exercise the responsibilities of power seldom find themselves in the happy position of deciding between right and wrong. Mostly a choice is thrust upon them between two alternatives, arising out of circumstances beyond their control and both presenting a mixture of good and bad, of risks and unknown factors.

The greater the power and the more onerous the responsibility of a statesman, the more fateful, complex and painful are the choices he has to make and the less he can foresee, let alone determine, the situation that has forced him to choose.

'The task of a Foreign Secretary is not that of choosing between an obvious and easy course and a difficult and dangerous one. It is to choose the least dangerous and the least disagreeable courses, all of which present dangers and all of which appear disagreeable. Of course, there is another way and that is not to take any decision at all. But that way out is seldom right'. (Mr Oliver Stanley, House of Commons, January 26, 1949.)

A second factor in wielding power is the necessity for team work and collective responsibility. A Minister may disagree with the majority of his colleagues in the Cabinet, but feel it a lesser evil that he should stay on and do the best he can than that by resigning he should weaken or even break up the government, and in any case should lose all influence to shape decisions along the lines he wants. This is a particular form of the necessity to choose between 'unavoidable, unwelcome and 'mixed' alternatives.

In the third place, those who exercise power find it increasingly hard, the higher up they go and the longer they stay in office, to keep in touch with the people. They tend to rely more and more on the advice of their civil servants and to see the world through official spectacles.

How those in office may drift away from the people, human nature being what it is, is something everyone can verify for himself or herself by the conduct of Trade Union officials, town and county councillors, etc. The process of separation from the people starts at the bottom. There is a kind of multiplier effect by the time you reach the level of the Cabinet.

The disastrous effect of Ministers relying on officials who know all the facts but understand none of the issues in the post-war world is plain enough in the light of the record of events in the preceding chapters. The point here is that it takes an exceptionally determined Minister, knowing his subject thoroughly and quite clear about what he wants, to stand up to his officials and not forget those who elected him.

On the other hand, power in a democracy is never wholly concentrated in the government. It is dispersed throughout the nation. The lion's share is in the hands of Ministers. A modest portion falls to the back benchers. A considerable amount is wielded by the Opposition, which is part of the machinery of government. Little bits remain in the hearts and minds of every citizen.

That great but impalpable force, public opinion, the activities of pressure groups, and, last but not least, the use of the vote, are

the means by which the people can make their wishes known and can correct tendencies in the government's policy that they dislike. The people leave the question of ways and means to the government, but insist on and judge them by results.

DEMOCRACY IN HOME AFFAIRS

In home affairs the British people know how to bring democracy to bear in order to make their views and wishes known to their rulers. Indeed, so well known is the attitude of the people on fundamental issues in home affairs that no government would dream of challenging them. A politically effective demand for a minimum standard of life, for instance, exists, because everyone knows that if any government failed to provide that minimum for any considerable section of the population, the resulting resentment would be so great as to endanger the government's hold on power.

More recently, the workers have ceased to be fatalistic about unemployment and have brought home their demand that the government should provide work for all. That requirement has become compulsory on any and every government, for the simple reason that everybody knows that mass unemployment would no longer be taken lying down by the workers, but would release some very tough and determined forces bent on drastic social change.

The rank and file in the Trade Unions and the Labour party, including the back benches in the House, made the government understand that they must go ahead with nationalising steel, because failing to do so would mean running into much bigger storms than any thunder from the right that the Tories and the steel owners could produce. Sir Stafford Cripps, replying for the government in the steel debate on November 16, 1948, put the matter in a nutshell when he said that those who protested against 'this attack on the power of private enterprise' were flinging down a challenge to the capacity of democracy 'to deal with the private industrial empires that have been built up under Capitalism. That is a fundamental challenge which we accept ... it is essential that democracy should assert its rights, as otherwise it must acknowledge for all time that it cannot touch these citadels of power, and that it is not the electorate but the owners of industrial property who shall determine the economic policies of the country. The ugly alternative would then be that any such change which is to occur, must be brought about by other and more violent means.'

The 1949 Budget gave a further turn to the screws of austerity and called a halt to the advance toward evening out social inequalities. It was a cold war Budget. Its guiding idea was 'through austerity (in payment for the cold war) to the Third World War'. It invited the people to sacrifice their standard of living in order to get ready to lose their lives. It released a remarkable protest in the Budget debate (April 7, 1949) from Mr Mark Hewitson, a leading official of the invariably moderate (to put it mildly) Municipal and General Workers' Union, and a member of the National Executive Committee of the Labour party. He warned the Government that the Trade Union leaders had gone to the limits of the humanly possible to hold back the wage demands of the workers. There were many living on intolerably low wages. They could bear the burden no further. This Budget was the last straw that broke the camel's back. There would now be a wave of wage demands. If they were rejected 'I give warning that we shall face industrial disputes in this country such as there have not been since the end of the first world war. I am giving that warning ... If this Government are going to depress us below the line of safety, then we shall fight them as we have fought in the past against Tories and Tory employers ... The Government have either got to help, or else ...'

That view of democracy is accepted and taken for granted in home affairs. It starts with the idea that the people are sovereign and that governments rule within the terms of the mandate conferred on them by the people who return them to power. If the government flagrantly fails to do what the people want, either because it has changed its mind, or has been held up by a privileged minority, or doesn't know its job, the people may be driven to take the law into their own hands in order to insist that their will be done. There is a flashpoint at which an explosion occurs.

CANNON-FODDER CITIZENSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS

But in world affairs, all governments up to the present take it for granted that they may do anything they like, election pledges or no election pledges, and that, no matter what the consequences of their foreign policy, the people must pay in unlimited suffering and sacrifice. Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die when their rulers break faith and blunder.

The people have learnt how to insist effectively on a minimum standard of life in home affairs. But so far they have never thought of asking for, let alone demanding, a minimum standard of death in foreign affairs.

The individual protest of the pacifist, refusing to fight in any war for any reason, is too rigid and narrow a moral foundation on which to build a realistic peace policy. Something broader, less brittle and more reasonable is required.

But neither is it possible to generate a politically effective demand for peace on the moral foundation of unlimited readiness to go to war for any government in any cause against any odds. There cannot be democracy in foreign affairs if the people are content to remain cannon fodder and have no ambition to become citizens in world affairs, if they value their right to live less than their standard of living, and cannot even see that they are being compelled to endure poverty now in order to be killed in the end.*

Not so long ago, it was still respectable to be a mercenary, that is to hire yourself out to any power to kill and be killed for a modest wage. The Swiss were famous for centuries for providing resolute, capable and cheap mercenaries. The autocratic German princelings went a step further and used to hire their able-bodied male subjects of military age to foreign powers, making a handsome profit on the deal. Britain hired the Hessians as mercenaries to fight our own flesh and blood in the American Revolution (besides using Indian savages for the purpose; our ruling class were never squeamish). Frederick the Great of Prussia, who detested the practice, showed what he thought of it by levying the cattle tax on the mercenaries exported to Britain through his territory.

This sort of thing is no longer quite respectable – a man who wanders around the world hiring himself out as a killer in the wars of other countries is now regarded as a picturesque adventurer or even an international gangster, rather than a good citizen. In the modern world, belligerency is respectable only in the service of one's own country, or of an ally of one's own country, or for a cause, such as that of the Spanish Republic, that is regarded as transcending the importance of one's own life.

* The point that austerity is due to the cold war and that the latter will end in the third world war unless our foreign policy changes in time needs driving home. Cf. the following from my speech in the Budget debate, April 7th, 1949: 'The Budget to-day is an austerity Budget, because it is a cold war Budget. Only those who object to the cold war and do not believe that our journey to the third world war is really necessary are entitled to object to and to quarrel with this Budget. If my hon. friends accept the necessity for the cold war, all they have to do is to count the cost in terms of the Budget and comfort themselves with the reflection that this is only the first instalment of the bill which will be presented. If they do not like the Budget, they should address their complaints not to the Treasury, but to the Foreign Office.'

But, although willingness to fight is no longer universal as in the palmy days of the mercenaries, the State has acquired the dread power of conscription to make a man fight whether he wants to or not. This is tempered by the right of conscientious objection. But it does face every male citizen with the individual necessity to choose, and to face great social as well as official pressure in making his choice.

With war preparations affecting every aspect of economic life and conditioning our prospects of economic recovery, it is not only the conscripts, but every worker by hand or brain who must choose whether he wishes to co-operate with or oppose the drift to war and the foreign policy that makes a U.S. satellite of Britain on the road to war.

WILL LABOUR FIGHT AND WORK FOR THE U.S.A.
AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.?

In the House of Commons, Mr Seymour Cocks and other Labour M.P.'s have from time to time warned the Government that they were reckless to assume that the workers of this country would consent to serve on the Labour front and submit to conscription in a war with the United States against the Soviet Union and the workers of Europe. Mr Cocks said that the miners in his constituency would dig no coal and their wives and daughters would not go into the Women's Auxiliary Forces or the munition factories in such a war. Sir William Lawther (then Will Lawther) the Chairman of the National Union of Mineworkers, wrote the following letter to the Secretary of the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee (it appeared in the Committee's bulletin of June 28, 1948):

'At the Annual Conference of the National Union of Mineworkers on July 7, 1947, I said:

'It is staggering to read of those who contemplate the dropping of atomic bombs over Europe.

'The advocates of atomic destruction make no bones about whom the next conflict is to be fought against - namely, the Soviet Union.

'I take this opportunity of declaring my belief that no British miner or other conscientious worker would produce any materials for such a war, and the sooner the warmongers understand that the better.

'If Britain declared its firm intention to stand alongside Russia and other peace-loving nations wherever they may be, then no other nation in the world dare talk of a new war.'

'What I said on that occasions stands.

'Let the warmongers take heed, otherwise they will be their own grave-diggers.

In the Spring of 1949 the Scottish miners took the same stand.

Are these warnings all bluff? Are the Government right to take no notice of them? The reader of the preceding chapters need not to be told that resistance to a war in which this country gets involved because the government have disregarded their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the obligation to settle all our differences peacefully with the Soviet Union and never to resort to force or the threat of force as a means of settlement, can find its warrant in Labour's own policy, as laid down in the War and Peace Memorandum of 1934 and expounded by Mr Attlee in 1937 and 1949. This view of the right of the individual to oppose the State in war-time is deeply rooted in the traditional British liberal and humanist view of the State and of democracy.

A MINIMUM STANDARD OF DEATH IN FOREIGN POLICY

The time has come, it may be suggested, to demand a minimum standard of death in foreign policy and to refuse to fight till we get it. A minimum standard of death in foreign policy means a foreign policy that gives us a reasonable chance of preserving peace, a cause worth fighting for and at least a sporting chance of victory in case there is a war. At present our foreign policy comes nowhere near fulfilling any of these conditions.

By abandoning the attempt to come to terms with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by peaceful means, scrapping the Charter and falling back on the balance of power and a race for arms, under the hypocritical guise of the North Atlantic Pact, we have made it certain that war will come sooner or later.

When war comes, we shall be fighting for the abominable and imbecile cause of restoring the Fascism we fought the second world war to destroy. A diehard Capitalist-militarist U.S.A. will give us our orders. A Tory-run coalition will execute them on the backs of the workers and the common people. Generals Franco and de Gaulle, the rag-tag and bob tail of European reaction and Fascism, will be our allies. The workers of France and Italy and the Socialist third of humanity will be our enemies.

Those who in their criminal folly land us in such a war will be unable to end it. It would drag on for years, kill millions of our people, reduce most of our country to a desert, and smash up civilisation.

Our answer to all that must be a ringing 'NO'.

HOW TO ENFORCE THE DEMAND FOR A MINIMUM
STANDARD OF DEATH

Having got these things clear and straight in our minds, and having rejected the balance of power and made our choice for the Charter, these are the ways in which a resolute clear-headed minority that knows what it wants, can raise such a volume of support in our peace-loving and increasingly worried people, that the demand to change our foreign policy becomes irresistible:

First, committees should be set up in every constituency, composed of men and women of all parties, or none, who really mean business with peace, to bring home the facts to public opinion and to demand of every Parliamentary candidate that he or she give a clear reply to some such questions as the following:

‘If you are returned as a member of Parliament, will you

‘(1) insist that this country must deal with both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations; not ally itself with either against the other; refuse to prepare for war or fight against the Soviet Union on the side of the United States just as resolutely as we should refuse to prepare for war or fight against the United States on the side of the Soviet Union?

‘(2) refuse to accept or act on any obligation in the Brussels Treaty or Atlantic Pact or any other agreement or arrangement, committing us to go to war if the United States fights the Soviet Union?

‘(3) demand the withdrawal of American land, air and naval forces from this country and refuse to allow British territory anywhere to be used as naval or air bases for the United States, until American foreign and defence policy is based, in deed as well as in words, on the fundamental principle of the United Nations’ Charter, that all differences with the Soviet Union must be settled by peaceful means and that force or the threat of force must never be used in our dealings with that country, and until the United States ceases to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, Italy, France and other countries?’

Those questions represent the essential minimum that should form the basis of a peace campaign. The positive proposals in the next chapter are the outline of the alternative policy that should be followed in order to break the deadlock between the West and the East.

Second, those who take a strong view on the need for a complete overhaul of our foreign policy and for renovating its moral and intellectual foundations, will, no doubt, feel impelled to give edge and weight to their views by refusing to aid recruiting and opposing the drain on our resources and manpower for armaments. It should be brought home to the public mind that we can either break the back of our economic recovery by rearming and conscripting or we can make a success of it by ceasing to rearm. But we cannot both rearm and have eighteen months conscription and hope to keep, let alone to raise, our present standard of living and to make ends meet by 1952. It's a case of guns or butter.

In the third place, there should be full use of the right to plead conscientious objection to military service. In 1947 a tribunal created an important precedent by allowing a conscientious objection by a youth who said he was not a pacifist but refused to fight in any but a United Nation's war. As the whole of our foreign and defence policy is based on treating the Charter as a scrap of paper and reverting to the balance of power, that political conscientious objection could properly be made and pressed by all who wish to register an emphatic protest against the drift to an unnecessary and suicidal war.

Fourthly, one of the most effective ways to conduct the campaign for peace is to support the Labour party. For it is only through the Labour party that we can get a Government capable of making peace. Within the Labour party there is a measure of freedom to discuss views and shape policies. If and when even an active minority in the Labour party, the trade unions, the co-operatives and women's organisations, begin to use their democratic rights to pass resolutions, appeal to their Members of Parliament and leaders, to protest and agitate, they can do a great deal to key the Labour party up to the pitch where it will act as an effective instrument of peace.

Labour candidates should have no difficulty in replying to the kind of questions suggested above, nor to pledging themselves again, as they did in 1945, but this time with full knowledge of what they are doing and the firm resolve to keep faith, to stand for Socialism and with the workers in Europe. Labour alone is capable of a positive and realistic peace policy, because Labour is on the side of the forces of social change and they are the forces on which we must rely to organise peace.

The more peace becomes a clear-cut, life-and-death issue at the general election, the plainer it will be that the Tories stand

for a third world war because they neither know how nor want to make peace with the Socialist third of humanity. In that situation the Labour party is bound to pledge itself so deeply to making peace, and to be so conscious of the public demand for getting on with the job, that the Fourth Labour Government will make a flying start in the world.

In and around the Labour party and so long as Labour is in power, these peaceful democratic constitutional methods of meetings, discussion, passing resolutions, questioning M.P.'s and Parliamentary candidates, etc., are enough to bring about a silent mental revolution that will herald the transcending of the cannon fodder stage of citizenship and will mean that democracy has arrived in international affairs.

But the quest for peace by these methods should be conducted with the clear realisation that if and when the present unavowed coalition with the Tories in foreign policy landed us in a war, there would be an official coalition with the Tories to fight the war. The resulting Tory-run 'national' government could not be stopped from waging a suicidal war of intervention against the European revolution by any means less resolute than those Labour employed in 1920 to stop the Tories making war on the Russian revolution.

The same energy must be shown by the workers to oppose any form of intervention against the workers of France or Italy in case a civil war situation develops in either country. It is devoutly to be hoped that American intervention and the Fascist proclivities of the French and Italian propertied classes will not goad the workers into revolutionary action. But in no circumstances and on no pretext whatsoever should the workers of Britain allow any British Government to intervene against the workers of France and Italy.

On some such lines as these the workers and common people of Britain can pay the price of peace and generate a politically effective demand for peace. For if even a quite small but active and enthusiastic minority started campaigning on these lines, it would introduce a new factor in the situation. It would invalidate the assumption on which Government and Opposition alike are proceeding in foreign affairs and defence, namely that they can do what they like with the lives of our people, that, whereas there may be democracy in home affairs, they can be totalitarian in foreign policy and get away with it.

The fact would be brought home to statesmen and civil servants that the people of this country are not a national blood-

bank on which bankrupt politicians can draw cheques for unlimited amounts of lives in order to pay for their failure to keep election pledges and make peace. For a time and in the early stages of the awakening of the people, Government and Opposition alike would, no doubt, be very abusive about those who fought for peace. But after a time the majority of the Labour Government, at any rate, would realise that they had to reckon with a new reality and that, on reflection, it meant an immense strengthening of Labour as a fighting force for Socialism and peace and put into the Labour party's hands deadly weapons for slaying the Tory warmongers at the next election. Above all, it would mean that the people, who until now have been nothing in world affairs, would become everything, and that henceforward any government, Labour, Tory or coalition, will know it must keep faith in foreign policy with those who elected it and must walk warily, for it cannot ride roughshod over the people, or bamboozle them in order to dispose of their lives as it will.

That means not only a mental revolution that sweeps away the basic assumptions of traditional British defence and foreign policy, but also replacing them by intellectual and moral foundations on which we can build Socialism at home and peace abroad.

CHAPTER XIII .

First Steps to Peace

It is not possible to unite Europe without the Soviet Union, or to reconstruct Europe without the workers, or to separate the working class in most of Europe from the Communist parties. We cannot make peace with the Socialist third of humanity on the basis of treating the regimes that govern these millions of human beings, and the parties that are the backbone and brain of those regimes, as untouchables and enemies of civilisation.

In short, we must choose between seeking peace through a policy based on the Charter, supporting Socialism and standing with the workers of Europe on the one hand, and on the other continuing the present policy of anti-Communist intervention and anti-Soviet power politics, which means war. We cannot have both, for there is no way of combining the two.

Until that choice is made, there is no way to arrest the vicious circle in which we are all revolving as we roll toward the third world war. Once the choice has been made, the diplomatic and technical problems involved in the settlement of outstanding issues and making a fresh and hopeful start in world affairs will be by no means easy. But neither will they be insuperably difficult.

Most of the chapters of this book have provided the information about what is happening in the world and what it is all about, that is necessary in making that fateful choice. The last chapter drew the conclusions that follow from relating the vital interests and purposes of the British people to the realities of the post-war world. It showed why we must reject the risks of the balance of power and choose the risks of the United Nations' Charter, just what is involved in that choice, and how the people can impose their decision on the Government by insisting on democracy in foreign affairs.

This chapter gives an outline of the policy this country should pursue, in order to follow up and make good the decision to stop losing the peace and take the risks of starting to win the peace. At the outset there is a three-fold difficulty to be faced: First, a policy is not a programme which can be set down on paper, for it has the dimension of time. It is a course of action that can be roughly plotted beforehand, but that varies and develops as the

situation changes, that adapts itself to events and finds its way around or through obstacles and difficulties. What follows, therefore, are only the headings of a policy, some basic principles and general indications as a guide to action, leaving a great deal to improvisation and ingenuity in dealing with the complexities of reality.

Second, the 'time-dimensional' difficulty is enhanced by the lack of information. Not even the Ministers responsible for a policy can foretell exactly what decisions they may have to take in situations that have not yet arisen. They can overcome that difficulty only in part by preparing alternative policies to cover unexpected contingencies.

Obviously, anyone outside the governmental machine, and so lacking the day-to-day supply of reports and telegrams, is quite unable to make any detailed forecast. The information provided to Ministers in international matters is unfortunately all too often heavily biased and highly selective. It is worse than useless unless the responsible Minister is able to relate it to a background of firmly-held principles of action and a clear picture of the great forces at work in the world. But it remains true that policy must, to a considerable extent, be made in the course of being applied, in the light of the circumstances and with the help of the information available at the time. There is always a large element of improvisation and guess work.

Thirdly, and this is only a further aspect of the three-fold difficulty already discussed in terms of the 'time-dimension' and of the supply of information, there is the question of the order of priorities. In describing a course of action, it is necessary to adopt a certain order of exposition. But it does not follow that the problems will in practice be tackled in the order in which they are set forth in these pages. They are all inter-connected, react on and influence each other in a thousand ways, and ebb and flow with the flux of events.

In practice, the order of urgency may not be the same as it appears on paper. It is almost certain, indeed, that all these problems will have to be attacked simultaneously, for peace is indivisible. We shall probably have to find out by trial and error where we can make progress, at what point and on what problem we get stuck pending a clearing up of difficulties somewhere else, when it is wise and when unwise to accept a bad compromise in preference to a continued deadlock, what hopes or plans must be abandoned, at least for the time being, and which can be pressed to a happy issue.

The one grand principle is the old one that where there is a

will there is a way. What we are tackling is something novel and much bigger than adjusting the policies of governments on specific subjects of disagreement. What we are endeavouring to settle is the whole future of civilisation, by harmonising the relations of peoples between whom yawns a gulf of mutual incomprehension and ignorance. On either side of that great divide the fundamental needs and desires of the people are the same. It is Britain's job, a job that can be done under Labour rule and only when Labour rules, to help the divided peoples to see the common ground of mutual interests on both sides and around both ends of the tragic breach. We can find that common ground ourselves and show others how to reach it only if the British people are capable of faith in and friendship for the workers of Europe and the countries of the social revolution, as well as acknowledging our bonds with the peoples of the English-speaking democracies, not least with the great American people, whom it is no longer fashionable to call our cousins but who are certainly closer and more than foreigners in the eyes of the British people.

That is why the quest for peace cannot be left solely in the hands of ministers and diplomats. It is necessary that they should be working visibly as the instruments of a militant popular demand for peace, a great revolt against the morally vile and intellectually contemptible traditions of power politics.

Edmund Burke was no mean statesman. There is profound truth in his remark that 'refined policy ever has been the parent of confusion and ever will be, so long as the world endures. Plain good intention, which is as easily discovered at the first view as fraud is surely detected at last, is, let me say, of no mean force in the government of mankind.'

Somehow the plain good intention, the sturdy commonsense and the political wisdom of the British people must inform our foreign policy and break through into world affairs, for that is our salvation and the assurance of our success.

Here then are the first steps to peace, once we have decided to pay the price of peace; the heads of the policy we should pursue in whatever order and by whatever strategy and tactics appear appropriate in the circumstances, against the necessary background of insight into what is happening in the world, clear-cut convictions about what are the vital interests of the British people in world affairs, steady purpose in pursuing our ends and resolute and resourceful goodwill in seeking ways and means to relate those ends to the policies of other countries and the realities

with which we must reckon. In the next and final chapter are the reasons why Britain's position in the world is so strong that she can act as a link between East and West, and take the lead in discovering the common ground that can serve as the foundation of agreements between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.

NO OBLIGATIONS INCONSISTENT WITH THE CHARTER

By Article 103 of the Charter it is provided that its obligations shall prevail over any other treaty obligations. That is, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, the latter must be regarded as having no binding force.

The British Government should make it clear that we take our stand on this obligation of the Charter and will not, in any circumstances, be a party to interpreting any obligation under any international agreement so as to conflict with the provisions of the Charter, or to make it impossible for the Security Council to discharge its primary purpose of safeguarding the peace.

Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty of Alliance of March 17, 1948, between Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom contains the same obligation of immediate assistance by all the signatories in case of an 'armed attack' on any of them in Europe, as is contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty and Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty provide that their obligations shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the purposes, principles and obligations of the United Nations Charter.

Britain should point out that any measures taken under Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty or Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the exercise of the right of self-defence that were not authorised by the Security Council and affected its authority and responsibility in any way, would be inconsistent with Articles 51 and 53 of the Charter. In view of the terms of Article 103 of the Charter, the British Government would therefore refuse to take action under these Articles or to be committed by any other signatory taking action of a military character without first convening the Security Council and endeavouring to deal with the emergency through that body.

This means in practice that Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would be inapplicable and become a dead letter, except if there were an armed attack by

Germany, which is not a member of the United Nations and the case of which is covered by Article 107 of the Charter. Article 53 of the Charter, it will be recalled (see Chapter IX, pp. 292) specifically allows for this exception. Article 107 provides that 'Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action in relation to any State which during the second world war has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorised as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.'

Unless and until we are satisfied that the United States also accepts the principle that collective defence arrangements and obligations contemplating or preparing for war against a fellow permanent member of the Security Council are a violation of the Charter, we must pull out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington, insist on the withdrawal of all United States forces from the United Kingdom and forbid the use of any British territory in Europe, the Mediterranean or the Middle or Far East, as a United States military, naval or air base.

We must also refuse to accept military Lend-Lease from the United States, on the ground that we are unwilling to alienate our independence in defence matters, are opposed to starting a new race for arms and cannot afford to increase our armaments and use our man-power for military purposes beyond our capacity for economic recovery.

As a positive policy, we should press for an agreement between Western Europe, Britain and the United States on the one hand, and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on the other, concerning collective defence measures to make sure that Germany remains disarmed and will be met by an overwhelming force if there is any revival of German aggression. Such an agreement would be part and parcel of the proposals outlined below for economic and political co-operation between West and East Europe and for a settlement of the German problem.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONDITIONS FOR FULL BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN UNION

On present lines, Western Union is running on the rocks. British co-operation is essential to salvage the project. But for Britain to commit herself wholly to Western Union might have the most serious consequences to British economic recovery, national independence and the prospects of peace, unless and until certain minimum British demands are met.

In the first place, Britain cannot afford to throw in her economic lot with Western Union as long as the working classes of France and Italy, not to mention Western Germany, are pauperised and the propertied classes are not paying income tax. A decent standard of living for the workers and sound finances are essential if the great majority of the British people are to gain more than they will lose by going into Western Union.

Without the co-operation and confidence of the workers and trade unions, France and Italy cannot recover and American aid will continue to be wasted, as it has been until now, in staving off the day of reckoning, instead of being used as a breathing space for mobilising national energies and resources. But the workers will not feel confidence and will refuse to co-operate, so long as their elected representatives are excluded from any share in power, not because of the will of the electors or of a majority in Parliament but by the operation of the United States veto. The U.S.A. must cease to interfere in the internal affairs of West European countries and to load the dice in favour of the propertied classes against the workers in the name of anti-Communism.

Britain's partly planned, semi-Socialist economy cannot be fully co-ordinated with the unplanned and chaotic economies imposed on Western Europe, largely by the United States throwing her weight and influence on the side of Capitalist restoration. Britain can and must insist, as a condition for coming into an economic Western Union, that there should be a certain minimum of common measures of planning and public ownership as well as of common social purpose.

Finally, France and the Netherlands must cease to bankrupt themselves in colonial wars in Indo-china and Indonesia before they become a good economic risk. This point is further discussed below in connection with the Far East.

These various proposals interlock, for the carrying out of one is impossible without satisfaction of the others. There are powerful arguments for all of them in terms of the conditions necessary for Western Union to succeed. These considerations also apply to the demand that Western Europe should be free to trade and to co-ordinate its economic planning with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as it sees fit, and that the United States must withdraw their claim to dictate what goods we may or may not sell to Eastern Europe.

The positive corollary should be to press for using the European Economic Commission of the United Nations as the co-ordinating body through which East-West trade and all-European

planning could be promoted. As a beginning the U.N. European Economic Commission might be asked to get in touch with both the O.E.E.C. in Western Europe and the East European Economic Mutual Aid Council, get all the information possible on their organisation, functions and plans; survey the network of East-West trade treaties; and then prepare the ground, technically and, with the aid of the governments concerned, diplomatically, for an East-West Conference on trade and the international co-ordination of national planning in both halves of Europe, the extension to Eastern Europe of the Intra-European Payments Agreement, etc.

The economic arguments for this course are unanswerable. It is the only way to salvage Western Europe.

On the military side, Britain should refuse to enter into any obligations or arrangements, or to interpret any into which we have already entered, in such a way as to commit us to go to war against the Soviet Union at the bidding of the United States on the plea of collective self-defence. The positive corollary to this stand on the United Nations Charter is to press for joint military arrangements with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for collective self-defence against any illegal rearmament by Germany, or renewal of German aggression or revival of Nazism in Germany.

PROGRAMME FOR A WEST-EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Britain should accept instead of opposing the idea of a Consultative West-European Parliament. The Parliaments of the three Scandinavian countries, of Benelux (Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands), France, Italy and Great Britain should elect delegations to this central body by proportional representation. Each delegate would have a vote and the size of the delegations would vary according to a scale agreed upon between the constituent countries (say 45 for France, 40 for Italy, 50 for Great Britain, 40 for the three Scandinavian and 40 for the three Benelux countries – a total of 215).

Reports and resolutions would be by mere majority and would not bind any government or Parliament. But the Parliaments would agree to find time to debate the reports and resolutions of sessions of the West-European Consultative Parliament.

Before any such institution were formally established it might be well to have an experimental meeting, on the initiative of the British Parliament, to see how the thing worked. The drafting of a constitution for the permanent establishment of such a body

could then be made in the light of experience, not only of theory.

Such a body could air ideas concerning the social and international foundations and world purposes of Western Union, including its relation to other countries and the United Nations. British policy should provide a plan for its future development through the governmental majority on the British Parliamentary delegation. The following are obvious points to be included in a draft plan for discussion and report by such a body:

The incorporation of Western Union in an all-European Agreement within the United Nations. On the defence side this agreement would incorporate the main provisions of the Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet alliances, together with any supplementary arrangements in East and West, so as to constitute an agreement to keep Germany disarmed and to take instant action against any German aggression.

On its economic side, the agreement would make the European Economic Commission of the United Nations the organ for co-ordinating international economic co-operation throughout Europe. It would recommend the linking up of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation in the West and the Economic Mutual Aid Council in the East with the central body, which already has a number of committees and sub-committees. The international economic machinery set up under the German settlement discussed below should also be fitted into these arrangements.

A further subject of discussion should be the idea of extending the international control of nationalised German industries in the Ruhr to the related basic industries in Western Europe.

The various auxiliary organisations of the United Nations concerned with health, transport, economic and financial relations etc., should form European committees functioning within the framework of the regional agreement. The general pattern of the latter should be similar to that of the United Nations as a whole, except that there would be no need for the existence of a European Security Council, and the European Economic Commission would understudy the Social and Economic Council for European purposes.

If the experiments in holding inter-Parliamentary meetings on the West European scale, and, as further discussed below, among the English-speaking nations, proved successful enough, proposals could further be discussed for having an all-European Assembly composed of delegations elected by their Parliaments by proportional representation.

The Western sub-division within this European regional agreement on the basis of Article 52 of the Charter would be Western Union. The idea should be discussed of how far to develop it in the direction of federation, and whether and if so on what terms and by what procedure other European States should be admitted into the Union.

To begin with, Mr Churchill's offer to France in 1941 might well be brought up to date and extended to cover Scandinavia, Benelux and Italy as well as France. It proposed a Franco-British Union, based on common citizenship; common economic planning and control of our tariffs and currencies; combined defence forces with a joint General Staff, and permanent association of the Cabinets, Parliaments and civil services of the two countries. The scheme, as outlined by Mr Churchill, resembled the old Austro-Hungarian 'Ausgleich' rather than full federation, but might well turn out a halfway house to the latter.

On the economic side, this group of States should look forward ultimately to forming a currency bloc, a monetary union and in the end to having a single currency. The departments of state concerned with their economic and social policies and planning would set up some kind of common Secretariat or liaison body, under a permanent council formed by the Ministers responsible for these departments in the member states.

The group should seek the agreement of the United States to their adopting the revised form of the most-favoured nation clause, based on reciprocity, that was recommended by the League of Nations Economic Committee before the war as a half-way house to a customs union. This revised form of the m.f.n. clause would allow groups of states to accord each other tariff preferences, provided any outside state, willing to grant the same preferences to the members of the group, could benefit by theirs; that any state whose tariffs were already at least as low as the mutual preferences enjoyed by the members of the group should automatically benefit by those preferences; and finally, provided the group did not raise their existing tariff levels to the outside world in agreeing to grant each other special rates.

Existing Imperial preferences between Britain and the Dominions might well be brought within this system of tariff preferences based on reciprocity and open to all on equal terms. This would mean the Dominions joining the West-European low tariff group and the U.S.A. being free to come in any time she wished on the sole condition that she made corresponding tariff cuts in favour of the members of this low tariff club. All these arrangements

would have to come into force gradually, over a series of years.

In return for the United States not objecting to this form of most-favoured-nation clause, the members of Western Union should further be prepared to offer to put their non-self-governing colonies under the trusteeship system. This would mean in the first place applying the policy of the open door, that is of equal economic and financial access to these colonies by all states and no tariff or investment preferences for the mother country, except insofar as the Trusteeship Council agreed that a preference or other form of discrimination was necessary in the interests of the native inhabitants.

In the second place, it would mean encouraging international co-operation, under the auspices and with the help of the Trusteeship Council and the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations, in financial investment in and the economic development of colonies on the basis of trusteeship charters safeguarding and promoting the progress of the native population in education, social welfare, and self-government. This would be a way of giving effect to President Truman's proposal in his message to Congress in January 1949 that the United States should co-operate in the economic and technical development of backward areas.

As put forward by President Truman, this proposal could easily degenerate into an enlarged Anglo-American Imperialism for the more thorough exploitation of colonial populations. But on the lines suggested in this proposal, the vast productivity and need for markets of the United States could be turned into international channels and contribute to the social and economic welfare of backward populations everywhere.

In order to cope with these new tasks the Trusteeship Council should be provided with an advisory commission composed, like the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, of members appointed as individuals, with knowledge and experience of colonial problems, independent of governments and sympathetic to the trusteeship principle. A majority of them should be nationals of States that have no colonies. They should have the right and the means to visit colonies, interview anyone they thought worth hearing, and gather information from any source they chose.

There were interesting small-scale experiments by the League of Nations, through its technical organisations (health, transport, economic and financial, education, etc.) in the new technique of substituting organised internationalism, based on equality of

status and reciprocity, for Imperialism. The success of this technical co-operation with the Commission for National Reconstruction of the Chinese Government, and in a variety of forms with other countries and with colonial administrations in Africa and Asia, showed that this method could be adapted either to the case of an independent State that wished to borrow experts and technical know-how from abroad to help it in planning and developing its economic life, attracting foreign capital, etc., without jeopardising its right to run its own affairs as it thinks best, or to colonies that have only a limited measure of self-government.

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These are some of the subjects not yet ripe for consideration by governments, but that might reach the plane of practical politics if they were discussed by an International Consultative Parliament, which after a plenary meeting would appoint Committees to make a thorough study and prepare reports for a further plenary discussion at a later date. If we are to move towards international government, the job cannot be left in the hands of Foreign Offices and hard-driven Cabinet Ministers. There must be broadly-based responsible discussion by Parliaments and other organised bodies of opinion, not least those of the Labour and Trade Union world, and the issues must be aired in the press and in public debate until they enter the political consciousness of the peoples.

A GERMAN SETTLEMENT

We must either unite Germany or divide Europe. There is neither economic solvency nor social stability for industrial Western Europe if it is cut off from agricultural Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, nor peace in either East or West, as long as Europe remains divided. It is mere folly to prolong the deadlock over Berlin, for the resulting situation hurts Britain and Western Europe more than it does Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. It is useless to be obstinate and go on trying to have it both ways, that is to claim the right to stay in Berlin while setting up a West German State, or in other words to exclude the Russians from any share in the settlement of Western Germany while claiming to keep our share of influence on the destinies of Eastern Germany.

The agreement reached at Paris in June 1949 to break the vexatious and unnecessary deadlock over Berlin cleared the way for a settlement. But it left wide open the question of the principles on which to negotiate a German Peace Treaty. The only

feasible basis is still the policy to which the Allies pledged themselves at the Potsdam Conference of building up a united, peaceful, democratic German Republic through Four-Power co-operation.

The Labour Government should take the initiative in proposing a new start on this basis and should follow it up by making proposals on the following lines:

(a) The Council of Foreign Ministers should make a fresh attempt to give effect to the principles of Potsdam. In order to assist them in reaching an agreement that would give due weight to every relevant factor, the Council of Foreign Ministers should obtain the views of Germany's neighbours and of the States in South-Eastern Europe that felt the economic power of Germany before the war and the weight of German aggression and occupation during the war. In this connection, the findings and recommendations of the Warsaw Eight-Power Conference on Germany should be taken into consideration.

(b) Economic and social guarantees for the peace-loving and democratic character of the future German Republic should be given equal weight with political guarantees such as decentralisation on Federal lines. The economic and social guarantees would take the form of public ownership of key industries, banking and transport, with the Trade Unions sharing in their control. The fact should not be lost sight of that as some 60 per cent of German industry and the whole of banking and railway transport have already been dealt with on these lines in Eastern Germany, some such measures in the West are necessary to make the unification of Germany possible. For the East German workers will in no circumstances give up the measure of Socialism they have achieved.

(c) There should be international control of the publicly owned industries of the Ruhr, of coal and steel production throughout Germany and of inter-State rail, water and air transport passing through German territory. Such controls should be vested primarily in the Four Powers and the neighbours of Germany. But they should be co-ordinated with the corresponding sub-Committees of the United Nations European Economic Commission.

(d) A scheme for payment of reparations out of current production should be agreed upon. This would mean some 10 per cent of current production being set aside annually for a period of years, say ten or fifteen. There should be an accounting

by the Soviet Union for what had already been taken in reparations from the Soviet Zone, and the Four Powers should be reimbursed out of reparations for the losses they had incurred in helping the German population during the first two years of occupation.

(e) The powers should agree on the political parties to be recognised and guarantee their freedom of action throughout Germany. They should cease to discriminate against the Communist or any other 'recognised' Party, or to discourage movements for unity of action between the three working class parties.

(f) On these foundations it would not be difficult to set up central administrative organs and a provisional all-German Government, remove zonal barriers, hold a fair election, and withdraw Allied troops. For a transitional period a small international force might be stationed at key points.

(g) A further step would be the signature of a peace treaty in which the new Germany would recognise its frontiers in East and West, and accept the international arrangements for disarmament, economic control of the Ruhr, etc. In return Germany should be admitted into the European Regional Agreement and into the United Nations.

GREECE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Intervention in Greece is part and parcel of the policy of returning to the Crimean War outlook in the Middle East. The collapse of the Arab bloc has left a policy vacuum in the Foreign Office. The recognition of the State of Israel and its admission to the United Nations should be followed by Britain proposing a comprehensive policy at the Security Council for a fresh start in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union should be admitted to full partnership in settling the affairs of the Middle East.

The whole of the Middle East, including Cyprus and the Dodecanese, should be demilitarised. This would mean no air or naval bases should be established or forces maintained in the M.E. by powers outside the area. There must be an end of Anglo-American air bases and of the arming and subsidising of Arabs, Turks, Persians, etc. The only exception would be the establishments necessary for an international force, recruited, maintained and commanded through the agency of the Security Council and its Military Advisory Commission, for all United Nations purposes in the Middle East.

The Dardanelles and the Suez Canal should both be put under the control of the Security Council, which should also be responsible for seeing that the provisions of the demilitarisation agreement were observed.

There should be international control of oil resources in the Middle East and international economic development schemes (Euphrates and Jordan River Valley authorities, development of the Negev Desert, etc.). The latter schemes, which would be a further application of President Truman's proposals concerning backward areas, should be carried out under the auspices of the Social and Economic Council and its auxiliary organisations, perhaps through the agency of a Middle East Reconstruction and Development Commission.

Against the background of a United Nations Middle East settlement, the policy of intervention in Greece becomes as meaningless and futile as it has already proved cruel, destructive and unsuccessful. If things have gone too far, the only recourse will be to accept defeat and get out, as the Americans have done in China and as Mr Churchill did in Russia after the first world war. That would presumably add a number of disgruntled ex-aristocrats and profiteers from Greece to the ranks of the émigrés and political refugees in the West.

Alternatively, Great Britain might accept the policy, first proposed by Dr. Evatt of Australia, of mediation between the two sides in Greece, through the U.N. Security Council and with the object of securing agreement on the application of the principles of the Crimean Conference. This would mean the formation of a Left-Centre Government, including the Partisans and excluding all those associated with the Nazi Occupation, the Quisling governments and the pre-war Fascist dictatorship.

After that, a cleaning out of Fascists from the police, the gendarmerie, the army and the civil service, and a policy of drastic social and economic reforms would put fresh heart and hope into the Greek people and make it possible to hold fair and free elections.

The United States Administration pledged itself to accept a majority decision of the Security Council. There is no doubt that a British policy on these lines would obtain such a majority. The Americans further attach importance to the retention of British troops in Greece. It would therefore be well-nigh impossible for the United States to resist these proposals, if brought by Britain before the Security Council and backed by the decision to withdraw British troops and missions and to

cease recognising the Greek puppet Government rather than to go on co-operating with the present infamous American policy in Greece.

A Provisional Greek Government, acting on the lines indicated, should receive every help through the United Nations for emergency relief measures, re-settlement of refugees and re-starting the wheels of trade and industry. The final settlement should include provision for turning Dedeagach and Salonika into free ports, with some measure of technical control, through the U.N. European Economic Commission, of the port facilities and of communications through Greece from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to these ports. The advisability of some kind of international guarantee for the fair treatment of the Macedonian minority in North Eastern Greece might also be considered.

Once Greece had been pacified, re-united and put on the way to making a fresh start, the people of Cyprus should be given the opportunity to decide by plebiscite whether they wished to join the Greek Republic.

Instead of opposing, British policy should favour co-operation between Greece and her Balkan neighbours, and even the ultimate formation within the European Regional Agreement of a South Eastern Federation or Union. It could come into being only in the context of agreement between the Western great powers and the Soviet Union on the desirability of such a development. This is impossible today but would become practical politics in the framework of an overall agreement on the lines discussed in this chapter. For such an agreement would harmonise the major purposes of the great powers and anchor them to the Charter of the United Nations. Within that international framework the small States in Europe, in West and East, could group and combine and assert themselves in a way that is impossible as long as they have to cling to one or other of two vast rival alliances.

THE FAR EAST

Britain began to eclipse herself in the Far East when the Tories appeased Japan in the early thirties. The process went a long way further in the ensuing second world war. Against the background of free Pakistan, India and Burma and the victory of the Communists in China, the British colonial war in Malaya is a rearguard action that may postpone but cannot avert sweeping social reforms and a great advance towards full self-government.

The Dutch and the French are in even worse case in their colonial wars. The Americans have lost the game in China. They have reproduced the familiar West European pattern in Japan of fostering reaction, near-Fascism and the restoration of big business on the one hand, and on the other of thereby creating glaring social injustices and strains that are incubating a Communist-led social revolution. In any case, a united and modernised China is destined to be the great power in the Far East and Japan's days of lording it over her neighbours are ended.

In this situation, British policy in the Far East should be first of all to end the war in Malaya by removing its social, economic and political causes. There should be British recognition of the new regime in China, followed by trade treaties and a policy of friendship and co-operation.

The moment the new China takes her place as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the quasi-isolation of the Soviet Union in that body will be over and a new situation will exist closer to the true purpose of the United Nations. This point is discussed below.

Britain should further use all her weight and influence to oppose and end the Dutch and French colonial wars and to deal with the whole position in Indo-China and Indonesia through the United Nations. We should press in that body for international mediation, including the Soviet Union, China, India and Burma, to bring these conflicts to an end, on terms that would wind up Western Imperialism and substitute membership of the United Nations, with international technical advice and assistance rendered through the appropriate organisations of that body.

Ultimately, these policies should lead to the formation of a Pacific Council and Conference of the United Nations, that would function much on the lines of the European Regional Organisation already described. Its task would be to draw up a reconstruction programme for the Far East, absorbing the surplus economic energies of the United States and guiding them into constructive international channels through the Social and Economic Council, and the auxiliary organisations and Pacific regional agencies of that body. Japan's industrial capacity, for instance, should be harnessed to a programme for developing the economic resources and raising the standards of living of the vast populations of the East. That would be a job big enough to allow ample room for British, West European, Dominion and American trade and capital as well, insofar as they were not in

demand for domestic and for European, Middle East, African and South American purposes.

KEEPING THE PEACE AND SETTLING DISPUTES

The peace-keeping organ of the United Nations is the Security Council, composed of five permanent members (the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China) and six members elected from time to time by the General Assembly. The Security Council takes all decisions of substance by a unanimous vote of its permanent members plus two of the six temporary members. The parties do not vote in a dispute but do vote if they are permanent members, whenever the Security Council has to decide what action to take to deal with an alleged threat to or disturbance of the peace arising out of the dispute. Matters of procedure are dealt with by a majority vote of all the members. But in case of doubt the permanent members must be unanimous in deciding what is or what is not a question of procedure as distinguished from a question of substance.

The way the Charter tackles the problem of collective security against war was hailed as more realistic than that of the Covenant. In a sense this is true.

International sanctions can be successfully applied against a small or middle sized State without disrupting the international community, because an overwhelming superiority of economic and military force can be brought to bear against the recalcitrant by the United Nations. But to attempt to take such action against a world power would merely start a world war in which the United Nations would split into two belligerent camps. That is why, as the British official commentary on the Charter, issued together with the text of that instrument in a White Paper (C.M.D. 6,666, misc. No. 9, 1945), points out. 'It is imperative that the consent of the great powers should be necessary to action in cases in which they are not a party, since they will have the main responsibility for action. Power must be commensurate with responsibility, and it is on the great powers that the Charter places the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.'

This, says the commentary, is the principle on which the Charter is based. It also points out that coercive action against a great power would mean the beginning of a world war and the end of the United Nations.

The United States have always been as strong a supporter of the unanimity rule in the Security Council as the Soviet Union.

In a statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on May 5, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall argued strongly against proposals to abolish the veto on enforcement measures by the Security Council. This, he said, would mean breaking up the United Nations and the world into rival camps preparing for war against one another.

The Senate, he added, would hardly have ratified the Charter if it had not included the unanimity rule where acts of aggression were concerned, because 'we do not want our manpower and our strength committed by a two-thirds vote.'

That is, the U.S.A. would object to being committed to take action that might involve her in war without the concurrence of the U.S. Government. So would Britain, which has actually introduced the unanimity rule into the West European Council of Ministers.

So would the small States. They would not be prepared to be committed to take sides in a world war, which would be the consequence of abolishing the unanimity rule in the Security Council while retaining the obligation of the members of the United Nations to apply sanctions to a state designated by the Security Council as a peace-breaker.

It follows from these provisions of the Charter that the Security Council is paralysed and for all practical purposes non-existent as long as there is deadlock and cold war between its permanent members. That was why the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr Trygve Lie, in his first annual report to the General Assembly, emphasized that it was the prime duty of the great powers to reach agreement and never to cease in their endeavours to harmonise their views.

The various attempts to devise rules of procedure and to improve the Security Council as a guardian of peace have therefore been a sheer waste of time so long as major issues of the peace settlement continue to divide the principal allies. They have indeed often looked more like diplomatic manoeuvres to isolate and 'show up' the Soviet Union than like a genuine endeavour to improve the Security Council. The moment Communist China takes her seat as a permanent member with the Soviet Union the situation will be radically transformed. The futility of reducing the problem to the U.S.S.R.'s real or alleged abuse of the veto power will become apparent, and the need for constant consultation, compromise and agreement between the permanent Council members will stand out clearly.

But the moment the peace settlement issues were taken in

hand jointly by the great powers on the lines proposed in this chapter, the atmosphere would improve to the point where the Legal and Political Committees of the General Assembly could be asked to prepare a report and recommendations on the defects revealed by experience in the way the Security Council works.

Here are some proposals the British Government might put forward for study by the great powers, the General Assembly, and/or the Security Council.

(1) The moment the great powers were within sight of agreement on solutions of outstanding issues in the Far and Middle East, Greece, Germany and Europe, on the lines suggested above, they would already be committed to almost continuous consultation over a wide range of questions, being dealt with on the basis of the obligations and through the machinery of the United Nations. They would therefore not only not object but would find it necessary to 'consult together wherever feasible upon important decisions to be taken by the Security Council.' From this it would naturally follow that 'they would consult together wherever feasible before a vote is taken, if their unanimity is essential to effective action by the Security Council.'

These two recommendations, therefore, made by China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States in a draft resolution submitted on November 26, 1948, to the General Assembly, would almost automatically be adopted by the powers. In this atmosphere and on this political basis, there should further be no great difficulty in reaching agreement on which questions should be regarded as matters of procedure and which required a unanimous vote of the great powers (excluding the parties to a dispute).

The annex to the draft resolution on 'the problem of voting in the Security Council' mentioned above, that was submitted to the General Assembly, contains a long list of such questions.

The second, third, fourth and fifth would appear to be inadmissible, in that they would make it possible to take out of the hands of the Security Council and transfer to the General Assembly questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, without the unanimous consent of the great powers. This would introduce confusion into the peace-keeping system of the Charter, which is based precisely on the over-riding responsibility and powers of the Security Council. It would mean continuing the pernicious system by which the U.S.A. and her satellite Britain could mobilise an obedient clique of

small States to vote resolutions that would in fact serve merely to cover Anglo-American anti-Soviet power politics with the moral authority of the United Nations. This system, as applied to Greece and Berlin, has merely aggravated the issues and tainted the international atmosphere with an almost unbearable stench of hypocrisy.

'The primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is entrusted to the Security Council,' says the British official commentary on the Charter. 'Only that body can initiate action in that sphere. It has been given much greater powers for this purpose than the Council of the League of Nations. And members undertake to act in accordance with its decisions and to supply it with the necessary force to carry them out.'

One of the ways in which the Charter is an improvement on the Covenant is indeed precisely that it does make a much clearer distinction between the functions of the Assembly and the Council in keeping the peace and settling disputes. By trying to treat as an issue of procedure to be settled by majority vote the question of whether or not a dispute being dealt with by the Security Council should be transferred to the General Assembly, the Anglo-Franco-Sino-U.S. draft resolution would in fact re-introduce the confusion and overlapping that existed between the League Assembly and Council and weaken the peace-keeping system of the Charter. In view of the close connection between settling disputes and enforcement action to keep the peace this would further give rise to friction, conflicts of competence and even deadlocks between the Assembly and the Security Council.

But the rest of the long list of questions submitted in the annex under discussion would appear to present little difficulty. In the political context of agreement on the major peace settlement issues on lines necessitating continuous consultation and co-operation, the great powers should be able to reach unanimity on recommending to the General Assembly what matters should be regarded by the Security Council as issues of procedure. Indeed they might well consider that this was a matter for the Security Council itself to deal with, and reach agreement within that body, which would report accordingly to the Assembly.

But the moment the great powers find it possible to consult and reach preliminary agreements with one another on important decisions to be taken by the Security Council, a further difficulty will arise: the permanent members of the League of Nations Council used to meet regularly and keep in constant touch to

adjust their views on the questions before the Council. As a result, the small States who were temporary members often objected that the meetings of the Council were purely formal and held only to rubber-stamp the decisions reached in private by the great powers.

This objection was weakened by the fact that the decisions of the Council had to be unanimous, including the temporary as well as the permanent members. Consequently, the great powers, while reaching preliminary agreement with each other, also had to negotiate with the temporary members so as to be sure of securing the necessary unanimity when the Council met.

This procedure, however, merely extended the objection that the real decisions and discussions took place in the fastnesses of the hotels where the delegations were lodged, rather than at the meetings of the Council. But this objection in its turn was weakened by the use of *rapporteurs*, that is of some 'neutral' member of the Council, who, together with the competent departments of the Secretariat, would get into touch with the parties to the dispute and prepare reports and recommendations for the Council.

However, the League Council was very far from a justice-awarding body. It was a group of governments acting as intermediaries in diplomatic negotiations where questions of power and 'squatting' the interests of important States generally played a far bigger role than the merits of the dispute.

Once the Security Council begins to function as it was meant to do under the Charter – and this will happen only when the great powers have settled outstanding peace treaty issues – the defects of the League Council will make themselves felt even more strongly than in that body. For the Charter was drafted by Foreign Office officials and diplomats of the great powers, who have made the Security Council a body concerned with peace to the almost total exclusion of justice.

To begin with, whereas under Article 15 of the Covenant either party to a dispute could bring it before the Council merely because he wanted to get it settled (in practice it was necessary to prove that all reasonable efforts had been made to settle it by direct negotiation between the parties), a dispute cannot be brought before the Security Council under the Charter by a party except by alleging that its continuance 'is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.' In practice this means that a party, in order to qualify in the eyes of the Security Council, must allege that the other party is endangering

peace. This, of course, is resented and denied by the other party, and so instantly envenoms the dispute. It also throws the whole emphasis of the Council's action on removing a threat to war, with every inducement to attempt a short cut by appeasing the stronger or more bellicose party to the dispute at the expense of the weaker or more peace-loving party. It would put a premium on bad behaviour.

In the second place, the great powers who were permanent members of the League of Nations Council had to secure the consent of all the temporary members to any solutions they proposed. But the permanent members of the Security Council need to get only two out of the six temporary members to vote for their proposals in order to turn them into a decision of the Security Council.

The adoption by the Security Council of the League of Nations Council's use of *rapporteurs* would go only a little way to improve matters. There is a strong case for revising Article 27 paragraph 3 of the Charter, so as to provide that decisions are taken 'by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurrent votes of the permanent members', etc. This would mean that the assent of four out of the six temporary members would have to be obtained in reaching a decision of the Council (excluding, of course, the votes of the parties to a dispute).

The experience of the League of Nations Council showed that there was never any difficulty in getting two thirds of the temporary members to come to terms with the permanent members about a decision. Requiring the votes of four out of the six temporary members in addition to the unanimity of the five permanent members would therefore not make it more difficult for the Security Council to reach decisions. But it would mean that the views of the temporary members, who are elected by the General Assembly according to geographical regions and groups of associated States and therefore represent the whole of the membership of the United Nations, would have to be taken into account. The final result, therefore, would reflect the consensus of opinion in the United Nations and not merely be a diplomatic compromise between the great powers.

A TREATY FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF ALL DISPUTES

But, even with these improvements, the Security Council would still be most inadequate as a body for seeing that justice was done. There should be a British proposal to frame a general treaty for the pacific settlement of all disputes, open for signature

to any member of the United Nations, with or without reservations (and to non-member States on the same terms as access to the Security Council or General Assembly or to the International Court in disputes). This treaty should be based on Article 38 of the Charter, in the sense that the signatories would recognise one another's right to bring any dispute between them before the Security Council under this article.

Article 38 says that 'without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33-37 the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to the pacific settlement of a dispute.'

That is, under this Article it is possible, if the parties agree, to leave out the often irrelevant and embittering consideration of whether or not the continuance of their dispute endangers peace and, if so, who may be responsible for the threat of war, and instead simply to seek the good offices of the Security Council to help them reach a settlement. But, whereas either party under Article 15 of the League of Nations Covenant could in practice invoke this procedure, the parties have to agree under the Charter before they can do so.

The proposed treaty for the peaceful settlement of all disputes would give any party to a dispute the right to invoke Article 38, as the signatories would have consented beforehand to this procedure in the treaty for any or all disputes between them.

The treaty should further provide that the Security Council, when dealing with disputes under Article 38 on a request by any signatory to this treaty, would be assisted by a Permanent Conciliation Commission, the members of which should be men of repute and independent standing (i.e. not representatives of Governments). There might well be provision that the members of this Commission should include nationals of the permanent members of the Security Council. But they would be in a minority on the Commission, and its reports and recommendations would be made by a two-thirds majority on matters of substance.

The reference of disputes in the first instance to a body of this sort, coupled with the use of *rapporteurs* by the Security Council (the Security Council *rapporteur* in a dispute might be co-opted *ex officio* into the Conciliation Commission for the purposes of the dispute), would ensure that justice and not mere power politics and diplomatic expediency would have a chance to influence the settlement of disputes. In this connection it should not be forgotten that the Security Council has the right under

Article 96 of the Charter to request the International Court for an advisory opinion on any legal questions. Article 36, par. 3 of the Charter indeed says that in making recommendations to the parties on how to settle their dispute the Security Council shall take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court.' This gives some assurance to parties to a dispute that any of them can demand that the opinion of the Court be taken on any question of legal rights involved in the case, with a reasonable chance of satisfaction.

In short, the Council would be the political authority in the background, ruling out resort to force, lending weight to the negotiations and recommendations of the Conciliation Commission, and referring legal issues to the Court. But it would rarely attempt itself to settle the dispute by its own direct action.

Finally, the treaty for the pacific settlement of all disputes should include provision for referring to the International Court all matters not otherwise settled within, say, two years of first being referred to the Security Council. This provision would sweep away the distinction between so called 'non-justiciable' or 'political' questions and those classified as 'justiciable' or 'legal'.

But Dr Lauterpacht, in his 'The Function of Law in the International Community', 'Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law' and other works, has proved conclusively that the distinction between 'justiciable' and so-called 'non-justiciable' disputes is purely artificial. It reflects not objective differences in the nature of disputes but the subjective unwillingness of governments to entrust to third party judgement applying the principles of law disputes involving interests that they feel are important. So long as states live in international anarchy and base their relations on power politics, these objections are insuperable. But they will cease to seem important to members of the United Nations regulating their relations on the basis of the Charter and weaving an ever-denser web of common interests between their peoples.

If the proposed treaty for the pacific settlement of all disputes would be divided into chapters, those conferring on any party the right to bring a dispute between signatories before the Security Council under Article 38 of the Charter, requiring a vote of nine members of the Security Council, including the five permanent members and excluding the parties to a dispute, on all issues of substance; and the chapter providing for a Permanent Conciliation Commission to assist the Security Council in

bringing about a settlement, would readily be signed by all the members of the United Nations and could quickly be incorporated in the Charter through revising appropriate Articles.

The chapter providing for the Court as the ultimate and final authority in settling disputes, where direct negotiation, conciliation and the Security Council had failed for two years, should present no insuperable difficulties to the small States nor to Britain, France and Italy.

The United States would be slower to come in. The Senate assented to the U.S.A. accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court for 'legal disputes' (defined in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court) only after practically invalidating it through the provision that the United States Government was to judge for itself whether a dispute was concerned with matters within its domestic jurisdiction, in which case the Court was not competent to adjudicate upon it, even if it came within the categories defined in Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute. One Senator remarked that this, of course, included borderline cases, such as the Panama Canal Zone. It could, in fact, be made to include pretty nearly anything that the United States Government objected at the time to submitting to the Court.

But the moment the Treaty for the Pacific Settlement of All Disputes was opened for signature a powerful movement would spring up in the States for signing it. This movement would grow stronger with every fresh signatory and would in the end carry the day.

The Soviet Union would be the last of all to come in without sweeping reservations, for her accession would depend upon the growth of confidence in the goodwill of the capitalist States or, alternately, in the Court not being dominated by judges from capitalist States. This confidence will gradually appear, partly as a result of improved relations resulting from the settlement of outstanding issues on lines strengthening the United Nations, as suggested above, and partly as Europe and Britain and large parts of Asia go sufficiently far towards Socialism to provide a solid foundation of common interests and aims with the Communist or near-Communist governed third of humanity.

It must be emphasized that it would be idle even to submit these proposals for study through the appropriate organs of the United Nations, until the cold war had ended and the powers were pulling together in tidying up the many loose ends in Asia and Europe. The situation would be ripe for action by govern-

ments only when agreement had been reached or was in sight on the major issues discussed in the preceding pages of this book.

ARMAMENTS AND ATOMIC ENERGY

The toughest problem of all, which is that of the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, including the atomic bomb, the reduction and limitation of armaments by international agreement and the control of atomic energy, will not be ready for action by governments until enough progress has been made, both with the settlement of the issues dividing the great powers and with framing an agreement to make the Security Council more efficient on the lines discussed in the preceding section, to change the present political atmosphere almost beyond recognition. But the study of these problems could be undertaken by the same means and at the same time as the consideration of the ways to improve the Security Council. And in the meantime the economic deadweight of armaments expenditure can be relied upon to provide a continually operating and powerful drag on the race for arms and a standing incentive to seek for ways to end it. This unhappily is only partly true of the United States, where powerful interests rely on the race for arms to stave off a slump and dread the outbreak of peace. But the new Truman Administration cut the requirements of the Defence Department from \$23,000 million to \$15,000 million, and reduced the air force programme from 70 new groups to 48. Although the appropriations have been raised again and the tug of war still continues, it remains true that rearmament hurts more than it helps the great majority of the American people, and they don't like it anyway on political and moral grounds.

Article 26 of the Charter provides that 'in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion to armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council, with the help of its Military Staff Committee, 'shall be responsible for formulating ... plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.'

By Article 11 'the General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.'

This overlapping in the Charter of the functions of the Security Council and General Assembly is an echo of the similar provisions of the League of Nations Covenant. In practice, the United Nations General Assembly, like the League of Nations Assembly, has taken over the whole business of trying to find the basis for an international agreement on the reduction and limitation of armaments, the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, including the atomic bomb, and the control of atomic energy. But, in spite of the comprehensive terms of its original resolution, the General Assembly, on the initiative of the United States, almost at once abandoned any attempt to treat armaments and atomic energy as a connected whole, and instead concentrated on trying to deal with the atom bomb in isolation from the rest of the subject.

It was reasonable and proper that the United States should take the initiative, since she was the sole possessor of this vastly important new weapon. It was not surprising that Britain on this issue too had no policy of her own but merely tagged along behind the U.S.A. The General Assembly ran true to form in providing an automatic majority of States dependent on the all-mighty Dollar, who obediently followed the Anglo-American line.

But the American proposals rested on three fundamental errors that doomed them to failure from the start:

First, the technical error that the atomic bomb is an 'absolute' weapon, capable of rapidly winning a push-button war. This exaggerated view of the military value of the atomic bomb was widely accepted in 1945 and 1946, but has since been generally abandoned.

The practical consequence was to make the whole subject of disarmament appear to be a matter of the all-powerful United States enjoying the monopoly of the absolute weapon, graciously making one-sided concessions to the rest of the world. On top of that the idealism of the brilliant Lilienthal-Acheson report, reflecting the generous views of the atomic scientists, was twisted to the purposes of the cold war in the officially adopted Baruch plan. The report contemplated what was virtually a system of world government on this one issue, based on international ownership and management of uranium and thorium resources everywhere and the international management of all plants producing atomic energy. It was intended that the Soviet Union should form part of this scheme.

In the hands of the State Department and Mr Bernard Baruch, affectionately known as the 'wolf of Wall Street', the plan turned

into simply one more weapon in the arsenal of the American cold war for coercing and putting in the wrong the Soviet Union. It proposed that for a period of years the Soviet Union should supply full information and submit to international aerial surveys and inspection of her uranium and thorium resources and atomic energy plants, as well as handing them over to an international authority with a safe majority for the United States.

Only as and when this majority was satisfied that the process of transfer was complete, would decisions be taken for the destruction of the American stock of atomic bombs. These obligations were to apply all round. But the net effect would have been for the Soviet Union to make a present to the American air force of the information they have hitherto sought in vain about the location of the most important industrial targets in the U.S.S.R., without getting anything in return. For at any moment Congress or the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission, or a new Administration, could on some pretext postpone the carrying out of the American side of the bargain after the U.S.S.R. had weakened and exposed herself by carrying out her side, which she was required to do first.

The technical error that led to trying to deal with the problem of the atomic bomb in isolation from other weapons was aggravated by an economic error. The American scheme is above all concerned with preventing the abuse of atomic energy for military purposes. The U.S.A. has more power generated by coal, water and oil and often made available through electricity, both absolutely and per head of population, than any other community in the world. The ownership of this power is mostly in private hands and has become a vast vested interest of American capitalism, which distrusts and fears the prospect of the development of atomic energy for industrial purposes.

But the U.S.S.R., not to mention China and other countries in Eastern Europe and Asia, is faced with the problem of developing its primary sources of energy so as to provide an adequate volume of power for economic purposes. It is very much interested in developing atomic energy and harnessing it to industry.

The American scheme would subject the building and operation of atomic energy plants by the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Government's plans for economic development, to receiving permission from an international authority, dominated by an American-led majority. Moreover, if this majority were to disagree with the atomic energy part of a Soviet Five Year Plan and the U.S.S.R. did not submit, it could, according to the

Baruch Plan, be treated as an aggressor and subjected to coercive action. In other words, the U.S.A., through its majority on the Atomic Energy Commission, could claim the right to veto essential parts of Soviet plans for economic development and could 'legally' start a third world war against the U.S.S.R. to enforce its view.

This last aspect of the matter draws attention to the third or political error underlying the American scheme adopted by Britain and endorsed by the Anglo-American majority in the United Nations. Articles 11 and 26 of the Charter, quoted above, show a vague realisation of the connection between the maintenance of peace and security on the one hand and disarmament and the regulation of armaments on the other. Article 8 of the Covenant was more explicit on the point. The League of Nations Assembly went further and based its whole work on disarmament on the famous resolution 14, adopted at its third session, that linked together arbitration, security and disarmament.

But the General Assembly of the United Nations has gone ahead with disarmament against the background of the cold war and without any reference to the necessity for arbitration and security. Moreover, it has, on the issue of disarmament, concentrated exclusively on the atomic bomb. On these lines its proceedings have been at best a sheer waste of time and at worst merely another opportunity to foment bad feeling and suspicion between the principal allies in the war, who must be partners in the peace if we are to have any peace.

There is need for a fresh start and a bold and sustained British initiative on broad lines in this field. It should begin by emphasizing the inseparable connection between arbitration, security and disarmament, and between all the aspects of disarmament.

Arbitration, that is, the peaceful settlement of disputes, including both improvements in the working and constitution of the Security Council and the framing of a treaty for the pacific settlement of all disputes, has been discussed in the preceding section of this chapter. It has also been explained that security under the Charter means not only particular arrangements for coercing an aggressor but making a reality of the fundamental principle that the great powers who are permanent members of the Security Council must have enough confidence in one another to be able to adjust their differences by peaceful means and to pursue common aims on the basis of the Charter. Until the permanent Security Council members can agree, the Council cannot take any decision to deal with a breach of the peace.

Once they agree, their combined influence is so overwhelming that the problem of how to use economic or military force to impose respect for the obligations of the Charter will rarely arise and will never present any difficulty.

The confidence between the great powers necessary to enable the Security Council to work and so to provide the missing element of 'security' in the trilogy will be the result of the changes in British policy and of the initiatives for the settlement of outstanding issues, discussed in this and the preceding chapters. It is impossible to say beforehand when matters will have reached the stage where the members of the U.N.O. are prepared to commit themselves to a comprehensive scheme for the reduction and limitation of armaments by international agreement, the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, including the atomic bomb, and the control of these arrangements as well as of atomic energy by international agreement. But the new start should be proposed by the British Government, as part and parcel of the general changes in foreign policy advocated in this book, in a draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly. This resolution should draw attention to arbitration and security, in the sense defined above, as the prerequisites of disarmament, and then put forward the following principles as the starting point for the consideration of a convention or set of conventions on armaments and atomic energy:

First, since it is now generally recognised that the atomic bomb is not an 'absolute' weapon, that can alone decide a war, it should be dealt with as part of a general scheme covering every type of weapon. This would put the subject on the level of bargaining between the U.S.A. and other powers, instead of that of one-sided concessions by the former to a grateful world.

Special attention should, of course, be paid to abolishing weapons of mass destruction and severely restricting essentially offensive weapons such as long-range bombers and submarines, etc. The U.S.A. might undertake to make no more atomic bombs in return for limitations on the size of the Soviet armed forces, reduce the stock of bombs in exchange for reductions in the existing armed forces of other countries, etc.

In the second place, once a code of conduct for the application of the unanimity rule in the Security Council had been agreed upon as suggested in the preceding section, there would be no practical difficulty about assimilating breaches of a convention for the control of atomic energy to all the other disputes or situations which might lead to international friction or the con-

tinuance of which might endanger international peace and security, in the sense of Article 34 of the Charter. The Lilienthal Report points out that infringements of the provisions for the control of atomic energy could not set up any sudden danger to peace. If there were any such danger, it would develop slowly. This is even more true in the light of revised views as to the efficacy of the atomic bomb as a war weapon.

The attempt to introduce majority rule for deciding on coercive action in one particular category of disputes or situations allegedly threatening peace would entail all the evil consequences discussed above for abolishing the unanimity rule on enforcement action in the Security Council. And whereas there is a case, although a bad one, for revising the Charter in this respect, there is no case at all for leaving the Charter unrevised but introducing a 'joker' in the shape of an Atomic Energy Commission claiming the right to usurp the functions of the Security Council and start a world war by a majority vote.

Third, there should be ample provisions for international inspection as well as obligations to provide full information. It is not generally realised that, as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of September 1947 pointed out, 'since the negotiations began fourteen months ago, the Russians have conceded step by step: that international control of atomic energy is necessary, and should include both atomic armaments and atomic power for peaceful purposes; that it should be exercised by an international personnel, having unrestricted access to all mines, plants and laboratories engaged in atomic activities; that the control agency must sponsor international research, and that the atomic energy developments in each country should be subject to a quota system.' The Russians have also accepted the right of an international committee exercising these functions to take its decisions by majority vote, while leaving the question of eventual enforcement action to the Security Council.

The Russians made further concessions in this field in 1948, both as regards international inspection and on the principle that the abolition of the atomic bomb should come before the entry into force of a system of international control of atomic energy. Mr Vyshinsky proposed at the General Assembly that conventions on the two subjects should come into force simultaneously.

Similar methods of control for other forms of armaments will also be necessary. The proceedings of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference give plenty of technical 'tips' on how such methods of control should be organised.

In the fourth place, there should be a definite attempt to relate the level of armaments to political arrangements. For instance, it has been proposed above that Britain, Western Europe and Italy should join with Scandinavia in interpreting the provisions of the Brussels military alliance and the Atlantic Pact as being applicable only to aggression by Germany, or a State fighting in association with Germany. It has further been proposed that there should be an agreement with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe about uniting and democratising Germany and for joint guarantees against German rearmament or aggression. It was also suggested that the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean should be demilitarised and an international force be provided through the United Nations for maintaining peace in the area.

It would be reasonable to ask the powers to scale down their armaments in order to fit these policy arrangements and commitments. We should have the forces necessary jointly to fulfill these purposes and any others on which we agreed through the United Nations. But it should be regarded as a breach of the fundamental principle of the Charter, on which the efficacy of the Security Council as an instrument of peace depends, for the great powers who are its permanent members to maintain forces and armaments for the purpose of being prepared for war against one another.

A German settlement, as suggested in this chapter, would carry with it a settlement of Austria and the evacuation of Western and Soviet forces from these two countries, and consequently of Soviet troops guarding communications through Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. The moment these policy settlements were agreed upon, there should be corresponding cuts in the armaments of the great powers party to them.

In the fifth place, the disarmament convention or conventions should provide for the limitation and progressive restriction of defence budgets. This is a valuable supplementary check on the reality of the limitation of armaments. The experience of the League of Nations showed that it is difficult to compare the budgets of different countries, but quite possible to compare the same country's defence budget from year to year, to see whether it goes up or down. The Armaments Year Book of the Disarmament Section of the League of Nations Secretariat performed this task adequately. On this basis it becomes possible to see from year to year whether the reduction and limitation of

armaments is being translated into the shrinking of defence budgets in the different countries, and if not, why not.

Sixthly and lastly, there must be an adequate supply of information on all the matters relevant to the compilation of an Armaments Year Book and to international inspection and supervision of the way the disarmament and atomic energy control provisions are being carried out in practice.

These are some of the principles that should be incorporated in a draft resolution, submitted, after preliminary discussion and agreement between the great powers, to the General Assembly, in order to form the basis for tackling the whole problem afresh. The real difficulties are not technical or administrative. The experience of the last three years, added to the still pertinent lessons to be derived from the League of Nations in this field, yields ample material for solving almost any conceivable technical or administrative difficulty of this nature. What we are up against are political and psychological difficulties. Rivalry in arms is a symptom of the disordered relations between states and of mutual suspicion and fear.

That is why international agreement on the amount and kinds of arms to be retained and the uses to which they may be put can be reached only as the end product of ancillary agreements on a number of other matters, engendering the desire to have done with the waste and folly of armaments. This means that at bottom the problem of reducing, limiting and pooling the armed forces of the world is inseparable from the process of switching over from competition between rival alliances in the maintenance of the balance of power, to co-operation in the establishment of a system of world government as the common aim of all states, great and small alike.

TOWARDS WORLD GOVERNMENT

In this field, too, there is need for a bold and sustained British initiative, based on a re-assessment of our position and interests in the world in the light of an up-to-date and realistic view of what is happening. This means we must understand that the balance of power game, which has always been deadly, also means, in the conditions of to-day and for the reasons explained in previous chapters, economic bankruptcy and the sacrifice of national independence on the way to the next world war.

We must cease thinking of ourselves as the ex-heavy-weight champ trying to stage a come-back. 'They never come back' is the melancholy rule we should remember. Instead, Britain

should emulate other retired prize-fighters in seeking alternative employment – in this case becoming ‘mine host’ at the World Government Arms, so to speak.

That is, Britain should cease to think of herself as the least of the world powers, trying to play the out-of-date murderous game of power politics under a hopeless handicap. Instead, she should become the leader of the smaller states, anxious to move towards world government through the United Nations.

‘The sense of a common interest of mankind or even the consciousness that such a common interest is possible, would change the face of world politics at once,’ wrote Graham Wallas in *The Great Society*, long before the first experiment in world government. That attempt, embodied in the Covenant, and the new attempt to which mankind is committed in the Charter, represent the dawn of the awareness that a common interest of mankind may be possible.

The Charter is an advance on the Covenant in that it pays a great deal more attention to linking together and promoting the common social and economic interests of the family of nations. In doing so, the Charter registers the advance of the idea of planning in the world since the end of the first world war, when it was rejected, on the initiative of the United States, in favour of returning to pre-war free, private profit-making enterprise as the economic main-spring of society.

The settlements and arrangements discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter would go a long way to harnessing the policies of the great powers to common purposes based on the Charter. They would promote ever closer and more far-reaching co-operation between the members of the United Nations; draw the peoples of the world together in a growing network of common interests and aims; and weave the fabric of a loosely-knit and limited but reasonably efficient system of world government. The effects would be gradual but far-reaching and cumulative.

‘The good citizen observes the law in letter and in spirit,’ wrote Thomas Hill Green in his essay, ninety years ago, on *The Rights of the State over the Individual in War*, ‘not from any fear of consequences to himself if he did not, but from an idea of the mutual respect by men for each other’s rights as that which should be, an idea which has become habitual with him and regulates his conduct without his asking any questions about it. There was a time, however, when this idea only thus acted spontaneously in regulating a man’s action towards his family or immediate neighbours or friends. Considerations of interest

were the medium through which a wider range of persons came to be brought within its range. And thus, although considerations of an identity of interests, arising out of trade, may be the occasion of men's recognising in men of other nations those rights which war violates, there is no reason why, upon that occasion and through the familiarity which trade brings about, an idea of justice, as a relation which should subsist between all mankind as well as between members of the same state, may not come to act on men's minds as independently of all calculation of their several interests, as does the idea which regulates the conduct of the good citizen.'

This passage reflected the belief of the Radicals and Liberals of the last century that the nations of the world would be bound together in peace and amity through free trade. That view rested on the assumptions of a Capitalist economic system that consisted of freely competing small and medium sized 'private' units of production and trade, independent of the power and influence of the State. Instead, competition gave way to combination, to ever larger and more powerful economic and financial units capturing the State from within and wresting it to their interests through policies of economic nationalism (tariffs, quotas, subsidies, administrative discrimination), the search for foreign markets and fields for investment that led to the scramble for colonies, and last, but not least, through the manufacture of armaments.

But the reasoning is sound and applies to-day in the context of planned socialistic economies, co-operating through common membership of the United Nations. Once most of the rest of the world develops planned economies, the capitalist economy of the United States must satisfy its need for expansion and trade through co-operating in international plans such as E.R.P. and those adumbrated in President Truman's reference to American technical assistance in developing the backward areas of the world. Existing arrangements need drastic revision, as explained in preceding chapters, if they are not to end in disaster and possibly even bring on a third world war. But, with the necessary adjustments, a pattern will grow up expressing the interdependence of the peoples of America, Europe, Asia and Africa and giving effect to the idea of mutual aid.

It is out of the social fact of interdependence and mutual aid that fellow-feeling and the desire will grow, until they become politically effective, to regulate the mutual relations of the peoples concerned by discussion and the rule of law. One of the nineteenth century British classics of international law, namely

Westlake's *Chapters on International Law*, points out that 'the cause why any rules of international law exist,' is 'the social nature of man and his material and moral surroundings'. A modern Continental jurist, M. Nicolas Politis, in his *Nouvelles Tendances du Droit International* carries the argument further: 'The cause of international as well as all other law is,' he says, 'the solidarity created by social needs: within every group the existing human relationships give rise to economic and moral habits which become obligatory rules of law so soon as the interested parties become persuaded that they must conform to them and if they do not do so, a state of mind will be produced in the other members of the group tending to the effective enforcement of these rules ... Law is not the emanation of an order nor the manifestation of a will; it is simply a social product, a pure fact that has become conscious.'

What are the practical measures that can be taken to promote the development of the United Nations into a system of world government within which states regulate their mutual relations according to the rule of law, because their overriding common interests have made them 'members one of another,' bound together by fellow feeling, the sense of the brotherhood of man?

The problem is the old one of reconciling the apparent opposites of freedom and order, discussion with effective action. Democracy means government by discussion. An enormous amount of discussion is necessary if new ideas are to be ventilated and tested and if a sense of common interests with other nations is to take root in the minds of Mr and Mrs John Citizen. The people must be brought into the business of organising peace and moving towards world government, for, if the job were left to governments and diplomats, it would never be done.

On the other hand, the purpose of discussions is to end in decisions and the United Nations will expire in ridicule if the member States prove incapable of using it for bold and intelligent collective action.

Let us begin with the machinery and obligations for organising concerted action in the field of social and economic affairs and technical co-operation. The central piece of machinery is the Social and Economic Council, acting as an emanation of the General Assembly. The Social and Economic Council is loosely related to a number of auxiliary bodies comprising different types of organisation and with varying degrees of autonomy.

As the system exists to-day, there is considerable danger that these various bodies will prove too loose and scattered to permit

of transmitting discussion into effective action. Their proceedings can all too easily run out into the sands of endless talk.

At the same time, the basis of discussion is too narrow. The auxiliary organisations are regarded as agencies for co-operation between governments. But at the same time they are subordinate bodies specialising in more or less technical fields. They are therefore manned not by politicians or ministers but by 'experts,' that is permanent officials.

There is a good deal to be said for giving the Social and Economic Council definite powers to decide on conflicts of competence between the different auxiliary organisations, to decide how they are to co-operate when some question is to be studied involving two or more of these bodies; to keep an eye on what they are doing and insist on results, etc. At the same time the budgets for all these bodies should be incorporated in the consolidated budget of the United Nations, voted by the General Assembly, and their secretariats should be amalgamated with the United Nations Secretariat.

In this way the Assembly, which is the Grand Assize of the nations, would be responsible for the main principles and general lines of policy, for which it voted the necessary appropriations. The Social and Economic Council would act as the executive organ of the Assembly, deciding how the jobs resulting from its resolutions should be 'farmed out' among the auxiliary organisations and stimulating, guiding and co-ordinating their activities. The latter, in tackling the job, would be assisted by Secretariats that were part and parcel of the central machinery of the United Nations and under the ultimate authority of its Secretary General.

This would render more coherent and streamlined the technical, social and economic work of the United Nations. But it might further be considered whether there should not be provision for 'functional' representation in the auxiliary organisations, on the lines of the International Labour Organisation, where trade unions and employers as well as governments are represented.* It seems illogical, for instance, that only governments through their Ministries of Transport, and not also world-wide shipping lines, international tourist organisations, the International Sleeping Car Company, the railwaymen's, dockers',

*The I.L.O.'s constitution, based on the assumptions of pre-first-war Liberal economies, need revising so as to fit the circumstances of planned, socialistic economies. Instead of two Government, one employers' and one workers' delegate from each Member State, there should be two Government, two workers' and one managers' delegate (the latter might, or might not, be an employer).

and transport workers' unions etc., should be represented in the General Conference of the organisation concerned with transport and communications.

Associations of doctors, nurses and municipal authorities should be represented in the World Health Organisation.

Chambers of Commerce, Associations of Manufacturers, Co-operatives and trade unions should have a voice in the economic organisation, and so forth.

The early training of new recruits to the Civil Service should include a grounding in the relation of the work of their respective departments to the corresponding organisations of the United Nations. Treasury and Board of Trade officials, for instance, should spend some months studying the work of the Economic and Financial bodies comprised in the machinery of the United Nations. Ministries of Transport, Health and Labour, the Home Office (for matters connected with international control of the drug traffic, suppression of social evils, etc.), should also get some notion of how their jobs at home link on with the world organisation of which their country is a member.

If this were done by international agreement, there should be international study courses in which budding officials from a number of countries would meet and mingle in the course of attending United Nations Conferences and Committees concerned with their work, visiting the corresponding sections of its Secretariat, etc.

It is not sufficiently realised that almost every government department is directly involved in some aspect of the work of the United Nations. The more we base our policy in deed as well as word on membership of the UNO and try to develop it into a system of world government, the more important it becomes that British Civil Servants should have some sense of their relation to their professional brethren in other countries and to our common interests and tasks in and through the United Nations.

Recruits to the Foreign Office, more than any other government department, should be given a thorough grounding in the United Nations. They might spend most of their first year in studying its constitution and working out our own country's position, policy and interests as a member state. They should spend two or three months at headquarters making themselves familiar with every aspect of the UNO in theory and practice, visit some of its main regional and national offices – and do all this as far as possible in association with embryo diplomats from the Foreign Offices of other countries.

The tendency has been continuously to broaden the basis of recruitment to the Foreign Office. At one time the diplomatic corps and the Foreign Office officials were two semi-distinct services. That distinction has long ago disappeared. More recently the Consular and diplomatic services have been amalgamated.

Not only are virtually all government departments drawn into international relations through the United Nations, but the Treasury and the Board of Trade negotiate loans and financial arrangements and trade treaties respectively, thus taking a part almost as important as that of the Foreign Office in foreign affairs.

Finally, the system of selection, superadded to examination, means that an unduly large proportion of the staff of the Foreign Office belongs to the small class that goes to the best public schools and universities and comes out of the top drawer socially. (The Selection Committees are generally dominated by one or two retired diplomats, carrying on the good old tradition and deferred to by their colleagues because of their superior knowledge).

So long as the diplomats of all countries were drawn from the aristocracy and upper middle class and there was a kind of freemasonry between them, it was an advantage to have our diplomats belong to the club, so to speak. But those conditions passed away after the first world war, although the Foreign Office has not yet noticed it. After the second world war, it has become a grave handicap that our diplomatic missions in Europe and Asia are staffed by people no more able to understand what is happening and to get on terms with the new regimes and in tune with the spirit of the revolutionary peoples than a pianist can make a living as a navvy.

For these reasons the present system, by which the Foreign Office stands by itself, should be abolished, and the Foreign Office should be put under Treasury control like the other branches of the Civil Service. Anyone passing the Civil Service examinations would then be allowed to choose the Foreign Office or any other branch of the service in the same way and without any Selection Committee, although of course, certain subjects, like at least one foreign language and international law and relations, would be compulsory for qualifying for the Foreign Office.

In 1943 a reform was passed under Mr Eden's tenure of office which allows senior officials to be retired on a high pension before they reach retiring age, if for any reason they are found unsuitable.

This right should be freely used to get rid of some of the diplomats who have no understanding at all of what is happening in the modern world. More use should be made of men recruited from outside the service and put straight into posts as ministers or ambassadors. This practice has been generally observed in appointing the British Ambassador to Washington and sometimes in relation to Paris. It should be used more widely.

The post of permanent delegate to the United Nations is a political post and should be filled by a supporter of the government. It is not a post for a retired diplomat like Sir Alexander Cadogan.

These are some of the measures that could be taken to break the evil tradition of nineteenth century power politics and anti-Socialist class war in the Foreign Office, and help that institution to catch up with the developments of the last fifty or sixty years. The intelligence, keenness and devotion to duty of Foreign Office officials and diplomats is impressive. They are a fine body of men. But the sort of job that Lord Fisher did at the Admiralty before the first world war needs to be done in the Foreign Office to-day if we are to win the peace.

There is a good case for proposing to the General Assembly that it study the question of converting itself into an inter-Parliamentary Assembly. This was an idea strongly pressed at the time of the formation of the League of Nations. It was first put forward by the Labour Party and the T.U.C., then taken up by the inter-allied Trade Union and Labour and Socialist Movement, and so vigorously urged that it was adopted in a watered-down form in a Foreign Office memorandum on the constitution of the League of Nations and in Marshal (then General) Smuts' famous pamphlet on the League. This was what the Foreign Office memorandum had to say on the matter:

President Wilson laid stress in his Mount Vernon speech on the formation of 'an organised opinion of mankind'. It would seem desirable to establish some body which would serve as a medium for the formation and expression of such a body of opinion. If this is not done the Socialist International which has, as it were, a vested interest in international opinion will cover the same ground with unsatisfactory results. The best expedient would seem to be the institution of a periodical Congress of delegates of the Parliaments of the Members of the League . . . The delegations of this Congress might be chosen by proportional representation from amongst the various parties in the National Parliaments. The assignment of numbers to individual States will be a difficult problem, but . . . in any case it is desirable for educational reasons that the more backward countries should be substantially represented.

The proposal was submitted to the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference in the so-called (Lord Robert) Cecil Plan, an early British draft of the Covenant, in the following terms:

There might be a periodical Congress of delegates of the Parliaments of States belonging to the League as a development out of the existing inter-Parliamentary Union.

The Foreign Office proposal suggested that this rather shadowy inter-Parliamentary body should be set up side by side with the inter-Governmental Assembly and have a purely advisory function. The Smuts pamphlet (*The League of Nations - A Practical Suggestion*) implicitly recognised that to set up two such bodies, representing the same countries and dealing with the same range of subjects, would create confusion. He therefore suggested only one assembly, in which both governments and parliaments would be represented:

There will have to be a general conference or Congress of all the constituent States which will partake of the character of a Parliament in which public debates of general international interest will take place ...

The Conference may be a most useful body and may become a most powerful and influential factor in moulding international public opinion. The League will never be a great success until there is formed as its main support a powerful international public opinion. With that public opinion behind it, it may go confidently forward with its great tasks; deprived of that support, all its power for good will be neutralised and nullified. It is therefore essential that it should create a favourable international atmosphere for its work, that an organised public opinion should be formed in favour of the League and its activities. The enlightened public all over the world will have to be taught to think internationally, to look at public affairs not merely from the sectional national point of view, but also from a broad human international point of view. And the debates periodically taking place in the general conference might well become of immense importance in this great task of forming and educating a strong body of international opinion behind and in support of the League and its work. For the first time in history people will hear great subjects discussed on an international platform, and the narrow national influence of the local Parliament and still more the local press will gradually be neutralised, and a broader opinion and spirit will be fostered.

The representation of the states on such a conference should be viewed largely from this point of view of favourably influencing and educating public opinion in all constituent countries. The Powers should not grudge strong representation to the smaller states as in

any case the resolutions will only be in the nature of recommendations to the national Parliaments. Both the Governments and Parliaments of the states might send delegates, and perhaps even parties could be represented by the selection of members on the principle of proportional representation.

The idea was defeated partly because the United States said it would be unconstitutional for Congress to be officially represented in an international body, and partly because the League of Nations was founded on the principle of unanimity. To-day the situation is different. The U.S. is represented in the International Labour Organisation by Trade Unions and Employers' delegates as well as by the Administration. President Roosevelt's policy, continued by President Truman, was to draw Congress into the making of international policy as much as possible.

Constitutionally, the Administration can enter into international agreements only with the assent of two thirds of the Senate. In practice, the tendency has been to get the approval of both Houses of Congress for most major decisions in foreign affairs, and there is a movement to substitute a majority vote in both Houses for the two thirds majority in the Senate. Clearly if the House of Representatives and the Senate were authoritatively represented in the General Assembly, through a delegation elected by proportional representation by Congress (which would allocate the representation between the two Houses), there would be less trouble in getting the subsequent decisions of the Assembly approved by Congress.

This argument derives additional weight from the fact that the General Assembly is concerned with voting the budget of the United Nations and deciding the principles and general lines of its policy for the coming year, as well as reviewing the record of the previous year. In practice this means that the decisions taken by the Assembly are of direct concern to Congress, which is responsible for voting the U.S. appropriation to the budget of the United Nations.

On the other hand, the Charter has thrown overboard the principle of unanimity (except for the great powers when it comes to enforcement action) on which the Covenant was founded. In particular, the decisions of the General Assembly on important issues are taken by a two-thirds majority and on other issues by a mere majority. The members of the United Nations have therefore agreed to accept decisions of the General Assembly on the matters within its purview even when they are out-voted.

In view of the nature of the General Assembly's functions, its

decisions do not in fact amount to more than recommendations on the general lines of policy to be pursued by the different U.N. organisations in the coming year or by Governments on general issues.

Throughout Chapter IV (articles 9-22) of the Charter, the emphasis is on the General Assembly's right to discuss and make recommendations upon any question. It can decide, in the sense of committing governments, only on such matters as approving trusteeship agreements under the international trusteeship system for colonies; electing non-permanent members of the Security Council, the members of the Economic and Social Council and the members of the Trusteeship Council; the admission of new members to the United Nations (when the Security Council has approved of their application); expelling members (upon the recommendation of the Security Council); and voting the budget.

Special stress is laid upon the fact that the Assembly, in addition to discussing all the past activities of the United Nations, is to consider 'the general principles of co-operation and the maintenance of international peace and security', and shall 'initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of (a) promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification; (b) promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields, and assisting in the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.'

An inter-Parliamentary Assembly would be composed of delegations elected by proportional representation by their national legislatures, with one vote for each delegate and the number of delegates from each country varying according to an internationally agreed scale, running from say fifty in the case of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, to a minimum of three for the smallest states. The method of election would automatically ensure that Government and Opposition would be represented in every delegation in the same proportions as in the Parliament electing it. That is, each government would have a majority in its own delegation and indeed it would normally be expected that the Government majorities in the delegations would include members of the Government and that they would be assisted by their official advisers.

Such an Assembly would be just as responsible as, but more

broadly based than, the present inter-Governmental body. For Parliaments are part of the machinery of government in their respective countries, and members of an international Parliament would speak and act with a strong sense of the responsibilities they would have to face at home when accounting for what they had done or refused to do.

The tendency on most issues would be for something like international parties of the Left Centre and Right to form in the Assembly, as those of like views found each other.

Discussions in such a body would be far more real and representative than in the present Assembly, which falls between two stools, neither having the authority of a diplomatic conference binding governments, nor expressing the voice of the peoples. It would be discussing and voting upon matters which pre-eminently concern the legislative branch of government.

The governmental majority within the delegations would have the choice on any given question between speaking officially in the name of the Government, or semi-officially, expressing the general goodwill of the Government, but making it clear that they must not be held to commit the Government, or wholly unofficially, every delegate speaking for himself or for the international group with which he was associated on that occasion.

For countries like France and the Scandinavian States, that have standing all-party Parliamentary foreign affairs committees, and are in the habit of sending Assembly delegations composed of Parliamentarians of all the chief parties, the change would not be great. The United States, it may be hoped, would see more advantages than draw-backs in the proposal. The British Government might have to swallow the affront of sometimes being outvoted at the Assembly by an international combination including representatives of its own Opposition. But it would occasionally be supported by the Opposition. More often the issues would be general, and the broadly based, truly representative discussions of an inter-Parliamentary assembly would help the Government to decide its attitude and formulate its policy realistically and positively. This book has dealt faithfully with Mr Churchill as the leader of world reaction. But who can doubt that a world Assembly would benefit by his presence and his voice, or that a man like Mr Eden could make a valuable contribution.

The objection may be made that the Western world would be at a disadvantage compared with the Soviet Union and the Peoples Democracies, whose delegates would constitute a solid bloc. This is only partly true outside the U.S.S.R. and the Balkans.

It would in any case be more than outweighed by the advantage of mixing the representatives of the Soviet and other East European Parliaments with their colleagues of other lands and plunging them into the thick of discussion, debate, the joint study of subjects, drafting of reports, negotiating compromises, seeking to promote common interests, etc.

Nothing could more powerfully or quickly contribute to a sense of the interdependence of peoples bound together in a common endeavour for common purposes than this intermingling of the elected representatives of the peoples, working as colleagues on common tasks. The educative and exhilarating effects on those not used to the cut and thrust of vigorous debate should not be underestimated. It is quite easy to acquire a taste for free speech.

On the other hand, the politicians of the capitalist West have a lot to learn from the elected representatives of the peoples of the countries of social revolution and Socialist reconstruction. If democracy is a good thing, then this essay in practical international democracy should do a power of good to all concerned and help the cause of peace through world government.

There are, of course, practical and technical difficulties in translating talk into action in a body of this sort. That is why it would be desirable to try some preliminary experiments, such as the proposed summoning of inter-Parliamentary conferences of the English-speaking peoples discussed below, and the proposed West European inter-Parliamentary meeting discussed above.

The matter should not even be put before the General Assembly for study unless and until these preliminary experiments had proved sufficiently successful to warrant extending the idea. One difficulty, however, may be mentioned at this stage. In an Assembly of some 8-900 delegates, the Speaker (President) would have a difficult job deciding who was to be given the floor. This choice would be easier when the Assembly had sorted itself out into large international groupings. In any case, the Plenary Sessions of the General Assembly are the occasion for the delivering of addresses by a chosen list of orators, rather than for free debate. The real cut and thrust of debate goes on in the committees and sub-committees of the Assembly.

The rule might be made, to start the ball rolling, that groups, national or international, of twenty delegates would have the right to designate one speaker each, and the list should be handed in in time to permit of arranging for all points of view to be represented in the Plenary Session Debate.

Nor would the large number of delegates make the Assembly look very different from the present one, where big delegations are the rule rather than the exception, each group of five government delegates being surrounded by a cloud of advisers and assistants. The Committees and sub-committees are so numerous that they could comfortably absorb the active membership of the Conference.

An inter-Parliamentary General Assembly would be the dynamo and fly-wheel of the whole vast machine of the United Nations. It would concentrate and hold the energies and faith of the peoples and promote the growth of a sense of the common interest of mankind.

These inter-related measures – making the Security Council a justice-awarding as well as a peace-keeping body; establishing international control over armaments and atomic energy; weaving an ever-denser web of common interests between nations; instilling in public servants a realisation of the fact that our national interests are offshoots of these common interests and spring from the same soil; bringing the people into world affairs, functionally through the auxiliary organisations and politically through the General Assembly – against the background of reaching agreement on the outstanding peace settlement issues on the lines suggested above, will not of themselves turn the United Nations into a system of world government. But they will go a long way to harnessing the policies of Member States to that common purpose, and they will release forces that will sweep us all the way into that shining goal.

Whether we learn enough fast enough to head that way is another matter. The only safe prediction at this stage is that within ten years mankind will either be acknowledging that grand aim and steering unitedly and hopefully on that course, or sinking into a new Dark Age after plunging into a third world war; and that British foreign policy can decide whether humanity chooses peace or war, salvation or suicide.

CHAPTER XIV

Why Britain Can Do The Job

Is our position in the world such that a policy on the lines suggested in the last chapter has a reasonable chance of success? Can Britain really give a lead in ending the cold war and the race for arms, achieving agreement with both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and re-floating the stranded United Nations? The short answer is that we must try, for the alternative is to continue the present drift all the way into the third world war.

But there are solid reasons for believing in the success of a British initiative. A survey of the situation reveals the strength of Labour Britain's position, deriving from five main factors.

THE SUPPORT OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS

First, because the policies outlined toward Western Union and the Atlantic Pact, a German settlement and developing trade and friendship between Eastern and Western Europe, Greece and the Middle and Far East, would win Britain the support of the entire European working class. It would reduce the differences on current issues between Social Democrats and Communists on the Continent to the point where the Labour Party could secure the co-operation of both sides. To begin with, it would put an end to the quarrel about the Marshall Plan and American Aid to Europe, for the policy suggested on these issues is one on which both Communists and Social Democrats would prefer following the Labour Government's and Party's lead to remaining intransigent.

When the Government's foreign policy had become one of common sense and conciliation in regard to the Communist-governed third of humanity and the Communist-led working classes of France and Italy, there would obviously have to be a corresponding change on the part of the Labour Party and the Trade Unions of Britain toward European working class parties and Trade Unions.

So far as the Labour Party is concerned, there is only one alternative to the present policy, or rather to the organised hysteria and irresponsibility that passes for a policy, of fighting the cold war with hot air. That is to recognise that, since the Communist or Communist plus Left Wing Socialist political and

Trade Union leadership of the working classes of most of Europe outside Scandinavia, Benelux, Switzerland and the Anglo-Franco-American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria is a fact that has come to stay, for it cannot be exterminated by war nor abolished by abuse and it will not obligingly fade away by itself, the only thing to do is to accept it.

That means adopting the view that the Labour Party is prepared to recognize any party that stands for Socialism and represents the majority of the workers in its own country, and to respect the right of the workers of other countries to adopt whatever type of leadership and whatever solutions of the problems of power and of transition from Capitalism to Socialism that they consider best suited to their circumstances. The only condition would be that the Continental working class parties would likewise recognize the right of the British workers to run their own internal affairs and cleave to the kind of party and leadership that they like best, and would respect the claim of the Labour Party, as representing the overwhelming majority of the organised British working class, to be the sole internationally recognised British working class party.

That would mean in practice that the Labour Party would recognise the French Communist Party and Italian Communist-Socialist alliance, as well as the Communist or United working class parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and would withdraw recognition from the French Socialist Party and the Italian Unity Socialists. The Labour Party would further work for practical co-operation between the Social Democratic Parties of Benelux and Scandinavia and these other working class parties, on issues both of economic reconstruction and political conciliation, on the lines discussed in the last chapter. The Labour Party would also seek both Social Democratic and Communist agreement in Europe on a policy encouraging unity of action, on terms fair to all, between the three working class parties of Germany, as part of the German settlement discussed in the previous chapter.

The big Communist and United working class parties on the Continent in their turn would withdraw recognition from the British Communist Party, respect the right of the Labour Party to do anything it liked about the British Communists, and would both nationally and through the Cominform internationally cease abusing the leadership of the Labour Party (which would exercise similar self-restraint).

The first step would be negative - that is the cessation of

mutual hostilities by pen and tongue. There would be a truce in the verbal cold war now raging between the Labour Party and the working class parties of most of Europe.

The next step would be practical co-operation for limited objectives, arising out of the economic issues we must all face in the perspective of political responsibility and of the interdependence of the interests of Labour Britain and the countries of Western and Eastern Europe alike, which is a very real and important fact.

Ultimately and at some undated future the Cominform and Comisco would both be dissolved and give place to some wider and looser consultative organisation of working class parties, all of whom in the post-war world have become parties of government, faced with the responsibilities of power. They are, therefore, concerned less with ideology and more with the practical problems of raising the standards of living of their peoples and making peace secure than was the case with the parties of the Second and Third Internationals.

The official reason given for the secession of the C.I.O. and the T.U.C. from the W.F.T.U. was that action on the practical problems of trade unionism had been frustrated by the political activities of the Communist-dominated Trade Unions. The real issue was about the attitude to be adopted to American economic aid through the Marshall Plan. This issue would virtually disappear by the adoption of the policies outlined in the preceding chapters, and is in any case temporary, for American aid is scheduled to taper off year by year and to cease on June 30, 1952, and Europe will have to live and the workers of Europe will have to pull together somehow or other after that date, if not before.

On the Trade Union as well as on the political plane, there will have to be first a truce to mutual hostilities, then cautious steps to practical co-operation for limited purposes, and gradually more regular and far-reaching relations that in the fullness of time should produce some form of world-wide association between leading national trade union organisations, ranging all the way from the non-Socialist American trade unions to the Communist trade unions of so much of the rest of the world.

The power and influence of the T.U.C. could be very great if it saw its task as one of standing midway between the two extremes and bringing them together.

At some stage in these developments, the question of what the Labour Party should do about the British C.P. is bound to arise. The big Continental Communist Parties have always been more

interested in getting in touch with the Labour Party than in the prospects of the British C.P., of which they take a pessimistic view, fortified by thirty years' experience.

It is as certain as anything can be in politics, that if and when the Labour Party adopted the attitude of 'live and let live', corresponding to the changes in foreign policy advocated in this book, and as soon as the Continental working class parties had grasped that this was not a case of 'too good to be true' but a real and lasting change in the attitude of the Labour Party, they would respond, cautiously at first but in the end warmly and steadfastly. In exchange for an assurance in which they could believe that the Labour Party had dropped the policy of acting on an international scale as the German Social Democrats acted in the Weimar Republic, and were going to stick to the great principle of international working class solidarity, they would readily abandon the British C.P. to the tender mercies of the Labour Party. But what, if and when that situation existed, should the Labour Party do about the British C.P.?

On the one hand, the changes for which this book has pleaded in the policy of the Government and the Labour Party alike, necessitate a fundamental mental shift and readjustment, not only in our intellectual outlook but in our emotional reactions to the word 'Communism'. It would mean realising that in the West the danger of democracy being replaced by the police state comes, not from Communism, but from fanatical anti-Communism, leading to witch hunts, purges, war preparations and war hysteria. Some form of Fascism and not Communism is the immediate danger. It comes from the die-hard defenders of Capitalism against the endeavours of the Labour Party to lay the foundations of a Socialist society by peaceful and constitutional means that will preserve our traditional liberties. It is the Tories, not the British C.P., that are a serious rival to the Labour Party for the allegiance of the electors and that may even become dangerous to democracy if the advance toward Socialism continues.

In that situation the only safe principle is the old French revolutionary one that the enemy is on the right and that there are no enemies on the left. But that does not exclude the possibility that some of the friends on the left may be the kind from whom one prays God to be preserved.

What that means in practice is that the Labour Party should stick to the workers and refuse to be stampeded into the Capitalist camp, as have so many Continental Social Democratic

Parties, by anti-Communist hysteria. Labour should be against witch-hunts and purges and should not be afraid of letting Labour folk consort for common purposes with men and women of other parties in such bodies as the British Soviet Society, the University Labour Federation, the Haldane Society, etc.

But at the same time the Labour Party should be hard-boiled and realistic about what it wants and about insisting that it gets satisfaction on terms commensurate with the relative importance of the Labour Party and the British Communist Party.

There is already very nearly unity of the British working classes in and through the Labour Party and its allies, the trade unions and the co-operatives. Complete political unity can be achieved only in and through the Labour Party. The Labour Party has the right to lay down the terms on which it will admit new members to its ranks. Those terms, since the Labour Party's Constitution was revised in 1946, exclude the collective affiliation of any politically organised nation-wide body. That means that for the British Communist Party the price for entering the Labour Party is to dissolve as a party, and for the ex-members of the British C.P. who wish to apply for admission to the Labour Party to do so as individuals untrammelled by political affiliations to any outside body or group and prepared to accept the principles, policy, constitution and rules of the Labour Party.

Obviously, in the present atmosphere any such solution is not desired by either side and is outside the sphere of practical politics. But on the assumption that the changes for which this book pleads are necessary and will therefore sooner or later be made, because there is no alternative but disaster, the time will come when the problem just stated will have to be faced.

At that time it will be up to the Labour Party to make it as easy as possible for the Communist Party to wind up its existence and for its ex-members to come into the Labour Party on terms compatible with the Labour Party's constitution and the survival within the Labour Party and for the purposes of the Labour Party of various publicity and educational enterprises and activities, such as the *Daily Worker* and the *Labour Monthly*. A section of the Communist Party might refuse the terms offered. In that case, with no international backing, it would soon dwindle to the obscurity of the Socialist Party of Great Britain or the I.L.P. or Common Wealth, all of which still exist on paper.

The process of assimilating and digesting the new recruits would, no doubt, be accompanied for a time by internal rumbles in the Labour Party. Perhaps in some cases it would have to

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emulate the example of certain birds, who regurgitate the indigestible parts of their meals – in this case the horns and hoofs and excessively hairy chests, as it were, of some of the new comrades. But the net result should be a refreshed and invigorated Labour Party, with no more True Blue rings under its eyes and a flush of deeper pink in its cheeks, denoting more robust health and less susceptibility to the seductive appeal of the Tories.

But, although it is necessary to mention these possibilities, because they will be in the minds of many readers, it must be emphasized that what has been said about the future course of the Labour Party with regard to the Communist Party is mere speculation and music of the future. The Labour Party today has a clean-cut, although negative policy towards the British Communist Party, based not only on emotionally violent anti-Communism, which is deplored by many members of the Labour Party, but on solid and realistic considerations, such as that there is no room for more than one working class party in Britain nor for another political party within the Labour Party, and that any kind of political alliance or association with the Communist Party would be an electoral liability and not an asset to the Labour Party. It is a hard and indubitable fact that the political sex appeal of the British Communist Party is emphatically negative.

There is no challenge within the Labour Party from extreme right to extreme left to the realism of these political considerations. Nor is there any disagreement about the view that the British Communist Party is not a first nor even second class factor in British public life, and that therefore the question of the Labour Party's attitude towards it is neither urgent nor important.

But what is overwhelmingly urgent and important is to call off the cold war and restore some kind of mutual understanding and co-operation between the Labour Party and the great working class parties of Europe. For just as it is impossible to govern post-war Britain without the full confidence and co-operation of the workers, so neither France nor Italy can effect their economic recovery nor can Western Europe get on her feet, or Germany be restored, unified and made safe for democracy and peace, without the workers of those countries. The workers are a mighty power in post-war Europe. They are indispensable to the reconstruction of Western Europe and they are, through their Trade Unions and political parties, running Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and building Socialism with all their might.

They are not doing it in ways that would suit British conditions and are no doubt guilty of mistakes and excesses even in terms of their own circumstances. But they are there and they are doing the job. To treat them as enemies means encompassing the common ruin of us all. Labour can and must learn to treat them as friends and allies on terms compatible with our and their dignity and rights and yielding not an inch in our preference for our own ways nor in our belief in the value of what the Labour Party is doing in Britain, not only for our own country but ultimately for all mankind.

BRITAIN THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN WESTERN EUROPE

In the second place, British policy is the decisive factor in Western Europe. It is admitted in Washington as in Paris, Rome, the Hague, Brussels, Copenhagen, Oslo and Stockholm that, without the fullest British support, Western Union would collapse and the whole enterprise of trying to build up Western Europe would be in ruins.

Even with Britain pulling all her very considerable weight on the side of American policy, it has proved impossible to push Sweden into the military alliance tying Western Europe to the U.S.A. France, like Benelux, is intensely worried about the American policy of reviving Capitalism and militarism in Western Germany. The French national tradition, which for half a century was the keystone of French foreign policy and accepted by all parties, of an alliance with Russia against Germany, is not dead. Not only the Communist third of France but a good deal of anti-Communist Conservative-nationalist French opinion believes that their country can be secure only if it is allied with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe against a renewal of German aggression and that France to-day is being sacrificed by Britain and the United States to Germany.

In Italy, too, there are many far outside the Communist-Socialist and left wing Republican Democratic bloc, which polled one-third of the votes and represents about nine-tenths of the workers and trade unionists, who want to go back to the Italian national tradition of sitting on the fence and not being tied up with either combination of great powers against the other.

In these circumstances a British lead on the lines suggested would have a twofold result. First, a British declaration that we would in no circumstances consider ourselves committed by the Atlantic Pact or any other treaty to fight the Soviet Union because the United States engaged in war with that country, on the

ground that any such commitment would be contrary to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, would knock the bottom out of the policy into which France and Italy have been unwillingly dragged by the joint efforts of Britain and the United States. Second, with the collapse of that policy and with the resulting new situation, not only the working class third of France and Italy, but a large section of the supporters of the present governments would find the British alternative policy and the British lead irresistible.

Even if they did not immediately line up with Britain on this policy, they would most certainly not join with the United States in opposing it. They, who have hitherto been to the left of Britain in international affairs, although to the right of Labour Britain in home affairs, would find Labour Britain well on their left and the whole of their own working class and parties of the left on the British side. In these circumstances, the first instinct of the present French, Italian and Benelux Governments would be to work for some kind of constructive compromise between the new British policy and the old policy of the United States. Nor would it be long before there was a shift to the left in the governments and parliamentary majorities of those countries.

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

In the third place, the policies suggested in the last chapter would discover enough common ground with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (not to mention the new China, which as a permanent member of the Security Council is destined to play an important part not only as the great power of the Far East but in world affairs) to make agreement possible. There will be hard bargaining, for many of the proposals described will seem for various reasons to be risky and undesirable to the Soviet Government and they will be reluctant to enter the various auxiliary organisations of the United Nations, to supply information and generally to take the full part through the United Nations in international co-operation that is implied by dealing with the issues of the peace settlement on the lines suggested.

There is nothing in the proposed solutions incompatible with British interests as seen by the Labour Party and set forth in the foreign policy on which it fought the General Election. For that very reason there will be not only common ground but differences, not always easy to adjust, between British and Soviet views as to how to settle these questions.

It would probably be necessary for Britain to go three-fourths

of the way in conciliation and to understand the other side better than it can be expected to understand us. That is partly because our type of free democracy is better training in the art of putting oneself into the other fellow's shoes and seeing his point of view. But mostly it is because the issues on which settlements are to be negotiated arise not so much out of the conflicting policies of governments as out of the necessity to accommodate ourselves to the advance of social revolution in Europe and to national emancipation in Asia. The main concern of the Labour Party as British Socialists should be to do all that is in our power to help these vast changes to take place as painlessly and smoothly as possible, to shorten the period of violence and intolerance and to safeguard legitimate British interests, of which the two greatest are food for our people and peace for the world.

But although the task of reaching agreement with the countries of the social revolution will not be easy, it can be tackled with every prospect of success the moment the Labour Party and Government make up their minds to take a Socialist and not a Capitalist view of the British peoples' interests abroad and of what is happening in the world. For on that basis there is common ground between Britain and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China, broad enough and strong enough to serve as the foundation for enduring peace between us, with all that that implies in terms of mutually advantageous co-operation and friendship.

BRITAIN AND THE U.S.A.

In the fourth place, Great Britain is of decisive importance to the world policy and position of the United States and the relations between the English speaking nations have reached the degree of civilisation where war between them has become unthinkable and the settlement of all their differences by discussion and compromise is taken for granted.

Take the latter point first. It is one of the brightest facts in a somewhat gloomy world that Great Britain, the Dominions and the United States, thanks to a common language and tradition and the similarity of our institutions, no longer feel toward each other wholly as foreigners. In the United Kingdom the tendency is to over-emphasize the 'Britishness' of the Dominions, for each Dominion is a separate nation although there is a common British citizenship and a degree of fellow-feeling that amounts to a form of wider patriotism. On the other hand, it is too little realised how much Britain and the Dominions have become

mixed up with the United States as the result of the war, and that this association is likely to become ever more intimate and far-reaching, not by deliberate government action but by the mere force of events and the march of time.

In practice, this means that, however sharply the two governments may disagree, there will always be minorities in each country agreeing with the other fellow's point of view, and larger minorities who will consider it a duty to put the other country's point of view fully and fairly to their own public opinion and to try to find how the two can be adjusted so as to end the disagreement. There will always be a majority in both countries insisting that every difference must be adjusted by discussion and compromise.

The former point, namely Britain's vital importance to the U.S.A. in world affairs, cannot be too heavily stressed. American world policy stands or falls by British support. If Britain, for instance, refuses to be committed to go to war on the side of the United States and denies the use of British territory for American forces and bases in peacetime until the two countries reach agreement on the principles of their foreign policy, the bottom is almost literally knocked out of the 'Be tough with Russia' policy.

'The British are in a position to exercise a good deal of veto power on American policy,' writes John Gunther in *Inside Europe Today* (quoted *New York Herald Tribune*, Paris edition, February 14, 1949). 'Obviously, it would be very difficult for the United States to undertake a war if the British did not fight with us.'

The whole strategic plan of the United States is based on the assumption that British manpower and territory will be at America's disposal for the asking, or even without asking if the U.S.A. plunge into war without consulting Britain. A British 'No' would transform the world situation.

If the U.S.A. were to cease her programme of exports under the Marshall Plan, because Britain and Western Europe took their stand on the Charter of the United Nations and showed they wanted and could make peace with the U.S.S.R., she would precipitate the slump which is so dreaded from the White House down to the humblest American home in the United States. The Administration and Congress taking any such evil and foolish step would put themselves in an impossible position before American public opinion.

In short, the United States cannot retire into isolation for she

has become too much mixed up with the world and American powers of production have outgrown the Western hemisphere, and she cannot carry on her present policy without full British and West European support. British defection alone would be decisive – and would carry with it that of Western Europe, as well as setting up tremendously powerful currents of opinion throughout Europe and the United States in favour of the changes in policy proposed by Britain.

Against this background we can estimate the true value of the strange argument used by supporters of Mr Bevin's foreign policy that

(a) American aid to Britain and Europe is pure charity given for disinterested motives and any suggestion that it is mixed up with self-interest is blasphemous and wicked.

(b) But if Britain dares to take a line of her own, on what she believes to be a matter of vital interest, our charitable American friends will bankrupt and starve us.

The two halves of this argument contradict each other. Both are nonsense. The argument is indeed a typical appeaser argument – like the one about our not daring to stand by the Covenant by applying oil sanctions on behalf of the victim of aggression, Abyssinia, because the British Navy could not stand up to Mussolini's mighty and irresistible fleet, and the pretence that the Labour Government could not honour its election pledges to the Jews of Palestine and must appease the British-made and armed Arab League at any price, or the whole of the Middle East would be in flames.

The people who advance such arguments sometimes really believe what they have been told, but mostly produce them because they cannot avow their real motives. In this case, the real motive is that the Foreign Office hate and dread the outbreak of peace with the Socialist third of humanity, and would rather land Britain in a third world war than see agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. The crypto-war mongers cannot tell the peace-loving British people that they don't really want to try to end the present tension because they like it better than paying the price of peace. And so they explain that Britain cannot even attempt to make peace, for the United States will not allow it.

The ultimate logic of that argument is that we must conscript our youth and hand it over to Uncle Sam as cannon-fodder in a war that will destroy us and smash civilisation, not because we think it is right but because we do not dare to disagree with

American policies we believe to be wrong. Blood for spam! The argument has merely to be stated in clear terms to show that it is as morally disgusting as it is intellectually imbecile.

The great and comforting truth is that the American people want peace and are being kidded just as badly as the British people. The American people are being 'sold' the return to the balance of power, the race for arms, the 'be tough with Russia' policy and the great American strategic plan, on the grounds that these things are necessary to defend the free peoples of Western Europe from the wicked Communists.

The fact that the free people of Sweden have resisted considerable pressure to be defended and protected by the United States, because they feel safer on their own, has made a slight dent in the befogged minds of good Americans. They are familiar with the phenomenon at home of gangsters 'selling protection' to unwilling shopkeepers by threatening to dynamite their premises if they don't pay to be protected. American 'defence' policy looks more and more like Uncle Sam trying to sell protection to Western Europe, Britain and Scandinavia. If we refuse to be scared, say we don't need to be defended and protected, and tell Uncle Sam to relax, U.S. public opinion would soon be de-bamboozled and turn against any rough stuff to *make* Europe accept American protection.

There would be a great rift in the murky cloud of propaganda and the light of truth would shine through if the British Government turned round and said that, because it wants peace and because it believes in the values of democracy and Western civilisation, it refuses to be committed to policies of anti-Communist intervention and anti-Soviet preparations for war. It is of the opinion that the democratic belief in reason and good will applies to Anglo-American relations with the countries of the social revolution as well as to their relations with each other and with Western Europe. And like the Swedes and the Swiss the British people is prepared to take the risks of this belief and rejects the risks of intervention and power politics.

If on top of that the British Government put forward a positive policy for solving outstanding issues on lines that would heal the breach between East and West, give life to the United Nations, and give democracy and freedom a future in Europe and Asia, the effect in the United States would be enormous.

Finally, if it then transpired that Britain could in fact reach agreement with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the new China on the lines suggested, and was equally ready to negotiate

with the United States on the basis of the new view of Britain's vital interests and position in the world and to seek accommodation between American, Russian and British views in terms of our common membership of the United Nations, the effect would be decisive.

The moment American intervention in China broke down, there was a swelling chorus of voices in the United States, pointing to the common sense necessity, in the interests of the American business man looking for foreign markets for trade and investment, to come to terms with the new China. All sorts of redeeming features were discovered in the Chinese Communists, after the attempt to assassinate them had finally failed. No one doubts that the collapse of the policy of backing Chiang Kai-shek will be followed in due course by a policy seeking ways of implementing in China President Truman's offer of assistance to economically backward nations, i.e. to reopen the Chinese market to American business and finance.

Similarly the changes in British policy proposed in this book would not lead to a cessation of American economic aid (the greater part of which will, in any case, have already been given before those who advocate these changes can hope to influence public policy). What they would do would be to revive the idea of economic aid without political and military strings, which was so popular in the U.S.A. in late 1946-7 that Secretary of State Marshall's famous speech at Harvard University launching his plan was couched in the language of Henry Wallace rather than that of the Truman Doctrine.

By 1950 too the power of the planned economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to produce food and raw materials to British specifications in return for British industrial goods will be considerable and capable of rapid expansion. If we gear our economy to acting as an economic connecting link between East and West Europe, and between both and over-seas countries, including particularly the Commonwealth and Empire, it would be physically impossible for the United States, even if it were psychologically conceivable that the American people would stand for any such policy, to exert decisive economic pressure on Great Britain to make her conform to a war policy and give up her attempt to make peace.

In short, as regards the United States, a bold British initiative would raise a tempest of discussion on both sides of the Atlantic and lead to hard bargaining in Washington and London. But there would be no threat of economic rupture that could not

be resisted with the aid of a large part of American opinion. In the end there would be an agreement in which concessions would have to be made to the American point of view as well as to that of the Soviet Union, but where the two would so often cancel each other out that the British line would generally appear as the lesser evil, accepted by both parties, for the sake of compromise and because it would end the drift to war.

THE NEW START

Let us suppose that the contents of this book and the views of those alarmed at our foreign policy are widely enough discussed, that the international deadlock becomes sufficiently painful and wearisome, and that so many Parliamentary candidates successful in the General Election are pledged to a new start on the lines suggested, that when the Fourth Labour Government comes into office, it will decide to take the initiative in making peace.

The first step would be a memorandum to the Cabinet, analysing the world situation and Britain's position and interests in the world and drawing clear-cut conclusions about the alternatives between which we have to choose, the choice we must make, and the principles and main lines of the policy that follows from that choice. The Dominions would have copies of this document as approved by the Cabinet, and would of course be kept fully informed and consulted at every step of the way.

Then would come a speech in the House by the Foreign Secretary, based on the memorandum as approved by the Cabinet, announcing as a bedrock principle of British policy that we were taking our stand on the fundamental principle of the Charter, which bids us trust the will to peace of our permanent fellow members of the Security Council to the point where we do not feel constrained to prepare for or contemplate the possibility of war against any of them and are confident we can settle our differences with all of them by peaceful means. As by Article 103 of the Charter its obligations must prevail over any other treaty obligations, we were bound to interpret the Atlantic Pact, the Brussels Treaty and any other international agreement subject to this fundamental principle of the Charter. That ruled out any commitment to fight either on the side of the United States against the Soviet Union or *vice versa*, and carried with it the belief in the absolute necessity of reaching agreement with both by the means prescribed in the Charter and of never ceasing in our endeavours until such agreement had been reached.

This publicly announced, firm and irrevocable decision of the British Government would change the whole international situation. The speech making it would of course go on to give an outline, in very general terms, of the kind of settlement of outstanding issues in the Far and Middle East, Greece, Germany and Western Europe for which we would work.

This would be followed by very full private explanations, for the information of their governments, to the French, Soviet and United States ambassadors in London. The analysis of the world situation and of our own position and interests, which the Foreign Secretary had submitted to the Cabinet before facing Parliament, as the justification for the new policy, should be communicated to them in a suitable form.

After that would come a visit to Moscow to reach an over-all tentative agreement with the Soviet Union, after the ground had been prepared through diplomatic channels. In coming to terms with the Soviet Union, it is necessary to deal at the top, that is with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary on the one side, Stalin and Molotov on the other. The United States would, of course, be kept informed through the American Ambassador in Moscow about the progress of the talks. So would France.

But, whereas there have been innumerable Anglo-American meetings in Washington, London, Paris and elsewhere, there has never yet been an Anglo-Soviet talk on any important political issue. We have dealt bilaterally with the Americans, triangulary with the Russians. The British Government must claim and exercise the right to seek to bring together Soviet and British views just as freely and intimately as Anglo-American views.

Having made up our minds, without seeking the approval of either Washington or Moscow, to take our stand on the Charter in relation to both, the rest would really be a matter of the consequential changes in British foreign policy. The Moscow talk would disclose how far the Soviet Government were prepared to accept the basis of settlement of outstanding issues considered reasonable by the British Government and what concessions they were prepared to make in return. There could be no final agreement on some matters at issue pending subsequent negotiations with the United States. But at any rate the British and Soviet Governments would be able to narrow their differences on all points and to reach complete agreement on some, thus providing the basis for the subsequent three-or four-power negotiations. The mere fact that the next stage in the British Government's political pilgrimage would be Washington would

put our negotiators in Moscow in a strong position, because the Russians would be anxious to make concessions rather than to leave gaps in Anglo-Soviet understanding that would continue the, as they see it, one-sided and dangerous Anglo-American line-up.

After Moscow would come a visit to Washington, where the ground would already have been pretty thoroughly prepared, not only by the constant flow of official information but by the tremendous public discussion that would have broken out ever since the initial speech of the Foreign Secretary announcing the new position the post-election Government had adopted in world affairs.

In Washington, Britain's bargaining power would be greatly strengthened by the united support of the European working class and large sections of American opinion, by the tentative agreement over a wide range of questions reached with the Soviet Union, and by the simple fact that, as the United States could neither carry on alone with their 'be tough with Russia' policy nor retire into isolation, they would have no alternative but to seek accommodation with the British Government.

Then would come a preliminary Four-Power meeting in Paris or London, followed by a full-scale Peace Conference to thrash out remaining differences and embody the resulting agreements in treaties and arrangements, settling the outstanding issues and making a new start in world affairs.

In the context of the Fourth Labour Government's and the Labour Party's new policy and attitude towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it should be easy to encourage fuller and fairer press reporting on both sides, more unofficial visits and, above all, contacts between working class parties and trades unions. But essentially the dealings would have to be between government and government at the top level, for public opinion in the countries of the social revolution does not exist as an independent force in the same sense as it does in the West (although the effect of the favourable reception that a British move on the lines indicated would receive in the press and radio of these countries should not be under-estimated).

On the other hand, one of the great advantages in Anglo-American relations is the importance and the 'inter-penetrability' of public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. There should be every encouragement and facility for the press, for exchanges of opinion by broadcasting debates and talks, for visits, for every kind of contact at every level of official and private opinion.

In this connection, it is to be hoped that the British Parliament would either directly, or perhaps with the benevolent assistance of the Canadian Parliament, arrange for an inter-Parliamentary Conference of the English-speaking nations at a semi-official level to be held, if possible, in London, but, if Congress preferred, in Ottawa. The delegations should be elected by proportional representation by their legislatures. That of the United States would naturally be considerably larger than that of Great Britain, which, again, would presumably have more delegates than any of the Dominions. The subjects for discussion would cover the whole range of questions arising out of our relations to each other and to the rest of the world, with particular reference to current issues. If the experiment was successful, it might be the starting point for similar meetings every year or two years.

These are the ways in which the peoples could be brought into the picture and take a hand in the business of making peace. This is how public opinion could be roused and informed, and its representatives given every incentive and chance to find out for themselves what is happening and to share in shaping decisions, as the best way to dispel the miasma of fear and drive out the bogeys and banshees of anti-Bolshevism and fear of war with which men's minds are haunted in our day and age.

Last but not least in the appraisal of the factors that make Britain's position strong and hopeful in the post-war world are the qualities of the British people and the high regard in which they are held by most of the rest of the world. One of the saddest things about the melancholy tale of Labour Britain's failure in world affairs has been the squandering of the treasures of good will accumulated by the heroism of the British people in the gruelling years of the world war.

Tory foreign policy had brought us low before the war. But the way we fought alone and Mr Churchill's war leadership more than redeemed the national honour and put us high in the hopes and affections of the peoples struggling to be free. Those hopes flamed up with Labour's victory. The warmth of the friendship with which Labour M.P.s were greeted throughout Europe in 1945 and 1946 was deeply moving. Mr Bevin has changed all that.

But bitter as the feelings of disappointed friendship have grown - often, of course, for reasons unfair to the motives and difficulties of British foreign policy, but nevertheless understandable - there is an abiding faith among the workers of

Europe in the fundamental rightness of the British workers. There is a deep belief that sooner or later they will stretch out the hand of friendship again to their comrades on the Continent. There will be no hesitation to grasp it when it is extended.

In the United States, too, not only Britain's war effort but the tremendous struggle since the war to put our house in order and make ends meet has met with generous sympathy and earned deep respect in the United States for the British people and the Labour Government.

The U.S. Department of Labour and Mr Thomas K. Findletter, the representative in Britain of E.C.A., have paid striking tributes to Britain's recovery effort, the economic and social policy of the Labour Government and the part played by the Trades Unions in the production drive. 'The United Kingdom is a shining example of a country which is using the time gained by the subsidy for a prodigious, almost ruthless, effort to adjust itself to the fact that it is much poorer than it was, and must learn to live accordingly,' writes Walter Lippmann (*New York Herald Tribune*, Paris edition, January 1949). 'The British have a doggedness, a cheerfulness, a self-reliance and, above all, an instinct for essential unity and an instinct for survival that put the people of almost every other nation to shame' (John Gunther, *New York Herald Tribune*, February 14, 1949).

Intelligent supporters of the present American foreign policy, like Mr Walter Lippmann, have explained often enough that if Britain chooses to back Socialism in Germany, the United States cannot do much about it, for the forces British support would release would be too strong to resist. And, if the U.S.A. pushed Labour Britain too hard, the result would not be to bring the Tories to power but to compel Britain in self-defence and in order to cope with the necessities of the resulting situation to become much more hard and militant in her Socialism than is the case to-day. 'Certainly, if E.R.P. should stop, the British economy would suffer a terrible set-back,' writes John Gunther in the article just quoted. 'I heard it said by British experts that it would probably necessitate the installation in Great Britain of a totalitarian economy, which might in turn produce political dictatorship.' Mr Lippmann and others have made the same point.

There are, of course, plenty of Americans who have no use for any kind of Socialism and regard it as merely a half-way house to Communism, which they in turn identify with unlimited evil, horror, tyranny, Soviet expansion and aggression, anti-Christ,

red ruin and the breaking up of laws. They are powerful in the upper reaches of society and in the Administration and Congress.

But the kind of people who gave President Truman his majority in the 1948 election are prepared to accept the view that Labour's brand of democratic Socialism is the British version of the American 'New Deal' and 'Fair Deal', and appreciate to the full the determination of the Labour Party jealously to preserve Britain's ancient liberties and traditions of tolerance and respect for minorities and the rights of individuals.

Physically it would no doubt be easier for either the United States or the Soviet Union than for Great Britain to transform the world situation by taking the initiative. But that kind of leadership need not be expected from either of the two ideologically muscle-bound giants. They are at the opposite poles of the conflict that is dividing humanity.

Britain has to be more international than either, for we cannot live alone and we depend on the tranquillity and prosperity of the outside world to a higher degree than either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. In the difficult art of living in society, the British people have led most of the world for many generations, and that political sagacity and experience should stand them in good stead to-day.

We have common interests and common points of view with both the Capitalist Western Democracies, led by the U.S.A., and the camp of the social revolution, building Socialism and determined to achieve democracy. Somehow or other the courage and common-sense, fair-mindedness and steadiness, the friendliness and reasonableness of the British people, who by their exertions are saving their country, must inform and transform British foreign policy so that it will set an example that saves the world. That is why Britain can do the job. It can be done only under Labour rule because the making of peace has become inseparable from the building of a Socialist Commonwealth.

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